6.1. iTSCi in a regional smuggling framework

Although it was designed by the mining industry, iTSCi is part of a regional governmental framework aimed at curbing contraband minerals in the African Great Lakes Region. This framework aligns with the conflict-free mineral policy narrative, following the idea that Congolese minerals finance violent conflicts (Autesserre Reference Autesserre2012). To improve the security situation in eastern DRC and to contribute to state-building, improved transparency in trading 3 T (and gold) is expected to cut the assumed ties between mining, violent conflicts and the involvement of warmongers in the mining business.

In pursuit of this aim of greater security, efforts to address mineral smuggling have been implemented at the regional and domestic levels. This first took shape in Lusaka, Zambia on 15 December 2010, when 11 presidents of member states of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) signed the Lusaka Declaration of their Special Summit to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region. In November 2013, the ICGLR created a regional anti-fraud committee. A first meeting of this committee was held in Kinshasa on 17–18 April 2015, gathering ICGLR's state agencies in charge of dealing with fraud and mineral contraband across the member countries. Additionally, on 20 October 2010, the DRC's government created a national commission against mineral contraband (decrees no. 0719/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2010 and no. 140/CAB.MIN/INT.SEC/2010) and iTSCi has also been expanded to neighbouring countries, namely Rwanda (June 2011) and Burundi (May 2014).

6.2. Anti-smuggling provincial measures

In Katanga and South Kivu, addressing smuggling has been an official priority of the provincial governments since the end of 2009. In October 2009, the governor of Katanga, Moise Katumbi Chapwe, raised administrative charges to US$5 per kg on the transit of cassiterite and its by-products, including coltan, from the Katanga province to any other province. This measure aimed to discourage the sales of Katangese minerals to other provinces, such as South-Kivu. Similarly, on 15 August 2013, Marcellin Chishambo, the governor of South Kivu, raised the frais rémunératoires, a tax paid by licensed négociants, from US$0.20 per kg to US$3 per kg of coltan and from US$0.01 to US$0.50 per kg of tin (decree no. 13/030/GP/SK). Although it was also intended to control contraband minerals, the main purpose of this measure was to increase provincial tax revenues from mining.

The above measures, combined with a ban on mining activities in North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema from September 2010 to March 2011 (Geenen Reference Geenen2012) and the prominent role of the Katangese policy network in establishing the iTSCi (Diemel & Cuvelier Reference Diemel and Cuvelier2015: 154), led iTSCi to expand to Katanga in 2011 and has been the most concrete initiative implemented in 3 T mines. By the end of 2014, iTSCi was being put into action in 471 mining sites in eastern DRC, including 232 located in Katanga. As a result, iTSCi has made a huge contribution to improving the 3 T trade by making it more transparent. Before iTSCi, Spittaels (Reference Spittaels2010: 17) notes that ‘the comparison of data [between northern Katanga and South-Kivu] suggests large-scale smuggling. Statistics from the Mining Division in Kalemie show 30 tonnes of coltan shipped from Tanganyika to the Kivus in the first three months of 2010’. Yet, from 2011 to 2013, 1,000.53 tonnes of coltan (mainly extracted in the three study sites) and 15,561.99 tonnes of tin were exported from Katanga (Diemel & Cuvelier Reference Diemel and Cuvelier2015: 158). According to the 2014 report from the division des mines, Kisengo alone produced 284 tonnes, officially exported from Kalemie by Mining Mineral Resources (MMR), a trading house that had been established by an Indian business in 2010.

6.3. Trading coltan under iTSCi

By 1 April 2011, iTSCi had transformed the coltan mining areas of Nyunzu and Kalemie from free spaces where négociants purchased coltan independently into ‘enclaves of regulations’. These refer specifically to closed spaces (the mining areas) where iTSCi ‘procedures and organisational structures’ (Olivier de Sardan Reference Olivier de Sardan2015: 1) of the coltan market are applied. Practically, iTSCi worked closely with trading houses (such as MMR) and mining cooperatives (Wakenge & Hilhorst Reference Wakenge, Hilhorst, Hilhorst, Weijs and Van der Haar2017), which provided financial and technical support to miners and négociants (Figure 1). Although these trading houses and cooperatives had entitlements over 3 T mines (i.e. mining titles or trading licences), they could only purchase coltan under iTSCi regulations. For instance, iTSCi field staff divided each mining area into sectors, subsectors and sites composed of several tunnels (chantiers), allowing them to establish selling points (postes d'achat) within each site. No minerals from another site could enter into a site or be traded there. iTSCi field staff monitored, on a daily or weekly basis, the sale of coltan under iTSCi's ‘tagging and bagging’ system. In the mines, the iTSCi system consists of putting tags on bags with minerals and data recording on iTSCi log books. iTSCi staff also helped civil servants in the division des mines to record mineral statistics. The cooperatives’ staff collected mineral loads and proceeded to the ‘remise’, an operation consisting of handing over the mineral loads to the trading houses’ counting office where the minerals were processed and bagged again, before being exported to the international market. All of these measures were meant to break up the existing networks of the informal coltan trade.

Figure 1.

iTSCi's role in the coltan supply chain. Source: Primary data collected in 2013–2014.

iTSCi has faced criticism. From its inception, it has been an externally driven intervention led by ITRI. Moreover, according to some observers, iTSCi has not totally eradicated informal mineral trafficking and failed to address problems associated with illegal taxation in which elements of the Congolese army were involved (Global Witness 2010). Other studies point out that iTSCi has been a technical solution to complex problems of the mineral sector. IPIS (2012: 38) for instance, argues that, not only has iTSCi disrupted local livelihoods, but it did little to improve social and environmental standards and, in a certain way, has even become a source of discrimination between powerful and less powerful economic actors sourcing minerals under the mantel of the ‘tagging and bagging’ system.

6.4. Addressing smuggling under iTSCi

By 2011, iTSCi had made significant strides towards addressing smuggling. First, iTSCi field staff monitored the ‘tagging and bagging’ of coltan. They also completed ‘incident reports’ related to four categories of practices: (i) cases of smuggling and issues related to ‘tagging and bagging’, for instance mistakes in data recording; the loss, damage and disappearance of tags; or recording higher than accurate weights for parcels of coltan; (ii) acts of corruption; (iii) acts of harassment, such as illegal taxes; and (iv) acts of insecurity and human rights abuses committed against miners, négociants or other people by any entity in a position of authority.

‘Incidents’ involving smuggling were repeatedly reported. However, these reports were ‘confidential’ and kept secret. In the eyes of iTSCi field staff members, this secrecy prevented them from confronting people who were directly or indirectly involved or suspected to have caused these ‘incidents’. In 2013, the Nyunzu-based iTSCi field coordination office completed approximately 20 incident reports monthly, of which 5–7 concerned smuggling. In 2014, there were only four reports on smuggling. This indicates an important trend towards a reduction in smuggling coltan.

Reporting and addressing ‘incidents’, including those involving smuggling, followed three steps. Reports were first sent to iTSCi senior staff members in Kalemie or Lubumbashi. Then, these senior staff members contacted and eventually called in state officials or senior staff members of the mining cooperatives and trading houses, asking them to address those ‘incidents’ in which their staff members were allegedly involved in cooperating with hiboux, dishonest mineworkers or mine-based négociants. The senior staff could then suspend them, warn them or terminate their employment.

Smuggling was also addressed during meetings of the follow-up committees (Comité Local de Suivi, CLS), which were created at the instigation of iTSCi. Gathering staff members from iTSCi, the trading houses and cooperatives, together with miners’ representatives, négociants and state officials, the CLS were held monthly in either Nyunzu or Kalemie. However, CLS meetings were often delayed for financial reasons or because many participants were unavailable. iTSCi staff reported that:

Addressing smuggling also aligned with legal requirements. According to Congolese mining law (Art. 300–303), smugglers are to be arrested, the smuggled and intercepted minerals are to be sold, and the amount earned is to be deposited into a national treasury bank account. In Nyunzu and Kalemie, no cases were documented in which the smugglers were arrested (iTSCi Field coordinator 2014 int.). Rather, public prosecutors’ departments seized parcels of coltan and sold them to trading houses, which ‘tagged and bagged’ them according to the iTSCi system. However, the profits from these sales were embezzled by the representatives of the public prosecutors’ departments (Civil servants c 2013 Int.).

Overall, iTSCi has clearly been an important mechanism to counteract smuggling. However, in the view of some miners and mine-based négociants, iTSCi field staff members’ work had an accusative character. Négociants working for the Cooperative des Artisanaux Miniers du Congo (CDMC) stated:

Hence, iTSCi was not perceived in a positive way, especially in terms of addressing smuggling. The sentiment expressed by the négociants above also reveals fears about the consequences of total transparency in fully embracing the iTSCi system. This also confirms that (international) policy, as well as humanitarian and development interventions, can generate unintended outcomes. Their rules, norms and principles are re-interpreted through interactions among various social actors (Dijkzeul & Wakenge Reference Dijkzeul and Wakenge2010).

7.1. Vragage

Examining the practice known as vragage, it becomes clear that the belief that the coltan business can be perfectly ‘cleaned’ is inaccurate. Etymologically, vragage comes from vrac, a French term meaning something left in a jumble. Similarly, miners and négociants used the term vrages to refer to fake minerals, worthless stones (sometimes called fausses matières or faibles matières), and the by-products of coltan or similar minerals, such as tin, which were often used for cheating or smuggling.

Basically, the vrages were found only in certain places. They entered into the coltan mining areas through two main sources. First, the hiboux transported vrages from often remote 3 T mines in northern Katanga, mostly those where iTSCi was not yet implemented or had been suspended, making it difficult for cooperatives to operate. In reality, iTSCi was not implemented in all areas, because certain mines faced a depletion of minerals, were less productive or the coltan produced there had a low concentration of tantalum (e.g. Kilunga). In collaboration with drivers or local motorbike transporters, the hiboux concealed parcels of vrages on trucks, in the reservoirs of motorbikes, in oil drums, and in sacks of charcoal and maize that were brought into coltan mining areas.

Second, vrages came from the maman muturuse, a group of women who processed coltan before it was sold by mineworkers at the selling points. After heating the coltan, the maman muturuse separated the genuine coltan from the by-products. The latter were rarely thrown away, leading people to believe that mineworkers and négociants used them afterwards as vrages.

Selling vrages was cleverly organised. This process took place in private houses or in the bush rather than at iTSCi selling points. Many hiboux had local clients – predominantly miners or mine-based négociants. They were not chosen by happenstance. During many informal conversations with the hiboux, they noted that their clients were not only linked through economic relationships (Hiboux a 2014 Int.). Rather, their ties were, in one way or another, kinship and/or trust-based (Hart Reference Hart and Gambetta1988).

These clients fulfilled various tasks and used the vrages for diverse ends. They were able to inform the hiboux about the evolution of mining activities, the current coltan prices and the local security situation – for instance, the places where the mining police had erected checkpoints. Clients purchased vrages themselves and also helped the hiboux to sell them to other mineworkers or to mine-based négociants. In the second half of 2013, one kg of vrage cost around US$15 in Kisengo and Kahendwa, approximately half the price of genuine coltan set by CDMC and the Cooperative Minière Maendeleo, which was US$40 in Kisengo and US$28.80 in Kahendwa.

Vrages were also used for mineral-producing ends and coltan trade. Mineworkers introduced vrages into their chantiers during the production phase. They mixed these vrages with the mineral sand found there to inflate the site's productive potential. Mineworkers also mixed vrages with the coltan sold to négociants. In addition, sous-couverts (lower-level mineral buyers often appointed by négociants at selling points mostly on the basis of trust relationships) used vrages to augment the quantity of minerals purchased and introduced these vrages in the purchases of négociants. This implies that négociants also used vrages before they handed over their parcels of minerals to the cooperatives (and these to trading houses) who were thus losing out. Even though the vragage was prohibited by iTSCi, none of the informants in this study denounced it.

Three explanations account for why vragage took place. First, this practice stemmed from the local organisation of the coltan market, which provided strong incentives for cheating and price evasion because of the monopoly of certain actors like MMR, who set prices of coltan that were continuously contested by mineworkers and négociants (Wakenge & Hilhorst Reference Wakenge, Hilhorst, Hilhorst, Weijs and Van der Haar2017). Also, given the limited production of coltan, the largest coltan trading house and cooperative – MMR and CDMC – did not purchase tin in Nyunzu and Kalemie; consequently, tin was mostly used as a vrage in these territories. Additionally, iTSCi was the only reform initiative implemented in the areas, and mining activity continued in those areas where iTSCi did not expand or was halted, as it was in Kilunga. However, mineworkers in these areas had no one to sell to unless their mineral or their vrages were purchased by hiboux who were capable of marketing them elsewhere, for instance in the Kahendwa or Kisengo mines.

Second, cheating and the smuggling of vrages resulted from the management policies of most trading houses and cooperatives. As mentioned above, there were significant variations in the prices set for coltan between and within the mining areas, depending on the concentration of tantalum. For instance, in late 2013, the price variation between Kisengo and Kahendwa approached 30%, pushing many mineworkers, local négociants and hiboux to search for promising market opportunities in Kisengo.

The third explanatory factor for the use of vrages is their role as a source of income. Négociants reported:

All three reasons for vragage indicate that people have room to manoeuvre with cheating or smuggling coltan.

7.2. Hiboux

The relatively uncontrolled nature of the coltan trade can also be seen when looking at the smuggling activities of the hiboux. These clandestine négociants either operated through local antennes or moved to coltan mining areas from other mining areas, urban cities or other provinces (e.g. from South Kivu to northern Katanga). Of the 11 hiboux followed in the present study, 9 operated through antennes who were their close relatives. The other antennes were people with whom the hiboux had collaborated for years. Both groups built up their relationships gradually (Geenen Reference Geenen2016: 113–16). Given the hiboux’s mobility, dispersed throughout the study area and using local connections, it was difficult to estimate how many hiboux there were, or how and when they formed their networks. Utas (Reference Utas2012: 10) has argued that networks of conflict economies are important to analyse but hard to pin down with precision. At the end of 2013, the Kisengo police station estimated that around 21 hiboux were smuggling coltan in Kisengo alone (PMH chief and ANR staff members 2014 Int.).

Although the trading houses, cooperatives, state agencies and mining police treated hiboux as illegal mineral buyers, the hiboux regularly visited coltan mines and their adjoining villages. Mine-based négociants of Kisengo and Mai-Baridi who worked for CDMC made the following comment: ‘When we see some faces of people known as hiboux coming to the mines, we guess that coltan prices have increased somewhere’ (Négociants a 2014 Int.). In addition, four hiboux noted:

Together, the above statements suggest two interesting elements. First, coltan mining areas were not virgin territory for many hiboux; rather, locally based négociants, their antennes and hiboux know each other well. They not only had economic exchanges but were also embedded in ‘networks of social relations’ (Granovetter Reference Granovetter1985: 490). Such social relations between traders have been documented earlier in the DRC. In their study on trade networks between Congo and Paris, MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga (Reference MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga2000: 16) showed that networks are more than conduits for economic transactions and emerge when people have long-term and recurrent relations.

Both in and out of the mines, the hiboux were involved in two types of activities. As discussed in the previous section, they first marketed vrages. They also smuggled coltan. This was ‘untagged’ and escaped iTSCi regulations. During their purchases, the hiboux offered higher prices than the trading houses and cooperatives as a means of attracting clients. For instance, in October 2013, when the price of coltan was US$28.80 per kg in Kisengo, hiboux offered to purchase it for US$35.50 per kg (Miners a 2013 Int.). This variation led mineworkers to wonder ‘why do hiboux never experience bankruptcy?’ (Miners a 2013 Int.). This question implies that, although they cooperated with them, many mineworkers also believed that the hiboux were better off and that these hiboux reaped higher benefits from smuggling than the income the mineworkers earned.

Coltan smuggling also flourished because of variations between prices set in mining areas and those found in the black markets of northern Katanga and South Kivu. In February 2014, one kg of coltan cost US$37.50 in Bukavu, US$44 in Uvira and US$34 in Kalemie. Each of these prices exceeded that set in the mines, which ranged from US$28.80 to 40 in Kisengo and Mai-Baridi. Price variations contribute to flourishing black markets, feed ‘broader patterns relating to cross-border smuggling’ (IPIS 2012: 35) and sustain shadowy commercial networks characteristic of the Great Lakes Region economy (Vlassenroot & Perrot Reference Vlassenroot, Perrot and Utas2012). In Uvira, many hiboux said on several occasions that they travelled to Bujumbura for ‘business’ (Hiboux c 2013 Int.), implying that they also traded minerals, especially coltan at higher prices than in northern Katanga and South Kivu.

The hiboux used various means to transport smuggled coltan out of the mining areas. According to inspectors at the division des mines in Kalemie and civil servants at ANR in Misisi and Uvira (Civil servants a 2013 Int.), hiboux used either commercial trucks or motorbikes and transported their parcels mostly by road to Kalemie or via Misisi to Uvira or Bukavu. Some parcels were transported to Uvira by boat from Kalemie. Regardless of the itinerary, the parcels were sometimes divided into small packages and then transported at various intervals (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Smugglers’ routes. Source: Adapted from De Koning (Reference De Koning2010: 2). - - - - - Vrages’ routes; Coltan smuggling routes.

Finally, the hiboux negotiated their passage with civil servants in the areas where they travelled. When asked whether they feared being arrested, several hiboux interviewed in Uvira remarked:

Clearly, the hiboux were experienced in negotiating with the civil servants appointed to curb the trade of contraband coltan. Similarly, in their study on taxation at a border crossing between South Sudan and Northern Uganda, Twijnstra et al. (Reference Twijnstra, Hilhorst and Titeca2014) found that norms and rules were constantly re-negotiated between traders and local state officials.

7.3. Cheating in dealings with the hiboux

Cheating and smuggling practices were not only used to breach iTSCi regulations. They were also used against the hiboux themselves. In coltan mines, many hiboux operated within a web of actors. They had antennes to recruit other mineworkers and mine-based négociants or sous-couverts to purchase vrages or to allow them to smuggle coltan. These actors and their social networks formed what can be seen as close social cartels based predominantly on either kinship, friendship or other trust-based relations that allowed them to develop and maintain their economic transactions. Locally, there were therefore many different cartels. This may explain why condemnation of misconduct related to vragage or smuggling coltan rarely occurred in the study area.

Nevertheless, as Rubbers (Reference Rubbers2009) argues about trust relations, social proximity among Katangese traders does not exclude suspicion, nor does social distance between them necessarily prevent trust.

In fact, smuggling was a two-way street. Within the cartels, miners and mine-based négociants also duped the hiboux. Instead of selling them genuine coltan, they also sold them vrages or other kinds of fausses matières. In the eyes of the miners and the local négociants, many hiboux were well off. They were convinced that the hiboux had the opportunity to sell smuggled coltan at better prices, were richer than they were and were exploiting them. Miners and local négociants viewed hiboux as ‘big men’ and often said that the Hiboux, na Muhindi (Indian in the Kiswahili language), bote ni bamwizi tu [meaning that hiboux and expatriate staff of MMR, predominantly from India, who were working for the company, were all stealing from them] (Miners b 2013 and 2014 Int.). This wording suggests that, although their objectives were not the same, mineworkers and négociants often viewed hiboux and MMR staff as similar groups. At the same time, although social networks were useful, relationships between mineworkers, négociants and hiboux were of subtle ‘conniving trust’. Although they could cooperate with the hiboux, miners and négociants were also able to deceive them. Cheating against the hiboux was not perceived as bad behaviour. Instead, the miners and négociants viewed this as an act of resistance against a group of hiboux who exerted control over the coltan black market and were probably exploiting them. This is further illustrated in the following account.

In Kalemie and Uvira, the first author met, on several occasions, four hiboux to whom mineworkers and mine-based négociants had sold vrages (fausses matières). These hiboux said that this happened regularly. The first author then asked them whether, despite being deceived in this way, the hiboux planned to travel to the mines and were willing to continue their ‘clandestine’ trade. The hiboux confirmed their intention to continue going to the mining areas and to maintain collaboration with their antennes. Additionally, they stated that they knew the mineworkers and négociants who had deceived them and were convinced that these persons would provide them with an in-kind reimbursement in the form of genuine coltan. Later, interviewed hiboux explained that:

This statement shows that the social networks in which mineworkers and mine-based négociants participated played a key role in this ‘economy of cheating’ against the smugglers.