Sayed Khatab has written a long overdue book. The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyyah discusses Qutb's political thought based on the ideologue's own Arabic writings from 1925 until his death in 1966. Khatab focuses on Qutb's theory of jāhiliyya, eloquently and thoroughly providing the reader with an in-depth analysis of the term. For most of us—scholars, Arabs, Westerners, and in particular Muslims—jāhiliyya essentially means pre-Islamic Arabia. For Khatab, based on Sayyid Qutb's understanding, jāhiliyya no longer translates as the “state of ignorance” that refers to the Arabs before Islam. In Qutb's view, jāhiliyya is not “a period in time, but a condition that is repeated every time society veers from the Islamic way whether in the past, the present or the future” (p. 8). Khatab's contribution should tempt scholars of Islam to reassess their understanding of the term and give the concept a broader discernment.
In Chapter 2, the author discusses what pre-Islamic Arabs meant by jāhiliyya and how the meaning changed after the rise of Islam. The author suggests that in pre-Islamic Arabian literature the term did not exist. Jahl, however, was used in pre-Islamic poetry to convey several meanings, most of which contradict, the author adds. The term meant lack of knowledge, rejecting knowledge, denying the truth, arrogance, and foolishness. However, after the advent of Islam, early Muslims used jāhiliyya to refer to the status of the Arabs before Islam (i.e., chaos, barbarity, and lawlessness).
According to Khatab, “the concept of jahiliyyah in classical (pre-Islamic) Arabic cannot be used as a point of reference to discuss the concept jahiliyyah manifest in the Qurʾan” (p. 21). In pre-Islamic Arabia, for example, the word jahl could mean ummiyya (illiteracy), among other things. In the Qurʾan, however, jāhiliyya is the antithesis of sovereignty. Thus, for the author, jāhiliyya does not automatically mean the society that existed before Islam; rather, according to the Qurʾan, jāhiliyya can be attributed to any society that abandons Islam whether in the past, present, or future. Furthermore, the term has nothing to do with “lack of knowledge” or “illiteracy.” The pagan Arabs were knowledgeable about the message of the Qurʾan, but they denied it. Because they denied the truth, the Qurʾan refers to them as jāhilūn, the ones who turned away from Islam. Therefore, as the author points out, the term jāhiliyya in the Qurʾan is not antithetical to knowledge, but it is antithetical to the concept of the sovereignty of God. Thus, “the Qurʾan presents the idea of jahiliyyah in contrast to the idea of Islam” (p. 24).
The author also discusses the lexical origins of the term jāhiliyya (this chapter might be of interest to students of the Arabic language and its grammar) and expressively explains the roots of the word and its various usages in the Arabic language. For this discussion, the author cites a number of linguists who have analyzed the term, as well as examining its use in the Qurʾan, where the term is applied several times.
In the remaining chapters, the author discusses Sayyid Qutb's intellectual life and character and the development of his jāhiliyya theory between 1925 and 1966. Khatab divides Qutb's writings on jāhiliyya into four stages. The first stage took place between 1925 and 1939, when in early writings the concept of jāhiliyya begins to develop in Qutb's thinking. Qutb did not explicitly use the term jāhiliyya; however, jahāla, the synonym of jāhiliyya, was mentioned. Khatab here is attempting to refute claims that Qutb's theory of jāhiliyya was the product of the harsh treatment he received from Nasser's regime in the 1950s or that he borrowed the concept from Abu al-Aʿla Mawdudi and Abu al-Hasan al-Nadawi, whose works became available in Egypt in the mid-1950s. The author states that “recent research has found nothing to support such a claim” (p. 59).
Furthermore, he argues that the term jāhiliyya was present in the Qurʾan and Arabic literature, and it is more likely that Qutb, who was well versed in these sources, adapted the concept from them. Thus, for Khatab, the concept of jāhiliyya in Qutb's thought was not a product of the 1950s but started to develop in his early writings in the 1920s and 1930s. In the last three stages of Qutb's writings (1939–66), the term jāhiliyya occurs several times to refer to deviation from Islamic law. Qutb labeled Egyptian society as jāhiliyya because it replaced Islamic law with Western and secular frameworks. According to Khatab, Qutb's “jahiliyyah is a comprehensive concept that can exist in any sphere of human conduct, in any society where Islamic law is not implemented” (p. 137).
I highly recommend this well-researched book to scholars and students of Islamic studies and political Islam. I agree with the author that to date there has been no in-depth study of this important concept. Thus, this work is a welcome contribution to the field.
