In her monograph, M.-L. examines the fundamental ethical question about actions performed contrary to the agent's better judgement, and the reason why Socratic moral intellectualism persists in ancient ethics. M.-L. focuses on theories by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and their ways of retaining the doctrine. Despite their critical attitude to the doctrine and modifications they have to offer to it, they still keep its main principle, consisting in the Socratic paradox that no one does wrong willingly.

In the introduction, M.-L. reconsiders some contemporary ethical theories that seek to explain challenges of moral choice and responsibility by means of a faculty of will. In particular, she examines the problem of akrasia Footnote ¹ (Aristotelian term translated as ‘lack of mastery’, ‘lack of self-control’, ‘incontinence’), usually brought by discussions of the ‘weakness of the will’. M.-L. questions the value and credibility of the concept of the will, and suggests that the conflict of the soul can be examined without hypothesising the will as a faculty. M.-L. evaluates the progress of moral intellectualism in ancient philosophy without making use of the concept of the will.

Chapter 1, ‘Plato and Soul in Conflict’, reconstructs Plato's position as an intellectualist reading of human action. The chapter opens with the discussion of the Socratic position that is usually summarised as ‘moral intellectualism’, where the evil finds its origin in the ignorance of the one who commits it. Moral intellectualism is based on the following theses: (1) no one does bad willingly; (2) virtue is a science or knowledge, vice is a form of ignorance; (3) the good is the fundamental object of moral knowledge (p. 29). M.-L. shows that Plato adopts this position as a starting point, and then his theory of action undergoes an evolution. While in Protagoras all the forms of vices are absorbed in amathia, the ‘maximal ignorance’ (p. 37), starting with the Republic, Plato seems to separate from this ‘aggravated’ ignorance certain vicious modalities: stasis, ‘discord’ (Republic), diaphora, ‘disaccord’ (Sophist), diaphônia, ‘discordance’ (Laws) (p. 53). Notably, he isolates the absence of self-control, akrateia, which on its own can constitute a source of motivation for a bad action. Thus, from Protagoras to the Laws, Plato supports an intellectualist position regarding the persistence of the Socratic paradox, with its implication that it is impossible to act virtuously without knowing the good. Therefore, the object of moral knowledge is the Good. However, all kinds of bad actions cannot be reduced to the same ultimate model, namely, that of rational failure. Reason itself cannot be reduced to a purely informative and static faculty. In Gorgias Plato identifies this dynamic version of rationality as boulèsis, ‘wish’, ‘aspiration’, ‘rational desire’. He considers a wide range of forms that can fall under this concept, where the failure of reason is explained by the insufficiently mastered knowledge. Plato's final amendment to the intellectualist position is his consideration of how characters or dispositions (hexeis) can be influenced by physical and social determinations, though the soul's vulnerability does not imply the agent's total lack of control.

In Chapter 2, ‘Aristotle and the Question of Akrasia’, M.-L. maintains that akrasia in Aristotle is portrayed differently from the modern ‘weakness of the will’. The incontinent, akratès, is someone whose decision (prohairèsis) to do good leaves room for an excessive appetite or violent passion (p. 155). Akrasia constitutes a problem for ancient moral psychology: it proves that, in order to act justly, knowing the good is not sufficient; one must also succeed in self-mastering. In Book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses two ‘categories’, hekôn (on one's own accord, voluntarily) and akôn (despite oneself, reluctantly), to discern, classify and evaluate human actions. Aristotle strays away from Socratic intellectualism showing that moral hexis (habit) in the soul is acquired by èthos (practice) (p. 237). M.-L. argues that Aristotle reverses the Socratic paradox that no one does wrong willingly. The epithumia (appetite) or pathos (passion) can make knowledge inefficient, without implying its total absence. On the contrary, this possibility of knowledge makes the agent responsible. The ‘desiring soul’, orektikon, is not the ultimate driving force of acting. Aristotle suggests alternatives to Plato's sources of motivation. Appearance of boulèsis, determined by the thinking agent, logistikon, but localised in the orektikon, authorises some operations that irrational animals or young children are incapable of performing. Neglecting these capacities makes the vicious or acratic agents responsible for their moral mistakes or lack of self-control. Human nature has potentiality that it must develop by study, exercise or practice. Moral education requires formation of critical abilities. Not only does becoming virtuous require fortifying the desire to imitate good people by repeating their acts, but that also involves learning to formulate one's own moral judgements.

In the last chapter, ‘The Stoics and the Quartered Mind’, M.-L. addresses the Stoics’ conflict of the soul. Their monistic psychology prohibits the reduction of the soul to the intellect. Therefore, one should apply the concept of moral intellectualism to the Stoics with caution. Rejecting theories that label Stoicism as a kind of ‘naive intellectualism’ (p. 289), M.-L. argues in favour of the concept of ‘rational monism’. The Stoics adopt certain theses of Socrates’ intellectualism: the theory of virtue as science, the idea that doing wrong is committed by ignorance of the good, the association of the pathos with an erroneous judgement. But contrary to Socrates, the Stoics explicitly postulate the conflict of the soul. They treat the febrile soul as torn between different erroneous and weak judgements which make the soul oscillate between different possibilities of action (p. 482). The Stoics believe that to be subject to passions is human (p. 299) but pathos is ultimately inferior to logos. They hold the agents responsible for their actions and for subjecting to passions and rejecting the reason voluntarily: thus Medea, who yields to her insanity, is solely responsible for her crime. Stoic monism prohibits division between the order of desire and the order of reason, where boulèsis secures the transition between the two in Plato and Aristotle. However, the notion of boulèsis is present in Stoicism as voluntas, where the Latinisation of the term creates additional difficulties (pp. 357–410). Boulèsis is considered a reasonable inclination to act, which, in its most restrictive version (in Cicero), is attributed to the sage only. Revisiting the Socratic tradition, M.-L. concludes that the Stoics’ rational monism, due to their unique theory of passion, weakens moral intellectualism (p. 316).

One issue to which I would like to draw attention is that M.-L. considers economising the concept of the will suggesting that ‘the weakness of the will’ does not have any proper motivation or value. According to M.-L., the Greeks should help resolve the question without unnecessarily introducing this ‘psychic double’, or the will, the concept arguably ‘more postulated than actually found or demonstrated’ (pp. 10–13). These bold claims are made in the introduction only. I would like to see M.-L. return to them and explain how ancient intellectualism can solve the specific problems raised by Davidson, Frankfurt and Elster mentioned in the beginning of the book, especially provided that, as M.-L. correctly notices, the Greeks considered evil differently from the modern perspective (p. 17).

The monograph is a welcome addition to the discussion of problems in ancient moral philosophy, and will be of interest to both specialists in ancient ethics and modern moral philosophers, who might find it challenging to reconsider the questions of moral freedom and psychic conflicts, without necessarily positing a faculty of the will.