In this book N., a former serving officer in the Royal Australian Navy, sets out to explore the nature of sea power in archaic and classical Greece, both at Athens, from which most of the evidence comes, and also as far as possible in other Greek states and poleis. N. adopts a broad definition of the topic, covering not just power exerted through navies but also the exploitation of the sea for strategic purposes in all its forms. In the introduction N. follows modern doctrine in dividing naval operations into three main categories: military, diplomatic and policing, which he prefers to call constabulary. Their relative importance over the period in question is demonstrated by the useful database that closes the volume and devotes sixteen pages to military, three to diplomatic, but only a single page to constabulary.

N. lays out the essential background in three chapters. In the first he surveys the practical limitations and determinants of sea power in ancient Greece, such as the geography of the mainland and the surrounding islands, which made the sea so important to the Greeks (length of coastline, mountainous interior, paucity of navigable rivers), and environmental factors, which were generally predictable but could be restrictive (tides, currents, winds). Following J. Beresford in The Ancient Sailing Season (2012), N. challenges the old orthodoxies about the practicality of sailing in winter and accepts that there was never a period when the sea was completely closed to navigation. He rightly argues that, while merchant vessels were sturdier, winter navigation by warships was still possible if it was necessary. A risk factor that he does not take into account is that a warship such as a trireme normally had a crew of 200, which would make the loss of even a small squadron a significant catastrophe for any polis, and this would certainly have been a major deterrent. N. also notes that Greek mariners were skilled not just in pilotage and coastal navigation but also in sailing out of sight of land, where they were able to rely on knowledge of winds, swell patterns and the stars; in this context it is surprising that he makes no reference to J. Morton’s important study, The Role of the Physical Environment in Ancient Greek Seafaring (2001).

The second chapter addresses the importance for sea power of an efficient naval organisation and infrastructure, which only really became possible for the Greek states with the emergence of the polis in the archaic period. This organisation was essential not just to build warships and harbour facilities including shipsheds, but also to recruit, organise and train the personnel who manned the ships: Athens’ largest recorded deployment of 250 triremes in 428 bce (Thuc. 3.17.1–2), for instance, would have required the services of 50,000 men. The most important factor enabling sea power was wealth to allow capital expenditure and the payment of crews, which had to be obtained through trade, empire or even from the Persians. The third chapter demonstrates the depth of what N. calls ‘Greek maritime consciousness’, which both reflected and drove engagement with the sea. This consciousness permeated Greek myth and epic, tragedy, comedy, history and philosophy, although the evidence comes very largely from Athens.

These topics (some more than others) run through the rest of the book, where N. focuses on the strategic use of sea power over seven chronologically arranged chapters covering the mid-sixth century to the later fourth century. A recurring theme is the linkage of wealth, coastal fortifications and sea power (‘money, walls and ships’), which in combination provided security and enabled poleis to become wealthier and more powerful. This is the Themistoclean model that made it possible, after the repulse of Xerxes’ invasion, for Athens to establish hegemony of the Delian League and gradually turn it into an empire. It is also the basis for the Periclean defensive strategy in the first phase of the Peloponnesian War that enabled Athens to maintain her flow of allied tribute and imports whilst undermining her enemies’ morale by annual raiding round the Peloponnese. Only when Athens overreached herself and suffered catastrophic losses, which she never made up, in the Sicilian campaign of 415–413 did the tide turn for the Peloponnesians, and then only with the assistance of Persian money, which allowed them to challenge Athens at sea, strip away her maritime allies and bring her to defeat at Aegospotami in 405. Ironically, it was also with Persian money and support that Athens subsequently began her naval recovery following the battle of Cnidus in 394.

In the first half of the fourth century, while Sparta failed to maintain her maritime momentum, Athens was able to rebuild her fleet and establish the Second Athenian League in 377. She was, however, no longer able to dominate her allies in the same way and had to allow them to maintain their own fleets. Some of these fleets were eventually turned against her in the Social War of 357–355, and meanwhile new rivals had begun to show an interest in sea power, including Thebes, Alexander of Pherae and then Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon. The Lamian War of 323/2 brought defeat despite relatively minor losses, and Athens thus fell under the domination of Macedon.

Not all the topics flagged in the introductory chapters are fully pursued in the chronological survey. It is disappointing, for instance, that the later chapters do not give more space to how geographical and environmental factors affected such aspects as logistics and the timing of campaigns. The recurring role of Persia in the financing of Greek sea power is only mentioned in passing, and one would have welcomed at least some discussion of what Persia was trying to achieve and why she was not consistent in the sides she favoured. One important aspect of sea power, hardly mentioned, is manpower, and how not just Athens but other states too managed to operate oared fleets with crews that outnumbered their entire adult male citizen bodies, making use of metics, hired mercenaries, subject populations and slaves.

The least satisfactory section of the book is that concerning ships. N. suggests that Greek fleets consisted of a variety of warship types in the classical period, but all the evidence indicates that the only type that mattered from a strategic or tactical point of view was the trireme. N. treats such ships as designed mainly for combat at sea (which was relatively infrequent), while noting that they ‘were also occasionally used as transport ships’ (p. 40). Recent scholarship has, however, increasingly emphasised the importance of the latter role, with rowers regularly doubling as auxiliary troops (Thuc. 4.32), peltasts (Xen. Hell. 1.2.1) and sometimes even as hoplites (Thuc. 3.18.3–4; 6.91.4). In this respect the 170-oared trireme was far superior to the earlier 50-oared pentekontor, and ideal for the coastal raiding of the Peloponnese undertaken in the fifth century and the expeditions of Iphicrates in the fourth: the very size of trireme crews allowed them to leave behind sufficient numbers of men to protect the ships while the main body of troops moved inland. It also gave an advantage to states that could afford large fleets: Athens was always able to move its forces around on triremes under oar, while we know that Peloponnesian and other states often had to transport their troops on merchant vessels under sail, and that this was not without its hazards (e.g. Thuc. 7.50.1–2).

Despite the issues raised here, the fresh perspectives provided by N., including the brief survey of non-hegemonic sea-power by states other than Athens in the final chapter, make this a valuable and enjoyable contribution to the understanding of maritime strategy and sea power in this period.