LEGITIMACY-CENTERED REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Modern constitutional governance tends to favor formal authority rather than informal advisory institutions. Yet, sovereign institutions like Congress often take cues from advisory bodies both within and outside of the organization. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) objectives and resources are established by Congress and the president through legislation and appropriations. Although most members of the House of Representatives are not competent to make a truly informed judgment on national space policy, they can rely on the recommendations of their colleagues who sit on the House Committee on Science and Technology and the House Science Subcommittee on Space. Because committee members, working with the executive and the administrative bureaucracy, possess a rudimentary understanding of the policy alternatives, congressional specialists are able to assist the House in establishing the agency’s goals and to provide the resources necessary to achieve them.

Although Congress can draw from internal experts to help formulate policy, most colleges and universities are overseen by a board of trustees with little or no experience in the “business” of higher education. Whether the members of the trustees are elected or appointed, they often lack a deep understanding of higher education’s traditions, practices, and culture (Amaral, Jones, and Karseth 2002). From an organizational theory perspective, typical board members are not familiar with the university’s “core technology,” which Hoy and DiPaola (Reference Hoy and DiPaola2010) describe as an understanding of the institution’s primary objective combined with a knowledge of how that goal is achieved. As trustees rarely include academics (Amaral, Jones, and Karseth 2002), boards are infrequently equipped to make fully informed decisions. Without an understanding of the organization’s core technology, the academic trustees rely on university administrators and faculty representatives to fill the void.

Organized hierarchically, the president or provost is well positioned to provide input on behalf of the administration. By contrast, faculty perspectives are often conflicting and diffuse. Academic constitutions give faculty a means by which to identify and then express their collective judgment. In this manner, mere “recommendations” from faculty representatives can carry considerable weight both with board members and, by extension, the administration.

In contemporary governance, the use of non-binding “recommendations” as an instrument of policy making is somewhat unusual. For example, although 24 states have some form of a popular initiative process, the results of the vote are typically binding in at least 23 of these states (Legislatures n.d.).

In the ancient world, however, the practice of giving guidance to elected leaders through resolutions was quite common. In fact, the use of non-binding resolutions was an important feature of constitutional governance in the Roman Republic (Jolowicz and Nicholas Reference Jolowicz and Nicholas1972). Although Hollywood depicts the Senate as the sole representative body controlling legislation at the height of the Roman Republic, the truth is far more complex. Prior to the collapse of the Republic in 27 BCE, elections and formal legislation were controlled by the Comitia Centuriata (Centuriate Assembly) and the Concilium Plebis (Plebeian Assembly). The executive functions of government were controlled by elected magistrates like consuls (chiefs of state), aediles (city managers), quaestors (treasury officials), etc. (Jolowicz and Nicholas Reference Jolowicz and Nicholas1972). At the height of its power, the Senate’s considerable influence was exercised through the senatus consultum, an ordinary resolution that expressed the opinion of the members. Although only advisory, the opinions of the Senate carried tremendous weight; elected officials were strongly inclined to carry out their duties and interpret the law in a manner consistent with the views of Rome’s political elites (Jolowicz and Nicholas Reference Jolowicz and Nicholas1972; Lintott Reference Lintott1999). The power of the senatus consultum varied as the Senate vied for influence with the popular assemblies in the late republic. Even as the republic transitioned into the empire under the leadership of Caesar Augustus, the Senate’s acquiescence to the consolidation of political authority served to legitimize the growing influence of the early Roman emperors.

The Romans understood the link between constitutional structure and government function and were extremely protective of their prestige-centered representative body, which wrote legislation that would both protect the independence of the senate while at the same time ensuring it was sensitive to popular will^{Footnote 2}. The fact that the Senate was unable to pass formal legislation was irrelevant. Even with a narrow grant of sovereign authority, its indirect influence in the formation of legislative and executive policies made the Senate an important force in Roman politics.

The example of the Roman Senate is instructive in that it provides a clear example of why, even for prestige-based or legitimacy-centered advisory bodies, rules matter. If members obtained their position in the Senate merely as a function of birth, rather than through election to high office, it seems probable that magistrates and the public at large would view the resolutions of the body quite differently. Although the Senate was undoubtedly an elite institution, its membership was tied, at least in part, to the people of Rome. This electoral nature likely contributed to its authority and legitimacy.

Returning to governmental structures within academia, it is no accident that many of the professoriate’s representative bodies are named “senates.” Given their vital role in advising administrators—the modern equivalent of Roman magistrates—it is perhaps natural that faculty representative bodies tend to look more like the Roman Senate than the United States Senate. As with the Roman Senate, non-binding resolutions emanating from the faculty senate often play an important role in the formation of university policy. Whereas scholars have conducted qualitative examinations of the link between structure and political influence (Minor Reference Minor2004), it appears that the question has never been examined quantitatively.^{Footnote 3}

Although virtually all colleges and universities have some form of faculty advisory bodies, there are, nonetheless, a dizzying variety of representative schemes that provide researchers with a unique opportunity to test whether the formal rules which govern faculty representative bodies are associated with faculty influence within the institution. Put another way: recognizing that faculty representative bodies play an advisory role in setting non-academic policies, do the rules of faculty governance predict whether the professoriate believes it has more or less influence in university decision making?

FACULTY GOVERNANCE AS A LEGITIMACY-DEPENDENT REPRESENTATIVE MODEL

This presumption that rules and institutional structures profoundly influence an organization’s behavior is deeply rooted in the study of governance by scholars of both political science and public administration.

Whereas researchers have carefully examined the interplay between form and function in corporate, local, state, national, and international contexts, there is precious little quantitative research on how the structure of faculty-representative institutions potentially impact governance of American colleges and universities. Unlike corporations, which are administered by owners or shareholders, American universities are remarkably democratic, guided by principles of “shared governance” wherein the faculty have considerable influence over the operation of their institutions (Burgan Reference Burgan2006; Tierney and Minor Reference Tierney and Minor2003; AAUP 1966; Birnbaum Reference Birnbaum1991; Tierney and Lechuga Reference Tierney and Lechuga2004).

There is considerable debate over the proper role of the faculty under the traditions of shared governance (Birnbaum Reference Birnbaum1991). Critics of shared governance like Fisher and Koch (Reference Fisher and Koch1996) argue that faculty involvement in the formation of university policy is an impediment to presidential authority. The Association of Governing Boards argues for streamlining, or outright limiting, faculty governance institutions, as restrictions on presidential authority complicate efforts to reform colleges and universities, particularly in periods of austerity (Reid and Strickland n.d.; AGB Commission 1996).

Even supporters of strong senates would acknowledge that faculty involvement in university governance impedes presidential authority and complicates efforts at reform. This is not a bug; it is a feature. Indeed, the Roman Senate’s involvement in governmental affairs often slowed, or in some cases impeded, efforts to consolidate political authority or enact reform. Much like the Roman Republic, faculty senates potentially enhance policy making by facilitating an open dialogue about proposed policies, thoroughly vetting university initiatives and conferring legitimacy on administrative reforms.

There is little doubt that the board of trustees of most colleges and universities possess the legal authority to enact unilateral institutional reforms—limiting faculty input and thereby streamlining the governance of the university (Tierney and Lechuga Reference Tierney and Lechuga2004). Nonetheless, universities are reluctant to take unilateral action because it might be seen as an illegitimate usurpation of traditional faculty prerogatives. Such action could potentially undermine the institution’s educational mission.

Setting aside concerns that streamlining institutional governance might result in a backlash from faculty, some scholars assert that higher education’s cumbersome traditions of shared governance might constitute needed reform (Bess and Dee Reference Bess and Dee2014; Benjamin and Carroll Reference Benjamin, Carroll and Tierney1998).

The ways in which administrators solicit input from the faculty varies from institution to institution. The constitutional structures that are established to provide formal input into the governance of the institution should, theoretically, have an impact on the faculty’s influence—or at least perceived influence—on university policy.

Scholars of higher education are seemingly aware that structures of governance can have an impact on the effectiveness of university leadership (Trakman Reference Trakman2008). There is relatively little discussion of what specific structures of academic governance are conducive to either inclusiveness or effective leadership. Indeed, Trakman (2008, 76) argues against a one-size-fits-all model of governance, paying particular attention to the ability “to steer a governance course that recognizes the reasons behind competing interests in governance and [does not] endorse any one interest over others on arbitrary grounds.” He provides few specifics about what governance structures are conducive to this sort of inclusiveness. Trakman concludes that, “Good university governance also does not simply happen. It is usually the product of painstaking efforts to arrive at suitable governance structures, protocols, and processes [emphasis added].”

The absence of research about the ideal structures of governance raises an interesting and potentially important question: Does the structure of a university’s governance alter the faculty’s assessment of their influence in university affairs?

THEORY

We theorize that perceptions of faculty influence (relative to the administration) will be greatest at institutions of higher education wherein the faculty advisory bodies operate under democratic, rather than deliberative, rules and procedures.

We differentiate between democratic rules and deliberative rules by assessing whether particular electoral procedures tend to limit the discretion of the faculty representatives or give them the authority to make independent judgments, notwithstanding the views of the professoriate. We use the structural distinctions between the House of Representatives and the Senate as one model for what differentiates a democratic body from a deliberative body. Whereas the House of Representatives, with its smaller constituencies, shorter terms of office, and the ability to elect its own leadership, is a democratic body created to reflect popular will, the deliberative US Senate was designed to have some distance from popular opinion. Similarly, academic constitutions vary in both form and function, providing faculty with varying degrees of direct control over their own representative institutions.

To test our theory that rules of academic governance influence perceptions of faculty power, we merged survey data from the North American Academic Survey (NAAS)^{Footnote 4} with a database of faculty constitutions at corresponding academic institutions.^{Footnote 5}

VARIABLE OVERVIEW

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Even before the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, political observers recognized the links between the structure of governance and the distribution of political power. Indeed, political scientists have examined the interplay between constitutional design and constitutional function in every conceivable facet of governance, from the corporate, local, state, national and international contexts. Until recently, there has been no systematic effort to quantitatively examine how academic constitutions influence the balance of power between the faculty and college administrators.

Under their traditions of shared governance, a vast majority of American colleges and universities provide some form of representation to the faculty in the form of an advisory council, faculty assembly, or university senate. We theorized that faculty at academic institutions that emphasize democratic rather than deliberative forms of representation would perceive themselves as having more say relative to administrators in governing the university.

Consistent with our theory, four constitutional factors were, in some variation of the regression model, correlated with the perception of faculty power in the colleges and universities included in our sample. The most important of these was the use of direct forms of representation—typically referred to as a faculty assembly.

The most surprising finding, which ran directly counter to the expectations of the original theory, centered on a peculiar feature of some faculty constitutions, which designates a university administrator—typically the university president or the university provost—as the head of the faculty representative body. We presumed that, because this automatic designation deprives the faculty of the opportunity to elect their own leadership, this constitutional feature would make the faculty respondents feel less powerful. Instead, based on the results provided in table 1, there is strong evidence that the faculty feel they are more influential overall when university administrators preside over the faculty representative bodies.

This counterintuitive finding begs an important question: Are faculty perceptions of institutional power a reflection of true influence within the university? Is it probable that having a university administrator preside over the meetings of the faculty actually increases faculty influence in the governance of the institution? It is entirely possible that these measures of perceived influence are just that: perceptions. Having the president or provost regularly preside over meetings of the faculty representatives gives the illusion of faculty influence, if only because faculty leaders have a regular opportunity to interact with the leadership of the college. It is also possible that having to regularly preside over meetings of the faculty senate or assembly encourages university administrators to be more accommodating to the perspective of the faculty. This might be the case because it gives administrators a better insight into faculty views, or it may demonstrate a concern that failing to respond to faculty input will lead to a public break with the members of the senate or assembly.

The very fact that university administrators do not perceive differences in faculty power based on the institution’s academic constitution highlights how measures of perceived power are imperfect proxies for power itself. Since faculty and administrators collectively reach different conclusions about variations in the university’s balance of power, they cannot both be correct. Without concrete measures of power and influence, it is difficult to know if the professoriate is simply sensitive to their influence relative to the rules of faculty governance or if administrators are correct in observing that constitutional structures make little difference in determining faculty power.

As to whether the NAAS dataset regarding faculty and administrative influence measures true influence or merely perceptions of influence, we must remember that each group exercises varying degrees of control over different facets of governance. For example, most faculty senates and assemblies exercise inordinate influence over proposed curriculum changes or rules governing promotion and tenure. We presume that faculty feel they have less influence in principally administrative spheres like facilities management and budgeting. Although the results provide some evidence that, from the faculty’s perspective, academic constitutions enhance the professoriate’s “say” in the institution, it is difficult to know if this perceived influence extends beyond curriculum and tenure. Future studies might examine different components of perceived influence to determine if particular features of academic constitutions potentially enhance the faculty’s influence in the general operations of the university.

Finally, it is important to note that, even if constitutional features such as faculty assemblies, short senatorial terms, and administrative-chaired meetings do enhance faculty power within the institution, this does not axiomatically lead to more effective institutional governance. Indeed, one of the key features of the Articles of Confederation was the tendency to favor state power over national authority. Although the preservation of state power did enhance local control and effectively guard against excessive national authority, it also precluded the formation of coherent national policy on trade, economics, military preparedness, and the national debt. Similarly, whereas configuring academic constitutions to enhance faculty participation, input, and loyalty has potentially positive consequences, doing so will undoubtedly come at a cost to efficiency in university administration. Like the American founders, university stakeholders should approach systems of university governance conscious that constitutional schemes of representation come with both costs and benefits.

The dearth of quantitative studies on the impact of academic structures of governance means that political scientists have a potentially new and exciting vista of exploration. Based on these results, it appears that constitutions matter, even in the governance of academic affairs.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096517002530