In La Guerre romaine, Yann Le Bohec, emeritus professor at the Sorbonne, has once again given us a comprehensive one-volume study of the Roman army of the early Empire. It builds on his earlier account of that army in his, L'Armée romaine sous le haut-empire, which is now in its third edition. It covers the same time period, from 58 b.c. to a.d. 235. Much of the material that appears in L'Armée romaine reappears in this work, but with a great deal of additional information and discussion. The book is a sound introduction to its subject matter among the increasing number of general works on the Roman army.

A prologue sets out the basic goal of the work: to explain how the Romans made war. This is followed by a treatment of the sources with a preference for literary ones. But B. does not neglect other types of material, although these are treated at lesser length. In error, B. limits Polybius' description of the army to 6.21–3. Included is a history of scholarship on Roman military affairs from the Renaissance to contemporary research and publication. It is too brief to deal adequately with its subject and ends in two short appendices (33). The first puts forward the claim that Chinese military writers offer nothing new, and the second complains about a mania for erudition and pedantry among certain scholars at the expense of understanding and explanation. They are polemical without giving the reader sufficient context to understand the points being made.

Overall the work falls into two parts. The first two chapters cover the army and navy as institutions, dealing with various units including the garrison of Rome, the legions, the auxilia and the navy. Also included is a description of the army's and navy's command structure. This is an extremely useful, but dense guide for the reader. B. supplements it with lists of legions and their stations at the beginning of the first, second and third centuries, as well as useful tables specifying the internal structures and command hierarchies in various units including naval ones (49–54).

The second part is a series of short chapters covering various aspects of the army and navy, with especially interesting discussions of mentalities and the relationship of the military to the economy and broader society. The discussion of the environment of war argues that the Romans were neither bloodthirsty nor warlike (85). This is a strange assertion about a culture which celebrated victories with triumphal processions and whose major public buildings were often constructed with the help of war booty. The discussion that follows does not argue the point and although reference is made to the extensive literature on the subject, the notes give the reader little help in finding the literature referred to. The discussion of the causes of war could have benefited from a reference to the extensive political literature by ‘realist’ scholars on anarchic state systems that produce an environment that is especially prone to igniting conflict.

The essays as a whole point the reader to other important topics and supply a fine introduction to their various subjects. This is certainly the case in the discussions on the psychology of war and the army and religion. There are minor points that might have had more discussion. In the chapter on philosophy and war (115–18), B. claims that the Romans considered war as an evil and peace as a good. This view ignores the tradition of the metus hostilis found in Sall., Iug. 41.2 and the deleterious effects of peace at Juv. 6.292–3.

The division of the work into short discussions of particular points is perhaps unavoidable but it makes it difficult to understand the evolution of the army over time. For instance, B.'s suggestion (120) that the deaths of the nobility in the wars under Marcus Aurelius resulted in the reform of Gallienus that excluded senators from military command needs argument. After all, a reform that occurred almost a century later requires more than simply referring the reader in a footnote to an article on the subject. Moreover, there had been a progressive exclusion of senators from various governmental posts over this period, so it seems more likely that there was no reform but simply the continuation of an earlier trend.

One general point should be made. There is no overall context provided for the army of the imperial period. Its republican predecessor and the changes it underwent during the last century and a half b.c. created the pattern for the imperial force. These changes receive only cursory mention. It would have greatly helped the reader to be given the factors that gave birth to the army of the early Empire. The illustrations consist of a combination of photographs and line drawings. Unfortunately the photographs are often hard to decipher. The footnotes are extensive and the bibliography is useful.