In the course of this book W. seeks to encapsulate the processes that saw the transformation of Greek warfare from the Bronze Age to the Battle of Ipsus in 301 bc, using the evolution of ‘combined arms theory’ as the explanatory prism through which such change might be understood. This is a valiant attempt to shed new light on a subject that has been the focus of much scholarly analysis, and W. should be complimented for the vigour with which he approaches the task and his determination to pursue the evidence. Indeed, one of the book's major strengths is the way in which it handles its debt to its predecessors, providing readers with a very welcome and up-to-date bibliography of the relevant literature in the field, notwithstanding W.’s plea to unchain the discussion of primary sources from the ‘many limits placed on the[ir] reliability … through an obsession with historiography’ (p. 34).

In terms of outline, this book charts a chronological course from the Mycenaean world to Ipsus, chosen as the endpoint as the ‘culmination … of combined arms in Greek warfare’ and the apogee of the ‘application of integrated warfare on the battlefield’ (p. 210). As each stage in this developmental trajectory is explained, W. provides an overview of the prevalent modalities of land-based war broken down into an analysis of the component elements of contemporary armies (infantry, cavalry etc.), including a discussion of the organisation of these forces, their equipage and tactics. This background is then marshalled to provide an insight into the degree to which the evidence supports the existence of a ‘combined arms’ consciousness in ancient commanders and, via the discussion of certain ‘key battles’, how this may have translated into effective application on the battlefield.

W. begins with a welcome explanation of his methodological and terminological parameters and defines his linking theme of ‘combined arms’. This concept, derived from modern military theory, ‘refers to the process of moving from an army centred on a simple unit to a diverse and multi-faceted army, as well as to the tactical uses and deployment of two or more units in combination in battle’ (p. 5). In basic terms, W. is looking for deliberate, tactical level articulation between different types of units (for example, using missile troops to screen heavy infantry while the cavalry performs a flanking attack) in the lead up to and during a battle, with the presumption that the more effective the integration (ending in full ‘integrated warfare’) the more sophisticated (and likely successful) the responsible general's approach. This model, seemingly infused a little too richly by the notion of unilinear ‘progress’ in antiquity, obliges W. to assert that the successful general will be the one who ‘make(s) use of each individual unit in the best possible way to achieve the overall aim of victory’ (p. 13), and whereas no one could doubt that efficacy in deployment and unit handling are desirable qualities in a commander, it is not always the case that ‘advanced coordinated action’ is a prerequisite for success. That the Spartans managed to pull off a victory at Mantinea in 418 bc despite the unwise decision by Agis to re-deploy his army while in contact with the enemy, suggests that battles could still be won by the unsubtle medium of stamina alongside the more nebulous imponderables of morale and reputation.

In the course of his introductory section W. is careful to restrict the scope of his discussion to tactical coordination on the land battlefield and is explicit in excluding the ‘strategical [sic] use of combined arms’ such as ‘joint operations’ featuring the interaction of naval and army elements (p. 7). Whereas it may be true, as he asserts, that this topic deserves fuller consideration, the fact that amphibious operations (or at least those that involved serious coordination between both land and sea components) feature so prominently in the Greek context should have resulted in some discussion of this mode of combined arms warfare. Indeed, the case for the inclusion of such a discussion is strengthened by the fact that W. does not make the optimal use of his available space. This is particularly apparent in the scene-setting Section 1, covering ‘The Hoplite Revolution’.

The broad sweep of warfare conducted from the Bronze Age to the eve of the Peloponnesian War is the subject of nearly one-third of the evidentiary part of the book notwithstanding W.’s assertion that ‘changes in Greek warfare … began in earnest with the Peloponnesian War’ (p. 107). Admittedly, it is necessary to establish the base point from which the first real manifestations of the combined arms approach developed, but it is surely unnecessary to devote quite so much space to the seven hundred or so years when such methods were adopted more by happenstance than by deliberate calculation. In outlining his version of ‘the hoplite revolution’, W. makes a number of interesting observations (the argument [pp. 50–3] as to the importance of dance to foster balance among heavy infantrymen is particularly striking), but this material is mostly tangential to the main objective of the volume and could have been summarised more succinctly.

The argument (Chapters 4–5) that combined arms tactics were first fostered in a planned manner during the Peloponnesian War and then enhanced during the Corinthian War (as witness the tactics of Demosthenes, Iphicrates and the often neglected Gylippus, the Spartan saviour of Syracuse) is well taken and surely right, and W. does a fine job in explaining how the role of light infantry and cavalry began to impinge upon the battlefield dominance of the heavy infantry. However, his enthusiasm may get the better of him when he then suggests (p. 134) that by the early fourth century ‘Greek light infantry was perhaps even viewed as equal to hoplites’, a comment he seemingly contradicts a little later when he opines that ‘to the Greeks the hoplite was still the bringer of victory’ (p. 146). Given the experience of the Theban hegemony and the hoplite clashes at Mantinea and Leuctra in 362 and 361 bc respectively, such confidence would seem unwarranted as neither of these major engagements amounts to ‘combined arms’ battles in W.’s understanding of the term. Certainly, in discussing the generalship of Philip II, his son Alexander and (briefly) the successors, W. is on much firmer ground where there can be little doubt that the practice of ‘integrated warfare’ had now become the norm and not the outlier.

There are a number of factual points that a pedantic reader might take issue with as the following examples may indicate. A machine gun team leader has a section of three to carry the weapon, tripod, ammunition etc. and does not have to stagger under such a loading by himself (p. 48); the redrawn detail of the hoplites on the Chigi Vase fails to include the all-important spears (fig. 2.3); at Delium, the hill that shielded Pagondas’ cavalry intervention was not in the Athenian rear (p. 105) nor were the horseman involved drawn from the Theban right (per fig. 4.1); the quotation deployed from Demosthenes’ Third Philippic (p. 167) mentioning the Macedonian's reliance on light infantry and other non-phalangite forces is taken out of context to suggest that Philip II had made permanent changes to his force configuration when, instead, it is a reference to the royal campaign in Thrace where light forces were much more useful to the invader.

This book is eminently readable and serves to introduce a modern military theoretical paradigm to a classical audience while simultaneously providing the student of military history a welcome chronological depth to the genesis of combined arms doctrines. Perhaps it is time for W. to write that necessary work on ‘joint operations’ in the Greek world to complete the story.