On 10 March 1812 the legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act to incorporate the Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities, marking the birth of an industry that, by the postbellum era, would become ubiquitous—a quiet pillar of support against the hazards of modern life for families across the entire income spectrum. But in 1812, the life insurance industry still faced an uphill battle of legitimizing itself to the American public while concurrently creating a demand for this little-known product. Unbeknownst to these insurance entrepreneurs, the times could not have been more auspicious. As the United States entered a period of extensive industrialization and urbanization—fracturing communal relationships and familiar havens in times of need, as well as laying the groundwork for the development of a middle class—life insurance emerged as the sole safety net for thousands of Americans facing this world of new and unfamiliar risks. By quietly pervading the entire fabric of American socio-economic life, life insurance would provide a crucial layer of support and stability to a nation in flux, enabling—and even facilitating—this transition from a rural, agriculturally based society to an urban, industrialized one.
My dissertation examines the early history of the life insurance industry in America, from the 1810s and 20s with the formation of the first for-profit companies, through the 1860s when life insurance was firmly established. The few historians who have examined this industry depict its antebellum growth in uncomplicated terms. In Marketing Life Insurance, J. Owen Stalson refers to the sale of mutual policies as the “revolution of 1843” and credits aggressive marketing campaigns by mutual companies during the 1840s with establishing the industry. Likewise in Morals and Markets, Viviana Zelizer primarily cites changes in religious sermons that first condemned and then promoted the institution with the “unexplained” growth of the 1840s. For both, their starting point and basic assumption is that the industry was “failing” prior to the early 1840s and succeeding thereafter. This rather simplistic approach completely ignores the dynamism of the pre-1843 industry, apparent in both the statistical and anecdotal evidence.1
Stalson, Marketing Life Insurance, pp. 103–25; and Zelizer, Morals and Markets, pp. 5–7. This fixation on 1843 is mainly due to the fact that the oldest companies surviving into the twentieth century dated from this period. Indeed, the corporate histories of these mutual companies almost universally ignore or significantly downplay the role of early stock companies in favor of their own pioneering efforts.
Life insurance was a direct response to the changing economic composition of the country. Specifically, it addressed the problems faced by an emerging middle class in the growing cities of the Northeast. The family and home were shifting from primarily being units of production to ones of consumption. Whereas early American women and children had been intimately involved in the successful operation of farms, artisans' shops, and stores, the economic options available to urban widows were much more limited. Thus life insurance was a means for a middle-income husband to provide for the needs of his family from beyond the grave, enabling them to maintain their class status and not be forced to rely on the kindness of family or the charity of strangers.2
Johansen, Family Men, pp. 23–24.
Companies specifically targeted this middle-class clientele, focusing their marketing literature on the aspirations and anxieties of this group, while simultaneously designing their policies to meet their financial needs by providing policy loans, allowing premium payments on a quarterly basis, or accepting partial payment of premiums in notes. The industry understood that this growing segment of the population faced opportunities and anxieties that made them unique among Americans. Life insurance appealed not only to their status consciousness, but to their fears. By analyzing both insurance marketing literature, as well as the characteristics of the people actually purchasing policies, this dissertation creates a composite profile of who was insured and how this profile changed over time. In particular, it looks at the initial clientele—the first adapters who gambled that their annual payments to this new, untested industry would result in monetary security for their families when they died 50 years hence, or the next day. By the second half of the nineteenth century middle-income Americans formed the core of the life insurance market, and life insurance had become a defining characteristic of membership in the middle class.
But in order to successfully establish this industry, early companies had to overcome a variety of obstacles. First, the core requirement for the success of any life insurance company was the accurate evaluation and management of mortality risks. No individual company possessed the information and resources necessary to draw up accurate American mortality tables or to evaluate the risk of insuring different demographic groups. Collaboration within the industry and with federal and state agencies was thus essential for the accomplishment of these tasks. Yet companies would still spend the majority of the nineteenth century grappling with the creation of an accurate American mortality table.
Although a basic understanding of mortality rates was critically important for the industry, companies feared that the people most likely to seek out an insurance policy were those with reason to suspect a below-average life expectancy. Firms knew all too well that the sum of poorly selected risks might mean bankruptcy, while that of careful selection meant greater profits. The more anonymous life became in the growing cities, the more insurance companies felt a need to break down that anonymity—recreating the glass-bowl mentality associated with rural communities through a microscopic analysis of each individual applicant's family past, present habits, and future life expectancy. The agency system thus was initially developed not as a sales force but rather as a means of repersonalizing the relationship between corporate headquarters and the individual applicant.
But beyond the agency system, life insurers also sought to break down mortality into its component parts in order to develop a profile of the ideal policyholder. Applicants could be rated specifically based on characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, occupation, travel preferences, drinking habits, health, family history, bone structure, personal hygiene, etc. By the postbellum period, this more objective profile would replace the need for subjective agents; rather than judging risks, agents could finally concentrate their energy on actively soliciting them.
The same anonymity that made it difficult for companies to select good risks from the outset likewise opened the industry up to charlatans of all types. The reputation of life insurance in Britain had become tainted by cases of gambling, murder, suicide, and insurance fraud; American companies sought to avoid such scandals by requiring that all applicants for insurance on someone else's life prove that they had a direct, monetary interest in the continued life of that person. But in attempting to ensure that applicants possessed only the purest, life-affirming motives, they initially undermined their own professed purpose—the protection of widows and orphans.3
Buley, American Life Convention, pp. 18–19; and Clark, Betting on Lives, p. 1.
In order to address this problem, the New York Life Insurance and Trust Company spearheaded the passage of an 1840 law that accomplished three important tasks. First, it established the right of a woman to enter into a contract of insurance on the life of her husband; this was the first instance in which married women were given blanket legal authority to enter into certain contracts without the express authority of their husbands. Second, that insurance would be free from the claims of her husband's creditors—a very important provision in the midst of the depression of the 1840s. And third, a wife would not have to provide any proof of insurable interest in the life of her husband.
Another type of moral hazard emerged in the underwriting of slaves. As life insurance spread to the South, it was embraced most strongly by urban slaveholders who viewed insurance as a means of mitigating the untimely loss of their slave property. By the 1850s the industry was firmly established in Richmond—underwriting the lives of slaves engaged in dangerous occupations, those valued as artisans or house slaves, or those hired out for work in factories and railroads—and was expanding rapidly into the other industrialized areas of Virginia. Indeed, life insurance was fast becoming a key component of industrialization in the Upper South. With the purchase of insurance, urban slaveholders demonstrated their confidence in both the longevity of the slave system itself and the value of slavery for the future of southern industrialization.
Additionally, insurance became a means of raising capital for the purchase and manumission of slaves on an individual basis, particularly in cases where a bondsperson was about to be taken away from his or her family and sold in the states of the Lower South. The insurance served as a type of loan collateral until the slave was able to earn his or her own purchase price. Although life policies for the purpose of manumission only accounted for a small percentage of total slave insurance, they represent a novel attempt to prevent the family breakups commonly associated with the slave trade.4
Murphy, “Securing Human Property.”
Finally, for the life insurance industry, the Civil War was a crucial test of their stability and long-term viability. The war was the first national catastrophe with the capacity to introduce true chaos into the insurance system. The industry had prepared for this type of contingency by inserting clauses to void policies in case of military service. But they likewise had spent half a century carefully crafting a public persona as the protector of the widow and orphan. If they shirked that duty now—when the need was the greatest—would their reputation ever recover? Yet if they agreed to underwrite soldiers, would the increased mortality burden damage or even destroy the fiscal soundness of their firms? This was the dilemma of 1861.
In effect, the industry adopted both approaches. For southerners, companies almost universally (yet independently) employed every possible means of legally voiding policies. Alternatively, in the North, the industry embraced its public duty—or at least wrapped itself in the image of that duty. While creating a united front and collectively charging an exorbitant war premium to cover the uncertainties of war, they simultaneously claimed to be patriotically supporting the Union and defending families from some of the worst consequences of war. In hindsight, their tactics were genius. The goodwill and publicity engendered with the payment of each death claim, combined with a generally heightened awareness of mortality, greatly increased interest in life insurance. Suffering little loss as a result of their war risk policies, the industry converted this reputation capital into huge gains as postwar demand for life insurance skyrocketed. Life insurance in force surged from approximately 70,000 policies collectively worth $150 million in 1860 to more than 800,000 policies totaling $2.3 billion (in 1860 dollars) just a decade later. Life insurance had quietly become a necessity for the average middle-income American family.
This dissertation was completed in 2005 in the Department of History at the University of Virginia under the supervision of Mark Thomas, John James, Charles McCurdy, and Peter Onuf.
