Feargal Cochrane provides a compelling historical narrative of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process in Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace. Rather than rely on theory, Cochrane, director of the Conflict Analysis Research Center at the University of Kent, explores the motivations, policies, strategies, and tactics of the various actors involved in governing and making peace in Northern Ireland. Cochrane explains how far Northern Ireland has come in terms of achieving peace and how far it still needs to go to build peace.

This book begins by identifying the origins of the conflict with the collision of religion and politics in Ireland in 1690. Recalling the Battle of the Boyne and the development of the “Orange” ascendancy in Northern Ireland, Cochrane emphasizes the historical roots of sectarianism. According to Cochrane, the famine played a critical role in developing the nationalist vision of a need for Ireland to gain its independence from Britain. The sense of grievance that Catholics carried with them motivated them to seek home rule. When this proved unsuccessful, many Irish nationalists came to accept the necessity of violence to remove Britain's control of Ireland.

The development of nationalism in Ireland inevitably led to a virulent unionism as those who sought to maintain their historic link in the United Kingdom defended their political position in Northern Ireland. Unionists triumphed in Northern Ireland, as the six counties emerged as a new political jurisdiction with an overwhelming Protestant majority. Cochrane shares a belief, common among Irish nationalists, that the development of an independent Northern Ireland government at Stormont created an inherently unstable polity. A Protestant government for a Protestant people was unjust. It was only a question of time before nationalists rose up to resist this political system that marginalized them and denied them basic rights. Cochrane believes the British government should have recognized what he sees as the highly predictable nationalist response to this unfair system. The British government is depicted as being both ignorant and negligent in its role in Northern Ireland. Its attempted efforts at managing the Troubles failed, and conflict escalated and continued from the 1970s through the 1980s.

Cochrane sides with scholars who depict the role of the United States as important to the peace process. He contends that President Clinton's intervention came at a critical juncture when Prime Minister Major was unable or unwilling to negotiate after the first Irish Republican Army ceasefire. By granting Gerry Adams a visa, periodically visiting and intervening in the negotiations, and selecting George Mitchell to be the US Special Advisor in Northern Ireland, Clinton kept the peace process going. Cochrane also praises Mitchell's intelligence, patience, and judgment in leading the negotiations that ultimately resulted in the Good Friday Agreement.

The arrival of Tony Blair as British prime minister brought new energy, enthusiasm, and hope to the peace process as well. Blair agreed to negotiate with Sinn Féin in an inclusive effort to bring peace to Northern Ireland. Blair's relentless effort may have included deception that other scholars have identified, but Cochrane seems to accept that this was necessary to achieve a final negotiated settlement. The Good Friday Agreement was crafted on prior negotiating positions and emphasized parity of esteem between the communities in Northern Ireland. It established a local Parliament at Stormont, North-South institutions, and institutions linking Ireland and Britain. Like other scholars, Cochrane stresses that the agreement utilized “constructive ambiguity” as a means of providing language that all parties could accept and simultaneously interpret differently. Cochrane depicts David Trimble as having the greatest difficulty selling the agreement to his constituents. Not only had Ian Paisley and the Democratic Unionist Party protested against the negotiations and the agreement, but even many important leaders within Trimble's Ulster Unionist Party came to oppose the agreement.

Ultimately, although the agreement was approved in a referendum, gaining a narrow majority of unionist support, the agreement did not fundamentally transform the bifurcated nature of political identity in Northern Ireland. Unionists were still unionists, and nationalists were still nationalists. Two critical issues, policing and decommissioning, that had not been settled during the negotiations plagued those who sought to implement the Good Friday Agreement. Cochrane recounts the demise of the more moderate parties for the more extreme parties and the ultimate power-sharing arrangement established with Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness running the reestablished executive at Stormont. Cochrane portrays the new governing institutions as stable but dysfunctional, unable to overcome the sectarian differences that separate the parties. This has prevented reconciliation and casts a dark shadow on Northern Ireland's future.

Cochrane also notes some other troubling trends that have continued after the Good Friday Agreement and power-sharing was established in 2007. The inability of the reformed police and newly established justice ministry to end punishment beatings and effectively take control of this violence shows the weakness of the new governing institutions. Similarly, the emergence of dissident republicans undermines the legitimacy of the new regime in Stormont without fundamentally threatening it. Cochrane calls for patience because it will take time to slowly overcome the sectarianism that has plagued Northern Ireland. He argues that Northern Ireland's new political institutions need to become effective, not just stable.

Cochrane also emphasizes the social healing that must take place for peace to be more fully realized in Northern Ireland. There is no way that unionists and nationalists can truly work together in the future without reconciling their pasts. The pain and trauma both communities endured has made everyone in Northern Ireland reluctant or unable to remember the past and commemorate the victims of the Troubles. Cochrane describes the peace in Northern Ireland as “reluctant” because of the difficulty Northern Ireland has had in overcoming its sectarian past. Cochrane concludes that Northern Ireland is more peaceful, but the peace, as he sees it, has only just begun.