On 24 November 1929, the Turkish newspaper Vakit featured a headline announcing that Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini had sent an agricultural tractor of the latest design to Turkish president Mustafa Kemal Paşa (later Atatürk).Footnote 1 The tractor was dispatched from Rome’s Trastevere station to Ankara.Footnote 2 A day later, Luca Orsini Baroni, the Italian ambassador in Turkey, met with the Turkish president to formally present Mussolini’s gift. This meeting also marked the ambassador’s farewell, as he prepared to leave for his new post in Berlin.Footnote 3 Reflecting on the state of the bilateral relations at that point, semi-official Turkish newspaper Hakimiyeti Milliye stated that the ambassador had left in Turkey ‘good memories of friendship’,Footnote 4 having successfully strengthened and deepened the relations between the two countries.Footnote 5
Although the departing ambassador could celebrate a legacy of deepened relations by the end of the decade, establishing these bilateral ties with Ankara was no easy task for Italian diplomats in the early 1920s. In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Italy participated in the Allied occupation of Anatolia, establishing a military presence across its south-western and western regions. As a latecomer to European imperialism in the region, Italy sought to secure a territorial foothold and economic influence over the western and south-western coastal Anatolian cities of the Mediterranean. These imperial ambitions had been evident since the turn of the twentieth century, as Italian officials and businessmen actively explored lucrative avenues for economic expansion. Consequently, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire appeared to offer an ideal opportunity for formal territorial acquisition.Footnote 6
However, the rapid rise and military success of the Turkish nationalist movement, consolidated under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, forced a strategic recalculation in Rome. Recognising the movement’s viability, Italy concluded that its long-term interests would be better served by establishing relations with the new government in Ankara. Rome subsequently withdrew its occupying forces and sought to cultivate cordial ties, anticipating lucrative economic concessions in return.Footnote 7 Despite this pragmatic shift, tensions persisted into the mid-1920s between Mussolini’s fascist regime and the new Turkish Republic,Footnote 8 exacerbated by Italy’s militarisation of the Dodecanese Islands just off the Anatolian coast.Footnote 9
Direct territorial expansion eventually gave way to a more calculated campaign of economic penetration. The timing was ideal. As Turkey’s economic relations with the United Kingdom and France deteriorated throughout the 1920s, Rome seized the opportunity to establish itself as a crucial economic partner.Footnote 10 Until the eve of the Second World War, the two Mediterranean countries managed to maintain a durable working relationship.Footnote 11 What emerged was cautious pragmatism, requiring both sides to walk a constant tightrope between reaping economic rewards and managing lingering geopolitical suspicions.
It was precisely within this climate of carefully calibrated, improving relations that Mussolini dispatched his gift. By November 1929, the two Mediterranean countries had already strengthened their ties with the signing of the Treaty of Neutrality and Reconciliation (30 May 1928),Footnote 12 and Italy had relocated its embassy to Ankara, signalling both official and symbolic recognition of the new regime. The late 1920s were marked also by a series of diplomatic, cultural and economic exchanges. Italian foreign minister Dino Grandi visited Ankara in December 1928, followed by a visit to Rome by Turkish foreign minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey (Aras) in May 1929.Footnote 13 Shortly after, an Italian air fleet of thirty-five planes visited Istanbul,Footnote 14 and in November 1929, Count Giuseppe Volpi, a former Italian finance minister and a well-known businessman, travelled to Turkey to advise on establishing a central bank, reflecting deepening economic and financial cooperation.Footnote 15
It was within this context of cordial bilateral relations that gift-giving became a frequent practice between the two countries at various levels.Footnote 16 In September 1928, when Mussolini’s sons, Bruno and Vittorio Mussolini, visited Istanbul as part of a group of young Italian avanguardisti, Mustafa Kemal Paşa gave them a ‘small gift’.Footnote 17 Similar gestures continued throughout the late 1920s. In April 1929, Foreign Minister Dino Grandi thanked his Turkish counterpart, Tevfik Rüştü Bey, for the ‘exquisite cigarettes’ he had received, reciprocating the gesture by sending a signed photograph.Footnote 18
In addition to such diplomatic gestures through gift-giving, Italian financial and commercial enterprises, too, donated money to institutions and projects that they thought might help boost their image in Turkey. The Italian bank Banca Commerciale Italiana’s Istanbul branch, for example, donated money to support the building of the Republic Monument in Taksim, an important Republican landmark in Istanbul, which was erected by the Italian sculptor Pietro Canonica.Footnote 19 In November 1929, only a few days before the arrival of Mussolini’s gift in Ankara, Count Giuseppe Volpi donated 5,000 Italian lira to the Turkish Association for the Protection of Children (Himayei Etfal Cemiyeti). Count Volpi’s donation was well targeted, as the association was one of the institutions that the Turkish government wanted to attract money for in the early Turkish Republic.Footnote 20 His donation was very much welcomed by the association, which expressed its gratitude for Count Volpi’s generosity through its magazine Türk Çocuğu.Footnote 21 Thus, gift-giving was a common practice in Turkish–Italian relations in the 1920s, whether in diplomatic or business contexts.
Though a common practice, diplomatic gifts were often marginalised by traditional historiography, which tended to treat them as incidental or peripheral to central political events.Footnote 22 This neglect is particularly noticeable in studies of modern diplomacy, where the significance of gift exchange is frequently downplayed or viewed as a trivial, generic sign of cordial relations. In contrast, scholars of the premodern period have long recognised the central, constitutive role of gifts in inter-polity/international relations.Footnote 23 A robust and growing scholarship, for example within the context of Ottoman diplomacy, demonstrates that material exchanges were not disinterested gestures but rather complex, meaning-laden mediums of communication, negotiation and competition.Footnote 24 Building on Marcel Mauss’s argument that gift exchange serves as a fundamental social bond, the gift has been examined through the ‘polysemy’ of these objects, that is, their ability to carry multiple meanings.Footnote 25 Their inherent ambiguity allowed different actors to interpret the exchange to suit their own strategic needs, making them vital tools for navigating geopolitical transitions and conveying nuanced messages of power, trust and amity, or in some cases, submission, aggression and competition.Footnote 26
Studying diplomacy through the lens of gift exchange blurs the customary distinction between diplomatic and economic exchange.Footnote 27 Diplomatic gifts, especially those involving technological innovation like agricultural machinery, are fundamentally ‘dual in nature (as gifts and goods)’.Footnote 28 They serve simultaneously as vessels of state authority and vehicles for commercial publicity.Footnote 29 For example, Ahmad Guliyev argues that gift exchange between the Safavids and Venetians in the seventeenth century not only served to strengthen political relations but also functioned as an astute ‘commercial strategy’.Footnote 30 This dual function can also be seen in modern diplomacy. By appealing to the interests of a country’s leader, for example, the gift can present a ‘pretence’ of a personal connection while overtly highlighting the culture of the gifting country and its industrial capabilities.Footnote 31 Furthermore, offering luxury or technological goods to a prominent global figure acts as a direct advertisement, helping brands expand their international market.Footnote 32 Thus, recognising that ‘the thing itself [i.e., the gift object] has its own weight’Footnote 33 allows historians to see how political motives, institutional ambitions, private commercial interests and technological innovation are inextricably interwoven within a single diplomatic act.Footnote 34
Mussolini’s 1929 gift of an agricultural tractor to President Mustafa Kemal Paşa perfectly embodies this interwoven dynamic. The uniqueness of this gesture did not stem from the object itself, as Italy was not the only nation to utilise heavy machinery as a diplomatic tool in Ankara. The Soviet Union, for instance, engaged in similar practices, although the geopolitical subtext of these exchanges was fundamentally different. From very early on, Soviet–Turkish relations were characterised by robust, state-to-state cooperation, particularly in industrial development.Footnote 35 This dynamic was starkly illustrated a few years later, in May 1932, during Prime Minister İsmet Paşa’s (İnönü) visit to Moscow. As British diplomatic correspondence noted, the visit resulted in a massive eight-million-dollar, interest-free credit for industrial machinery, alongside which the Soviet government ‘further ma[d]e Turkey a present of a tractor, three large and two small tanks, two motor-lorries and a motor-bus’.Footnote 36 While the Soviet tractor was embedded within a broader structural aid package between established strategic partners, the Italian gift emerged from a fragile geopolitical context. Mussolini’s gift was a calculated move from a former occupying power in Anatolia, an act whose diplomatic strings and commercial implications had to be cautiously navigated by Ankara. For instance, a primary target for Italian manufacturers was the Cilicia (Çukurova) region of southern Anatolia, an area where Italy already possessed deep-seated agricultural and commercial interests. Given the weight of these historical implications, Rome knew that the overture had to be handled delicately. Consequently, as the first step, the Italian embassy in Ankara was instructed to determine if Mustafa Kemal Paşa would even welcome the gesture.Footnote 37 Viewed through this lens of cautious diplomacy, the tractor’s historical significance lay precisely in its dual nature: it functioned outwardly as a personalised, thoughtful gesture tailored to Ankara’s agricultural development goals, while simultaneously operating as an astute commercial strategy designed to advance Italian private and national interests.
Rather than catalysing an immediate shift in foreign policy, Mussolini’s tractor thus served as a highly calculated nexus point, where Italian commercial ambitions and Turkish developmental pragmatism could cautiously intersect. The agricultural tractor not only symbolised Italy’s keen understanding of the new Turkish regime’s economic policies but also reflected its broader policy of crafting economic influence in Turkey. The gift would, for example, help increase the reputation and boost the sales of Italian companies such as Fiat, Pavesi and Motomeccanica in Turkey, particularly at a time when foreign competitors, like the American Ford, held a strong presence in the Turkish agricultural machinery market. Using Mussolini’s gift as a case to explore the intersections of Italian economic policy and Ankara’s economic priorities at the time, this paper examines Italy’s perceptive recognition of Ankara’s mindset and the Turkish president’s interests, as well as the effective leveraging of them for diplomatic and economic gains.
The Appeal of Tractors
The agricultural tractor was a personal gift to the Turkish president. Mussolini’s choice was astute, as it perfectly aligned with Mustafa Kemal Paşa’s interest in driving tractors and agricultural work. The Turkish president’s interest in tractors was particularly more visible after he established a model farm called Gazi Forest Farm (Gazi Orman Çiftliği, now known as Atatürk Orman Çiftliği) in Ankara in the spring of 1925 to determine the guiding principles of the agricultural economy and ensure their application all around Anatolia.Footnote 38 He managed the project himself, constantly checking the farm’s development, driving tractors and strolling around the fields almost every day.Footnote 39
His work at the farm was widely publicised in national and international publications. On 14 July 1929, newspapers reported that Mustafa Kemal Paşa was seen on his farm driving a tractor, dressed in a Panama hat, a ticking suit and a turndown collar shirt.Footnote 40 Soon after, international periodicals began publishing the photo of the Turkish president from this day. In August 1929, the Illustrated London News, for example, dedicated a full page to the Turkish president’s interest in farming. Titled, ‘Farming a “Desert”, Mustafa Kemal Pasha as Agriculturalist’, the periodical published various photographs of his farm.Footnote 41 For the French socialist newspaper, Le Populaire, however, Mustafa Kemal’s interest in farm work was yet another characteristic of dictators. The newspaper stated: ‘Indeed, dictators seem to have a fondness for farm work. Often, the newspapers have shown us Mussolini walking through wheat fields. Today, here is Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a professional dictator and an agricultural tractor driver in his spare time.’Footnote 42 Similarly, Charles H. Sherrill, the US ambassador to Turkey in the early 1930s, referred to ‘the profound affection for forests shared’ by both Benito Mussolini and Mustafa Kemal, adding that ‘Kemal’s deep devotion to forests is of a completely personal nature. He has had a modern farm constructed . . . [in] Ankara. Throughout the three seasons he resides in the city (autumn, winter and spring), he goes there daily to seek a measure of repose.’Footnote 43
Indeed, both statesmen were interested in agricultural work and often captured working in fields. Photos of a bare-chested Mussolini working in wheat fields or driving a Fiat tractor were featured in national and international periodicals, capturing widespread attention. These virile images of Mussolini particularly resonated in the United States, where they garnered significant appeal.Footnote 44 More importantly, however, the images served as an internal propaganda tool for Mussolini’s Battle for Wheat (Battaglia del Grano), a project initiated in 1925 to ‘make Italy independent of foreign wheat’.Footnote 45 According to Carl T. Schmidt, a contemporary American scholar specialising in Italian economy, Mussolini targeted a substantial increase in domestic production of wheat, but a significant challenge for the fascist regime was to raise a ‘wheat consciousness’ among the nation.Footnote 46 A 1934 issue of the periodical La Domenica del Corriere, for example, featured a photo of ‘the Peasant Duce’ (Duce contadino) on its cover page, with the caption arguing that the Italian leader was ‘working tirelessly for three hours’ in the wheat field with the farm workers under the ‘scorching’ sun.Footnote 47 Mussolini’s photos were thus used to portray agricultural work as an honourable occupation for young Italians, who were increasingly reluctant to live in the harsh conditions of the countryside.Footnote 48
In stark contrast to Mussolini’s performative toil among the sheaves and straw, Mustafa Kemal’s photographs taken at Gazi Orman Çiftliği were used as a reminder of the value of not physical exertion but rather education, urging the public to adopt modern agricultural machinery. For example, the footage and images taken on 14 July 1929, mentioned above, were quickly used for propaganda purposes by the government. In addition to its coverage in the contemporary press, this image of the president driving a tractor was reproduced, for example, by the Turkish postal administration as part of new postage stamps released that month. The aim was to reach the public as much as possible.Footnote 49 The very same image was later used in an embossed form on the cover of a book on the history of Turkish agriculture, published after the first Village and Agricultural Development Congress in 1938.Footnote 50 In fact, the image would become so iconic that it was repeatedly used as a symbol of agricultural development in Turkey. In 1970, this image appeared on 2.5 Turkish lira commemorative coins for the Food and Agriculture Organisation, bearing the slogan ‘The Plough Is Mightier than the Sword’ (Saban Kılıçtan Üstündür).
The images and their propaganda use were a direct response to the scarcity and challenges surrounding the use of agricultural machinery in Anatolia. As İbrahim Bey, a machinist at the agricultural school in İzmir, stated, Turkey’s need for agricultural machinery was ‘extraordinary’.Footnote 51 While the farming population was around 80 per cent of the total population in the 1920s, agricultural machinery made up only 1 per cent of all agricultural tools.Footnote 52 According to Reşat Rakım Bey, who wrote for the periodical Ziraat Gazetesi in 1934, there was thus an urgent need for the mechanisation of agriculture ‘to restore the former agricultural production of the Turkish nation that emerged from two great wars and to increase production’.Footnote 53
There were, however, obstacles in front of the mechanisation of agriculture in Turkey. The poverty of the rural population in Anatolia presented a significant challenge to purchasing agricultural machinery. The lack of credit, and the high costs of credit to buy tractors, also created a ‘heavy burden’ for the farmers.Footnote 54 Identifying the lack of capital as a central problem, İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin), in his book Turkey’s Village Economy (Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı), argued that ‘whereas the wooden plough constitutes the “emblem of self-production” in zones of subsistence economy, within the domains of commodity economy it stands as a symbol of poverty’.Footnote 55 For Mahmut Makal, writing much later, in 1950, rural poverty meant that peasants could afford neither machinery nor even animals for farming; the mere prospect of replacing human labour with animal power would have been seen as progress.Footnote 56
The people’s attitude towards the new machinery and technical information also shaped the trajectory of the mechanisation of agriculture in Turkey. The farmers in villages were often reluctant to try new farming methods and the machinery.Footnote 57 Prejudice and indifference towards new machinery had existed since the introduction of tractors in the Ottoman Empire at the start of the twentieth century.Footnote 58 With Turkey’s literacy rate at just 8.15 per cent in 1927, and notably much lower in rural areas, farmers lacked both the technical proficiency required to maintain modern machinery and the educational foundation needed to grasp its long-term economic value.Footnote 59 Consequently, tractors were often seen as not tools of progress but rather unreliable, alien impositions by the educated elite, leading to widespread prejudice and indifference towards mechanisation.Footnote 60 Thus, in an effort to lure large landowners and wealthy farmers to buy tractors, companies staged public exhibitions and competitions to showcase the benefits of the agricultural machinery. In November 1921, for example, the periodical Spor Alemi and other agricultural periodicals together organised a competition in Gülhane Park (Gülhane Parkı) in Istanbul, where tractors of different brands were introduced.Footnote 61 A few months later, in his article titled ‘The Age of Machine’ (Makine Devri), the Turkish journalist Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu) announced that the representatives of companies would soon visit Istanbul to introduce their agricultural tractors.Footnote 62
Even when financial constraints and prejudices were overcome, the lack of technical knowledge meant that there were very few people who could drive tractors, and that broken machinery often went unrepaired and was consequently abandoned. According to the assistant manager of Ziraat Bankası, Zeki Bey, for example, people were unable to use the tractors previously imported from Italy by the Ottoman government since they did not know how to drive them. ‘It is essential’, Zeki Bey declared in a parliamentary discussion in July 1922, ‘to run these vehicles and utilise them’.Footnote 63 There was also a broader problem of the labour force in Anatolia. In an interview that Mustafa Kemal gave right after the opening of his farm in 1925 in Ankara, he argued:
In terms of size, our country is equivalent to twice that of France. Yet, in terms of population, we have only a quarter of theirs. How disheartening it is that the Turkish peasant cannot benefit from such a favourable ratio between land area and population! If we leave the 20 million Turks of our country to exploit the land using primitive methods, this country will never be able to free itself.Footnote 64
For the Turkish president, both the country’s limited population and reliance on outdated farming methods posed major obstacles to expanding agricultural productivity, a goal central to the government’s pursuit of economic independence. The scarcity of and problems about labour in Anatolia also led Mr Clyne, the American undersecretary of state for the economy, who visited Turkey in November 1930, to conclude that ‘Neither for the use of machinery nor for direct fieldwork have the native and immigrant Turks shown truly suitable qualities’.Footnote 65
Aware of the problems in front of agricultural development in the country, a book published for the twenty-fifth anniversary of Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), the ruling party at the time, underlined the need for a ‘technical revolution in agriculture’ due to the ‘centuries of neglect [which] have piled up tasks and challenges as vast as mountains’.Footnote 66 The goal was, according to the booklet, ‘to free the farmer from traditional, simple and primitive agricultural tools and methods and to equip them with advanced techniques and modern agricultural tools and methods, as well as to provide farmers with quality seeds’.Footnote 67 Among these modern tools, the tractor stood out as a central instrument of mechanisation, symbolising the shift from traditional farming to new agricultural practices.
The Turkish government first aimed to increase the number of tractors in Anatolia. Purchasing agricultural machinery became a significant part of the Turkish government’s policy to enhance both the quantity and quality of agricultural production.Footnote 68 For example, in 1924, a Turkish governmental decree stated that four new American Fordson tractors would be bought for the immigrants in Thrace.Footnote 69 A year later, three Fordson tractors and eight tractor ploughs were bought by the state for ‘poor farmers’.Footnote 70 According to a governmental decree in August 1925, the Turkish government decided to buy five tractors ‘due to the necessity of purchasing machinery . . . to increase our country’s agricultural production and yield’.Footnote 71 By 1934, the government had bought 221 tractors and distributed them to farmers under ‘favourable’ conditions.Footnote 72
The increase in the number of tractors was not, however, solely due to the state purchase. Similar to some previous Ottoman initiatives to encourage the use of tractors,Footnote 73 Ankara, too, adopted various policies to promote the use of new agricultural machinery in farming. In October 1921, during the ongoing foreign occupation of Anatolia, the parliament in Ankara passed a law that granted a deferment of military service for ‘those engaged in large-scale agriculture, who, instead of using animal power, employ machines such as tractors and motor ploughs’. Two machine operators and one farm worker per 100 dönüms (10 hectares) of land were allowed to postpone their military service.Footnote 74 Similar incentives for tractor use became more institutionalised after the establishment of the Republic. For instance, in February 1926, the parliament enacted a law granting tax exemptions for agricultural machinery and chemical products used in farming. With an aim ‘to support and modernise Turkish agriculture’, the law offered to farmers exemption on customs, consumption and monopoly duties for the fuel used in tractors and other motorised machinery. Local commissions would be established to assess the annual needs of farmers.Footnote 75 Similarly, in 1930, the periodical İnkilâp announced to its readers with the title ‘Support for Farmers’ (Çiftçilere Yardım) that the government would offer compensation for tractor owners for damages caused by the fuel shortage. Since the tractors were often rented out for daily use and the lack of fuel prevented their rental, the compensation payment would be calculated according to the daily rental cost of a tractor.Footnote 76 The same year, the Turkish parliament introduced another law setting compensation for agricultural tractors at a total of 3.5 million Turkish liras. This marked a significant step, as the total compensation to date had already reached 9 million Turkish liras. Writing for Ziraat Gazetesi, agricultural expert Reşat Rakım Bey argued that thanks to the direct state support, the number of tractors increased from 183 in 1923 to 2,003 in 1930, reflecting a more than tenfold expansion within seven years.Footnote 77 These efforts, ranging from state purchases to various incentives, highlighted the central role of tractors in Turkey’s agricultural policies during the 1920s and early 1930s.
While the effectiveness of these efforts and their primary beneficiaries might be debated,Footnote 78 one thing was clear: Mussolini’s tractor gift was a strategic gesture, perfectly aligned with the Turkish government’s push to promote agricultural mechanisation. This gift’s appeal to Mustafa Kemal Paşa and the Turkish government becomes even clearer when viewed in the context of Ankara’s comprehensive approach to agriculture, an approach whose necessity was echoed in a 1927 article: ‘There is no mistake as great as thinking that agriculture in a country will progress solely through agricultural machinery.’Footnote 79 This view was, in fact, the very reason why the Turkish president decided to establish Gazi Orman Çiftliği in 1925 as a model farm.Footnote 80 As argued in a booklet on the farm in 1930, the mechanised farming method was implemented on the farm to ‘set an example in the country’.Footnote 81 The aim was to extend these new methods to the villages in Anatolia.Footnote 82 Thus, the Turkish farmers who wanted to visit the farm were encouraged, for example, by cheap transportation to the farm.Footnote 83
One of the principal objectives of the farm was to function as a vocational school dedicated to training a sufficient number of qualified machinists.Footnote 84 As noted in the 1930 booklet on the farm, the demand for such expertise was regarded as ‘absolute and essential’.Footnote 85 To address this need, a workshop for machinist training was established within the farm’s first year, and by March 1929, Milliyet reported that the institution had acquired eighteen tractors of the ‘latest technology’ for practical instruction.Footnote 86 Teenagers aged between fourteen and seventeen from various provinces were enrolled to receive training in the operation and maintenance of agricultural machinery, to enable them to return to their home regions and assist local farmers in adopting mechanised methods.Footnote 87 Although Gazi Orman Çiftliği was not the first initiative to promote vocational education, with similar efforts dating back to the nineteenth century, the ‘personal initiative’ of the Turkish president as the farm’s founder and owner endowed it with distinctive ‘symbolic value’.Footnote 88
The government likewise recognised the pressing need to educate the wider public about the advantages of modern agricultural methods by extending its efforts beyond the establishment of vocational schools. Courses were organised through the ministries of agriculture, education and culture, as well as through the ruling party’s local institutions, the People’s Houses (Halkevleri). These courses addressed topics such as the use and repair of agricultural machinery, the training of machinists and the maintenance and operation of tractors.Footnote 89 Alongside these activities, the government also published a range of instructional manuals on farming and animal husbandry.Footnote 90 Among them was A Practical Guide for Tractor Owners and Agricultural Machinists (Traktör Sahiplerile Ziraat Makinistlerine Amelî Rehber) (1930), which provided detailed explanations on the operation of tractors and their various attachments, such as ploughs. The guide emphasised the importance of technical knowledge, remarking that ‘the upsetting and difficult aspect of acquiring tractors lies in the issue of machinists’.Footnote 91 Other publications directly targeted farmers, aiming to explain the significance of mechanisation for agricultural development. German expert Otto Sack, who had visited Turkey to assess the state of mechanised agriculture, for example, contributed two articles to Ziraat Gazetesi on the need for agricultural machinery, seeking to persuade Turkish farmers of its benefits. He explained several reasons for mechanisation, such as saving time, increasing efficiency and relieving farmers from excessive fatigue and health problems. Sack argued that these benefits would allow farmers to focus on productivity rather than exhausting manual labour.Footnote 92 Nevertheless, as the Italian ambassador Francesco Maria Taliani observed in 1925, such endeavours, like the establishment of Gazi Orman Çiftliği or public education and propaganda, were unlikely to attract widespread imitation immediately. This was because ‘the farmer is still using a rudimentary plough and obtains from his labour perhaps even less than what he needs to survive’.Footnote 93
Recognising the Need for Tractors
The ambassador’s remarks demonstrate the awareness of the need for tractors in Anatolia by Italian diplomats who consistently reported this to Rome. Three years after Taliani’s remarks, similar observations were also made, for example, by the Italian commercial attaché in Turkey, Franco Fontana. Having travelled around Anatolia in the summer of 1928, Fontana argued that although Anatolia was rich in terms of agricultural resources and mines, these resources could not be exploited well due to the lack of capital and labour. For Fontana, a major problem was the practice of farming through ‘primitive’ means and methods, arguing that agricultural machinery, modern ploughs or the use of fertilisers were unknown in the country. The Cilicia (Çukurova) region, which the attaché considered as one of the most fertile regions in Turkey, would, for example, be ‘extremely prosperous’ if a large colony of Italian farmers replaced the poor Turkish farmers who used ‘prehistoric’ methods.Footnote 94 Mussolini’s choice of a tractor as a gift for the Turkish president was likely influenced by these reports from Italian officials that reached his desk over the years.
Mussolini was also aware of the Turkish president’s agricultural policies. In an interview in 1928 with Turkish journalist and MP Yunus Nadi Bey, he praised the Ankara farm as an exemplary institution, stating: ‘His Excellency Gazi Mustafa Kemal is a great personage who has bestowed the supreme boon and benefit upon Turkey.’Footnote 95 This existing appreciation was likely reinforced by key Italian figures familiar with the Turkish landscape. Notable among these influences was the former Italian finance minister and well-known businessman, Count Giuseppe Volpi, who visited Ankara in November 1929 to advise on the establishment of a central bank in Turkey. Following his visit to Turkey, Volpi returned to Rome in late November and immediately met with Mussolini. During this meeting, Volpi shared his positive impressions, referring to Turkey as Italy’s ‘friend’.Footnote 96 While logistical timelines suggest the tractor may have already been on the way to Ankara by the time of this debriefing, the sequence of public events is nonetheless telling.Footnote 97 Italian newspapers published the news of the gift immediately after this meeting took place, suggesting that Volpi’s positive report provided the ideal diplomatic framing to publicly announce the gesture.
During his visit in Ankara, Count Volpi had the opportunity to assess the Turkish president’s personal interests as he was received by President Mustafa Kemal Paşa for a two-hour discussion.Footnote 98 This firsthand knowledge appears to have directly informed a diplomatic correspondence from Italian ambassador in Ankara Luca Orsini Baroni to Foreign Minister Dino Grandi on 30 November. The report, which was probably based on Volpi’s own account of the meeting, detailed the president’s interest in farm work and history:
No longer able, due to the season, to devote many hours to agriculture and work in the fields, he is currently occupied with research and the history of the very ancient populations of the Asian plateau . . . He spends hours and hours in his library at Çankaya, which he develops day by day with publications on the subject, sent to him as gifts from France, Germany and Russia (Count Volpi has also promised to send some from Italy). He studies, gives lectures to his close circle and discusses interesting problems with them.Footnote 99
Volpi’s promise to send books to the Turkish president illustrates a clear pattern. It shows that he had both astutely observed the president’s personal interests and, crucially, taken the initiative to act on that knowledge. This blend of careful observation and strategic action was similarly apparent in Mussolini’s tractor gift.
The suggestion of a tractor gift would have found fertile ground with Mussolini, who himself was acutely aware of such a gift’s practical and symbolic power. Mussolini was, at that very time, deeply immersed in his own ambitious agricultural programmes in Italy, such as the Battaglia del Grano, initiated in 1925, and the Integrated Land Reclamation (Bonifica Integrale) of 1928. Just a few years after Mustafa Kemal had established Gazi Orman Çiftliği in Ankara, Mussolini himself was busy waging his own battle against the land in the Pontine Marshes (Agro Pontino) near Rome, draining vast swamps to make them agriculturally productive.Footnote 100
Both projects, led by the two Mediterranean leaders, therefore aimed to transform a non-fertile land into a fertile one. For example, La Turquie Kemaliste, in a propagandistic manner, described the transformation of Gazi Orman Çiftliği as ‘indescribable’, noting that ‘dry swamps surrounded Ankara’ and the first task was to dry them up properly before any work could begin.Footnote 101 It is highly fitting, then, that upon its arrival at Ankara station on 27 November 1929, Mussolini’s tractor was dispatched directly to this very farm, serving as a physical manifestation of the transnational link between the two leaders’ agrarian visions.Footnote 102
The transnational encounters in the agriculture sector between Turkey and Italy were also commented upon by Italian officials. However, they often characterised them as knowledge transfer from Italy to Turkey rather than a knowledge exchange between the two countries. In September 1925, reporting to Rome about the establishment of Gazi Orman Çiftliği and Turkey’s agricultural policies, the Italian ambassador, Taliani, argued that Turkey’s ‘renewed spirit of initiative for the agricultural development of the country’ was ‘almost a literal imitation – in both methods and execution – of [Italy’s] grain campaign’. The examples Taliani provided for his claim were a questionnaire sent to agricultural specialists and professors by the Turkish government about dividing the country into agricultural zones and a planned congress in Ankara that would gather experts to plan the country’s agricultural policies.Footnote 103
Although Turkey’s agricultural policies cannot be characterised as a simple imitation of Italian models, Italy nonetheless emerged as a key partner for information exchange.Footnote 104 In his interview with Mussolini, the Turkish journalist Yunus Nadi Bey informed the Italian leader that ‘Turkey’s endeavours in this field have been established, at least in principle, upon foundations akin to your own methods of work, and they continue to proceed as such’.Footnote 105 This influence was deemed logical by Turkish officials, given that both are Mediterranean countries sharing similar climates, soil compositions and crop types. As early as 1924, the Turkish press praised Italy’s agricultural regulations and institutions as exemplary models for agrarian reform.Footnote 106 For example, in a meeting that the Italian ambassador Giulio Cesare Montagna had in 1925 with the Turkish minister of agriculture Sabri Bey (Toprak), whom Montagna described as someone ‘distinctly pleasant and courteous’, the Turkish minister asked for copies of Italian regulations in the field of agriculture, particularly those on agricultural schools, mobile teaching units, agricultural credit and model farms.Footnote 107
This transnational knowledge exchange was not purely theoretical. It also entailed the mobility of people. For example, in late 1924, Recep Bey, a young professor from the agricultural school in Balıkesir, was sent to Higher School of Agriculture of the Kingdom of Italy (Scuola superiore di agricoltura del regno d’Italia, today’s Department of Agriculture at Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II) in Portici after winning a competition organised by the Turkish ministry of agriculture.Footnote 108 Similarly, in the summer of 1929, only a few months before Mussolini’s gift arrived in Ankara, Muhlis Bey (Erkmen), an agricultural expert who played an influential role in the establishment of Gazi Orman Çiftliği in 1925 and would later be the minister of agriculture in the 1930s, was sent to Italy to study the Italian project Battaglia del Grano on site and visit the agricultural schools in Italy.Footnote 109 Muhlis Bey was given the opportunity to have long conversations with the bureaucrats at the Directorate General of Agriculture in Rome about the agricultural policies of the fascist government. Accompanied by a technician, he also visited the rural areas surrounding Rome to examine Italy’s policies in practice.Footnote 110
Tractor as a Vehicle for Economic Penetration
These efforts to acquire knowledge were present at varied levels and scales in the transnational links between the two nations. Local bodies in Turkey, such as the General Council of Tekirdağ, also submitted requests to ‘benefit, preferably, from the unquestionable progress that Italy made in the important field of agriculture’. This specific request sought to send two students abroad to gain technical expertise in the handling and repair of agricultural machinery.Footnote 111
When the Italian government approved the local council’s request in November 1924, a primary reason for the decision was the potential to strengthen Italy’s economic expansion into Turkey’s agricultural machinery market. According to an internal correspondence within the Italian foreign ministry, one key ‘benefit of attracting these young Turkish students to Italy’ would be their becoming familiar with Italian agricultural machines and tools. The students, on their return, could ‘significantly contribute to their diffusion in Turkey, with a clear advantage for Italian industry’. Thus, the ministry should act quickly and ‘consider granting the most favourable possible conditions’ for the Turkish students’ admission to Italian agricultural schools.Footnote 112 Driven by these strategic calculations, the Italian government therefore approved the students’ admission in November 1924. They were accepted into a special course for agricultural machinery operations at the Royal School of Agriculture in Brusegana, Padua.Footnote 113
These strategic calculations were not limited to the admission of Turkish students to Italian agricultural schools. The desire to exert economic influence over Turkey was a key policy of the fascist government in the 1920s and 1930s, continuing a long-standing Italian ambition towards the Ottoman Empire that dated back to the beginning of the twentieth century. After the establishment of the new regime in Ankara, Italian officials viewed it as a new chapter, believing they could capitalise on Turkey’s dire economic situation as an opportunity for Italian business. The Italian MP and journalist Orazio Pedrazzi, for example, stated this view explicitly in his book The Mediterranean Levant and Italy (Il Levante Mediterraneo e l’Italia). The Turks, he argued, ‘will have to rebuild [their country]. They are unable, [however], . . . to equip the country on their own and will have to ask for the collaboration of those most ready and most capable. The time for Italy will then come.’Footnote 114
From an Italian perspective, supporting the Turkish government’s plans for agricultural development would therefore enhance Italy’s prestige among Turkish official circles and provide a significant position in the Turkish agricultural machinery market. Mussolini’s gift of a three-tonne Motomeccanica brand tractor to the Turkish president should also be considered as part of this broader Italian strategy of economic penetration and not merely a diplomatic gesture.Footnote 115 It was a move designed to reinforce the significant presence that Italian companies had already established in Turkey.
The choice of the gift itself was highly significant. The Italian company Motomeccanica was founded in 1910 and designed the well-known Pavesi P4 tractors, which had gained international recognition. Fiat, which also produced Pavesi tractors under licence,Footnote 116 further amplified the visibility and reach of this model in Turkey due to its much wider business network. Italian-brand tractors were often distributed through the same agencies in Turkey, a practice that tended to obscure distinctions between individual brands and models within the local market. An advertisement for Fiat, which appeared in the popular Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet on 18 January 1931, for example, also referred to the Pavesi tractors sold by the same Istanbul branch.Footnote 117 Thus, by gifting a Motomeccanica tractor to Mustafa Kemal, Mussolini did not necessarily target an individual company. Instead, the gift showcased the peak of Italian industrial and agricultural technology, tying it to the broader commercial success of Italian companies.
Throughout the 1920s, Italian automobile and agricultural machinery companies steadily expanded their footprint in Turkey. Fiat, for example, established agencies in Mersin, Tarsus and Adana to complement its Istanbul branch.Footnote 118 This expanding network within the country directly led to an increase in Italian exports to Turkey.Footnote 119 A 1924 Adana commercial guide celebrated Fiat’s world-renowned ‘victory’ in the automobile sector, noting a daily increase in its customer base.Footnote 120 In the early 1920s, the popularity of Fiat’s latest diesel tractor proved influential enough to impact policy, prompting the Turkish government to propose exempting diesel fuel from customs and consumption taxes to support the machinery’s use.Footnote 121 Recognising this public appeal, the Italian consul in Mersin urged Fiat to prioritise its tractor division within Turkey, which had so far been a secondary concern for the company.Footnote 122 This strategy was reinforced in September 1927 by the Italian foreign ministry, which recommended expanding into the agricultural hub of Konya.Footnote 123 Only a year later, a Fiat agency was opened in the city.Footnote 124
Parallel to its expansion into the agricultural machinery market, Fiat cultivated a strong relationship with the Turkish state, positioning itself as a supporter of the new regime even before the Republic was established. A striking example appeared in a 1922 issue of Spor Alemi, which featured a cover photo of the Ankara government’s foreign minister, Yusuf Kemal Bey (Tengirşenk), with a Fiat car provided by the company’s Istanbul agency. Far from a simple advertisement, the image, with the Fiat logo in Ottoman Turkish prominent at the top, served as a public show of allegiance to the government in Ankara.Footnote 125 This support quickly led to commercial privilege for the company. By April 1925, a government decree authorised the foreign ministry, embassies and foreign visitors to purchase Fiat automobiles at a discounted rate.Footnote 126 This privileged position was not incidental, for, according to Italian ambassador Orsini, Fiat’s expansion enjoyed the backing of Prime Minister İsmet Paşa.Footnote 127 The depth of this commercial relationship was further illustrated in July 1926, when Mr Paladini, the head of Fiat’s representation in Turkey, travelled to Ankara to secure a payment of around 20,000 Turkish lira. During the visit, Colonel Tevfik Bey, the presidential chief of staff, personally requested that Paladini take over an inactive repair workshop on the president’s estate, a request that, despite the potential financial burden for the company, underscored the exceptional trust Fiat had earned within Turkish official circles.Footnote 128
The market presence of companies like Fiat was driven by not only their commercial relations with the Turkish government but also by the technical superiority of their machinery, particularly in the 1920s. Their overwhelming success was frequently referenced in Turkish periodicals,Footnote 129 which often refer to Fiat’s tractors as ‘the best agricultural machinery in the world’.Footnote 130 The company’s success was also evident in the promotional competitions and exhibitions it joined. On 7 October 1921, the Turkish journal Spor Alemi and other agricultural publications organised an event in Istanbul’s Gülhane Parkı. This event featured a parade of the latest models of automobiles and agricultural machinery, including Fiat tractors. According to Spor Alemi, it was the Fiat tractors that particularly caught the audience’s attention due to the company’s technical prowess.Footnote 131 Fiat tractors were therefore regarded as the most effective and cost-effective option available to Turkish farmers in the early 1920s. Fiat’s agency in Mersin, for example, imported eighteen new model tractors in the summer of 1923, tractors that, according to the Italian consul in the city Zanotti Bianco, ‘seemed to meet the local agricultural needs very well’, ensuring ‘greater efficiency’ and a reduction in the consumption of fuel and oil.Footnote 132
The advertisement strategies, too, directly contributed to the market presence of Italian companies. Fiat’s Istanbul branch, which operated an agency in Pera and a garage in Taksim, frequently advertised in local publications to attract customers. While some of these were generic last-page adverts, others were more creative.Footnote 133 For example, the company’s tractors, including the one that won the gold medal at the international agricultural fair in Adana in 1924, appeared on almost all cover pages of Yeni Çiftçilik, an agricultural journal published by the Agricultural Society (Ziraat Cemiyeti) in Istanbul.Footnote 134 It is easy to attribute the frequent cover appearances of Fiat tractors simply to the magazine’s agricultural focus and the machines’ proven merit. However, the accompanying inclusion of Fiat automobile adverts and corporate factory photos, content unrelated to farming, exposes a broader commercial agenda. This shift from relevant agricultural machinery to general corporate promotion strongly suggests direct sponsorship of the journal by the company’s Istanbul branch.Footnote 135 Although less prevalent than Fiat’s advertisements, Turkish agricultural periodicals such as Yeni Ziraat Gazetesi also featured promotional material for other Italian manufacturers, notably Motomeccanica and Pavesi. An issue of the magazine in 1922, for instance, published an advertisement highlighting these companies’ recent exports to the Turkish market with the endorsement: ‘a great line of progress with agricultural tractors and trucks’.Footnote 136 Mussolini’s choice of a tractor as a gift, therefore, built upon the already established prestige of Italian companies in Turkey, particularly Fiat, which had cultivated its reputation through quality products and commercial advertising.
This gesture, however, was also timed for a critical period of growing competition in the automobile and agricultural machinery markets in the late 1920s. The Italian companies faced fierce competition in Turkey, notably from the American Ford company, which produced Fordson tractors.Footnote 137 In 1929, the same year that the tractor gift was sent to Ankara, the Turkish government and Ford Motor Company agreed to establish an assembly plant in Tophane, Istanbul. The agreement granted Ford the right to import, assemble and supply automobiles, trucks, tractors, aircraft materials, components and accessories within the customs borders of Istanbul and to set up and operate the necessary assembly factory, offices and management facilities under specified conditions.Footnote 138 The assembled products would then be distributed from Istanbul to other countries, including Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Russia and Syria.Footnote 139 The Turkish finance minister, immediately after the signing of the contract in January 1929, argued that the hiring of Turkish workers and personnel, as well as the exports of assembled machinery abroad through Ford’s assembly factory, would ‘render a great service’ to Istanbul’s economic life.Footnote 140 Although Ford’s venture in Istanbul was short-lived, the company ceasing production by the end of 1933,Footnote 141 it nevertheless posed a significant challenge to the other companies operating in Turkey.
Market competition was not always fair either. In July 1929, Rambaldo Bruschi, the central director of Fiat, wrote a letter to the Italian foreign ministry, complaining about a competition organised by the Turkish defence ministry in December to choose the best tractor for artillery towing. Although Fiat’s Pavesi P100 heavy tractor came first in the competition, with, according to Bruschi, an ‘outstanding’ performance, this competition was later cancelled by the ministry. The Turkish ministry then announced a second competition, in which Fiat’s same model of tractor participated. Once again, the technical commission officially declared it the best tractor. However, ‘in a strange turn of events’, Bruschi noted, the ministry started negotiations to purchase a Caterpillar tractor instead of Fiat’s tractor. He thus decided to write to Rome because the formal complaints made by the company directly and through the Italian commercial attaché in Turkey earlier had no effect. Resolving this issue was important, Bruschi argued, to ‘promote and safeguard the penetration of Italian industry abroad, which today more than ever must vigorously defend itself in foreign markets against American and European competition’.Footnote 142
As competition intensified, Mussolini’s gift proved to be an effective move for safeguarding Italian commercial interests. By the late 1920s, the threat posed by American firms had become so severe that Italian diplomatic officers in Turkey voiced increasing concern about the issue. A diplomatic correspondence from 1927 regarding the agricultural situation in Adana pointed out that the number of Italian-brand agricultural machinery in the city was not comparable to that of other foreign, especially American, companies. ‘Unfortunately, the major Italian industry has not been very active. The only Italian agricultural machines I have seen are tractors from Fiat and Pavesi-Tolotti [i.e., Motomeccanica].’Footnote 143 Similar concerns were echoed by the Italian vice consul in Antalya, who decided to take the initiative himself in 1928 to fight against the ‘strong market presence of “Ford” and other foreign brands’. Having recently ‘facilitated’ the purchase of a Fiat water-spraying fire truck for the municipality of Antalya, the vice consul this time wrote to the Istanbul agency of the company. He asked for a ‘reliable agent’ to be sent to Antalya with ‘a few practical and economical machines’. The vice consul, using his apparently good relations with the vali (governor) of the city, had concrete plans for Italian companies to increase their presence:
I even reached an agreement with the Vali, who promised to provide a space in the Public Works building for a potential exhibition of Italian-brand cars and agricultural machinery, an initiative that could attract the interest of the vilayet’s farmers. Negotiations are also underway for the purchase of another Italian vehicle by the Vali, should the government in Ankara allocate him a service car.Footnote 144
Although the vice consul’s account may not provide a fully reliable measure of his actual role, given the likelihood of self-promotion in correspondence with Rome, it nonetheless serves as evidence of the perceived necessity and urgency to expand the footprint of Italian automobile and agricultural machinery firms in Turkey.
Beyond its value as a diplomatic gesture, the tractor gift was likely intended to influence purchases made by the Turkish government, ministries and local institutions. As part of its agricultural development programme, the government purchased tractors for distribution across Anatolia, leading to frequent tenders to select the most efficient machines. Consequently, the presence of the Motomeccanica tractor at Gazi Orman Çiftliği provided a crucial opportunity for the Turkish president, who himself drove tractors on the farm, and his technicians to assess its technical capabilities firsthand. This direct exposure was particularly strategic given that American Fordson tractors otherwise dominated the president’s machinery fleet.Footnote 145
Another long-term benefit of this gift was its potential use for teaching, for Gazi Orman Çiftliği also served as a training centre for machinists and students from the Ankara Agricultural School. Using an Italian tractor for training purposes would familiarise new machinists with its workings, giving Italian equipment a distinct advantage. As Turkish minister of agriculture Sabri Bey noted, the challenge of training drivers on diverse machinery forced the ministry to standardise its fleet, prioritising similar tractor models to ensure easier maintenance, lower costs and accessibility of spare parts.Footnote 146 Therefore, the greater the number of Italian tractors in agricultural schools, the higher the likelihood of their purchase by the Turkish government and farmers. This was not unprecedented since Italian tractors had already played a key role in agricultural education during the 1920s. A 1925 governmental decree mandated the purchase of the latest model Fiat tractor for agricultural schools, the same model that won a gold medal at the Adana International Agricultural Fair in May 1924.Footnote 147 Similarly, in 1926, the Turkish government acquired four Pavesi tractors for farms and the Ankara agricultural school.Footnote 148 This influence extended beyond vocational schools into general education. For example, the 1929 textbook Lessons on Objects (Eşya Dersleri) featured a Fiat tractor to teach fifth graders about agricultural mechanisation,Footnote 149 and technical manuals by Selahattin Bey relied on Fiat models to demonstrate technical principles of automobiles and tractors.Footnote 150 Viewed against this backdrop, Mussolini’s gift was far more than a simple diplomatic courtesy. It was a calculated continuation of a strategy designed to embed Italian machinery into the very foundation of Turkey’s agricultural future.
Conclusion
The tractor was thus not just a tool; it was a promise of progress, a tangible expression of the Turkish government’s push for agricultural mechanisation. In 1934, Edirne’de 6 Ok, the journal of Edirne People’s House (Edirne Halkevi), featured an article that directly linked agricultural development to nation-building:
The world has now bid farewell to stagnation and moderation… . Those who sleep will be captives and humiliated; those in motion will be free and honourable. Not only our lands but also our waters and skies will awaken and live… . hope-filled literature, institutes, schools, lights, ploughs, machines, tractors… . Workers and farmers running behind them; thinkers, labourers, powerful and creative intellectuals… . A great sun is rising in Asia Minor. This is a movement; in this movement, there is joy and a cry: a nation is awakening.Footnote 151
This ‘awakening’, used in the article in a propagandistic manner, was not just poetic but also physical. Tractors became the symbol of this transformation, replacing wooden ploughs and symbolising a new era of agricultural productivity.
Mussolini’s 1929 gift to Mustafa Kemal demonstrated a keen understanding of this mentality. It was not an isolated ceremonial act but rather a calculated strategy that leveraged the Turkish president’s personal interest in farming at Gazi Orman Çiftliği. Assessing the overall efficacy of this strategy requires distinguishing between its tangible commercial successes and its broader geopolitical limitations. On a purely economic level, the strategy helped cultivate a highly favourable commercial environment. As Paul Brummell notes, offering luxury or technological goods to a prominent global figure serves as an international advertisement, helping to build a global market for the donor’s domestic brands.Footnote 152 By integrating the tractor into daily farm operations and vocational training, the gift functioned precisely in this manner, positioning Italian machinery as a familiar choice. The success of this sustained commercial push was evident in the subsequent decade. By 1932, Fiat, for example, sought Mussolini’s approval for a major export order to Turkey, including seventy Pavesi tractors, forty city buses for Ankara, motorboats for customs administration and twelve hydroplanes, underscoring Italy’s growing role in shaping Turkey’s agricultural and transportation infrastructure.Footnote 153 Thus, in a competitive market dominated by American firms like Ford, Mussolini’s gift assisted Italian companies in reinforcing their presence and prestige.
Evaluating the geopolitical impact of the gift, however, reveals the inherent limits of gift diplomacy. Mussolini’s gesture contributed to the cordial environment that characterised Turkish–Italian relations following the 1928 Treaty of Neutrality and Reconciliation. It fostered goodwill and symbolised a period of pragmatic, friendly cooperation. Yet, as Anthony Cutler warns, it would be a mistake ‘to equate pronounced intentions with ultimate results’ or assume that deliberate diplomatic policy guarantees its desired geopolitical effects.Footnote 154 While the tractor was warmly received, this cordiality did not immediately translate into a direct, structural shift in Turkish foreign policy. Throughout the 1930s, Ankara maintained a vigilant watch over escalating geopolitical tensions in the Mediterranean. Particularly after its 1935 invasion of Ethiopia, Italy was increasingly perceived as a major threat to regional and international stability.Footnote 155 Nevertheless, a cautious pragmatism ensured that functional bilateral relations between the two nations persisted.Footnote 156 Thus, material gifts, no matter how technologically advanced or thoughtfully targeted, do not unilaterally guarantee trouble-free alliances.
Ultimately, this episode reveals that inter-war gift diplomacy thrived on its inherent ambiguity. The tractor was a diplomatic ‘key to success’ precisely because its meaning was flexible enough to satisfy both parties without requiring deeper geopolitical alignment.Footnote 157 It enabled Rome to expand its economic influence through a gesture of friendship, while allowing Ankara to secure a vital tool for turning the Anatolian ‘steppe into a fertile heaven’.Footnote 158 Ultimately, the tractor exemplifies how material gifts can operate as potent instruments for facilitating commercial exchange and projecting cordiality, even if their capacity to enact profound or permanent foreign policy changes remains fundamentally limited.
