Impact statement

This article aims to advance knowledge of the influence on global plastics treaty negotiations of developing states that have signed pledges, joined coalitions, or issued statements calling for ambitious obligations to end plastic pollution. It conceptualizes this informal, loosely coordinated grouping of states as a “quasi-bloc” of high-ambition developing countries (HADCs). Coalescing around a shared exposure to the health and ecological harms of plastic pollution, the HADC quasi-bloc, the authors show, has been a formidable force pushing for a treaty covering the full life cycle of plastics, including global controls on the extraction of fossil-fuel feedstocks, petrochemical production and product supply and design. It has been a powerful voice calling for common but differentiated responsibilities, adequate and equitable financing and just measures to protect the health and rights of marginalized peoples. And it has resisted the efforts of an alliance of petrostates – without a formal membership, but consistently including Russia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran – and petrochemical interests to weaken obligations and shift the scope of the treaty to downstream waste management. Significantly, even when some of the more vocal HADCs appear to lose ambition over the course of negotiations, others have stepped up to assume leadership. Showcasing the influence of Global South countries in treaty negotiations, the HADC quasi-bloc reveals the power of historically sidelined states in international relations. Yet the authors caution against overstating the quasi-bloc’s cohesion, unity and power in the face of intense pressure from petrostates and industry to lower ambition. A key contribution of this article is to introduce the concept of a HADC quasi-bloc and lay the groundwork for further research into the dynamics of rising, wavering and declining ambition among HADCs within plastics treaty negotiations.

Methodology

Our evidence draws on participant observation during plastics treaty negotiations. We build on three rounds of negotiations in Ottawa (in 2024), Busan (in 2024) and Geneva (in 2025). We attended the Ottawa and Geneva talks, and closely monitored the Busan talks, including coordinating and co-authoring with other participants. We took detailed notes of the negotiations, spoke with delegates and observers, attended side events and joined informal corridor discussions. We wrote daily summaries to track trends. Like most observers, however, we did not have access to formal closed-door sessions or informal behind-the-scenes interactions. This is a limiting factor of our study – one we strived to remedy by interviewing negotiators, lobbyists, scientists and nongovernmental participants. Whenever possible, we verified our participant observations against interview findings, policy documents, reports from international organizations and scientific publications.

We conducted 20 open-ended, semi-structured interviews – some confidential, others on the record – just before, during and after the talks in Geneva in 2025 (see Appendix A). Potential interviewees with substantial knowledge of the roles of developing countries in negotiating the global plastics treaty were identified by searching the internet, scholarly publications, policy documents, nongovernmental reports and lists of INC delegates and observers. When citing large numbers of interviewees, we use the shorthand “multiple interviewees.”

In addition to participant observation and interviews, we analyzed the content of country submissions, coalition statements and plenary speeches by state delegates (including recordings on UN Web TV, 2024, 2025). As mentioned, we also compiled a list of 80 developing countries that have signed pledges or statements in support of a high-ambition plastics treaty, revealing patterns of consistent support among some and more sporadic engagement among others (see Appendix B).

Rising, but limited influence of developing countries in environmental treaty negotiations

Developed countries and industry actors have tended to dominate environmental treaty negotiations, reflecting greater political, financial and technical resources. Developed countries forged the post-WWII international rules and today control strategic nodes in the global order – dominating key institutions and conventions, and exercising significant financial leverage and military capacity. These advantages have long reduced the bargaining power of developing countries in multilateral negotiations (Humphrey and Messner, Reference Humphrey and Messner2006). Debt burdens and reliance on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund further limit the autonomy and negotiating power of lower-income countries (DeSombre, Reference DeSombre2000). Industry actors and stakeholders, meanwhile, wield great power in both developed and developing countries. Dependence on specific sectors – such as mining, forestry, oil and gas, and agriculture – has enabled powerful industry interests to capture political levers and limit national autonomy in international environmental treaty negotiations (Saha, Reference Saha2024).

Yet the power of these states and industries is neither constant nor absolute, and the influence of developing countries in environmental treaty-making has been gradually increasing since the 1970s (Miller, Reference Miller1995; DeSombre, Reference DeSombre2000; Costantini et al., Reference Costantini, Sforna and Zoli2016). This trend stems from a range of factors that vary over time and by issue. A key factor has been the increasing economic strength of the Global South states, allowing them to invest in strategic sectors, including education, health, and industrial development. Another important factor contributing to their influence in treaty negotiations is the steady increase in the experience, skills and legal training of their negotiators, alongside expanding scientific expertise and greater participation by civil society organizations, scientists, Indigenous peoples and other rights holders as observers and advisors (Page, Reference Page2004; Chan, Reference Chan2021).

Importantly, forming and joining negotiating coalitions and alliances have helped developing countries amplify demands, pool resources and give more weight to the threat of refusing to sign an agreement. The G77 – founded in 1964, and now comprising 134 states – is one example of an influential coalition of developing countries. Other examples include the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS, founded in 1990, now with 39 members) and the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS, now with 14 members), which have empowered these states and facilitated joint statements and positions in negotiations. UN groups of developing countries with common goals – such as the 54 UN member states in the African Group and the 33 UN member states in the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) – have also enhanced the influence of blocs of developing countries within negotiations (Page, Reference Page2004; Costantini et al., Reference Costantini, Sforna and Zoli2016).

Furthermore, strategic bargaining and issue-linking to trade, security and natural resource access have also enhanced the power of developing countries during environmental negotiations. At times, the rising economic and political influence of China, India and Brazil and their leadership within blocs of developing countries, have further reinforced negotiating power, including by financing development and environmental projects (e.g., as China is doing with the Belt and Road Initiative) (Jinnah, Reference Jinnah2017). China and the G77, for instance, championed the inclusion of the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) principle in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, a principle that is now core to several environmental treaties. The importance of developing countries for environmental stewardship (e.g., biodiversity) and for protecting the global commons (e.g., climate) has also proven significant for enhancing the negotiating power of developing countries (Draguljić and Anspach, Reference Draguljić and Anspach2025).

Moral appeals have further strengthened the influence of developing countries in some environmental treaty negotiations (Rübbelke, Reference Rübbelke2011; Beaudoin, Reference Beaudoin2024). Such appeals have rallied global sympathy and civil society support, at home and abroad, by highlighting the far greater historical responsibility of wealthier countries for pollution, biodiversity loss and climate change, as well as the disproportionate vulnerability of low-income countries to contemporary harms. Invoking moral arguments has helped developing countries, for instance, advocate for the inclusion of principles of equity, justice and CBDR when setting obligations, targets, timelines and financing (Rübbelke, Reference Rübbelke2011).

As one would expect, the interests and influence of developing countries in multilateral environmental negotiations have varied widely, reflecting differences in economic priorities, geography and vulnerability to ecological change (Miller, Reference Miller1995; Williams, Reference Williams2005). The “developing” label itself is imperfect and fluid, with countries classified differently across agreements (Farias, Reference Farias2023, Reference Farias2024). Within the G77, positions range from Venezuela’s defense of oil interests to Tuvalu’s advocacy for urgent climate action (Williams, Reference Williams2005). Influence on treaty formation has ranged from minimal (e.g., the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer) to decisive (e.g., the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification, shaped largely by African states), and has taken diverse forms: blocking treaties (e.g., on forests, where tropical countries resisted restrictions on resource use), lowering ambition (e.g., the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, when China and India rallied allies to weaken targets) and raising ambition (e.g., when small island states secured a commitment in the 2015 Paris Agreement to aspire to limit warming to no more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels).

A significant trend over the past 50 years has been the aligning of positions of developing countries that are disproportionately and highly impacted by global environmental change – such as small island states, tropical countries and heavily-polluted low-income countries – to advocate for principles of livelihood rights, justice, equity, fair financing, historical accountability and moral responsibility in environmental treaties (Williams, Reference Williams2005; Costantini et al., Reference Costantini, Sforna and Zoli2016). These countries have increasingly become advocates of ambitious obligations and financing to address the escalating triple planetary crisis of pollution, biodiversity loss and climate change. In part, this trend reflects accelerating and compounding environmental crises in these countries, and a strengthening belief that these are grave threats to health, well-being and political stability – or, as with climate change, an existential threat to territorial integrity of the state and profound consequences for peoples and species. And, in part, this reflects demands from civil society, marginalized populations, fenceline and frontline communities, Indigenous peoples and other rights holders to enhance protections from these escalating environmental crises (Williams, Reference Williams2005; Etemire, Reference Etemire2023; Zhao and Etemire, Reference Zhao and Etemire2025).

Influence of the HADC quasi-bloc on plastics treaty negotiations

Rwanda and Peru, as we mentioned, were instrumental in launching plastics treaty negotiations in 2022. Together with Norway, Rwanda also cochairs the High Ambition Coalition (HAC) to End Plastic Pollution, an intergovernmental coalition of 75 state members plus Greenland and the EU (as of September 2026). Just before the 2024 talks in Busan, the HAC (2024) issued a Ministerial Joint Statement calling for “legally-binding,” “measurable” and “time-bound targets” to end plastic pollution, including obligations to decrease the “production and consumption” of new plastics to “sustainable levels.” Yet, even though many of its member states have pressed for strong treaty obligations, the HAC has not acted as a cohesive force for ambition during negotiations (participant observations). The ambition of some HAC members, such as South Korea, has been wavering and “ambiguous” (Dauvergne and Paik, Reference Dauvergne and Paik2025). The United Arab Emirates, which may have joined to monitor the coalition, has even openly opposed regulation of upstream production (Dreyer et al., Reference Dreyer, Hansen, Holmberg, Kielhöfer, Olsen and Stripple2025).

Leaders within the HADC quasi-bloc have joined HAC, including Mexico, Colombia, Panama, Ghana, Palau and Tuvalu. But their primary focus has been on leveraging broader and larger informal groupings of states to sustain – and raise – ambition (participant observations). During the Busan negotiations, for instance, Panama (2024) proposed a “global target to reduce” primary plastic production to “sustainable levels,” which 89 states supported. At the closing plenary in Busan, both Rwanda (on behalf of 84 states) and Mexico (on behalf of 94 states) called for the phasing out of “the most harmful plastics and chemicals of concern in plastics” (Mexico, 2024; Rwanda, 2024). The Panamanian delegate, meanwhile, received a standing ovation at this closing plenary after declaring that “the more than one hundred nations that demand action will return louder, stronger, and more determined than ever” (UN Web TV, 2024, Part 4, at 2:04:22).

Similarly, during INC-5.2 in 2025 in Geneva, scores of HADC delegates called for ambitious treaty obligations (participant observations; UN Web TV, 2025). The African Group, despite some sharp differences of opinion, especially between North African and sub-Saharan countries (interview 7), was a leading voice of ambition (interviews 1, 2, 7, 9, 16 and 17). Ghana (2025), for instance, submitted a statement on behalf of the African Group reiterating the region’s support for a legally binding treaty covering the full life cycle of plastics and with a robust financial mechanism for just transitions. “Africa is offering leadership and demanding justice,” the submission declared. “It is time the rest of the world meets us there.” Countries are “sticking together as an Africa bloc,” said Neil Tangri of the Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives, “and much more so than any of the other negotiating blocs. … That’s really been most powerful. And I think they’ve set the highest bar on ambition” (interview 2).

Pacific Island states similarly demanded a high-ambition treaty during the Geneva talks (participant observations). These states have been leaders in pushing for a “reduction” in global plastic production (interview 6), and have repeatedly underscored the disproportionate harms of plastic pollution on island nations, species and ecosystems (interview 2). At INC-5.2 in Geneva, Palau (2025) called for a treaty that “transforms the way we produce and consume.” Palau also called for procedural justice and greater fairness during the negotiation process. “We have been caught in a web of informals upon informals – uncounted, uncontrolled and stretching our small delegations to the breaking point” (Palau, 2025).

Many other HADC delegates also pressed for ambitious treaty clauses at INC-5.2, including from Bangladesh, Colombia, Chile, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Palau, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Uganda and Uruguay, among many others (participant observations; UN Web TV, 2025; multiple interviewees). They have also amplified the growing scientific evidence of escalating health harms from plastic pollution (Bowyer and Fletcher, Reference Bowyer and Fletcher2025; Beaudoin and Dauvergne, Reference Beaudoin and Dauvergne2026; Carney Almroth et al., Reference Carney Almroth, Grilli and Stoett2026). This has included raising awareness of contamination of food chains with microplastics, nanoplastics and chemical additives leaching from plastic waste (participant observations). Further, it has included the harms from the backyard and illegal burning of plastic garbage, a common practice in countries swamped by single-use plastic containers, bags and packaging (interviews 5 and 7; Pathak et al., Reference Pathak, Nichter, Hardon, Moyer, Latkar, Simbaya, Pakasi, Taqueban and Love2023; Dauvergne and Poole Lehnhoff, Reference Dauvergne and Poole Lehnhoff2026). One consequence has been a vocal and persistent demand by HADC delegates for a separate health article in the treaty to address the escalating health crisis from plastics (interviews 4 and 12; participant observations; Winters, Reference Winters2025).

Additionally, HADC delegates have elevated justice-related issues during plenary speeches and corridor discussions at INC-5.2 (participant observations; UN Web TV, 2025). These issues include the importance of addressing historical responsibility for pollution, disproportionate health and ecological burdens for most-at-risk developing regions, the importance of a human rights-based approach and the necessity of financing and compensation for highly polluted communities (participant observations; interviews 1, 7, 15 and 19; Carney Almroth et al., Reference Carney Almroth, Grilli and Stoett2026). This has amplified the demands of civil society and Indigenous peoples from these regions who are calling for just transitions and fair and ethical allocation of responsibilities (multiple interviewees). Illustrating this dynamic, Azul (2025), a justice organization working to promote ocean conservation, stated during the Geneva talks: “We are again heartened by the bold leadership of GRULAC Member States, particularly Panama, Colombia, and Mexico, who have championed the kind of treaty our communities need and deserve. They are listening to science, centering human rights, and working to ensure this treaty delivers on its promise.”

During the Geneva talks, numerous HADC delegates called for upstream controls on petrochemical and plastic production (interviews 1 and 6; participant observations). Some pressed for a limit or cap on primary plastic production. Others called for mandatory fees on the production of new fossil-fuel-based plastics to internalize some of the social, ecological and health costs into the price of plastics, as a way to enhance the financial viability of recycling, and help finance waste infrastructure and just transitions in low-income countries (participant observations; interviews 1 and 2). Others argued, however, that fees alone would be insufficient and must be paired with production caps (participant observations). Delegates also repeatedly stressed the need to restrict the production of single-use plastics (multiple interviewees), as some local governments in these countries have done over the past decade as single-use plastics overwhelmed collection, recycling and waste capacities (Dauvergne and Poole Lehnhoff, Reference Dauvergne and Poole Lehnhoff2026).

Throughout plastics treaty talks, HADC delegates have also called for robust, fair and equitable financing to enhance waste management and ensure just transitions to low-plastic economies in Africa, Latin America, the Pacific and Caribbean islands and developing Asia (interviews 6, 7 and 11; participant observations). This has included advocating for binding financial obligations for high-income countries, technology transfers and special financing for small island developing states (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs), a polluter-pays logic, capacity-building commitments and a dedicated multilateral fund internalizing CBDR principles (multiple interviewees; participant observations). Palau (2025), for instance, declared: “Our special circumstances must be operationalised – not just as words in a preamble, but through equitable and effective access to funds and means of implementation that allow SIDS’ full and effective participation. … SIDS are supportive of all developing countries being able to access finance; however, we can only accept a treaty which includes an undiluted, particular treatment for access for SIDS and LDCs.”

Significantly, the HADC quasi-bloc stood firm against pressure from petrostates, the oil and gas industry and their allies to lower ambition. Several HADCs forcefully rejected a revised treaty draft designed to appease states aiming to limit the reach and scope of the treaty to “waste management” (multiple interviewees). Tuvalu, on behalf of the 14 PSIDS, described this revised draft as crossing many of the group’s “red lines,” including the cutting of the “specific circumstances of small island states and least developed countries,” the importance of “Indigenous Peoples and traditional knowledge,” the necessity of covering “the full life cycle of plastics” and “Article 6 on sustainable production and consumption” (Tuvalu, 2025). Chile’s delegate Julio Cordano described the revised text as replete with loopholes and gaps, while Colombia’s delegate, Sebastián Rodríguez, called the text “completely unacceptable” (participant observations; McVeigh and Bryce, Reference McVeigh and Bryce2025). Micronesia called the draft “a step backward,” and Mexico declared that it signified a “crisis in multilateralism” (quoted in McVeigh and Bryce, Reference McVeigh and Bryce2025). Panama delegate Juan Carlos Monterrey went even further, calling the draft “repulsive.” “It is not ambition,” he emphasized, “it is surrender, and we will not allow our future generations a treaty as weak as this” (quoted in Winters, Reference Winters2025).

Constraints on the power of the HADC quasi-bloc

The HADC quasi-bloc has internal and structural weaknesses that further dilute its power. Notably, it is neither cohesive nor stable. There is a great diversity of interests, views, priorities and commitment to ambition within the quasi-bloc (interviews 1, 2, 4 and 7). At various times, countries such as Rwanda and Mexico have helped unite large portions of the quasi-bloc, but no single state or coalition has provided consistent leadership, limiting the emergence of sustained strategic direction and long-term coordination (participant observations; multiple interviewees). Delegations from HADCs were also relatively small, reducing participation in formal and informal negotiating sessions occurring simultaneously (Kiessling et al., Reference Kiessling, Rech, Reus and Walker2025; interviews 6, 7, and 11). Domestic industries in some developing states, moreover, have lobbied to restrain or lower their government’s ambition (multiple interviewees). Notably, many developing states signing high-ambition pledges have not demonstrated much ambition during negotiating sessions (participant observations).

Significantly, too, the HADC quasi-bloc does not represent the interests or views of a large portion of the Global South, including emerging economies such as China and India (interviews 2, 4, 5 and 6). “The stakes are much higher,” as an NGO policy analyst said confidentially, for developing states in oil-producing regions or with petrochemical and plastics industries (interview 11). Moreover, the vulnerabilities to plastic pollution vary widely across the developing world (interview 7), and views range on “who’s vulnerable, who’s developing, who needs help, who needs support” (interview 11). Some developing states supporting high-ambition statements, meanwhile, appear to have lost ambition, as may be the case for Rwanda, or were joining for reasons other than ambition, as may be the case for Brazil (multiple interviews; participant observations). Additionally, many states in the HADC quasi-bloc are entangled in geopolitical and geoeconomic webs that leave them vulnerable to pressure and intimidation from states opposing a strong plastics treaty (multiple interviewees).

Petrostate and industry pushback

The oil and gas, petrochemical and consumer goods industries have heavily influenced plastics treaty negotiations, including the stances of states such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, China, South Korea and the United States (Dauvergne and Paik, Reference Dauvergne and Paik2025; Kiessling et al., Reference Kiessling, Rech, Reus and Walker2025; Ralston et al., Reference Ralston, Carney Almroth, Radvany, Shah, Wang and Lee2025; Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Carney Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, de Groot, Farrelly, de Miranda Grilli, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggart, Tiller, Villarrubia-Gómez and Vince2025a, Reference Dauvergne, Ralston, Clapp and Taggart2025b; Taggart et al., Reference Taggart, Ralston and Tilsted2026). At INC-5.2 in Geneva, as at INC-5.1 in Busan, powerful political and industry groups strove to stall negotiations and weaken the ambition of the plastics treaty (Cowan et al., Reference Cowan, Fossbakk, Fischer, Nütz, Tiller and Maes2026). They sidelined Indigenous and other rights holders, cast doubt on scientific evidence and spread misinformation (participant observations; multiple interviewees). And they worked to prevent limits on production and narrow the treaty’s focus to downstream waste management (participant observations; multiple interviewees).

Petrochemical and fossil fuel lobbyists showed up in force at INC-5.2 in Geneva – with at least 234 officially registered, including 7 for Dow, 7 for the American Chemistry Council and 6 for ExxonMobil (CIEL, 2025b). Six of the lobbyists registered were part of the Egyptian delegation, four were on Kazakhstan’s, three were on China’s and three were on Iran’s (CIEL, 2025b). Approximately 99% of new plastics are manufactured from petrochemical feedstocks derived from crude oil and natural gas, and, as countries transition away from fossil fuels for energy, the oil and gas industry is increasingly looking to the expansion of plastics production to sustain future growth in oil demand (International Energy Agency, 2025; Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Ralston, Clapp and Taggart2025b). Consumer goods manufacturers and retailers also sent lobbyists to the Geneva talks, as did waste management companies. During open sessions, industry lobbyists were vocal and assertive, extolling the benefits of plastics, downplaying the need for regulation and advancing solutions like chemical recycling (participant observations; multiple interviews).

These figures and observations, moreover, represent “only the tip of the iceberg” of industry influence (quoted in CIEL, 2025b; verified by multiple interviewees; see also, Kiessling et al., Reference Kiessling, Rech, Reus and Walker2025). “On the first day of INC 5.2, we saw them boldly take the floor, speak in plenary, and push their agenda in plain sight,” said Rachel Radvany of Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). “They’re working in lockstep with petrostates to drag the process toward the lowest common denominator” (quoted in Mishra, Reference Mishra2025). As CIEL (2025b) further notes, industry influence “extends well beyond formal participation – through lobbyists embedded within country delegations, informal advisory roles, and lobbying during intersessional periods.” Many of these lobbying efforts happened behind the scenes and ahead of formal talks.

At a Geneva press conference, panelists highlighted how industry manufactured scientific doubt, strategically placing industry groups in key national hubs (e.g., Washington) and attending INC meetings to shape country positions – access generally denied to civil society (participant observations; CIEL, 2025a, 2025b). Industry is strategically locking out those most harmed by plastic pollution, argued John Chweya, the founder of Kenya’s Empower Grassroots Initiatives. Those profiting from plastic pollution, added Dylan Kava of the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network, were “weaponizing participation to water down ambition and delay systemic change” (quoted in CIEL, 2025a; participant observations). Xananine Calvillo, co-founder of Mexico’s Jna Tsjo Collective, was equally critical of the influence of oil, chemical and plastic industries on negotiations. “These industries are buying decisions to continue with their interests and profit from the destruction of life” (quoted in CIEL, 2025a).

Throughout the Geneva talks, delegates from Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – claiming to represent a “Like-Minded Group of Countries” – systematically opposed any measures to regulate upstream oil and gas extraction for petrochemical feedstock, the processing of petrochemicals and the production of plastics (multiple interviewees). Other countries, too, worked to protect and promote the interests of “big plastic” (de Groot and MacNeil, Reference de Groot and MacNeil2025). China and India spoke of the need for consensus and compromise, emphasizing the importance of balancing ambitious obligations with other priorities (participant observations). The United States also aligned itself with those pushing back against obligations to reduce plastic production or regulate petrochemicals (interviews 13 and 17; Schröder, Reference Schröder2025). A memo from the United States to several other delegations shortly before the start of the Geneva talks is telling: “We will not support impractical global approaches such as plastic production targets or bans and restrictions on plastic additives or plastic products – that will increase the costs of all plastic products that are used throughout our daily lives” (quoted in Le Poidevin and Volcovici, Reference Le Poidevin and Volcovici2025). As one nongovernmental observer told us confidentially, “the US position is to delay everything” (interview 4). Some observers even argue that industry and petrostates have effectively captured the negotiations, with overall ambition steadily declining over the course of the INCs (participant observations; interviews 8 and 10).

Clashing forces of ambition and opposition

At an opening reception for INC-5.2, the Swiss hosts and UNEP Executive Director Inger Andersen sought to set a tone of optimism and compromise. In hindsight, however, only limited progress was made in Geneva (participant observations; multiple interviewees). Time and again, those looking to weaken – or derail – the treaty shifted conversations toward framing and procedural matters. Lengthy discussions focused on whether the Chair’s text from Busan should serve as the basis for negotiations or be replaced by new proposals (participant observations). As in Busan, parties clashed over whether the treaty should address the “full life cycle” of plastics. Supporters insisted this was mandated by the UN Environment Assembly Resolution 5/14 (UNEA, 2022). Opponents, including the United States, argued that upstream regulation should only occur at the national level, given differing contexts and capacities (participant observations; Le Poidevin and Volcovici, Reference Le Poidevin and Volcovici2025; interview 8).

Emphasizing the need for consensus, delegates opposing upstream regulation of the plastics life cycle repeatedly called for further consideration of the treaty’s mandate, objectives and processes (participant observations). These delegates steered conversations in misleading or pro-industry directions, striving to ensure little to no binding obligations (interview 10). They insisted on bracketing text, deleting substantive provisions and revising drafts to insert ambiguity and loopholes, while introducing exceptions in the name of national circumstances or national security (participant observations; interviews 8 and 10).

Negotiations around production and supply were especially contentious during the Geneva talks, with coalitions of petrochemical and oil-exporting states repeatedly opposing HADC calls for stronger measures, drawing red lines through any obligations to reduce or cap plastic production (participant observations). This contrasted with the optimism of INC-5.1 in Busan, where a seeming understanding had emerged that the treaty would cover the full life cycle of plastics, but low-ambition states undermined this ahead of and during the Geneva talks (interview 20). For some delegations, this opposition seemed cast in stone (or in oil) from the opening day (participant observations and discussions with observers and delegates). Some state delegates even openly opposed having an article on supply or sustainable production (Article 6 in the Chair’s text for the Geneva talks) (participant observations). There was also strong pushback to Article 3 on “plastic products,” especially binding measures to reduce hazardous or single-use plastic products (participant observations).