Few political leaders and diplomats of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are as significant and controversial as Zhou Enlai, China's premier from 1949 to 1976. When Mao Zedong emerged as the top CCP leader, Zhou became his chief supporter and closest colleague. Zhou supported Mao's radical programs and political purges but was also respected by Mao's rivals as “a modern Saint.” He was popular among world leaders, including US president Richard Nixon, who described Zhou “as the greatest statesman of our era.” Michael Dillon's biography of Zhou is concise and highly approachable. It explains how Zhou became a CCP leader during Mao's reign and notes his standing as a national hero within an objective human portrait. Dillon's political and social survey treats Zhou's life as the history of modern China.

Dillon's focus on “an enigmatic revolutionary” (p. x) mentions Zhou's “natural great modesty” (p. 270) and limited ambitions, creating his legacy as one of the great leaders in modern Chinese history. Chapters 1–5 cover Zhou's life from 1898 to 1928, including his childhood, overseas studies, early revolutionary career in CCP movements, and civil war (1927–37) against the Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) government. Chapters 6–12 interpret how Zhou survived the Long March, World War II, and the Chinese Civil War (1946–49) and, after Mao proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, his rise to national leadership. Chapters 13–16 explore Zhou's mastery of China's foreign policy and renewal of diplomatic relations with many countries as premier and foreign minister from 1949 to 1957. Chapters 17–21 explain Zhou's involvement in Mao's radical movements and political purges from 1957 to 1965 and attempt to determine whether he was a benefactor or a victim. Chapters 22–23 focus on Zhou's final struggle during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 as he desperately tried to maintain his legacy. Zhou's political longevity led to China's consistent foreign policy, particularly during the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution.

Despite the difficulty of obtaining relevant information, Dillon offers a close-up of Zhou's life and an overview of his complicated personality and contradictory behaviors, on both the personal and public levels. Zhou combined traditional Confucian values with radical Communist ideology. As Dillon points out, “This was important component of his personality that served him well in his political life” (p. 271). A skillful politician, Zhou was able to transform Mao's extreme ideas and decisions into practical and manageable policies through the PRC's most difficult times.

This short biography serves as a useful overview for general readers and a jumping-off point for those exploring specific aspects about Zhou; it does not provide substantial or detailed information about specific decision-making with Mao or his diplomatic role. The book only provides a few sentences about Mao's decision to send Chinese troops into the Korean War (pp. 166–67), one of the most controversial decisions of his regime; Zhou was the only supporter at the Politburo meeting on October 4, 1950. The book has one sentence on Zhou and China's nuclear and strategic weapons development (p. 240). He played the leading role in China's first nuclear bomb testing in 1964, first hydrogen bomb in 1967, and first satellite launch in 1970. And the book barely mentions Nixon's visit (p. 265) to Beijing in 1972, where Zhou was crucial in working tirelessly and secretly with Henry Kissinger to make the “historical trip” happen. He was responsible for rapprochement that led to normalizing PRC-US relations.

One reason for the limited interpretations may come from lacking primary sources, including Zhou's papers, published in Zhou Enlai's Manuscripts since the Founding of the State (Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, three vols., 2008) and Selected Military Works of Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai junshi wenxun, four vols., 1997). In 2004 and 2009, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs declassified tens of thousands of diplomatic files from its early years. A large number of them expanded upon Zhou's leadership role as China's premier. CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press also published Records of Zhou Enlai's Military Affairs (Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi, two vols., 2000). These documents, if not available during the preparation of this book, would be useful for any further discussion on Zhou Enlai. Although the newly declassified documents shed light on many questions about Zhou's personality and political career, they do not necessarily offer automatic answers. They certainly provide new research opportunities, but they also require historians take greater care in the treatment of sources and innovate in the construction of new conceptual and analytical frameworks.