For most of American history, black Americans were excluded from the political process. Even after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, for decades, especially in the South, blacks were prevented from voting through various institutional tactics (e.g., poll taxes and literacy tests), violence, and intimidation (Franklin and Moss Reference Franklin and Moss2000; Grofman, Handley, and Niemi Reference Grofman, Handley and Niemi1992). As a result, most political institutions through the mid-twentieth century had few or no black faces. With the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Fifteenth Amendment was codified, and blacks began to vote and participate in the political process in unprecedented ways (Davidson and Grofman Reference Davidson and Grofman1994). Many civil rights activists saw this increased political access as an opportunity for blacks to elect representatives who would be responsive to the needs of the black community; there was an assumed connection between the election of black officials and the potential for obtaining substantive policy gains for black Americans. The goal was to elect not just any black politician, but those who had an authentic connection to the community and would work toward an economically and socially progressive agenda once in office (Clay Reference Clay1992; Guinier Reference Guinier1994, 44–54). The shift from protest to formal politics could be witnessed in the founding of organizations such as the Congressional Black Caucus in 1971. Congressman William Clay of Missouri wrote about the decision to organize black House members:
Stokes, Chisholm, and I came to Washington determined to seize the moment, to fight for justice, to raise issues too long ignored and too little debated. We were described by the media as militant, aggressive new leaders determined to make changes in the way black members of Congress had been viewed in the past. And we wasted no time seeking to establish a forum for articulating our concerns.
(Reference Clay1992, 116)Today, 40 years later, black members of Congress find themselves under serious scrutiny from black intellectuals and scholars. Many of the latter have argued that increased political incorporation has translated into cooptation of black leaders rather than strengthened advocacy for black Americans (Reed Reference Reed1999; Smith Reference Smith1996; Smith Reference Smith, Marable and Clarke2010). Others have asserted that even those black representatives committed to the black struggle are likely to find themselves tokens inside majority-white institutions, with very little power and influence (Guinier Reference Guinier1994). Now, with a new generation of black politicians adopting deracialized political frameworks in which race is removed from the discourse, the future of black leadership and its role in black political progress has been brought into question (Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh Reference Assensoh, Alex-Assensoh, Johnson and Stanford2003; Crayton Reference Crayton, Marable and Clarke2010; Marable Reference Marable, Marable and Clarke2010). Even with the first black U.S. president in office and a number of black Americans in leadership roles in American institutions and major political parties, some still argue that there is a crisis in black leadership. In this article, I argue that many black political leaders, specifically members of Congress, are actively engaged in advocating for issues relevant to the black community. However, I contend that much of that work remains invisible to the public. Further, I argue that strong advocacy on the part of black elected officials often encounters institutional and structural constraints. Many scholars have noted the institutional limitations that are placed on black mayors (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb Reference Browning, Marshall and Tabb1990), and I would also say that systemic challenges often restrict black political action in Congress. While some scholars suggest that institutionalized marginalization requires more radical politics that occur outside formal political institutions (Smith Reference Smith1996; Reed Reference Reed1999; Smith Reference Smith, Marable and Clarke2010), I believe that some important gains can also be made within American political institutions. To achieve substantive gains within majority-white institutions, I argue that two things must occur: (1) black elected officials must be more incorporated into institutional and party leadership positions, and (2) those individuals placed in leadership positions must have clear and strong ties to the black community. Even when government possesses these characteristics, I acknowledge that there are limits to how much change can be achieved through formal political institutions; however, I believe that formal institutions are one of many tools that can be used to push for social and economic equality for black Americans.
Background
Much of the literature on black congressional leadership has focused on whether black representatives behave in ways that differ from their white colleagues and result in better representation for black constituents. In other words, does the presence of more black faces in Congress lead to more quality representation for black Americans? The results are mixed, and much of what one finds is driven by what aspect of representation is chosen as the focus and how representational behavior is measured. Researchers have examined bill introductions as a measure of agenda setting (Bratton and Haynie Reference Bratton and Haynie1999; Canon Reference Canon1999;Haynie Reference Haynie2001; Sinclair-Chapman Reference Sinclair-Chapman2002; Tate Reference Tate2003), voting records and preferences as a measure of ideological alignment with the black community (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran Reference Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran1996; Canon Reference Canon1999; Hood and Morris Reference Hood and Morris1998; Lublin Reference Lublin1997; Overby and Cosgrove Reference Overby and Cosgrove1996; Sharpe and Garand Reference Sharpe and Garand2001; Swain Reference Swain1993; Tate Reference Tate2003; Whitby Reference Whitby1997), and the influence of committee behavior and debate on political discourse (Gamble Reference Gamble2007; Hall Reference Hall1996; Minta Reference Minta2009). Yet, no consensus exists on what is gained for African American constituents by having more black faces in Congress. Understanding black political behavior, I argue, requires a more intimate examination. Collecting data on committee behavior, bill introductions, and voting records provides some perspective on congressional behavior, but it misses much of the work that occurs inside the institution on a daily basis (Hall Reference Hall1996). Much of that work—done by staffers, in private meetings, and through informal conversations—goes unseen, but has significant influence on political outcomes. It is with these invisible political actions that many black political leaders are fighting for changes on behalf of the black community.
View from Inside
I use two examples to elucidate my arguments about black political leadership. My analysis and arguments are based on my observations as a 2009–10 APSA Congressional Fellow. As a Congressional Fellow, I worked in the policy shop of the U.S. House Majority Whip's Office for James E. Clyburn (D-SC). At the time, Mr. Clyburn was the third highest ranking Democrat in the House and only the second black American to hold the Majority Whip position.Footnote 1 Democrats were in control of both chambers and the presidency. However, without a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and with an ideological diverse House Democratic Caucus, many described the 111th Congress as divisive and extremely partisan.
A bit more about my “boss,” (as political staffers often refer to their members): Mr. Clyburn grew up in South Carolina and was involved in public service and community organizing from a young age. He is a graduate of South Carolina State College, a historically black college and university. Early in his career, he worked as a high school teacher in Charleston and later served as an advisor for South Carolina Governor John West. He also served as South Carolina's Human Affairs Commissioner for nearly 20 years before he resigned to run for Congress in 1992.
Mr. Clyburn is a part of the civil rights generation—he grew up in a segregated South and participated in marches and protests during the 1960s. In fact, he met his wife, Emily, while in jail for participating in a protest. His ability to run for political office and his subsequent service as a leader in American politics can be directly tied to the achievements of him and his peers during the civil rights era. I point this out because there were many times throughout my fellowship when I witnessed Representative Clyburn pull from that personal history to discuss contemporary political issues. For example, as House Democrats fought to pass health care reform, Mr. Clyburn often spoke about the matter as a civil rights issue. When different factions were pushing for a single-payer system or nothing while others to the right within the Democratic Party saw this effort as a losing battle, Mr. Clyburn used the 1964 Civil Rights Act as a lesson in political pragmatism. He noted that when the 1964 Civil Rights Act was being legislated, some thought that it should not move forward without including voting rights—but the Act passed and served as a stepping stone for future civil rights legislation. Of course, history shows us that just a year later, the 1965 Voting Rights Act was passed, solidifying black Americans' political rights. This example serves as a testament to how Mr. Clyburn's personal background influences his politics and viewpoint. Even if his discourse is not always explicitly racialized, it is clear that being a black man in America and growing up in the 1960s informs his political framework. All members' personal histories inform their political perspective and behavior in some way, and this is no different for black elected officials (Burden Reference Burden2007; Gamble Reference Gamble2007). I argue that the strength of Mr. Clyburn's experience—participating in the civil rights movement and having strong ties to the black community—was not erased once he obtained a leadership position. To the contrary, these experiences appear to inform his work and how he communicates with his colleagues in important ways. The cases presented in this article show that increased political incorporation can provide positive benefits to the black community.
Before I begin my analysis, I want to provide some additional information about my fellowship experience so that the reader can understand my vantage point for this analysis. I worked in the Majority Whip's Office for eight months, from January 2010 until August 2010. I was quite lucky in my placement in the Whip's Office. Serving in a leadership office granted me access to multiple points in the legislative process that would have been unavailable to me if I were a staffer in a member office. I was able to observe votes from the floor chamber and attend Democratic Caucus and several other Democratic leadership meetings. However, for a leadership office, our staff was relatively small, and everyone was seen as an important part of the Clyburn team—which meant that I was fully incorporated into the office in a substantive way. I helped write memos, took constituent meetings, conducted research for legislation, and helped staff the member for various meetings. It was a fast-moving place where it was necessary to jump in or get left behind—which required some adjustment for me, as an academic. By the end of the fellowship, I was a working member of the team with multiple projects.
Academic judiciousness prevents me from making broad generalizations based on my observations, but I do believe that they provide important information about black political leadership and hopefully will encourage scholars to think innovatively on how they might analyze representational behavior that is not readily apparent. There is an immense amount of significantly important political action that occurs behind the scenes. The fellowship year was the ultimate in “soaking and poking” (Fenno Reference Fenno1986), as described by seminal political scientist Richard Fenno, and I believe there is a lot to be learned from such an immersion in congressional politics.
Influencing the Agenda: The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
One way that representatives influence legislation and policy is through agenda setting (Hall Reference Hall1996). Some scholars have found that African American representatives are more likely to introduce bills that reflect the interests of the African American community (Hall Reference Hall1996; Canon Reference Canon1999). However, hundreds of bills are introduced in Congress each year. Bill introductions have little substantive impact if they do not make it through the legislative process and onto the floor for debate and a final vote. In a year when the country was in the midst of an economic crisis and the president was pushing major legislation such as health care reform and Wall Street reform, getting a piece of legislation on the agenda was no small feat. However, being a part of the majority party leadership and having the ear of the Speaker provides the House Whip with a level of influence that is unavailable to most rank-and-file members. I was able to observe firsthand how having a black American in a leadership position can affect the legislative agenda in important ways.
Background: Crack-Cocaine/Powder Cocaine Sentencing Disparity
In 1986, Congress passed legislation imposing long prison sentences for even low-level crack possession. The amount of crack cocaine that a defendant had to possess in order to receive a severe sentence was 100 times lower than the amount required of defendants who possessed powdered cocaine. At the time, the argument was that crack cocaine induced violence and extreme criminal behavior, and tougher penalties were required to protect poor and black neighborhoods ravaged by the drug. The law also instituted a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for individuals found with five grams of crack cocaine—equivalent to the weight of two pennies (Sentencing Project Research and Advocacy for Reform 2010). The availability and cheapness of crack made it more likely to be consumed by poor and black American individuals; therefore, the law resulted in the mass incarceration of black Americans. While U.S. government data find that drug-use rates are similar across racial and ethnic groups, black Americans are much more likely to be prosecuted for drug offenses (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2006). According to a report by the Sentencing Project, “Between 1994 and 2003, the average time served by African Americans for drug offenses increased by 62 percent, compared to an increase of 17 percent for white drug offenders” (Sentencing Project Research and Advocacy for Reform 2010).
Bill Passage
For decades, advocates and politicians have pushed for a change in the crack cocaine sentencing law. 2010, with a Democratic president and Democratic control of both congressional chambers, seemed a perfect time to pursue legislation that would resolve this racially discriminatory sentencing policy. Congressman Robert “Bobby” Scott (D-VA) was chair of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security and actively spoke out against the crack cocaine/powder cocaine sentencing disparity. In many ways, Mr. Scott's efforts kept the policy issue on the congressional radar even during politically unfriendly climates. His office also worked diligently with various organizations and House Republicans and senators to negotiate language that could successfully become law.
In the summer of 2010, several major issues were taking up the political agenda—jobs, the unemployment extension, and the Gulf Coast oil spill—and serving as impediments to the Fair Sentencing Act getting to the floor for a vote. First, the theme of the moment was jobs, jobs, and jobs. With the national unemployment rate holding steady at 9.6%, Democrats were focused on passing legislation that would save jobs or create jobs. Summer recess was just around the corner, and the urgency of getting as much done to help stimulate job growth was quite apparent. Then-Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD) had just presented the “Make It in America” agenda, which focused on the manufacturing sector and legislation that would spur job creation. Given the state of the economy, the focus of the Democratic leadership was justified and not surprising, but it did make it more difficult to move legislation that did not fit into that focused agenda. Second, Democrats were negotiating with the Senate to try and pass legislation to extend unemployment benefits. The temporary extension had expired and millions of Americans found themselves without income; therefore, the House Democratic leadership was also focusing its attention on discussions with the U.S. Senate to develop legislation that would allow for the extension of unemployment benefits. Finally, multiple bills and hearings to deal with the 2010 Gulf Coast oil spill were dominating the agenda.
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was supported by years of research and was a bipartisan bill with support from Democrats and Republicans in both chambers of Congress. However, given the political climate, the bill would not have made it onto the House floor for a vote in August 2010 if not for the work of Mr. Scott and Mr. Clyburn. Mr. Scott's staff and staff from the Whip's office held several meetings hashing out details and solidifying bicameral and bipartisan support for the bill. Furthermore, Mr. Clyburn saw the legislation as a civil rights issue and spoke with members of the Democratic leadership about the importance of the legislation and the need to get it onto the floor for a vote before the summer recess. I was on the House floor when the bill was voted on, and its passage was amazingly uncontroversial. Members of both parties got up and spoke in support of the bill, and it passed with a simple voice vote. The whole process took less than hour, which is unheard of in such a partisan political climate. Yet I was struck by the fact that if Mr. Clyburn had not pushed for the bill to be placed on the floor, it would have likely died at the end of the session. This served as a clear example of the substantive impact of having a black representative with a commitment to civil rights issues in a leadership position.
Certainly, holding leadership positions within a majority-white institution and party requires some compromise; party leaders are expected to represent a much broader agenda. However, if the leaders holding those positions have both a strong commitment to the black community and access to power, the results can be beneficial for those pushing for racial equality. Sometimes the barrier to success is not substantive conflict, but rather the difficulty of getting one's voice heard through the barrage of issues fighting for attention—and having an advocate with a seat at the table who is willing to speak up can be invaluable. As a testament to his commitment to social justice, Congressman Scott introduced a bill in the 112th Congress that would allow the Fair Sentencing Act to be applied retroactively to people currently serving prison time as a result of the old racially discriminatory policy. Of course, his fight will be much harder in a Republican-controlled House, but he has continued to pursue these important policies, despite the difficulty.
Getting in the Weeds: Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) Capital Financing Program
The Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) Capital Financing Program is a small but important program in the Department of Education. The program was designed to provide “low-cost capital to finance improvements to the infrastructure of the nation's historically black colleges and universities” (U.S. Department of Education 2009) and assist HBCUs in obtaining loans to renovate and construct buildings. Many HBCUs are quite small and have limited access to capital. Most individuals will have never heard of this program, but those that are aware of it are likely to acknowledge that it has some serious problems. In fact, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in 2006 suggesting multiple reforms to the program. Without getting into too much detail, the biggest issue with the program is the way in which the government structures the loans. Colleges and universities participating in the program are required to put 5% of their loan into a pooled escrow account. The pooled escrow account lowers the risk for the government but places an enormous burden on the educational institutions—if one university defaults on its loan, then all participating colleges and universities are required to cover the cost of that default. There are also some additional problems with the level of collateral required for the loans—in some instances, colleges are required to put their entire campus up for collateral. The fiscal burden of covering other universities' defaults have discouraged many HBCUs from participating in the program, limiting its potential impact.
Representative Clyburn has long been an advocate of HBCUs and is himself a graduate of one. As noted previously, like all members of Congress, African American representatives bring their personal histories to the institution, but these histories are likely to be shaped by racial experiences in ways that some white representatives' experiences might not. Congressional scholar Richard Hall (Reference Hall1996) argues that preference intensity—the strength with which a member advocates for an issue—can be explained, in part, by the member's personal interests and history. When supporters of HBCUs are looking for an advocate in Congress, they might be better served by someone who has strong ties to HBCUs, understands the history of the institutions, and has a personal commitment to the preservation of the institutions.
While I was working for Mr. Clyburn as a fellow, the office was contacted by several universities and advocacy organizations concerned about problems with the HBCU Capital Financing Program. I and some other colleagues were tasked with researching the program and developing a series of potential solutions to make it more viable and less burdensome to the educational institutions it was meant to benefit. This task involved not only working with advocacy organizations to think through legislative language that would improve the program, but also communicating concerns about the program to congressional liaisons at the Department of Education. By the completion of my fellowship, active discussions about how the Department of Education might improve the program and what efforts might be made to draft the appropriate legislative language were already occurring. Unfortunately, my tenure in the Whip's Office ended before I was able to see the project completed, but I felt confident that Mr. Clyburn was committed to pursuing this issue, and that changes were likely to occur soon.
I present this example because although the HBCU Capital Financing Program is small, it has a clearly racial framework and is substantively important to black higher education. Given the size of the program and the small political capital of HBCUs relative to other U.S. interests groups, this issue is likely to get little (if any) media attention. Clearly, a member of Congress will not take on this issue for public credit or political benefits. Fixing this program requires a representative who is willing to get in the weeds and secure the ear of the Department of Education, and Mr. Clyburn is a representative who, because of his position in the Democratic leadership and his personal commitment to HBCUs, fits that description. Most legislation that gets through Congress has only a small or incremental impact, but it is important that those steps get taken. When evaluating black political leadership, some might look only to large political issues like health care reform, which no doubt is important, but they are likely to miss the many smaller and quieter ways in which black members of Congress are making a difference.
Conclusion
I offer these observations not to make broad generalizations about black political leadership, but rather to extend the discussion about the ways that black leaders can influence political change. One clear limitation of this article is that it is based on the observations of a single individual from the vantage point of one congressional office. I openly accept this limitation but note that it is also a strength. Spending nearly a year working in a congressional leadership office for a black member of Congress gave me a perspective unavailable to most congressional scholars. Although I was working as a congressional staffer, my observational lens was clearly that of an academic, and it is from that viewpoint that I have written this article.
I only focus on two issues here, but while working in the Whip's Office, a number of issues that one might consider black interest issues arose: funding to support community health centers under the health care reform law, advocacy to address the deleterious impact of pay-day lenders on the poor and communities of color during Wall Street reform debates, and the development of small programs to help spur employment in poor communities. Many of these policies were smaller parts of larger bills and received little attention. Additionally, the impact of these changes could be described as incremental rather than revolutionary. Given the challenges facing the black community such as health disparities, soaring unemployment rates, and an educational achievement gap, some might argue that we need more radical and revolutionary changes. I would not disagree with that assessment, but I would also say that given the challenges, we should pursue all paths toward racial and economic equality. Electing black leaders who are rooted in the black community and can achieve significant political incorporation can serve as one successful strategy for black political progress.
