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Speaking Truth to Power on the Brink of Armed Conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2026

Tess Bridgeman,
Doug Wilson,
Chimene Keitner,
Namira Negm and
Srinivas Burra
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Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting , Volume 119 , 2025, pp. 311 - 320
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© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Society of International Law

Introductory Remarks by Tess Bridgeman

Welcome to “Speaking Truth to Power on the Brink of Armed Conflict,” which aims to understand and advance our thinking on legal advising on the jus ad bellum.

The jus ad bellum is, of course, the body of law that grew up over centuries to divide us from our darker past when wars of conquest were seen as a legitimate right. Today, it is well accepted that the jus ad bellum’s prohibition on the resort to force except in legitimate self-defense (or with proper UN Security Council authorization) is the bedrock of our international order. As a legal regime, the jus ad bellum is arguably showing signs of erosion, but also of resilience—lawyers play key roles in both phenomena, each of which I hope we can examine today.

For those involved in legal advising in the field of international law, the duty to safeguard the jus ad bellum against abuse, or unintentional erosion, is a solemn one. As a former government attorney at the U.S. State Department and White House, I can attest that it is one that my colleagues and I took very seriously. Legal advisers in this practice area are also keenly aware that our government’s actions and the legal justifications we provide in taking them are a part of forming, or shifting, customary international law on extraordinarily contentious issues.

But at the outset, we should also recognize that most government officials in a position to be making decisions regarding the use of force understand the basic principles of the jus ad bellum before turning to their lawyer: we cannot invade a neighboring state to seize its territory or resolve a dispute and we cannot threaten to use force that would itself be unlawful. Unfortunately, egregious examples of these basic rules being violated—such as Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine—are all too easy to find in modern practice. Cynicism regarding how the jus ad bellum is faring as a body of law is not unmerited.

But taking the most egregious violations off the table, the jus ad bellum is also notorious for its grey areas and ambiguities in harder cases, particularly given it is the subject of so little black letter treaty law. Just in the context of recent U.S. practice, government lawyers have grappled with questions such as whether states are permitted to use non-consensual force in self-defense in the territory of other states that are “unwilling or unable” to address a threat posed by non-state actors operating there, and whether the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has achieved the status of customary international law, to name just a few examples.

Likewise, the contours of what constitutes a legitimate invocation of self-defense (a permissible basis for the use of force that is enshrined in treaty law) can be contested: Is the threat of armed attack sufficiently concrete in cases where no armed attack has yet occurred? What must be done, in practice, to exhaust peaceful means in each unique context? What limits does jus ad bellum proportionality place on how much force may be used in self-defense? What are the ongoing requirements of the jus ad bellum after an initial use of force—if consent of the territorial state is withdrawn or modified, if the circumstances justifying reliance on the “unwilling or unable” doctrine have changed, or if the threat justifying the use of force has been mitigated, but only partially or in an uncertain manner?

Alongside questions of law, advising on the jus ad bellum often requires addressing issues that go beyond doctrine: Will other states agree with the espoused legal theory? Can we explain publicly the factual basis for our invocation of self-defense? What consequences might we face if the answer is “no” to either of the former? These questions sounding in reciprocity and necessitating legal diplomacy can be just as important, and fraught, as providing sound legal advice to policymakers.

With an understanding of the legal and law-adjacent substantive questions at issue, we can turn to the core content of our panel today: the process of advising on the jus ad bellum. Often, but not always, jus ad bellum questions arise in a highly charged, fast-moving policy process. The stakes are high. As a result, there can be strong pressure to “get to yes” on use of force decisions (though the legal advising culture can vary considerably across states and across administrations within a state). This pressure can be caused by expectations in the policy process itself, but can also be driven by legal culture, including a fear of irrelevance should the client pursue a use of force policy against legal advice, and a desire to be viewed as facilitating the preferred policy choices of the client, among other factors. In some cases, the real consequences of embracing (or generating) further elasticity in the law can be neglected given the high-stakes policy consequences of acknowledging and acting within real constraints.

How should policy processes be designed, and legal advising cultures fostered, to ensure meaningful provision of legal advice in the jus ad bellum context? Are there modalities learned from past mistakes—such as ensuring lawyers with the relevant international law expertise are present in deliberations on the use of force from the outset, with full access to intelligence and other necessary information, requiring advice to be written down ex ante rather than memorialized only post hoc, and setting the standard for legality higher than “plausibility,” for example—that should be considered best practices? If so, how can they be implemented sustainably in high pressure situations across a range of scenarios?

The experts assembled here with diverse backgrounds and a rich array of practical experience will help us understand, in concrete terms, how legal advice on the jus ad bellum is developed, communicated, memorialized, received, and accepted (or not) inside governments and international organizations. We hope to conclude with a summation of best practices in service of fostering the resilience and reinforcing the importance of this crucial area of international law.

Hard Lessons Learned in the United Kingdom
Doug Wilson

I. Iraq - Background

In looking at how to give advice on the jus ad bellum, it is instructive to look at past examples. In the United Kingdom (UK) at least, the process within government around decision making that led to British participation in the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 is the most resonant.

What follows are of course my personal views, not those of my government.

As many will recall, following the 9/11 attacks and military action in Afghanistan, the then U.S. administration began to seriously consider its options for dealing with the threat of Saddam Hussein and the belief that he still had Weapons of Mass Destruction and might use them again or provide them to terrorists. This led to a U.S.-led invasion and regime change in 2003, with the UK and over forty other countries being alongside the United States.

The international law position made public by the UK at the time of the invasion was the “revival” argument, namely that the material breach by Iraq of the Security Council resolutions bringing about a ceasefire to the first Gulf War in 1991 revived the Chapter VII authority provided by the Security Council in 1990 to use “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the area. This legal position was shared by the United States and a number of other countries who expressed a public position.

In the aftermath of the invasion, and in light of both the absence of any Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq and major difficulties for Coalition forces in Iraq, the UK government set up a public inquiry—which became known for its chair, a former senior civil servant called Sir John Chilcot. The Chilcot inquiry took seven years to conclude hearings and finally produce a report.

The report is public and anyone interested in a detailed and public explanation of how government works and how legal advice on the use of force was given can read its 171 pages just on that point (with the transcripts of individual witnesses running to hundreds more pages).Footnote 1

II. Chilcot on the Process of Giving Legal Advice on the Lawfulness of the War

The overall conclusion of Chilcot on the law was:

[T]he Inquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was legal. That could, of course, only be resolved by a properly constituted and internationally recognised Court. We have, however, concluded that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were far from satisfactory.Footnote 2

There are five criticisms or questions identified around those circumstances and that process that are worth touching on:

  1. (1) Legal advice was not sought early enough. In the UK system, the attorney general is the chief legal adviser to government and the Crown, and advises on all critical issues involving legal considerations. The implications of the Inquiry’s criticism was that those at the center of the UK government should have asked for fuller and formal legal advice at an earlier stage and not asked the lawyers to hold back.

  2. (2) Full legal advice was not given to the Cabinet when it was considering whether the UK should participate in the military action. Only the positive legal justification for the military action was given, not the full legal advice which gave a more comprehensive outline of legal pros and cons indicating that a further UN resolution was preferable and that there were legal risks in proceeding. The Inquiry said that the Cabinet should have been made aware of the legal uncertainties.

  3. (3) The factual evidence of a “material breach” which was provided by No. 10 Downing Street was criticized as “perfunctory” and should have been fuller and more considered.

  4. (4) Questions were asked about the standard of legal certainty in the case of military action. Often lawyers can see arguments on different sides. Should a lawyer advising a government on military action advise that “reasonable” or arguable justification be enough for a country to use military force? Or should there be a higher standard, for example that you have to decide that is the “better” legal view? The Inquiry did not resolve this question, but a number of witnesses before it argued for a higher standard of legal certainty for situations involving military action.

  5. (5) The public explanation of the legal justification for the UK’s participation in the military action was criticized in part too, with ministers rather than the attorney general suggested as best placed to make explanations of a legal position.

III. The Situation Today: Aiming to Avoid the Same Mistakes

Today, those events and the Chilcot Inquiry Report continue to have an impact on how we make government decisions, and not just on legal advice.

For example, in meetings involving foreign policy or national security or in a crisis, placed in front of the prime minister and every other attendee is a copy of what is called the “Chilcot Checklist”—a list of challenging questions we are reminded to ask ourselves with the aim of making the best possible decisions.

One of those questions is a reminder to ensure proper consideration of the lawfulness of any course of action.

As a practitioner within government advising on the use of force today, it is incredibly helpful to have that as a starting point.

There are five other developments since the Chilcot Report worth mentioning:

  1. (1) Lawyers are now brought in from the outset, with the attorney general being a member of the National Security Council, which makes decisions on these matters as a Cabinet Committee, and his officials attending such meetings at official level. This means the attorney general and his lawyers are able to hear the same briefings, understand policy or operational aims or drivers as they develop, and—to quote the great musical Hamilton— “be in the room where it happens” in a manner which helps legal thinking be fully integrated into policy and decision making.

  2. (2) The attorney general’s office (AGO) established a National Security Council legal group. Chaired by the director general of the AGO, this brings together the head lawyers from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence, intelligence agencies, and a number of others in government. Its purpose is to support and advise the attorney general in his role within the National Security Council. It considers both specific situations and more detailed guidance on the law, legal process, and how relevant facts or intelligence should be gathered and assessed.

  3. (3) International law is part of our Ministerial Code of Conduct. Overseen by the UK prime minister, the Code obliges his or her ministers to comply with an “overarching duty” to comply with the law, including international law. It has now been woven into other guidance documents on the use of force and on the provision of legal advice by government lawyers.

  4. (4) The applicable standard of legal argument is now explicit. In the UK system, the attorney general is responsible to Parliament and to the public for all legal advice in government. Successive attorneys have issued guidance to government lawyers on how best to present legal risk. The latest Guidance, issued by Lord Richard Hermer KC last year, provides that—in line with professional legal obligations incumbent on lawyers across the UK— “tenability” or arguability is the relevant minimum standard for a legal argument to justify government action. The attorney general’s Guidance adds to this though, that lawyers should be giving full merits advice not just on what arguments may be tenable, and that the tenability standard may not be appropriate in some situations.

  5. (5) Successive governments have published summaries of the government legal position when embarking on military action. Examples include Syria, Libya, and, most recently, Yemen and the Red Sea. Importantly, these are not summaries of legal advice, but rather statements of the legal position. They are made in a lawyer’s advocacy not advisory role, and so do not outline any risks publicly in a way that would undermine a government’s legal, political, or diplomatic position.

These process improvements are set out to suggest only that a better process is more likely to produce a stronger, resilient, and considered legal position, and ensure decisionmakers are alive to the legal risks they are taking. It does not, of course, mean that everyone will necessarily agree with that legal position.

Remarks by Chimene Keitner

I have been asked to speak about how international lawyers in the U.S. government formulate legal advice, although in the interest of full disclosure I have been an academic for about ten times as long as I served as counselor on international law at the U.S. Department of State. One of the things I have done in my international law class is teach the Chilcot ReportFootnote 1 that Doug mentioned, including some of the testimony given both by Sir Michael Wood and Elizabeth Wilmshurst. One of my favorite lines from her testimony is when she was asked “isn’t [Foreign Secretary] Jack Straw a lawyer,” although in the circumstances he was the policy client. She paused and responded, “he’s not an international lawyer.” I think that is very important because there is a certain discipline and sensibility that comes with an international legal training.

The title of this panel is “Speaking Truth to Power.” I certainly feel this is an important part of my job as an academic, but I am not sure this is the self-conception of the typical civil servant. In the current Trump administration, I think many civil servants are concerned primarily with keeping the ship afloat. I would recommend Bec Ingber’s article on “interpretation catalysts,” which does a terrific job illustrating how the context in which a legal issue arises shapes the advice given.Footnote 2 The development, communication, and implementation of legal advice—to use Tess’s framework—is an iterative process, and sometimes these three things are happening at the same time. As Doug mentioned, one of the observations from the Chilcot Report was that lawyers should have been consulted sooner in the decision-making process.

Generally, in the United States, the development of legal advice happens initially within each government agency that has an “equity” (in government lingo) or some sort of stake in the decision being made. With jus ad bellum issues, this would include, at a minimum, the Legal Adviser’s Office in the State Department and the General Counsel’s Office in the Department of Defense. Assuming the issue is at least somewhat nuanced, there would be in-depth research about past U.S. practice and statements, as well as other countries’ past practice and statements, and an assessment of what other countries’ reactions would be to a proposed course of conduct. A legal analysis would also take account of how particular actions might shape customary international law or the interpretation of multilateral treaties. All of these considerations are taken into account in the development stage of legal advice. There will then be an interagency consultation process, including among the lawyers, to try and establish a shared understanding about the applicable legal requirements and any areas of disagreement. The more politically sensitive or challenging the issue, the more disagreement you might see. The idea is to reach a consensus but that is not always possible. The remains some constructive ambiguity around which agency should have the last word.

The primary audience for legal advice in the first instance is the policy client, who is the actual decisionmaker. But Doug raised another very important point, which is that eventually there is also going to be a public audience. I contributed a short piece to the McGill Law Journal some time ago called “Explaining International Acts” that talks about the importance of public legal justifications for a country’s actions.Footnote 3 Keep in mind that sometimes the implementation or result is presented before the legal advice is fully formulated. This might feel familiar to those of you who work as outside counsel or general counsel for corporations. I do not imagine a lot of CEOs come to the lawyers and say “OK, my mind is completely open as to what course of action I’m going to take, and absolutely if you tell me something is a ‘no go’ I won’t even consider it.” There are similar sorts of dynamics for government lawyers, who do not want to make themselves irrelevant. The hydraulic pull that that desire to remain relevant has for both government and corporate lawyers can be extremely corrosive. Another piece I would commend to you is Rebecca Sanders’s book Plausible Legality.Footnote 4 During the Obama administration, legal justifications were crafted to make certain courses of conduct at least plausibly legal. As international law professors, we often say “well, that’s preferable, we’d like you to at least say that you’re following the law because then it shows that you think the law is important.” But the flip side is you get these very elastic legal definitions that do not feel constraining.

This is the dilemma that I am left with and it is a dilemma that in my current role I am facing as an academic and a teacher, which is that speaking truth to power presumes that there is a receptiveness to truth among those in power. The current secretary of defense has repeatedly gone on the public record indicating that he disagrees fundamentally with the legal restrictions that exist because he thinks they hinder the United States’ ability to conduct war effectively. We have a nominee for the legal adviser to the State Department who in confirmation hearings—and this is a bind because you know you currently have an audience of one in any confirmation hearing in the United States—but when the question was posed to him whether he would only offer advice that is consistent with current federal law, there was not a “yes” or “no” answer. The response was, “the law is a conversation.” I agree from an academic perspective and even from a practitioner’s perspective there are elements of law that are conversations, but I think if we are talking about providing legal advice then we cannot always treat law as a “conversation.” You will end up in the situation that Elizabeth Wilmshurst found herself in, where she determined that the legal justification for joining the U.S. invasion of Iraq was insufficient. And, when her advice was not accepted, she resigned.

Jus ad Bellum in Practice
Namira Negm

Lawyers are usually called by governments when there is a political will to resort to war. Hence, it is not a legal decision but a political, economic, and military one and lawyers are called to analyze jus ad bellum to provide for the “packaging” on how to activate what the executive wants.

The packaging of lawyers usually focuses on the concept of self-defense to justify resorting to war under Article (51) of the UN Charter, which requires an attack by a state against another, when it stipulated, “if an attack occurs.”Footnote 1 Yet, when the situation fails to justify this condition, politicians start using “the preemptive strike” rhetoric, which has no grounds in international law and cannot be justified as a legal use of force by a state against another based on the analysis of many scholars, including Professor Ian Brownlie.

Such legal advice in national contexts might be provided directly in the operation rooms for war or through relevant national authorities represented by high executives in the room.

In Egypt, for example, per Article 152 of the 2014 Constitution,Footnote 2 the president of the RepublicFootnote 3 is the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.” Yet, the president cannot declare war by a unilateral decision, as the same Article stipulated,

The President shall not declare war, or send the armed forces to a combat mission outside the State borders, except after consultation with the National Defense Council and obtaining the approval of the House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds of the members. In case the House of Representatives has not been elected, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) must be consulted and the approval of both the Cabinet and National Defense Council must be obtained.

Based on this provision, the decision to resort to war has to be done through consultation between supreme members of the executive branch of the government and requires two thirds of the legislative branch (Parliament), which includes lawyers but not necessarily specialists in the laws of war or international law.

Further, the National Defense Council is

chaired by the President of the Republic and comprise the membership of the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Interior, the Chief of the General Intelligence Service, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces as well as the Commanders of the Navy, the Air Forces and Air Defense, the Chief of Operations of the Armed Forces, and the Head of Military Intelligence.Footnote 4

This composition includes neither military nor civilian lawyers, yet the advice of lawyers still can be heard through the ministers represented in the Council, as each of them has legal advisors. Furthermore, the pool of lawyers in these institutions includes civilian and military lawyers, as well as specialists in public international law. In many cases, academics who are specialists in jus ad bellum are consulted before such important decisions as part of special committees formed to study such matters and they meet regularly all through the war to lend advice in necessary situations. Having both civilian and military councils in this context is crucial as they complement each other and bring different legal aspects to the discussions.

Again, the role of lawyers is advisory and usually the real decisions are made based on political will to resort to the use of force and the role of the lawyers will always try to find an explanation to justify the legality of the decision.

While on the regional level, jus ad bellum found its way to the African Union Constitutive Act Article 4(h), when it addressed the right of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government (which is the highest organ of the organization) to decide on a military intervention in a member state in grave circumstances, “namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”Footnote 5 This is meant to be used only in grave circumstances for serious violations related to the failure of protecting the civilian populations of the continent. There are similar clauses in several founding documents that established the African Regional Economic Communities, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that has already used this clause to intervene in situations like The Gambia and Sierra Leone, following unconstitutional changes of governments, a phenomenon that has frequently escalated since the 1990s and affected the stability of the continent.

Despite the existence of these rules, the implementation is still substandard, in light of the current twenty-three armed conflicts in Africa. In this regard, during the deliberations of the AU Peace and Security Council on matters to decide on cases of unconstitutional change of governments, which might be basis for sanctions and/or military intervention, the Legal Council of the Organization is asked to join the Council meetings and ensures that States are fully aware of the rules, not only those of the African Union, but also, the jus ad bellum rules on the global level.

On the global level, jus ad bellum is often ignored or become the focus for a short while, then the focus shifts to the jus in bello due to the conduct of the parties to the conflict toward the civilian populations during the war. Yet, the International Court of Justice reminded the international community of the legitimacy and importance of the jus ad bellum, when it based its pronunciation of the illegality of the Israeli occupation to the Palestinian Territories on the jus ad bellum and not the jus in bello. The Court based the illegality of the occupation on the violation of rules forbidding seizing lands of others by force (including the colonial project of building settlements on the occupied territories) and its impacts on the right of the Palestinian people to self determination. Of course, the Court still considered different legal aspects of jus in bello when addressing the conduct of the occupying power, but it was dealt with as legal consequences of the prolonged occupation and not the cause of the illegality of the occupation.

Therefore, the jus ad bellum should not be forgotten as a major principle when legal classifications are discussed in international consultations. Despite the fact that a decision to resort to war is not taken by lawyers, it is important to voice our concerns. Relying solely on force in international relations as an alternative to the law constitutes a disaster for the super powers and to the world.

In conclusion, dynamics between legal counsels and executives that occur in closed-room deliberations, both at the global and national levels, require a more robust approach from the lawyers. Counsels need to give their honest advice in a timely manner. In the end, talking about the law between truth and power, if counsels do not defend the law, there will be no truth and only power prevails.

Remarks by Srinivas Burra

The decision on the use of force is primarily taken at the political level, usually at the highest political level of a state. This is so because resorting to the use of force is an option along with other diplomatic, regional, and multilateral modes of engagement. While domestic and geopolitical considerations play a crucial role in deciding on the issue of going for the use of force, the decision making also involves its evaluation in accordance with international law. That is where lies the importance of legal advice on the position of international law. Unlike political decision making, the legality of the use of force is evaluated on the basis of existing international law with purported objectivity.

Hence, it is essential to reflect on whether the legal advice is always provided as an independent and objective view arrived at through the evaluation of legal texts applicable to the use of force. Formalist understanding of law and legal institutions suggests this view. It is premised on the understanding that the law operates independently of any other considerations and maintains its autonomy, and any advice rendered through this process carries those objective legal characteristics. Thus, the legal advice that is rendered may not always be in line with the decisions taken by the political leadership of a state. If we move away from this formalist view, we realize that this is not always or most of the time the case. It is not that we move away by choice, but it becomes necessary when we look at specific and concrete facts. The concrete facts are that the individual legal positions of certain states, presumably taken based on the objective evaluation of legal texts, align with those of certain other states. Thus, though these positions were purportedly taken as legal positions of individual states, they seem similar. One way of looking at it is that this can be taken as an example of the result that can be achieved through the objective application of the law. However, contrary to this, the alignment of positions of certain states is not always the result of the objective application of the relevant law. This alignment is based on states’ geopolitical, economic, and military status.

Therefore, we see the similarities between the positions of certain states and these states can be grouped on broad lines. Like the positions of Global Northern states often seem similar, the positions of Global Southern states also find similarities. We need to reflect on how there are similarities between the opinions of certain states. The point that needs to be underlined is that it is not always that you can draw clear lines between the global north and the global south or between developing and developed countries. However, we often see division in the articulation of their interests and priorities. It is also not to assert that these groups do not have any internal differences between them. Rather, the point is to show that despite these internal differences, there are certain fundamental issues in which these divisions are present, and they inevitably lead to division among states. It also needs to be noted that while legal advice is provided in each case based on the facts involved in it, this cannot be seen in isolation. They always need contextualization. In fact, we, international lawyers, are familiar with the importance of contextualization and continuity as we look at the state practice with utmost care in the formation of customary international law. The practice of certain states leads to the formation of customary international law with implications for all states. However, the practice of global southern states often does not attain similar weightage and does not lead to similar results.Footnote 6

An example of this can be observed from the legal positions of states on the use of force against non-state actors operating from the territory of another state. Western states argue in favor of expanding the scope of the right of self-defense to include the use of force against non-state actors operating from another state, and they emphasize the related doctrinal innovations like the “unable or unwilling” test.Footnote 7 It is difficult to argue that the legal advice on these matters is purely the result of an objective assessment of legal and doctrinal position in law. Rather, it is evident that the similarly placed Western states predominantly deploy this kind of legal position in situations often involving Global Southern states.Footnote 8 While the Western states articulate their independent legal positions based on the legal advice they obtain, they align on some central issues involved in it. Despite being the view of a few states, because of their economic, military and geopolitical domination, these views occupy a prominent position in the discussions on the legality of the use of force.

It is essential to examine how the legal advice is processed in a state, as it helps understand how states make decisions, particularly in matters involving the use of force. However, this examination may remain incomplete if it does not take into consideration the other factors like power relations at the international level, geopolitical considerations on the basis of the global north and the global south divide and the capacity for generating a particular discourse on the legality of use of force in a situation. This is imperative because we find similarities in the legal positions of states divided on the basis of the above-mentioned lines. Thus, it is difficult to imagine legal advice and legal positions of states as independent articulations devoid of any extra-legal considerations.

Footnotes

This panel was convened on April 18, 2025 at 3:30 p.m. by its moderator, Tess Bridgeman, who introduced the panelists: Srinivas Burra, Douglas Wilson, Chimene Keitner, and Namira Negm.

1 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Ch. V, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry.

2 Sir John Chilcot’s Public Statement (July 6, 2016), at https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20171123124608/http:/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/sir-john-chilcots-public-statement.

1 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry.

2 Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 Yale J. Int’l L. 359 (2013).

3 Chimène I. Keitner, Explaining International Acts, 63 McGill L.J. 649 (2018).

4 Rebecca Sanders, Plausible Legality: Legal Culture and Political Imperative in the Global War on Terror (2018).

1 UN Charter, Art. 51.

2 The Egyptian Constitution, entered into force Jan. 18, 2014, amended Apr. 26, 2019, at https://sschr.gov.eg/en/the-egyptian-constitution.

3 Referring to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

4 Egyptian Constitution, supra note 2, Art. (203).

5 African Union Constitutive Act, adopted July 11, 2000, entered into force May 26, 2001.

6 B.S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112 AJIL 1 (2018).

7 Adil Ahmad Haque, The Use of Force against Non-state Actors: All over the Map, 8 J. Use Force & Int’l L. 278 (2021).

8 Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, “Bombable Geographies” and the International Monroe: A Global South History of the Unwilling and Unable Standard, 11 J. Use Force & Int’l L. 240 (2024).