Donald Trump campaigned on and implemented anti-immigrant policies. At the same time, he employed immigrants, including undocumented workers. It is a well-established dynamic: in the United States, hostility toward immigration has always coexisted alongside a voracious appetite for immigrant labor. Intrigued by that apparent contradiction, historian Robert F. Zeidel explores the attitudes that “capitalists” held toward immigrant workers during the industrialization of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Employers who sought workers born abroad did not hesitate to denigrate those who resisted the exploitative terms of their employment. Specifically, they branded immigrants involved in industrial action as foreign agitators who failed to appreciate American values. Ultimately, Zeidel argues, associating immigrants with labor unrest backfired when employers “saw their pronouncements used to curtail access to the immigrant labor pool on which they relied” (2).
Zeidel’s sweeping narrative of the road to the restrictive Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 draws on the archives of business leaders and the public pronouncements of their political supporters while highlighting canonical events in labor and migration history. Zeidel begins after the Civil War, when, he maintains, business interests first linked immigrants to labor strife as U.S. industry burgeoned and events abroad, such as the Paris Commune of 1871, sensitized Americans to the potential power of wage workers. By the time of the Great Strike of 1877, employers were primed to blame industrial clashes on foreigners.
On the West Coast, employers touted Chinese immigrants as ideal workers because they would labor for less and had a reputation for “placidity.” Notable figures like California governor Leland Stanford showed that they were prepared to both hire Chinese laborers and encourage the racist restrictionism spearheaded by white workers who thought Asian workers undercut their wages and tolerated poor working conditions. In Trumpian fashion, Stanford hired Chinese laborers for his horse farm and railroads while also supporting “any constitutional action having for its object the repression of the immigration of the Asiatic races” (44). Chinese exclusion passed nationally in 1882.
Zeidel discusses immigrant strikebreakers before focusing on other examples of businessmen and politicians who portrayed foreigners as sources of violence and disruption. He covers the Haymarket bombing of 1886 and the violence at Carnegie Steel in Homestead, Pennsylvania, in 1892. In Homestead, immigrants were underrepresented in arrests despite claims that they were instigators. There, the strikebreaking Pinkerton Detective Agency positioned itself as an all-American outfit, claiming to be composed solely of citizens. Against such a backdrop, efforts to restrict immigration increased. President Grover Cleveland vetoed a bill in 1897 that would have instituted literacy requirements. (Woodrow Wilson did the same in 1915 and again in 1917, when Congress overrode his veto.)
Meanwhile, Zeidel moves on through the assassination of William McKinley in 1901, mining strikes across the country, and organizing in the female garment trades. In 1910, the Dillingham Commission “revealed Americans’ conflicted beliefs about immigration” by offering “competing calls for restriction and assimilation” (135). All of the commission’s members recommended cutting unskilled immigration. The era’s progressives held employers responsible for industrial injustice but also often saw immigrants as “pawns” who were easily swayed by rabble-rousers. The Commission on Industrial Relations, for example, agreed that immigration was a problem in 1915. U.S. entry into World War I and the outbreak of the Russian Revolution spurred a crescendo of policies, including restrictions on speech, the possibility of deportations based on membership in an organization alone, and a spate of mass raids and expulsions in the postwar Red Scare. It all culminated in the exclusionary laws of the 1920s.
Historians familiar with the events Zeidel describes will appreciate his documentation of employer attitudes and his well-written synthesis, but they might be frustrated by his analysis. The title hints at the book’s approach; the terms “robber barons” and “wretched refuse” evoke amorphous groups. The book does not distinguish among employer types or systematically differentiate the views of business interests from those of other Americans. Neither does it foreground the aspirations of immigrants. Zeidel asserts that the words “wretched refuse,” from Emma Lazarus’s poem, do “not demean” immigrants (8). He is right that Lazarus was sympathetic to her Jewish coreligionists coming from Eastern Europe, but a Sephardic Jew from a wealthy family with deep roots in the United States still might not be best positioned to understand impoverished newcomers.
Zeidel is interested in a broader dynamic, but he does not quite capture the dehumanizing combination of recruitment and denigration that created a vulnerable and deportable workforce ripe for exploitation. From the start, the book’s engagement with historiography is light. Zeidel misrepresents John Higham’s classic Strangers in the Land (1955), which did in fact present antiradicalism—not simply cultural or ethnocentric prejudice—as an important strand of nativism. Historians since have examined the ways in which race and ethnicity were constructed in light of class. In contrast, Zeidel unconvincingly tries to separate the exploitability of immigrant workers from race and ethnicity. After discussing racial prejudice against the Chinese, especially on the part of working-class whites, he writes, “Yet in the eyes of employers, neither their cultural nor ‘racial’ distinctions had much significance” (40). This statement ignores the fact that the racial marginalization of the Chinese and racial divisions among workers made the Chinese all the more attractive as employees.
Zeidel seems constantly surprised that employers would insult the workers on whom they relied, referring often to “irony” and “paradox.” While employers certainly shot themselves in the foot, discrimination can serve purposes other than physical exclusion. Employers benefited from having marginalized and stigmatized employees. African Americans knew what it was like to work for people who wanted to keep them “in their place.” Scholars of the twentieth century have also shown that attacks on undocumented immigrants do more to create a pliable workforce than prevent migration. Maybe there is no great tension after all.
