In 1923, Sir Michael O'Dwyer sued Sir Chettur Sankaran Nair for a libel alleged to have been made in his book, Gandhi and Anarchy. O'Dwyer, a fiery Ulsterman, had been lieutenant-governor of the Punjab from 1913 to 1919 and in this position had been largely responsible for the suppression of the Punjab Disturbances in his last year in office. His authoritarian rule had made him very unpopular in India and was the prime cause of his later assassination by the Indian Udam Singh in London's Caxton Hall in 1940. His opponent, Sir Sankaran Nair, was a prominent establishment Indian politician, high court judge, president of the Indian National Congress in 1897 and, until 1919, when he resigned in protest at the suppression of the Punjab Disturbances, a member of the Viceroy of India's Executive Council. He had written his book to attack Mahatma Gandhi's Non-Cooperation movement, but Nair, who was a moderate, did not resist the opportunity to take a swipe at O'Dwyer, whose oppressive policies he, with much of India, regarded as the real cause of the disturbances of 1919 and the repression under martial law that followed them.Footnote 1 He wrote: “Before the reforms [the Montagu-Chelmsford Indian constitutional reforms] it was in the power of the Lieutenant-Governor, a single individual, to commit the atrocities in the Punjab which we know only too well”.Footnote 2
The O'Dwyer–Nair trial has been described many times in the Amritsar literature, but its records have not been analysed in print. They are of interest in two ways. First, they provide detail of events in the Punjab which is unrecorded elsewhere. Principal participants expanded the accounts they had given at other times. Some of the minor characters who had played parts in 1919 and who remained otherwise unheard were given the chance to speak. This article's first aim is to examine this new evidence. Second, the testimony of witnesses at the trial reveals clues to two issues which have not since then been much considered, one being the attitude of Indian establishment classes to the suppression of the Punjab Disturbances, the other being the quality of the intelligence then available to the Government of India. Coupled with other long-ignored snippets of evidence recorded elsewhere at the time, evidence given at the trial indicates that some of those Indians whose positions depended upon continued British rule in India were not only content to see the Punjab Disturbances crushed but also did what they could to ensure this outcome. The second aim of this article is to consider this evidence.
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Some detail of the trial will be useful here. The case was heard before Mr Justice McCardie, an opinionated judge of right-wing views, in the Court of King's Bench over five weeks from 30 April 1924. Apart from being one of the longest civil hearings in legal history, the case was notable for being the only airing in an English court of any issue arising from the Punjab Disturbances of 1919. The trial was seen, and was intended by the plaintiff, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, to be seen, as a means of vindicating the actions of his Punjab administration and of the officials who had taken a hand in suppressing the disturbances, among them most notably Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, the perpetrator of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre at Amritsar. It was accepted at the trial that two of the major points at issue were that, first, on 13 April 1919, General Dyer committed an atrocity by ordering the shooting at Amritsar, and, second, that the plaintiff caused or was responsible for the commission of that alleged atrocity.Footnote 3
The trial brought together many key actors from the India of 1919. Most of the Englishmen involved were, by the time of the trial, back home and so could appear in person. These included the viceroy of the time, Lord Chelmsford, a remote and rather characterless placeman, who, with Secretary of State for India Edwin Montagu, had given his name to the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. He had not distinguished himself in the crisis of 1919 and now in 1924 was First Lord of the Admiralty. Also present was Major-General Sir William Beynon, Sir Michael O'Dwyer's military equivalent in the Punjab and Martial Law Administrator during the disturbances, who was now in retirement. He was a very gallant commander of Gurkhas who had won a DSO in 1895 during the Relief of Chitral and had sprung to public fame soon thereafter with the publication of his account of the campaign, With Kelly to Chitral. In 1919, he had been the general officer commanding the 16th (Indian) Division in Lahore and so Brigadier-General Dyer's superior in the Punjab. Of the major figures, only Dyer himself, struck down in 1921 by a stroke and afflicted by the arterial sclerosis which was steadily killing him and so therefore too sick to endure the excitement of the courtroom, was missing.
The proceedings of the libel case were reported in great detail in the British press, usually with almost verbatim recounting of what had been said in court. In the absence of the court record (which has not been located), the law report of The Times for the period May to June 1924 gives the best account of what transpired.Footnote 4 Of course, the evidence given at any trial, deliberately presented in the adversarial circumstances of a courtroom some five years after the event under scrutiny, has clearly to be used with some caution. Nor can full confidence be placed in the reporting of any newspaper, even the most august. The columns of The Times however, do give much corroboration of the accounts of events and attitudes found in other sources and are themselves corroborated by these sources and by the law reports of other newspapers, such as the Daily Telegraph and the Morning Post, which also covered the trial in detail. In general, it can be said that the statements recorded by The Times from witnesses at the trial confirm in all major aspects what is already known from sources elsewhere.
In court, Nair found himself at a very great disadvantage. In the England of 1924 there were few who were prepared to support his view that Sir Michael O'Dwyer had been a repressive tyrant, and those who were had little public standing. The only Englishman ready to appear for him as a witness was Gerard Wathen, a man of liberal views who in 1919 had been principal of the Khalsa College in Amritsar. By 1924, Wathen had returned home and was a school headmaster in Hampstead. His evidence adds little to what is known of events, though his description of the summons to join all the British in the safety of the Amritsar cantonment, which was issued to him at his college on 13 April 1919, gives a hint to the nervousness of the British forces in the city at the time:
The first I heard was when I saw a wild man – it was a subaltern – riding towards me firing his revolver in the air to attract the attention of the students, who were running away in terror. He was shouting in execrable Hindustani, ‘Where is the Sahib?’Footnote 5
In the absence of other English support, Nair's legal team was forced to fall back on the depositions legally sworn by over 120 witnesses in India.Footnote 6 Among these were statements from witnesses who had testified before the Indian Congress Inquiry led by Gandhi, whose report is much amplified by them.Footnote 7 The depositions contain much evidence of wrongdoing in the Punjab during O'Dwyer's tenure in office (though, regrettably for Nair, none that could be laid directly at O'Dwyer's door), yet Mr Justice McCardie made it plain that for him these had far less weight than did the evidence of those who appeared before the jury. Sir Michael O'Dwyer won his case, and was able ever thereafter to maintain that he and Dyer had been vindicated in a British court of law. He could do so relying to a good degree upon Mr Justice McCardie's highly partial summing up, which included the words:
I express my view that General Dyer, under the grave and exceptional circumstances, acted rightly, and in my opinion, upon his evidence, he was wrongly punished by the Secretary of State for India.Footnote 8
Before looking at the trial testimony, however, some recapitulation of the events that lay behind the trial will be useful. In the early part of 1919, opposition had arisen in India to the Rowlatt Acts, which had been proposed as a framework for India's security after the imminent expiry of the wartime Defence of India Act. The acts were viewed by many Indians as unnecessarily repressive and a betrayal of India's hope for the gradual devolution to self-government. Gandhi took up the fight against them and allied himself with many groups across India; in March 1919 local politicians created what was the Punjab's first political movement under the Raj to oppose the Acts. The British took fright, mistakenly believing they faced a rebellion. The province's lieutenant-governor, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who ruled with a firm, many would say a hard hand, behaved true to form on this occasion and acted pre-emptively. On 9 April 1919, he prevented Gandhi from entering the province and on the 10th had Amritsar's two most prominent local leaders deported. These actions sparked off a rash of violent incidents which lasted for over a month and became known as the Punjab Disturbances.
In Amritsar there was a particularly violent reaction. On 10 April, a large number of townspeople poured out of the city and headed towards the British civil lines to demand the return of their deported leaders. They were stopped by rifle fire, which killed several of them. The crowd turned into a mob which killed two British men before flowing back into the city, where it killed three British bank managers and ransacked and burned many official and business premises. The city passed at that point out of British hands. British military reinforcements started to reach Amritsar that night and Brigadier Reginald Dyer, commanding the 45th Brigade at nearby Jullundur and in whose area of responsibility Amritsar lay, arrived to take command on the 11th. Two days later, Dyer led a column around the city announcing the banning of all meetings, but that afternoon a political meeting was held in the Jallianwala Bagh, an area of open ground enclosed by high walls in the city near the Golden Temple.Footnote 9 Over 20,000 people gathered, some to hear the speeches, but most were locals or visitors attending the celebrations for the Baisakh festival, who were resting in the garden in the heat of the day. All were unarmed. Dyer marched a force into the Bagh and, without warning, opened fire. His troops maintained firing for over ten minutes, killing an unknown number of people, at least 480, but almost certainly many more, and wounding probably several thousand. Martial law was imposed on the city, and Dyer enforced the notorious crawling order. This stipulated that all who wished to traverse the street where a British woman missionary had been attacked and left for dead must crawl on their stomachs. The Government eventually yielded to pressure to hold an inquiry into these events; this, known as the Hunter Committee after its chairman, Lord Hunter, published a report in 1920 which criticised Dyer severely.Footnote 10 Without further investigation, Dyer was removed from his post and sent to England, where he received the censure of both the Indian and British governments. A resolution in the House of Commons condemned him, though the House of Lords voted to support what he had done. He retired without punishment in 1920.Footnote 11
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Nearly five years later, Major-General Sir William Beynon took the stand on 13 and 14 May 1924.Footnote 12 He maintained, as he had done at the Hunter Inquiry, a stout defence of Dyer's actions at the Jallianwala Bagh. Dyer's statements (no less than three had been given to the public over the years), Beynon averred, had grown less reliable as time passed and he continued to accept the original account Dyer had given him face to face in the Bagh in the days after the massacre: this was that he had opened fire as the crowd was surging to surround his force and because he feared for the safety of his troops in the confined space of the Bagh:
I am sorry to say that the evidence that he gave [to the Hunter Inquiry, where he had stated he went to the Bagh with the intention to open fire on any crowd he had found there] was quite different from what he was doing and thinking at the time. You must judge General Dyer not by what he said, but by what he did.
That Dyer had changed his tune before the Hunter Committee was, Beynon suggested, due to the hardships he had suffered in the Third Afghan War, which had intervened between the massacre and the inquiry. “He might have forgotten some things and exaggerated others . . . I think that he over-brooded. I think that his memory was getting rather inaccurate”. He told the court that he had taken Dyer to task after he had emerged from the Hunter Inquiry's witness box for misleading them by saying that he had gone to the Jallianwala Bagh with the intention of firing. Outside the inquiry room, he had asked Dyer: “Why did you say that you went down with the intention of firing?” Dyer had replied: “Of course, I intended to fire if necessary.” “I said: ‘That is not the impression you have given the Committee.’”Footnote 13 Beynon, a much more straightforward man than Dyer, might be forgiven, perhaps, for missing Dyer's characteristic verbal quibble; Dyer was an officer with a history of misleading his superiors. He had not been straight with Beynon in his original account and had not been straight with him outside the inquiry hall. The Hunter Committee, though, had got the correct impression. They accepted that Dyer had intended to open fire if he found anyone in the Bagh.
Beynon's testimony adds further muddle to the confusion surrounding the issue of why Dyer was in Amritsar in the first place. Beynon's original testimony to the Hunter Committee, together with the war diaries of the 16th Division, of which he was General Officer Commanding (GOC), and Dyer's 45th Brigade, neither of which records any order sending Dyer to Amritsar, had been equivocal on this point. It is highly likely that Dyer went to Amritsar on 11 April of his own accord.Footnote 14 Dyer maintained that he had been sent there by Beynon, but his GOC was strangely reticent on this point, merely telling the Hunter Committee that he had sent another officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, to take charge in Amritsar, adding that “General Dyer had however, arrived at Amritsar” and, as the most senior officer, had automatically assumed command. Now, in court, Beynon took the same line but then altered it. Having mentioned that he ordered Dyer to send 100 “Mohamedan” troops to Amritsar on 10 April, Beynon added: “General Dyer arrived in Amritsar on April 11, and after that I had communications from him [. . .] I ordered General Dyer to take charge of Amritsar and to take any necessary action”. Here again Beynon seems to be seeking to avoid saying that he ordered Dyer to go there, but he then added, in response to a question as to whether he had been satisfied to leave affairs in Amritsar to Dyer's discretion: “I should not have sent him there had I not been”. So at the last, Beynon did say that he had sent Dyer to Amritsar, but only after much careful choice of words. The question is an interesting one for the light it may throw on Dyer's motivations; the issue was referred to later in the trial and will be discussed again below.
One actor with a minor role in Amritsar in April 1919 who had not given testimony to the Hunter Inquiry was Captain John T. Botting of the Royal Field Artillery. His eye witness account here is therefore new. Botting told the court that he had been commanding the twelve British and two hundred Indian troops of the 12th Ammunition Column, which was part of the city's permanent garrison.Footnote 15 He described one of the murders carried out by the mob on 10 April, that of railway guard Robinson:
We heard a roar and saw a surging mob coming towards the civil lines . . . They murdered an inoffensive railway guard who was working in the station. All that he had to defend himself with was an umbrella. When the mob had done with him he bore no resemblance to a human form. He was simply a bundle of red rags.Footnote 16
While the city was largely out of British control between 10 and 12 April, Botting sent some of his Indian NCOs into the city and they reported to him that they had found there an air of defiance. “The British”, they said they had been told, “were no longer the Government of India”. His men reported that meetings “were being held secretly at different persons’ houses” and that people were saying “We will try our strength”. He also heard that the meeting on which General Dyer eventually fired would be held in the square “whether there were British troops there or not”. He had informed Dyer of all this. He stated that, after the firing in the Jallianwala Bagh on the 13th, “I had walked through the city at midnight with one of my Indian officers and there was not a soul about”. He described the effect of Dyer's actions as “electrical. The city became normal”, an odd description of the paralysis induced by the fear afflicting its population. Botting clearly approved of what Dyer had done. It seems likely from this that he was one of the conservative coterie surrounding Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, the Amritsar medical officer, which, in March 1919, had given Sir Michael O'Dwyer reactionary advice behind the back of Miles Irving, their new and rather weak deputy commissioner, advice which called for strong tactics in the city and which had encouraged O'Dwyer to stoke the fire that broke out on 10 April.
New evidence was heard in court from a soldier of a far more eminent rank, who as commander-in-chief in India had played the key role in dismissing Dyer from his post after the Hunter Report was published in 1920. This evidence was taken on oath from abroad, as General Sir George Carmichael Monro was now governor of Gibraltar. Monro, a bluff, taciturn and almost monosyllabic soldier, had known Dyer since they had served together in the Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regiment in the Third Burma War in 1886 and 1887. At the publication of the Hunter Report, he had felt personally betrayed by Dyer's admission of his intention to fire without warning in the Bagh and had immediately removed Dyer from his post, returning him to England without taking any formal disciplinary action against him and even without asking him for an explanation of what he had done. Monro had been much criticised for this within the Army and in India. Now, in his evidence to the court, he let slip one small additional ground for his animosity towards Dyer, who appears to have lied to him directly.Footnote 17 Questioned about the infamous crawling order imposed by Dyer on the street in which a British missionary teacher, Marcella Sherwood, had been beaten and left for dead by the mob of 10 April, Monro stated: “I sent a direction to forbid it [the order] directly I heard of it. General Dyer sent back word that he had heard of it and had stopped it before he got my telegram”. Dyer's reply to his C-in-CFootnote 18 had been typically disingenuous; he had personally designed the crawling order as retribution and had imposed it himself, not merely “heard of it”. When he was in full possession of the facts, Monro must have found this a highly offensive obfuscation on the part of a relatively senior officer long known to him personally. It is yet more evidence that Dyer was far from the ‘honest soldier’ he liked to portray himself.
The evidence at the trial of Mr A.J.W. Kitchin, in 1919 the commissioner of the Lahore Division, also contains new elements. He had been the superior of the Amritsar deputy commissioner, Miles Irving, and had been one of the very few officials who had been censured by the Government of India after the publication of the Hunter Report, largely for his actions on 10 April 1919, when he had handed control of Amritsar to the military without giving them clear instructions. He had been delegated authority to deal with events at Amritsar by Sir Michael O'Dwyer,Footnote 19 to whom he reported directly, and had been an advocate of taking firm steps to deal with the disturbances. He had always been a supporter of Dyer's actions. The censure he had suffered forced his resignation and he was chief among those whom O'Dwyer was seeking to rehabilitate at the trial. His account to the court supplements the detail he gave the Hunter Committee, before which he had worked hard to follow the Punjab Government line as well as to exonerate Dyer.Footnote 20 He took the same line in the evidence he gave to the court.
Asked whether, when on 12 April he returned to Amritsar from Lahore, he had instructions from the lieutenant-governor for General Dyer, he said he had not; “so far as I know he did not know General Dyer was there. I did not know it.” This new evidence is particularly noteworthy as one day earlier, on the 11th, Kitchin had pushed the lieutenant-governor to demand from General Beynon that a senior officer be sent to Amritsar to take charge. It had been for this reason that General Beynon had sent the Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan whom Dyer superceded, so it is interesting that General Beynon had not informed the civilian authorities of Dyer's despatch there; a further indication, perhaps, that Dyer had gone there of his own accord.
Kitchin stated to the court that he had left Amritsar to go back to Lahore on 13 April and so was there when, in the early hours of 14 April, he and Sir Michael O'Dwyer were awakened and informed of Dyer's action in the Jallianwala Bagh. O'Dwyer immediately sent him back to Amritsar “to take care that there should be no more firing if it could possibly be helped”. On arriving in Amritsar just after dawn, he met Dyer. “He said: ‘I have done my duty. It was a horrible duty. I haven't slept all night but it was the right thing to do.’ He asked me what Sir Michael O'Dwyer's view was, and I told him that at the moment he had not expressed an opinion”.Footnote 21 Kitchin's words (uttered by him here for the first time) confirm the state of Dyer's mind as reported by others who met him just after the shooting. Gerard Wathen had found him “distraught” immediately after he returned to his base from the Bagh. Miles Irving met Dyer shortly after this and found him “dazed and shaken up”. Others including Dyer's wife testified of his sleeplessness for months afterwards, and he himself mentioned this to others up to six months or more later.Footnote 22 Dyer was to use the word “horrible” many times in describing what he'd done. Before the Hunter Committee he repeated it: “It was a horrible duty for me to perform”; “a horrible act and it took a lot of doing. . .it only struck me at the time it was my duty to do this, and that it was a horrible duty. . .a merciful act though a horrible act . . . a horrible duty for me to perform”.Footnote 23 He was to use similar words when he arrived back in England in 1920, telling the Daily Mail reporter who met him at the quayside in Southampton that he had done: “my horrible, dirty duty”.Footnote 24 The phrase seems to have stuck in Dyer's brain from the very beginning, and there is more than a hint here that it was at least in part a ploy for sympathy. Just after the shooting, Dyer felt highly insecure about the rightness of what he had done and was very worried about the reactions of his superiors and the military authorities. He knew he had broken the law. It was that which caused him to lie and to alter his story until he felt so sure that he had secured his superiors’ support that he at last felt free to boast of what he had done before the Hunter Committee. Even there, though, his words make plain that he was still fishing for sympathy (though not from the Indian members of the inquiry; he never used these words in response to questions from them). Kitchin's evidence makes it plain that this trait began on the day following the shooting.
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Before the court, Commissioner Kitchin made some surprisingly disparaging remarks about the unreliability of the Indian troops in the Punjab in 1919 and in particular of those stationed at Amritsar. In this, he was repeating what he had said at the Hunter Inquiry where he had echoed the words of his lieutenant-governor, who had maintained before the Hunter CommitteeFootnote 25 that he had proof of disaffection. O'Dwyer made these charges again in his autobiography.Footnote 26 Though such fears were no doubt real at the time, neither Kitchin nor O'Dwyer (or anyone else) ever made a convincing case that they were justified. Indian troops almost universally did their duty unswervingly in the Punjab in 1919 and the idea that the Indian Army had become unreliable was dismissed out of hand by Lieutenant-General Sir Havelock Hudson, Adjutant-General in India, in his own testimony before the Hunter Committee.Footnote 27 The fears of the Government of the Punjab were unfounded, but the question remains as to why it had been led to give credence to these fears. Kitchin's evidence at the trial presents one small key to this mystery.
In the background to all British thinking about the Punjab Disturbances of 1919 was the recent memory of the Gadr conspiracy that had caused disaffection during the First World War among some Indian troops in the province and as far afield as Singapore and Hong Kong. This had been dealt with relatively easily and had been limited in scope, but many of those under suspicion at the time were still resident in the Punjab. Further back in time of course, lay the Mutiny of 1857, when much of the Bengal Army had risen, an event which still coloured much of British thinking in the early twentieth century. But now in court, Kitchin made clear that there was something more specific causing the Punjab Government concern. Kitchin rather extraordinarily maintained to the court that one of the reasons that Dyer had acted as he did in the Jallianwala Bagh was because he feared for the loyalty of his Indian troops (something that Dyer had never mentioned and an idea against which, in all likelihood, he would have objected violently had such a thing been suggested to him). Kitchin said: “I am content to put it forward as a factor operating on my own mind. It was an argument put forward by practically every Indian who came to us. They all said that we could not trust the troops”.
Who were these Indian informants who had dripped such poison into the administration's ears, why had they done so and why had the administration taken any notice of them? The question is wider and more important than might strike one initially, for it was not just in the issue of the reliability of their Indian soldiers that the British were fed highly suspect and deliberately inflammatory information during the Punjab Disturbances. This disinformation was but one piece of a pattern of alarming reports which included information that the Golden Temple was about to become a centre of ‘the rebellion’, that agents of the ‘rebels’ in Amritsar were abroad spreading their ‘rebellion’ throughout the province, that reinforcements to the ‘rebels’ were on their way to Amritsar and that the surrounding countryside was about to rise.
It might be maintained perhaps, by those laying all evil at the feet of the colonialists, that the British made up this information themselves in order to provide an excuse to heighten tension and to impose the severe measures of martial law. But just as there is no evidence that there was any Indian conspiracy to overthrow the Raj in 1919, so there is no credible evidence of a British conspiracy either to create a breakdown in civil order or to use the opportunity of such a breakdown to crush India. Deliberate misinformation will not do as an explanation. The British were being misled.
Alternatively, it might be imagined that the British were taking fright at the rumours that arose around their own dining tables. Among the wider Anglo-Indian population, this may indeed have been so. Gossip about what was seen as an impending storm certainly did damage the morale of the British in the Punjab in the early part of 1919 and especially during Gandhi's satyagraha campaign. In the weeks that led up to the disturbances of 10 April, the British became increasingly jittery about a threat that they thought they could see but which they could not understand. In Amritsar specifically, there was loose talk of mutiny and of attempts at subversion of the troops in the garrison early in April.Footnote 28 On 9 April, rumours surfaced that there was a plot afoot to kill all the Europeans in the station on the 16th.Footnote 29 These rumours proved groundless, but they made the British very nervous, caused the initiation of preparations for civil disturbance (including the issue of weapons) and prepared the ground for what was to happen on 10 April. A bad case of nerves though, is insufficient an explanation for the actions and reports of those in power, men who had other sources of information upon which, they thought, they could rely.
However, that these sources of information were themselves faulty, and perhaps deliberately faulty, is indicated by evidence that had emerged earlier at the Hunter Committee. The Inquiry heard that there were two occasions around the time of Dyer's action in the Jallianwala Bagh when Kitchin gave Dyer information which proved to be untrue but which could have led to more bloodshed had Dyer taken action upon it. The information, in fact, seems to have been given in order that the British, and in particular Dyer, should take further drastic steps. On 12 April, the day before the shooting in the Bagh, Kitchin returned from Lahore to Amritsar accompanied by Superintendent Donald, the Punjab's deputy inspector-general of Police. They told Dyer that they had picked up information on the road that trouble would go further unless the riots in Amritsar were stopped at once. They added that 200 armed Sikhs from the Manja (the country area around the city) were about to raid Amritsar.Footnote 30 They gave this information only verbally to Dyer and it is noteworthy that Kitchin did not include it in his telegrams to Lahore that day. The information thus formed a part of Dyer's assessment of the military situation when, on the following day, he fired on the crowd in the Bagh. Two days after the firing, Kitchin and Donald were back in Amritsar and told Dyer that the “mutineers” intended to hold another meeting around the Golden Temple (again, something not repeated in Kitchin's telegrams to Lahore). This information caused Dyer considerable anxiety, but this time, rather than take action himself in or around the Sikhs’ holiest temple, which would have led to a bloodbath, Dyer summoned the temple sarbrah (chief priest) to a discussion and defused the situation.Footnote 31 By then, even Dyer could see that there had been enough bloodshed, and, in any case, he held a high regard for the Sikhs, many of whom were his soldiers.
Kitchin's two pieces of provocative disinformation were by no means unique. They can be compared with the false report that the Hunter Committee found had been submitted to Dyer on 12 April by Amritsar's Indian City Superintendent of Police, Ashraf Khan. This apparently cowardly and untrustworthy police officer, who was clearly seeking to salvage what had been left of his reputation after his failure to take any action to stop the murders and destruction of the 10th, told Dyer that rebellion was being spread into the surrounding districts by agents from Amritsar and that large numbers were coming into the city to form a danda fauj (army armed with staves) to drive the British out. Ashraf Khan had been barricaded in his police station inside Amritsar for two days since he had taken refuge there on the 10th. He had not emerged outside it until escorted out of the city by Dyer's troops, so it is unlikely that he could have explained how he had ascertained this information had Dyer thought to ask him. The information was made doubly unlikely by the fact that troops had been guarding all access to the city through its gates since Dyer's arrival.Footnote 32 The information was indeed completely false, yet it chimed neatly with that from Kitchin, which came close on its heels, and must have had an effect on the already susceptible Dyer, who had already formed the belief that what was now facing him in Amritsar was the army of the Punjab insurgents which, the next day, he would set out to destroy in the Bagh.
Where did Kitchin and Donald acquire their information? In court in 1924, Kitchin said that on the evening of 12 April, he returned to Lahore by motor car and that as he went, he enquired about the state of the countryside, thereby coming to the conclusion that “the position was most serious”. The road between Amritsar and Lahore was the Grand Trunk Road, by 1919 a metalled easily drivable road of thirty miles in length which could be covered by car in about fifty minutes. There was no need to stop, in fact in those disturbed times every reason not to do so, but Kitchin and Donald clearly did so several times en route. It is unlikely that they pulled over to talk to bullock cart drivers or labourers in the fields. Instead, they must have called in at locations where they felt they could pick up information from sympathetic sources. Along the road were several such places. Closest to Amritsar was Chheharta, where there was an important gurdwara (Sikh shrine) founded by the Sikhs’ fifth guru. Next along the road came Khasa, the site of another gurdwara, the Saint Babu Lal Singh ji Maharaj. The gurdwaras were administered at the time by British-appointed mahants, or priest managers. Atari was the next village along the road, and nearby that was the home of the influential Sikh Atwirala family. All around these villages clustered the large houses of wealthy and locally powerful Sikh families, supporters, in the main, of the status quo. All were families whose stakes in land and property were threatened by the disorder in nearby Amritsar and who in all likelihood would have desired the British to act decisively before events got further out of hand. It is perhaps from such sources that Kitchin and Donald received the information they passed on to Dyer.
The use of such personal contacts among India's upper classes was one of the few means of gathering intelligence then open to the British authorities. Senior civil servants did not come much into contact with Indians other than through their work and so were forced to rely upon narrow channels of information from the Indian establishment upon whom they largely relied to rule. At the trial this was made clear; Sir Michael O'Dwyer's Indian witnesses were exclusively drawn from the upper class and included six landowners and tribal chiefs and no professional men at all.Footnote 33 The Punjab Government's available sources of information during the Rowlatt agitation and the Punjab Disturbances were similarly limited, in part due to the prejudices of its officers. O'Dwyer told the Hunter Committee that “while I would not meet extremists or conspirators I often spoke to the leading politicians of a more moderate type and asked them to use their influence with the political associations, to prevent the political agitation in the Punjab on extreme lines”. At a meeting of local worthies called by O'Dwyer in Lahore on 11 April, two of them, Mr Shafi and Raja Narendra Nath, proposed to the lieutenant-governor that he should meet the leaders of the Rowlatt agitation to defuse the situation. He refused to do so.Footnote 34
O'Dwyer preferred at all times to work through those he knew were firm supporters of the Government. The sources of information he lists in his autobiography, India as I Knew It, are indicative. Writing of the beginning of the Rowlatt agitation, he says that he met Nawab Sir Fateh Ali Khan Kizilbash, “one of the most prominent members of the Shiah community in Northern India. Head of a loyal, influential and historic family with connections in Kabul and Irak, and thoroughly conversant with Islamic thought and feeling”. This man confined himself to congratulating the Government on the British victory in the First World War. O'Dwyer then met “a Hindu gentleman of wide knowledge, acute observation, and shrewd judgment” who did warn of Gandhi's threat of passive resistance. The third and only other source of information he states he consulted at the time was an English friend, a judge of the Chief Court, who warned of rumours he had picked up in the bar room, that: “the Punjab extremists intended to have a trial of strength with the Government”.Footnote 35
O'Dwyer also continued to expect that he could use the usual array of local dignitaries to pass information downwards in order to influence events. He told the Hunter Committee that on 10 April “[A]t 3.15 I met Sardar Raghbir Singh and other Sardars and Native officers from Amritsar and told them to go there at once by motor, and report to the Deputy Commissioner”. He added that on 12 April “it was urged on me then and has been urged since by Indian gentlemen of position and proved loyalty that martial law should have been introduced on the 10th or 11th, and that such a course would have in the end been the more humane one”.Footnote 36 That these men had little contact with those campaigning against the Rowlatt bills and that their interests were diametrically opposed to those of the new emerging politicised professional classes to whom they were rapidly losing their local influence did not, it seems, occur to him or his officials and accounts for his evident surprise that “when I went to Amritsar a week afterwards I enquired for the Vice-President of the Municipal Committee. Rai Bahadur Gopal Das [. . .] had bolted to Lahore on the first day of the disturbance and did not come back”.Footnote 37
At the next level down, Kitchin consulted the same type of people. On 11 April, he telegraphed O'Dwyer from Amritsar to say that all was quiet, that the shops would reopen soon and that “[A] message has come from the heads of the Dharmsalas [religious associations] that all is well”.Footnote 38 That unsolicited information from sources of this type was also utilised is shown by the inclusion in the Hunter Report of a letter sent on 15 April to Mr G.G. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General, C.I.D., by one of O'Dwyer's witnesses at the trial, the then Major (later Colonel) Malik Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, who wrote in to give the Government information on the rumours and reports he had received while on the way to Shahpur.Footnote 39
Military officers had similar sources of information among their men (as Captain Botting's testimony to the court indicated) and among the large numbers of pensioners who had retired with wealth and status to their villages. Dyer was in the habit of consulting those he knew and with whom his regiment kept contact.Footnote 40 They were to emerge to help the authorities in many places during the suppression of the disturbances. But these men were by their nature conservative, ill-educated and of an older generation. They were unlikely to have been acquainted with, or to have held any sympathy for, the new political classes. Clearly, too, they are unlikely to have reported that their younger comrades in arms were so unreliable as to be a danger to the Government.
The remaining source of intelligence available to the Government of India was the apparatus of state intelligence embodied in the Indian police. In the Punjab, this took the form of the provincial Criminal Investigation Department (which included Special Branch). It had been established in 1907 and had won its spurs against revolutionaries in the Punjab before and during the First World War.Footnote 41 It operated through networks of informants who were paid or blackmailed into giving information and it reported directly to the lieutenant-governor. It had had considerable success in the war years in defeating the Gadr conspiracy, in thwarting the efforts of German agents and in snuffing out insurrection caused by the Caliphate agitation. It did not, though, have any experience of monitoring the new middle-class Indian political movements. What is striking from the secret portions of the Hunter Inquiry recorded in the unpublished Volume VI of their findings is that there is no real police intelligence of the Rowlatt agitation recorded in it at all. It seems there was none to record.
If the misinformation fed into the administration in Amritsar came from the police, it must have been from local sources. O'Dwyer told the Hunter Committee that he had tasked the CID at Amritsar before the disturbances broke out:
On the 12th March I drew the attention of the new Deputy Inspector-General, C.I.D., to the serious state of affairs generally and to the need of keeping closer watch on Lahore and Amritsar agitation, getting him to send special agents to watch events at Amritsar. Question: By special agents you mean C.I.D. men? Answer: Yes.Footnote 42
CID plain-clothes Indian officers were present in the Jallianwala Bagh just before the firing and it was their information, passed on to Dyer through Amritsar's superintendent of police, Mr Rehill, that alerted Dyer to the meeting taking place.Footnote 43 These agents were inside Amritsar city, so may conceivably have been the ones who passed on the information picked up by Kitchin and Donald on the road from Lahore. It is also possible that Donald had this information from police sources through his headquarters in Lahore and that he had fed this information to Kitchin, who might have wished to disguise the source. But Kitchin was specific that, on both the occasions he gave Dyer information, they had picked up that information on the way, so it is more likely that, if the information had come from the police, it was acquired at one or more of the small police stations along the road. The staff at all of these had been clearly scared by the disturbances. Ashraf Khan's report was an indication of the type of report that junior police officers would make in such circumstances.
In sum, the sources of information utilised by the Punjab Government were narrow and, in the newly politicised circumstances of the province, dangerously skewed. Their sources remained at either the very top or at the criminal bottom of the social structure. Neither were to prove useful when the Government was faced with a political movement driven by the newly numerous educated middle class. The traditional channels of information were becoming unreliable if not redundant. The depositions from Sir Sankaran Nair's Indian witnesses make it plain that almost the entire professional middle class in the Punjab became disaffected from the British either during the Rowlatt agitation or during the suppression of the Punjab Disturbances. Nair's Indian witnesses included fifteen lawyers, eleven medical men, three educators and six prominent businessmen. O'Dwyer's list had none.
So, by default, the administration consulted its old sources and received advice that was less and less useful as time passed. They pulled the old levers but found that these no longer worked so well, for the power of the upper class to control events was ebbing. The Punjab Disturbances brought this out in sharp relief. The upper class found itself out of touch with political movements that threatened to overturn the status quo. Additionally, though only for a short time, the police lost control of the streets and saw their lives and their livelihoods, both licit and illicit, endangered.
Strangely, the only man who seems to have picked this up at the time was the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, Miles Irving, a man not long in post, whose superiors, the military and the civilians of Amritsar all seemed to discount and despise. Writing to O'Dwyer on 8 April, describing the hugely successful hartal called by Gandhi on 6 April, which had totally shut down Amritsar, Irving said:
I was doing my utmost to keep in touch with what was going on, and the opinion almost unanimously expressed, was that there would be no hartal, or if there was that it would be a failure. The only opinion on the other side, and a significant exception, was that of the poor, such as patients at the Mission hospital. Indeed, the Congress Reception Committee itself passed a resolution against the hartal, and the last opinion I had, that of a meeting of Honorary Magistrates and other dignitaries held at my house at 3 P.M. on Saturday was in the general sense [. . .] We know now [. . .] that the so-called leaders have lost all influence. The mob showed a correct appreciation of the situation not devoid of some sense of humour when they conducted in effigy the funeral obsequies of a Hindu in front of the house of Rai Bahadur Gopal Das Bhandari. The Khan Bahadurs and Rai Sahibs are dead, and not fresh corpses at that. I am trying to get in touch with the new leaders who have influence.Footnote 44
It would scarcely have been surprising if the classes which had held power under the British for so long had been unwilling to surrender it easily or if they had done what they could to bolster their position. Their relief and thankfulness when order was restored in the Punjab was genuine, despite all the bloodshed. The crowds of notables that thronged the grounds of Dyer's headquarters at the Amritsar Circuit House towards the end of April, all pressing Dyer to speak to them and determined to give him their thanks for restoring law and order, provided local proof of this. As did the extraordinary episode of Dyer's being invited to the Golden Temple by Arur Singh, the chief mahant, to be made an honorary Sikh. He and his brigade major were given a privilege unheard of then and since.Footnote 45 It was a privilege greatly resented by the majority of the Sikhs and played its part, if a minor one, in the successful Akali struggle (what some have called “the Third Sikh War”) which started in 1921 to wrest control of the gurdwaras and the Sikh faith from the hands of the corrupt classes hitherto appointed to control them by the British.Footnote 46
In Amritsar, both the upper class and the Indian police did what they could to prick the British to defend the status quo. They were not to know that the man whom they were urging to action needed no encouragement. Dyer was quite capable of making up his own mind, of reaching the wrong conclusion and of acting upon it. The guilt of the Jallianwala Bagh remains his. Yet the evidence heard at the O'Dwyer v. Nair trial of 1924, taken together with the Hunter Report and the other evidence of the day, is unequivocal that the British intelligence system was at a loss in 1919, that in place of reliable information it was being fed deliberate lies and that at least some of the poison that dripped into the ears of British administrators in the Punjab came from Indian mouths.
