The philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce is not easy to classify. A man of many talents, he was at home in a number of fields, including not only philosophy and logic, but also mathematics, linguistics, astronomy and geodetics, to name only a few. As a polymath, he exerted every effort to present his thought in the form of a system, and in his later years claimed it to be his paramount task “to erect a philosophical edifice that shall outlast the vicissitudes of time.” (Collected Papers, Vol. 1, p.1.) However, in spite of all the industrious efforts Peirce scholars have made so far, the full meaning of his system, at least in some respects, still remains a riddle.
Paul Forster’s Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism adds to these efforts and presents an intriguing way of reading Peirce as a systematic philosopher. Forster chooses to display Peirce’s major ideas against the background of nominalism—the view Peirce incessantly criticized and at times treated with unvarnished disdain. This novel approach to the subject appears to have an important advantage. Reading Peirce, as it were, ex adverso, as a matter of fact, turns out to be an attempt to understand him “in his own terms,” because it helps the reader put Peirce’s philosophy in the wider context of nineteenth-century scientific, moral and religious thought, of which the nominalist view, as Peirce himself deeply believed, was a preeminent feature.
Forster’s core insight is that to have a proper grasp of the twists and turns of Peirce’s thought, one has to approach the controversy between nominalism and realism not just as a technical problem of logic, but in the manner Peirce himself approached it. For Peirce, it was a question of the practical choice between the view of reality as consisting of individuals isolated from each other by their personal vagaries, on the one hand, and understanding it as involving the idea of a true cooperative community, on the other hand. Using the unremitting tension between the two doctrines as a tool, Forster traces intricate links among Peirce’s ideas, showing how different fields of his research are connected and, at the same time, displaying “his reaction to the debates of his time and his place in philosophy.” (x)
The preface and the first chapter of the book together form a brief, but lucid discussion of how and why reading Peirce through his sustained rejection of the scepticism and individualism inherent in nominalist epistemology may serve as glue that brings together different parts of his theory.
Following the introduction, in chapter two Forster discusses Peirce’s view of logic as a non-naturalistic and anti-intuitivist normative science which “provides a legitimate foundation for metaphysics.” (32) The chapter also lays stress on the central role diagrammatic thinking plays in Peirce’s logic. Although appealing to forms of expression which are immediately clear, diagrams, or “moving pictures of thought,” as Peirce called them, do not involve introspection or any other sort of “private experience,” characteristic of the nominalist approach, but, on the contrary, necessarily presuppose intersubjectively grounded experimental verification.
On a side note, Peirce, as he himself confessed on many occasions, had discovered quite early a personal disposition toward diagrammatical thinking, i.e. had a habit of thinking by means of pictures and diagrams rather than linguistic units. Moreover, he was inclined to attribute this capacity to his mathematical mindset—which is significant considering the fact that Peirce’s family had three mathematicians, including, besides Peirce himself, his father and his older brother James Mills (both professors at Harvard). This context, in my opinion, adds to the persuasiveness of the link Forster makes in the next chapter between the importance of diagrammatic thinking for Peirce and the logical and mathematical implications of the problem of continuity in his later theory. This chapter also offers an explanation of why nominalism, from the Peircean point of view, fails to give a plausible account of the nature of laws and general concepts. This explanation plays a central role in the book as it provides a set of illuminating ideas which serve to support Peirce’s arguments throughout the rest of the text.
Chapters four and five deal with Peirce’s approach to meaning. Here, Forster does an excellent job of showing how Peirce’s take on continuity, described in chapter three, helps him meet nominalist objections to his pragmatic maxim. While briefly discussing different formulations of the maxim, he concentrates on the initial one as it was presented in Peirce’s early paper “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” There are two points which deserve special attention here. First, the proposed vindication of the maxim is, in fact, the author’s elaborate reconstruction conceived as an alternative to Peirce’s own defence of it and “as a response to the objection that Peirce’s original argument makes illicit appeal to psychological facts.” (102) Second, it draws on Peirce’s theory of signs, which creates an excellent opportunity to read it in the context of Peirce’s late attempts at the proof of pragmatism, and in the context of his famous MS 318 in particular.
The next three chapters shift our attention to Peirce’s theory of inquiry and his theory of truth. This part of the book invokes the nominalism vs. realism controversy in relation to Peirce’s notion of experience and the self-corrective character of inquiry. Chapter six provides an extensive and thorough description of the problems Peirce encounters in formulating his view on the empirical foundations of knowledge, including his response to the nominalist idea of immediate experience, and then proceeds to describe how Peirce finally arrives at his own understanding of the nature of perceptual judgments. The next two chapters deal with Peirce’s understanding of the reality of laws, objections to it raised by nominalists, and the implications of this debate for Peirce’s views on the nature of truth.
Chapters nine and ten present a masterful discussion of Peirce’s cosmology, i.e. his evolutionary view on how laws of nature evolved from the initial chaos. Although this subject has a longstanding history in Peirce studies, it is widely recognized as one of the most controversial for the reason that Peirce several times modified his view on this matter and, as some researchers suggest, none of these modifications appear to be conclusive. (See, for instance: Short, Tom. 2010. “Did Peirce Have a Cosmology?” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 521-544.) However, according to Forster, Peirce’s cosmological controversy is undoubtedly an important part of his philosophy which, “far from being a product of unchecked speculation, … results from the application of his mathematical analysis of continuity, his theory of symbols and his account of the method of inquiry to the question of the nature of being.” (177) Moreover, Peirce’s cosmological views provide a solution for the intriguing problem of how laws of nature originate and operate in the world in such a way so as to allow us to predict future facts and discover new laws and regularities. Again, as Forster points out, nominalism fails even to see the predictive power of human intellect as a problem due to the fact that it takes laws and regularities to be mere generalised summaries of past experiences disconnected from the future.
The last chapter explains how the notion of continuity allows Peirce to reconcile science and morality. This approach, on Peirce’s part, seems to be more than appropriate, as, on the one hand, it invokes Peirce’s late attempts to systematically articulate his conception of ethics as a normative science, and, on the other hand, refers to his early paper “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” in which Peirce introduced his idea of a community of inquirers which was later to play a central role both in his pragmatism and his semiotics. It is in this idea, as Forster suggests, that Peirce’s notions of reality, scientific method and moral life finally converge; and it is this idea which thus “provides the very thing nominalism most threatens, namely, an ultimate, impartial, binding and rational framework for the organization and fulfillment of human potential.” (246)
Overall, Paul Forster’s Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism is a book definitely worth having and will reward a careful reader. It represents both an excellent introduction to Peirce for those new to his thought and a must-read for Peirce enthusiasts and professionals.
