Not long ago a MESA Bulletin reader objected to introducing coverage of the Internet, saying that there were few Middle East studies online. However, you do find Middle Easterners. With increasingly accessible technology, there are thousands of websites that are added to listservs and now supplemented by blogs from, by, and about Middle Easterners. The trend has been from witness to participant. Yet the subjective register of the Internet in Middle East and North Africa is often a new example of exceptionalism: less free than in the West, less extensive than in the Far East, slow to grow and stunted when it does, with limited access and high costs that confine it demographically and culturally, not to mention politically. That is also what most comparative measures tell, but those do not measure what is happening. Early interest a decade ago has subsequently faded—or phased—into something more interesting than another story of absences.
Initial interest in the Internet focused on what is on the screen, on information and potential information freedom, a largely media studies approach to parsing the passing of messages, particularly messages across borders. More interesting, at least to me, has been who is behind the screen: Internet advocates and early adopters, engineers and other implementers (ranging from entrepreneurs in telecoms to website designers to regulators to “content providers”), rulers or close associates interested in the Internet as a development tool, and growing professional middle classes trained or seeking training in information technology (IT). As an anthropologist, I am not bothered by small numbers. They make it easier to study something, in this case intense bargaining and striking new state–society bargains over the Internet, whose own protean capacities invite multiple interpretations and projects.
In this respect, the Internet opened less a new information economy than a boom in social constructions, often just out of the media spotlight. It includes (1) new tech elites bargaining with patrons at the highest levels, abetted by (2) a generational shift in leaders' focus from national security to national welfare and (3) shifting paradigms of development from modernization to globalization, which (4) multiply other mobilities of people and expertise.
The Internet has attracted at least as much interest at the ruling level in the Middle East as in the United States, and at the same sort of level as Al Gore—as a turn not to be missed, it was frequently put, as the region had missed the industrial revolution and thus fallen behind. Attention shifted from scarce capital accumulation to relatively abundant human capital, from PhD computer scientists to telecom entrepreneurs to shawarma sellers on the fringes of universities who turned their shops into Internet cafés that struggled to keep up with demand (and have since been joined by a growth industry of private universities and institutes offering IT and business courses, often given by university faculty).
IT elites now include Web designers with arts backgrounds as well as those trained in computer science and electrical engineering. They operate in a transnational space, regional as well as international, of jobs and projects marked by high mobility that also underwrites the formation of new alliances and coalitions to build the Internet within nations. Many IT elites whom Michael Hudson and I have followed for over a decade have moved up, on, and out. One became the first head of a new ministry of information and communication technology and then prime minister; at least one other became a deputy minister; others became ambassadors in London, Paris, and Washington, as well as governors and agency heads; still others passed into and out of the international circulation of experts and other “revolving doors.” Whether they convey their expertise into changes of consciousness, what is observable in the short run is a new round of state–society bargaining, alliance seeking, and coalition building around implementing the Internet. This has largely settled down to institution building, which can be nearly invisible amid the overwhelming emphasis on agency enhancement that has dominated thinking about the Internet.
Emerging tech elites, generational change, and new mobilities intersect macrolevel shifts in development paradigms from modernization to globalization. Enthusiasm for the Internet and IT has been marked among rulers, whose networks may not include the United Nations Development Programme and other international agencies on a daily basis but do include Davos and Aspen, where tech and political elites unite as reference groups. It is interesting that more strictly cultural concerns tend to be swept aside in moving beyond the prospects for Internet technologies as development tools to IT as a development sector. Such patterns and transformations repeat down to the microlevel, where anthropologists such as myself can find students not just Web surfing at Internet cafés but forming computer clubs that combine knowledge they acquire about computers with models of majlis they learned from their parents. Grandchildren of scribes are figuring out how to network Windows-equipped computers to create an Internet café so that refugees can e-mail family left behind; religious organizations are investing in Web firms that often appreciate them as more reliable over the long run than strictly commercial customers.
Thus, although the Internet may not usher in the liberal utopia of information freedom anticipated a decade ago, IT provides a window on neoliberal globalization that is manifest in political economy as a regime of flexible accumulation, in cultural economy as creolization, and in a sociology of network organization.
