David H. Kaye has been an active participant in and commenter on debates about the evidentiary status of DNA evidence over the past two decades. Accordingly, his new history of those debates exhibits some of the benefits and pitfalls of being authored by one so intimately connected with the story being told. Kaye describes the book as “part history, part legal analysis, part popular science, and part applied statistics,” (xi) and he admits that he is not an academic historian. These limitations aside, the book does a commendable job of detailing debates about the admissibility of DNA evidence, especially those relating to probabilistic and statistical inferences about DNA matches.
The book's first two chapters establish twin themes that continue throughout the text. Chapter 1 briefly recounts the era before DNA-typing, when courts considered the admissibility under the Frye general acceptance standard of genetic markers, including blood groups, for identifying and convicting suspected criminals. Chapter 2 then turns to debates in both the courts and academic literature about the use of probability evidence at trial. Kaye shows how courts grappled with the difficulties of applying statistics and probabilities, and he performs a valuable service by clearly explaining important concepts such as the transposition fallacy.
The central chapters of the book develop the themes of scientific and legal acceptance and the challenges of probability theory as they affect the admissibility of DNA “fingerprinting” evidence. Kaye traces the development of DNA evidence from its earliest applications in the 1980s to the heated disputes in courtrooms, law journals, and science publications in the early 1990s and ultimately to the acceptance of DNA as the gold standard of identification evidence. Kaye's focus throughout is on contested issues surrounding the validity of statistical inferences concerning the ubiquitous random match probabilities reported to jurors, for example, that there is a one in 300 million chance that the DNA sample came from someone other than the defendant. He shows that these statements are the result not of the pure application of scientific principles to evidence law but rather of legal and academic debates about population frequencies, racial categories, and probability theory. Not surprisingly, the O.J. Simpson “trial of the century” features prominently in Kaye's analysis, yet his focus on the mathematical principles underlying the case's infamous DNA evidence helps shed new light on this often-rehearsed story. The book's final chapters shift away from the history of DNA evidence to discuss, among other things, the identification of the remains of the last tsar and the author's opinions about the appropriate use of DNA evidence in courts.
Kaye's story encourages a reanalysis of the received wisdom about the relationship between science and law, that is, that the hidebound, conservative tendencies of the bench and bar keep the law in a position of following science slowly and reluctantly. As Kaye shows, lawyers and judges were quick to embrace DNA evidence, and they were admitting it in court before scientists had resolved a number of fundamental issues about its use. In some respects it even seems as if the forensic use of DNA evidence spurred scientists to consider previously unexplored topics in population genetics. In such cases, the different demands and expectations of the two fields created tensions as courts’ needs for speedy trials and generally accepted scientific principles outpaced the scientists’ ability to provide them. Moreover, Kaye's work helps dissolve the notion that science and law are separate, independent spheres of activity. From almost the moment of the discovery of DNA-typing, developments in DNA science and technology involved not just the work of geneticists and statisticians but also of litigators, police agencies, legal academics, and the commercial laboratories that processed DNA evidence. Seen in this light, science and law appear to be mutually constitutive intellectual fields.
More so than other works on the subject, Kaye's highlights the importance of numbers, frequencies, and statistics in DNA evidence. He discusses where the numbers come from, what they mean, and how they have been misunderstood by judges, lawyers, and, presumably, jurors. As Kaye shows, reporting random match frequencies to juries was alternatively seen as problematic and necessary for admission of DNA evidence. Accordingly, it would have been helpful if he had offered a more nuanced analysis of the perceived value and threat that numbers represented. Kaye notes that frequencies are not required—or even allowed—for the admission of other forms of evidence. So why did numbers play such a large role in use of DNA evidence? Why were courts more attracted to quantification in these cases than they were, for example, in the admissibility of eye-witness testimony or fingerprint identification? Although Kaye leaves these questions largely unanswered, he has provided a valuable addition with his careful and accessible treatment of an important story in the history of American evidence law.
