In 1997, child-protection activists in the Dallas area called for the launching of the nation's first Amber Alert system for missing children. Between 1999 and 2005, every state suddenly adopted the Amber plan. In his cleanly organized and clearly written book, Greame Boushey provides both specific details and general factors explaining how and why such dramatic, sudden adoption of new policy innovations took place in American states from 1900 to 2006.
Extant theories of policy diffusion do not explain the sudden diffusion of policy innovations. Classical approaches to diffusion models of policy adoption compare early and late adopters primarily to evaluate the internal dynamics leading states to innovate. Alternatively, they model the effects of social learning through interstate networks on patterns of policy adoption. All of these studies share a similar behavioral model of political decision making: incremental learning and gradual mimicking. However, numerous cases of empirical analysis demonstrate that there are nonincremental bursts of policy adoptions. Death-penalty reenactments and legislation providing for the Amber Alert, gubernatorial term limits, and English Only have exemplified sudden periods of policy change. State policy decision makers rely on incremental learning, but policy diffusion also takes place through elevated issue attention, heightened emotional reasoning, and sudden policy emulation. Boushey conducts an excellent analysis of sudden policy diffusion in American states by investigating specific details of policy diffusion, while at the same time identifying general factors for sudden policy diffusion.
Boushey starts his analysis from one of the most comprehensive frameworks of bounded rationality, developed by Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner (The Politics of Attention, 2005). In policy processes, policy decision makers tend to ignore information inputs flowing from policy environments. However, at some point in the temporal policy process, decision makers cannot continue to ignore the previously unattended facets. They are then likely to pay disproportionately heavier attention to the facets. Therefore, episodic but dramatic policy adjustments will follow.
Institutional conflicts under collective decision-making settings further augment the disproportionality in decision makers' information processing. When aggregations of individuals respond to information inputs from policy environments according to rules, institutional costs are incurred. As the information inputs or signals get stronger, the supporting or opposing response is likely to grow. When institutional costs incurred from the information inputs or signals are higher, the response tends to be weaker, and vice versa. One key point is that when the signals get very strong, institutional costs will rapidly decrease. If so, the signals will be suddenly translated into the response by the aggregations of individuals, resulting in sudden policy adoption. Boushey's framework mainly employs this second dimension of Jones and Baumgartner's theory.
The real strength of Boushey's analysis is that he borrows a framework from epidemiology and further polishes Jones and Baumgartner's theory by revealing much more nuanced specifics of policy diffusion dynamics. Patterns of transmission of disease are contingent on environmental conditions, the characteristics of the carriers of disease, the traits of the host susceptible to infection, and the unique attributes of the disease agent. Boushey applies the epidemiologic framework to interstate policy diffusion. Issue salience or national mood over policy innovations (environmental conditions), the unique features of policy innovations (agents), the institutional and political characteristics of states (hosts for policy innovations), and the structural and strategic differences in interest groups and professional organizations (carriers of policy innovations) jointly explain interstate policy diffusion. In Policy Diffusion Dynamics in America, Boushey focuses on the latter three factors.
When policy innovations are complex and need more technical expertise to be understood, policy diffusion will be slower. When innovations are highly visible, they spread more rapidly. The target population of policy innovations also affects the speed of policy diffusion. Innovations targeting on both negatively constructed groups, such as drug users or criminals, and positively constructed groups, such as children or seniors, garner strong support from state governments. When policy innovations are met with weaker opposition, there will be rapid policy diffusion. Boushey's empirical analysis supports these expectations to a great degree. Morality and social regulatory policy, such as same-sex marriage bans, abortion laws, pornography, and so on, is technically simple and highly salient in the policy process. Such governance policy as term limitations, tax limitations, campaign finance reform, and so on is highly visible, gets mass political support, and is related to direct democracy. These policy innovations show rapid nonincremental policy diffusion. In contrast, state regulatory policy is characterized by high issue complexity and low political salience. Accordingly, this type of policy features more incremental policy diffusion.
Boushey identifies more general state characteristics that influence policy diffusion. This aspect is also contrasted with previous case-based studies of policy diffusion. When states have professional legislatures, they can handle technocratic, complex, and low-salience regulatory policies quite well. Legislative professionalism will therefore expedite policy diffusion. Since it is hard to measure and analyze fundamental values inherent in morality policy, legislative professionalism cannot effectively facilitate the diffusion of morality policy. Boushey's empirical analysis supports these expectations as well. Political candidates have recently looked to mobilize their voting base through symbolic high-salience morality issues. Boushey's analysis thus indicates that in the states with conservative citizen ideology and traditional political culture, morality policy has been more rapidly diffused. When citizens rely on direct statutory initiatives, governance policy has been more quickly adopted.
Interest groups, as carriers of policy innovations, differ in terms of their capacity in venue selection, issue framing, and trial-and-error strategies. Interest groups attempt to take advantage of multiple points of access in the policy process to promote policy changes. However, such venue shopping is highly costly. Larger, wealthier, and centrally organized interest groups can more effectively induce political changes across states. For instance, mass-member interest groups, such as the National Rifle Association or the American Association of Retired Persons, can propel signature drives and initiative campaigns. In addition, their centralized organizational structures efficiently coordinate political campaigns and rapid policy adoptions can erupt. Boushey also shows a historical case. In the middle of the nineteenth century, various liquor prohibition laws and the Prohibition Party quickly ran out of steam because they linked the prohibition issue with other economic issues. In the early twentieth century, a single-issue organization like the Anti-Saloon League maintained highly centralized, hierarchical organizational structures and thus could simultaneously drive national and state campaigns for strong liquor control. Boushey stresses that 36 states ratified the Eighteenth Amendment in 14 months.
Despite the book's significant contribution to the literature of bounded rationality in general and policy-diffusion dynamics in particular, there are some points for improvement that will make this already strong work even stronger. If Boushey had clarified that his framework is primarily based on institutional frictions under collective decision-making settings, Policy Diffusion Dynamics in America might have appealed to a broader readership. In particular, scholars and students of public policy and administration have significantly applied Jones and Baumgartner's model to policy and budget processes in the United States and abroad. Boushey's analysis obviously investigates key factors of collective decision-making institutions such as interest groups, information signals from policy environments, and overall state characteristics. Throughout the book, however, his analysis looks as if it also covers decision makers' disproportionate information processing. This might be true, but scholars and students of public policy and administration often prefer enhanced clarity at the potential expense of scientific rigor.
