Introduction: western imperialism and municipal administration in late imperial China

Max Weber's thesis advanced in explanation of the early modern Chinese city has dominated twentieth-century western historiography. For Weber, cities in the administrative sense did not exist in China, nor were they the seat of state authorities.Footnote ¹ The origins of modern municipal administrations in the most westernized Chinese cities, such as Shanghai and Tianjin, in 1905 and 1907 respectively, were regarded as a response to the western presence there, and they were demonstrably created by Chinese elites who had a working knowledge of western or Japanese urban institutions.Footnote ²

However, in the 1980s Max Weber's theory of the nature of Chinese cities, largely derived from reading the observations of western commentators of the time, was challenged by William T. Rowe. In a two-volume study of the nineteenth-century city of Hankou, Rowe intended to correct a flawed understanding of Chinese cities as administrative units lacking the right elements to transform themselves into industrialized, self-governed capitalist places.Footnote ³ Rowe's argument was supported in part by the analysis of Bryna Goodman of the guilds (huiguan) and the native-place associations (tongxianghui) in Shanghai, the latter emphasizing the important role played by these civil organizations in city life, social order, urban administration and national identity.Footnote ⁴ Revising the ‘impact-response’ and ‘tradition-modernity’ paradigms adopted by Ssu-yü Teng and John King Fairbank, probably influenced by Paul Cohen's call for a ‘China-centred approach’ to Chinese history,Footnote ⁵ these studies examined the Chinese origins of the modern municipal administration, showing that guilds were the most powerful socio-economic organizations in most early modern Chinese cities, and had a broad range of functions, both economic and more broadly political, social, cultural and religious.Footnote ⁶

Yet, western influences also shaped modern municipal administration in Chinese cities. What is harder to ascertain is how western municipal institutions were established in the treaty ports, and the degree to which these institutions influenced the Chinese. Recent studies on European imperialism in China have explored the importance of European activities in the shaping of Chinese statecraft,Footnote ⁷ arguing that the threat of European imperialism after the mid-nineteenth century encouraged the most innovative state-making in China from the seventeenth century.Footnote ⁸ Some historians have paid close attention to the history of the institutional transplantations of the foreign settlements or colonies in China. For instance, Kerrie L. MacPherson's pioneering work focused on the role of public health in the expansion of western municipal authority in Shanghai, both in terms of western initiative, but also Sino-Western co-operation in an issue of common interest.Footnote ⁹

Since the late 1990s, in a new historiographical trend, Chinese history has been approached from a broad perspective. Based on the discussions developed in Edward Said's thesis of orientalism, adopting Mary Louise Pratt's idea of ‘contact zones’, Arif Dirlik suggested the tendencies of ‘self-orientalization’ which would become an integral part of the history of orientalism. He extended Said's concept of ‘orientalism’, arguing that it was not only a construction of Asia by Europeans, and a problem in Euro-American modernity, but also a product of the circulation of Euro-American and Asian intellectuals in the contact zones or borderlands.Footnote ¹⁰ In this vein, concentrating on the pedagogy of imperialism as well as empire-building in Asia, a few historians reopened the study of Euro-American imperialism in East Asia in order to clarify the nature of colonialism in nineteenth-century China. The fundamental objective of ‘New Imperialism’ is to suggest ways of supplementing and reconsidering a one-sided ‘China-centred approach’ and of bringing imperialism and colonialism back into discussion of the nature of China's modernities as well as the formation of the modern Chinese state.Footnote ¹¹ With new archival materials and theoretical frameworks, recent studies on Qingdao, Hong Kong and Tianjin shed fresh light on how western knowledge of China was produced and circulated through the processes of negotiation and struggle, and how such knowledge was then deployed to reconstruct new treaty-based social institutions and modern administrative systems in Chinese cities.Footnote ¹²

Previous scholarship has emphasized the important role played by the western-influenced local elites in promoting their self-government in Shanghai in the early years of the twentieth century. It argues that the beginning of local autonomy in Shanghai was due to the influence of foreign settlements and the needs of urban development.Footnote ¹³ However, this article, focusing on the French perspective, based on a wealth of western primary sources on imperialism in China, seeks to explore the imperial story of modern China through the urban form. Pace Paul Cohen, we do need to know something about foreign activities in modern China, not as ‘impact-response’ and ‘tradition-modernity’ paradigms, but rather as part of local history both in terms of local administration and urban landscape. The case of the French Concession of Shanghai in the Taiping period shows how a number of institutions bolstering the ‘western’ presence in China were created in response to the political-military crisis. Euro-American expansion and exploitation were not part of a unitary or totalizing enterprise, and warfare and Franco-British conflicts facilitated the making of modern municipal administration in the French Concession of Shanghai. However, Chinese forces indirectly shaped the structure of the institutions of imperialism, as well as pointing to divergent national approaches to imperialism.

From neutrality to intervention: an aborted common defence plan, 1853–55

Broad interpretations of the history of late imperial China inevitably revert to the stereotyped image of the dynastic decline of the Qing Empire since the late Qianlong reign. In the context of the political and social worlds in which bureaucrats had to live, dynastic decline has traditionally implied a loss of moral and administrative vigour in the bureaucracy, the collapse of centralized power, the rise of regional governors and a disruption of the balanced tension between state and society.Footnote ¹⁴ In addition to the rampant corruption throughout the bureaucracy, the phenomenal rise in population was certainly a striking feature of the history of late imperial China. Due to the long period of internal peace that began in the late seventeenth century and lasted until the White Lotus uprising in the late eighteenth century, China's population almost doubled within a century, from around 150 to over 300 million.Footnote ¹⁵ As a result, the efficiency of the imperial bureaucracy was weakened both by bureaucratic corruption and the rapid growth of population, and rebellions increased considerably through the nineteenth century.

The Taiping Rebellion (1851–64) was probably the most destructive civil war in the nineteenth century, in which the rebels weakened the authority of the Qing Empire. More than half of the 18 provinces with a Han Chinese majority population, including the most prosperous and wealthiest area to the south of the Yangzi River, were engulfed by warfare. The death toll of the Taiping Rebellion was 30 times that of the US Civil War, with at least 20 million people losing their lives, and famine and pestilence devastating the region.Footnote ¹⁶ Some scholars have argued that it was the incapacity of existing institutions to cope with population pressure, plus the political ‘exhaustion’ of the state, that together account for the collapse of the imperial bureaucracy during the 1850s.Footnote ¹⁷ In other words, the administrative bureaucracy of the Qing Empire lagged behind the growth of population. Although the local uprisings and small-scale banditry in rural China were a perennial thorn in the side of the Imperial authorities, according to Chinese government reports there seemed no pattern to the rising disorder in the years following the First Opium War (1839–42).Footnote ¹⁸ The most recent study concerning the rebellion, crime and violence in late imperial China shows that, starting with the White Lotus Rebellion, the Qing Empire was shaken by a range of rebellions and revolts, and when a rebellion did occur it attracted the attention of the Imperial court more or less continuously until it was repressed. However, in the mid-nineteenth century, major rebellions like the Taiping were essentially unpredictable.Footnote ¹⁹

The Taiping Rebellion destroyed some existing administrative systems of the Qing Empire, but generated other newly created institutions as well. By the time of the Taiping Rebellion, Shanghai had become the major trade port for all of the Lower Yangzi region, but its political status was low. By the end of the Song dynasty, the centre of trade had moved downstream of the Wusong River to central Shanghai, which was upgraded in status from a village to a market town in 1074. From the Yuan dynasty in 1292 until the opening of the port of Shanghai in 1842, central Shanghai was administered as a county under the Songjiang prefecture, whose seat was in the modern Songjiang district. The raids of Japanese pirates helped promote Shanghai's development in the Ming dynasty. A city wall was built for the first time in 1554, and the county's political status promoted because of its economic importance. During the Qing dynasty, Shanghai became one of the most important sea ports in the Yangzi Delta region as a result of the relocation of the customs office for Jiangsu province from the prefectural capital of Songjiang to Shanghai, which gave Shanghai exclusive control of customs collection for Jiangsu's foreign trade.Footnote ²⁰ Moreover, international attention to Shanghai grew after the First Opium War (1839–42) due to European recognition of its economic and trade potential on the eastern coastline of China. The war ended with the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, which allowed the British to dictate opening the treaty ports, Shanghai included, for international trade. Following the British, under the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia and the 1844 Treaty of Huangpu, the United States and France forced Chinese concession to European and American desires for settlement and trade in Shanghai. In the following years, Britain, France and the United States all carved out their respective concessions outside the walled city of Shanghai.Footnote ²¹ The opening of the port of Shanghai implies not merely economic changes in the city, but institutional, organizational and ideological adjustments to a new order, as well as the early emergence of Chinese nationalism.Footnote ²²

It should be noted, however, that the original establishment of an international municipality at Shanghai was not directly provided for in any treaty between the Qing Empire and the west but was, rather, the result of agreement between the Shanghai Daotai on one hand and the consular representatives and foreign residents on the other.Footnote ²³ As the first Shanghai Daotai who worked under the treaty system, hoping to avert Sino-foreign conflict by minimizing contact, Gong Mujiu initiated the idea of a foreign ‘settlement’ in the suburbs, a policy of segregation between the Chinese and foreigners.Footnote ²⁴ The form the international municipality at Shanghai took dates from as early as 1854. In that year, constitutional rights in Land Regulation took the comparatively elementary form of fixing the method of acquisition of title, of provision of roads, bridges, drainage, lighting and other municipal infrastructure and facilities. With agreement between the British consul and the Daotai, three land renters were elected to serve as a ‘Committee on Roads and Jetties’, an annual meeting held under the chairmanship of the British consul.Footnote ²⁵ During the Taiping War period, in order to cope with warfare and thousands of refugees, the small European community of Shanghai had to seek wider powers of government.

In 1853, the Taiping Rebellion, which had swept across south-central China for three years, won international attention by the dramatic capture of Nanjing and Zhenjiang, Yangzi River cities around 200 miles above Shanghai.Footnote ²⁶ In view of the Taiping threat to the Lower Yangzi region not only the Imperial authorities in Jiangsu province,Footnote ²⁷but also the foreign authorities in Shanghai requested military reinforcement. On 15 March, the French corvette Le Cassini, under the command of Robinet de Plas, arrived at Shanghai with 6 cannon and a crew of 125 with the purpose of supporting the British brig Lily.Footnote ²⁸ Despite the necessary precautions against the Taiping troops taken in the foreign society, the Anglo-American authorities attempted to get in touch with the Taiping kings in Nanjing. From March to April, the Anglo-American envoys Sir Samuel George Bonham and Humphrey Marshall sailed up the Yangzi River from Shanghai to Nanjing in order to obtain intelligence from the Taiping regime and to probe their attitude towards trade with foreign merchants.Footnote ²⁹ Upon meeting with the Taipings, Bonham, the British plenipotentiary and superintendent of trade in China, inaugurated the policy of British neutrality. He then decided to confer with the Taiping authorities at Nanjing rather than render aid to the Imperial authorities at Beijing unless the British obtained advantages in trade. To enforce neutrality, he forbade British subjects to engage in warfare, and considered the Taipings more favourable to foreigners than the Imperial authorities.Footnote ³⁰ He observed to Foreign Secretary Clarendon that ‘more Political and Commercial advantages are likely to be obtained from the Insurrectionnists’.Footnote ³¹ Bonham's observations and decisions formed the basis of Clarendon's policy in China in the Taiping period. In reality, the British speculated about trade relations with the Taipings. In accordance with Clarendon's policy, Bonham informed the French minister in China, Alphonse de Bourboulon, that the British intended to maintain neutrality while negotiating for a free trade treaty with China. At the same time, he assured Bourboulon that the British would share the commercial advantages with all the civilized nations of the world.Footnote ³²

However, since the foreign community was potentially threatened on two fronts, some defensive measures were adopted by the foreign authorities in Shanghai. Under the auspices of the British consul, Rutherford Alcock, public meetings in regard to the defence of the Settlement and the Concession were held on 8, 9 and 12 April 1853 in the British Settlement. Among the foreigners in Shanghai, Alcock pointed out, there could be no division in national interests with regard to security, and it was essential that there should be no division in defence measures. Charles de Montigny, the French consul, pledged the co-operation of French naval forces on emergency measures for defending the Settlement and Concession. Shortly thereafter, British and American volunteer corps were organized without delay in the British Settlement. In order to unify all the foreign forces in Shanghai, a Defence Committee was elected to co-operate with the civil and naval authorities. Permanent defence works were also projected, the Defence Creek was extended northward and the British Settlement was enclosed within a ring fence protected by ditch and embankment as an outer line of defence.Footnote ³³ Although the protection of the French Concession was less considered by this British-led defence scheme, the common defence plan was doomed to failure at the beginning of the Franco-British co-operation.

In addition, in spite of a policy of co-operation concluded between Bonham and Bourboulon, the French authorities emphasized the close link reinforced by the treaties between the Imperial authorities and the foreign powers. In discussing the security problem in Shanghai, Montigny declared clearly to Alcock that he should not hesitate to make a choice between a mob of bandits and a government with which the foreign powers had signed the treaties.Footnote ³⁴ The French interpreted the neutrality policy in the opposite way to the British, as they cared much more about the political rights of the foreign powers in the treaty ports and the interests of Catholic missionaries in China than about the commercial advantages.

The Small Swords Society's (xiao dao hui) capture of the wall-encircled city of Shanghai on 7 September 1853 greatly complicated the situation and worsened the problems of trade and customs administration.Footnote ³⁵ This secret society was well known, aimed at the overthrow of the Imperial authorities and claimed its many affiliations with the Taipings.Footnote ³⁶ The Chinese local government had no power to resist the surprise attack by unemployed seamen and other disaffected elements in the Shanghai area. The rebels slew the guard, destroyed the county administrative building and deposed the Daotai Wu Jianzhang.Footnote ³⁷ Some of the Chinese officials, including the Daotai Wu, managed to escape with the connivance of some Cantonese chiefs.Footnote ³⁸ Wu hid in the American district, as he was himself Cantonese and had been a successful merchant closely connected to the American firm Russell & Co. His fellow provincials allowed him to flee and his American contacts provided him with safe quarters.Footnote ³⁹

During the eighteen-month period of occupation by the Small Swords Society, although the rebels sent down a guard to protect the Chinese Custom House, and guaranteed a guard for the protection of foreign property in the city,Footnote ⁴⁰ the municipal administration of Shanghai collapsed. The Daotai Wu was unable to run their government and the Chinese customs was in the hands of a mob.Footnote ⁴¹ Foreign officials were calling for Shanghai to be made a free port under the control of a foreign protectorate.Footnote ⁴² They promptly proclaimed a species of neutrality, and took it upon themselves to withhold payment of duties, but collected them in the form of promissory notes from the foreign merchants in Shanghai – a highly creditable and honourable proceeding,Footnote ⁴³ but subsequently greatly abused and mismanaged by the British and American authorities.Footnote ⁴⁴ The dangers to Shanghai were clearly real. The foreign officials had to find pragmatic solutions to the problems which included the absence of Chinese authorities, the cessation of trade, an influx into the Settlement and the Concession of Chinese refugees and foreign seamen, the danger posed by the rebels, by the Imperial forces and by deserters, robbers and the defeated soldiers in flight.Footnote ⁴⁵ In order to establish a better administration for the Settlement and the Concession and to strengthen the defence of the foreign community, in agreement with the Daotai Wu, a customs compromise was reached among the consuls of Britain, France and the United States.Footnote ⁴⁶ The foreign inspectors of customs were employed to assess duties at Shanghai, which would be paid to the Chinese authorities.Footnote ⁴⁷ In June 1854, Yi Liang, the viceroy of Jiangnan and Jiangxi provinces, accepted a proposal of Robert M. Maclane, the American minister in China, to create a newly founded Chinese customs supervised by a board of foreign inspectors near the Suzhou Creek.Footnote ⁴⁸ On 12 July, the foreign officials established the Imperial Maritime Customs Service in Shanghai and put it under their direct control.Footnote ⁴⁹ By placing the Chinese customs under their control the foreign authorities ensured integrity in the municipal administration of Shanghai. This process was the origin of the new regime of Chinese customs under the supervision of foreign officials.Footnote ⁵⁰

The foreign authorities of Shanghai made an administrative compromise as well. The Taipings rose in the south of China and advanced rapidly toward the Yangzi Valley. In 1852 and 1853, thousands of Chinese refugees sought the safety of the British Settlement and the French Concession of Shanghai, as the rebels of the Small Swords Society captured the city and the menace of the Taiping troops to the region increased.Footnote ⁵¹ The situation was undoubtedly dangerous. Foreign officials needed not only a profitable customs service which would allow them to meet their treaty obligation for trade in the absence of Imperial authorities, but also better municipal administration for the British Settlement and the French Concession: in a word, ‘a stronger voice and a firmer hand’.Footnote ⁵² The Committee of Roads and Jetties of the British Settlement became a fully fledged municipal council with new municipal powers and administrative expectations.Footnote ⁵³ British ambition was not limited to their Settlement. British consul Alcock had been drafting a new code of Land Regulations, which in 1854 extended the 1845 version to the area of municipal administration, for its articles were applicable to the Anglo-American Settlements as well as the French Concession. Alcock hoped that the foreign community of Shanghai would be administered by a unified municipality and that the new code of Land Regulations would be made to apply to all foreigners in Shanghai. From May 1853 until the following July, Alcock discussed the draft with his American colleagues Humphrey Marshall (US commissioner) and Edward Cunningham (US vice-consul), and the previous British Land Regulations of 1845 ceased to be operative.Footnote ⁵⁴

In order to levy taxes on non-British subjects for the maintenance of public roads and jetties in the Settlement, in 1845 the first Land Regulations were established between the first British consul Captain George Balfour and the Daotai Lin Gui. These regulations granted certain extraterritorial authority over the residents and standardized the title-deed registration system. Under the regulation, three land renters were elected to a Committee of Roads and Jetties which levied taxes to maintain the public areas in the Settlement. Nevertheless, non-British subjects were allowed to acquire land, with the consent of the British consul, if they observed the Land Regulations.Footnote ⁵⁵ In addition, Chinese residence in the Settlement was initially forbidden.Footnote ⁵⁶ But the Taiping crisis called for a sounder municipal administration. The executive privilege of the British consul was restricted by the new code of 1854. Any person desiring to rent land or purchase a house from the Chinese proprietors within the limits of the British Settlement and the French Concession had first to apply to the consul or consular agent of his nation rather than the British authorities, and Chinese residence was allowed as well.Footnote ⁵⁷ On 5 July 1854, the new code of Municipal and Land Regulations was issued by the consuls of Britain, the United States and France, acting under instructions from their respective plenipotentiaries, for the better security and government of all foreigners in Shanghai. Among the 14 articles and by-laws, the two governing the mode of land acquisition and the form of the municipal government were the most striking modifications in the new code of 1854. As the British authorities proposed, the code was binding upon all foreigners in Shanghai who might at any time reside within the municipal limits defined in the regulations.Footnote ⁵⁸ Thus, on 11 July 1854, with such a code, municipal government of a comprehensive and effective character had for the first time become a possibility, although it had never previously been necessary for the security and well-being of the foreign community of Shanghai.Footnote ⁵⁹

The question for the foreign authorities to decide, however, was not so much whether a municipal government was necessary or desirable, but what form it should take.Footnote ⁶⁰ The discussions revealed the starkly divergent views of the British and American authorities with regard to the basis for a municipal government. Alcock wanted the foreign municipality to be under the joint control and supervision of the consuls of the Three Treaty Powers and the local Chinese authorities, while the renters, who managed the details of all funds concerning roads and jetties and other municipal infrastructure, wanted to control it themselves. Alcock's objective was to assert consular authority and to have a police force at the command of the consuls which could be used for Settlement and Concession protection when necessary, in consideration of the refusal of the British admiral, Sir James Stirling, to be bound by consular orders and the continued friction between the consuls and naval authorities over the question of the protection of the foreign community.Footnote ⁶¹ Yet, Marshall objected to this view and suggested that full authority to determine municipal issues, including infrastructure construction, the question of land transfer as well as the control of the police force, should be given to taxpayers, and that there should be no consular intervention in municipal administration. Permanent provision for the security of the Settlement and the Concession was impossible without a municipal constitution. There had to be some organization to take the form of a representative council with municipal powers and authority. The functions to be exercised on their behalf by such a council were no longer those of roads and jetties, but involved the protection of life and property from causes of national disturbance in the region of Shanghai where they were located and from sources of danger within and without the Settlement and the Concession, where a large number of Chinese refugees sought shelter. The major objectives of such a council were comprehensively included in municipal government, that is, to guarantee the security of the foreign community, with municipal forms, all the regulations and measures necessary for the preservation of health in the maintenance of cleanliness, the organization of policeFootnote ⁶² and the creation and administration of revenue.Footnote ⁶³ Finally, Marshall's suggestions were partly incorporated into the 1854 Land Regulations, but the division between the consuls and the municipal officers was never clearly established in the British Settlement.Footnote ⁶⁴

In view of the impossibility of organizing an effective police force on the spot, and the necessity of sending to the region of Shanghai for troops, the consuls of the Three Treaty Powers were asked to put themselves in communication with their military authorities, that is with Sir James Stirling as commander-in-chief of the British Naval Force, and with the senior naval officers of America and France. Such policy acknowledged in the meeting of the renters a strong sense of the danger to which the whole foreign community would be exposed, and present troubles continued to render such military assistance necessary for the security of the British Settlement and the French Concession of Shanghai.Footnote ⁶⁵

From December 1853 to the beginning of 1854, the talks between the rebels and the Imperial authorities broke down, and the Imperial troops began an assault on the city of Shanghai from the north side, which shared a boundary with the French Concession.Footnote ⁶⁶ The military menace threatened the security of the French Concession,Footnote ⁶⁷ and the common defence plan agreed by the British and the French authorities would have faced a test. As early as 17 March 1854, the Daotai Wu addressed a note to Benoît Edan, French consul in Shanghai, urging the foreign authorities to relocate the French consulate in the British Settlement and to destroy the stone bridge over the Yangjingpang between the Chinese City and the British Settlement, in order to cut off the retreat of the rebels in the Chinese City.Footnote ⁶⁸ Relying upon a series of treaties concluded between the Imperial authorities and the foreign powers since the opening of the port of Shanghai from 1842, Edan flatly refused the Daotai's requests, claiming that the relocation of the French consulate and the demolition of the stone bridge would trigger disputes with his British colleagues on the question of consular jurisdiction, and the neutrality policy of foreign authorities would be violated by the non-military interventions. Yet, in spite of the support of Alcock, the British commanding officer of Encounter, George O'Callaghan, and the British vice-consul, Thomas Wade, were inclined to accept Daotai's proposal, arguing that without the stone bridge connecting with the Chinese City, the British Settlement would be entirely isolated from the battlefield – in other words, the demolition of the stone bridge would contribute to British interests in Shanghai.Footnote ⁶⁹ Ironically, Thomas Wade interpreted the neutrality policy in a different way from that of the French. According to him, some limited non-military intervention such as the demolition of the stone bridge would embody the neutrality policy of the foreign authorities rather than go against it.

Accidental military friction between Anglo-American forces and Imperial troops in the north-western boundary zone of the British Settlement on 3 April 1854, known as ‘the Battle of Muddy Flat’, eventually prompted the British and French authorities to abandon the neutrality policy and to intervene in the local military conflicts in their own manner. At that time, the British Settlement extended only to the Henan Road on the west, the interval between that and the Defence Creek being mostly open country, with an occasional hamlet and a few missionary residences; the old race course, which skirted the eastern bank of the Defence Creek, occupied a considerable portion of the space. The capture of the Chinese City by the rebels on 7 September 1853 brought along a large force of Imperial authorities, who camped on the western bank of Defence Creek. In the afternoon of 3 April 1854, an exchange of fire turned off a grave military conflict between the Anglo-American forces and the Imperial troops. With the aid of volunteer reinforcements the Imperial troops were driven out, one of their camps was destroyed and another shelled.Footnote ⁷⁰ The fight occupied only one day in all,Footnote ⁷¹ but it had a lasting impact on the urban society of Shanghai.Footnote ⁷² Although Alcock's action was approved by the British parliament after the event,Footnote ⁷³ he was impugned, on the one hand by those who saw in the event only his ‘unreasonable haste and imperiousness’, and on the other hand by a few who were in favor of the Imperial authorities.Footnote ⁷⁴ More importantly, the basis of the common defence plan as well as that of the unified municipal government was shaken because of the division of the British community.

On 8 July 1854, the British minister plenipotentiary, Sir John Bowring, arrived at Shanghai, accompanied by his secretary Walter Henry Medhurst and Admiral James Stirling.Footnote ⁷⁵ In order to restore order to Shanghai as early as possible, Admiral Stirling and Sir John Bowring, intending to protect the British commercial interests in the region, had made proposals to get the rebels to surrender the city of Shanghai, and offer asylum to the rebels. The negotiations, however, were not carried out.Footnote ⁷⁶ In contrast to the defence scheme proposed by Alcock and Edan, Stirling shared the opinions of the American authorities. He proposed to end the military occupation by foreign troops in the Settlement and the Concession, rather than strengthen the foreign forces in Shanghai.Footnote ⁷⁷ But the problem was that if the foreign authorities adopted Stirling's proposal to withdraw the defence forces in the Settlement and the Concession, the battlefield would probably be extended northward and the French Concession would be devastated by the fire of war. Shortly after, on 11 July, while inaugurating the municipal council, Alcock set forth certain views expressed by Stirling in a memorandum concerning defensive measures. He concluded that the protection of the British Settlement rested properly with the Imperial authorities, and failing the foreign authorities, with the community itself. Naval aid might be expected only in an emergency, but not for the occupation of Chinese territory and exercise of martial law on Chinese subjects, nor for permanent patrol or police duties.Footnote ⁷⁸ In a conference of land renters thereafter, having noted that the Settlement was being turned into an open market for pillaged goods from the city and for the purchase of provisions and munitions,Footnote ⁷⁹ the Anglo-American authorities decided to promulgate a joint declaration with the rebels on the issue of the security regulations in the Settlement for the purpose of keeping strict neutrality. Stirling notified Edan of the decision made by the Anglo-American authorities: anyone passing through the Settlement armed would be severely punished.Footnote ⁸⁰ After examining the joint declaration approved by their Anglo-American colleagues and the heads of the rebels Edan and the captain of the French warship Le Colbert, Baudéan, noted two main points: first, the defence area was divided into two parts, the principal located between Yangjingpang and Suzhou Creek, the secondary area lying north of Yangjingpang and south of Suzhou Creek;Footnote ⁸¹ secondly, the French property and the territory of the French Concession were totally excluded from the limits of protection.Footnote ⁸²

This project was naturally open to the most serious objections by the French authorities. At the end of August, commander-in-chief of the French Naval Division of the Seas of China, Rear Admiral Laguerre, arrived at Shanghai by the frigate La Jeanne d'Arc commanded by Admiral Charles Jaurès;Footnote ⁸³ before its arrival it was Le Colbert which took charge of assuring the security of the French Concession as well as French property in Shanghai.Footnote ⁸⁴ In his note of 14 December to Edan, Laguerre expressed his complaints with regard to the so-called ‘neutrality policy’, pointing out that obstinate resistance on the part of the rebels was due to foreign instigation, and it was desirable that British and American residents should be duly warned of the danger they incurred in continuing their relations with the besieged rebels.Footnote ⁸⁵ Edan also protested against the British navy in his note to Alcock, hoping that the British naval commander would at least put an end to the support and supplies given to the besieged rebels under the aegis of the British flag.Footnote ⁸⁶

The French Rear Admiral Laguerre had evidently been expecting an opportunity to interfere with arms on the side of the Imperial authorities. A few months after the occupation of the city of Shanghai by the rebels, the Imperial authorities built a wall between the Chinese City and the French Concession in order to prevent the rebels from coming to the Concession to sell their plunder and purchase supplies. The Imperial authorities bitterly complained about this market which had been established on both sides of the Yangjingpang, where a lively business was carried on by the rebels.Footnote ⁸⁷ The building of that wall was approved by the consuls of the Three Treaty Powers. Therefore, the American authorities extended it on the north side of the Yangjingpang; but the British authorities would have nothing to do with continuing it further, whereupon the Imperial authorities did so.Footnote ⁸⁸ This meant that the rebels’ supplies were in practice supported by the British,Footnote ⁸⁹ and accordingly the Imperial authorities fiercely criticized the British failure to observe neutrality.Footnote ⁹⁰ The French Rear Admiral Laguerre found an opportunity to intervene in the warfare when the Chinese and British blamed each other and the rebels erected a mud fort or battery between the Chinese City and the wall, located near the Rue Touranne in the French Concession. He immediately ordered its removal, but with no positive response from its builders, he then sent a party of sailors to destroy the fort. A collision ensued; shots were exchanged.Footnote ⁹¹ Rear Admiral Laguerre at once declared the Chinese City in a state of siege.

In the following days, with the support of the strong firepower supplied by the warship Le Colbert and the frigate La Jeanne d'Arc, the French sailors and marines launched a series of attacks on the besieged rebels. The fleeing rebels found sanctuary in the nearby British Settlement. Edan wrote to Alcock complaining of the protection provided by the British authorities for the rebels; Alcock immediately called a meeting of British land renters and impressed on them the duty of absolute neutrality. But when Alcock proposed they erect a wall round the whole British Settlement in order to protect the British community, the British land renters unanimously resolved that such defence measures should be undertaken by the representatives of the Three Treaty Powers rather than by the British themselves. At this meeting, a letter from Sir James Stirling was read, in which he informed the British community that it was the duty of the Imperial authorities to assure the safety of the Settlement, even though he would allow a guard from the British warships to provide military assistance. Stirling's letter gave great dissatisfaction to the British community, as they thought that he was passing the buck to the Chinese troops instead of assuming his responsibility for the protection of the Settlement.Footnote ⁹² It would appear that the passive attitude of the Anglo-American authorities towards the warfare restrained the French Rear Admiral Laguerre from further military operations against the rebels until the beginning of the following year, when he made the final decision to intervene, and took military actions unilaterally (Figure 1).Footnote ⁹³ The date of the attack was fixed for 6 January 1855, Feast of the Epiphany.Footnote ⁹⁴ On 18 February, after 17 months of occupation by the rebels, the Imperial authorities again took over the city of Shanghai. The French suffered great losses in the fight,Footnote ⁹⁵ and this battle marked a watershed in the history of Shanghai: the policy of neutrality was abandoned; the common defence plan was not carried out and the basis of the unified municipality was thrown into disarray by the Anglo-French friction.

Figure 1.

Monument in the Baxianqiao Cemetery for the French soldiers who died in the battle of 6 January 1855

Source: Virtual Shanghai Project: www.virtualshanghai.net. Image ID: 1478.

Defending the city: the unified defence and the independence of the French municipality, 1860–62

After the battle of 6 January 1855, peace and order were restored in the region of Shanghai, but not for long. The Sino-foreign conflicts in south China once again drew the empire of China into wars with the western empires. A change in relations between the militant powers involved had a lasting effect on Shanghai society. The Second Opium War, also known as the ‘Franco-British expedition to China’, which took place from 1856 to 1860, was a fateful conflict that had profound consequences on the histories of both China and Shanghai.

On 8 October 1856, the lorcha Arrow, a small coastal trading vessel registered in Hong Kong and flying a British flag,Footnote ⁹⁶ was impounded by Canton officials who suspected that this small trading vessel was involved in opium smuggling in China.Footnote ⁹⁷ To assist in dealing with the Chinese, the British contacted France, Russia and the United States about forming an alliance. France joined the British action against China, prompted by complaints from their envoy over the execution of a French missionary, Father Auguste Chapdelaine, by Chinese local authorities in Guangxi province.Footnote ⁹⁸ Thus, the Arrow Incident triggered the Second Opium War, a large-scale conflict stretching from 1856 to 1860, and it involved French and United States military forces.Footnote ⁹⁹ From the late autumn of 1859 until the early winter of 1860, the British and French governments agreed on a joint military expedition against China. It was led by the diplomats Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, who represented their respective governments. On 26 June 1860, the British and French governments jointly announced that a state of war existed in China. In Hong Kong, Lord Elgin heard from Frederick Bruce, British minister in China, that the ultimatum, which had been forwarded from England, had been delivered to the Chinese government, with the intimation that an answer was to be sent to Shanghai by an early date. Lord Elgin decided therefore to proceed immediately, and arrived at Shanghai on 29 June, where he met Frederick Bruce, the British admiral and general, together with all the forces of the Joint Expeditionary Force.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Elgin and Gros stated their business with the Chinese side. In fact, before the declaration of war the British and French governments had mobilized their troops from India and Indochina respectively to China. The British troops were under the command of General James Hope Grant, who had at his disposal almost 11,000 men, including cavalry and infantry. The French troops, numbering 7,000 men, complemented the British troops, under the command of General Cousin Montauban, who had at his disposal the 101st and 102nd regiments of the line, the 2nd Cavalry Battalion, two companies of Engineers, four artillery batteries and one regiment of marine infantry. British and French naval units and a 2,500-man Chinese coolie corps were also assembled in Hong Kong.Footnote ¹⁰¹ While the British land force and navy were commanded respectively by Sir James Hope Grant and Admiral Hope, the French navy was under the control of Admiral Léonard Charner instead of the supreme command of General Cousin Montauban, and Admiral Charner was assisted by two rear admirals, Page and Protet.Footnote ¹⁰²

The Anglo-French allied troops battled with the Imperial troops in north China. They collaborated with the local authorities in the region of Shanghai on issues of defence, as the vanguard units of Taipings posed a threat of war to the whole foreign community in the city.Footnote ¹⁰³ This contradictory policy was driven by distinct communities of interest at work in China: the foreign community in Shanghai, and the ‘China trade’ as a whole. Anglo-French interests in Shanghai grew rapidly in the Taiping period and helped to draw in limited intervention against the Taiping troops, but without a growth in trade the expense of an extensive intervention and its potential consequences could not be justified.Footnote ¹⁰⁴

General Montauban had been in Shanghai from 12 March 1861, and under the command of Admiral Charner, the French navy landed at Wusong on 18 April. The flagship was the Impératrice Eugénie.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ In May, the Taiping forces wiped out the Imperial forces that had besieged Nanjing, and then decided to take Shanghai. As the Taiping troops seized Suzhou and were rapidly advancing on Songjiang and Wusong, war came again to Shanghai.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ On 17 August 1860, the approach of the rebels was heralded by a dense cloud of smoke in the west, due to the burning of villages in the suburbs of Shanghai. Daotai Wu had by now visited the French consul Edan and demanded the support of the allied troops in the defence against the Taiping troops.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Although Li Xiucheng, the commander-in-chief of the Taiping troops, had promised the security of the foreign settlements in Shanghai, foreigners in Shanghai were still in fear of direct exposure to the war. As the missionary Charles Elisha Taylor observed,

Ironically, instead of putting military pressure on the Qing Imperial government for more indemnity, the British and French expeditionary army helped the defence of the Chinese local authorities. Alcock told the Daotai Wu that they defended for ‘their own interests’. As early as 26 May, the French and British ministers in China, Bourboulon and Frederick Bruce, jointly published a proclamation, declaring that since Shanghai was a treaty port for commerce, for the sake of commercial interests of all nationals, the military authorities of France and Great Britain had decided to defend the city in co-operation with the Chinese local authorities (Figure 2). This proclamation was posted on the city gates and in the foreign settlements.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

Figure 2.

The north gate of the Chinese City of Shanghai, 1860

Source: Virtual Shanghai Project: www.virtualshanghai.net. Image ID: 20811.

On 18 August 1860, the Taiping troops occupied the French Jesuit college and cathedral at Xujiahui, southern suburb of the city of Shanghai, and marched on the city gates. The foreign volunteer corps were mobilized and put up barricades around the British Settlement.Footnote ¹¹⁰ However, unlike the British, the French interests were not limited to the Concession: their defence plan included Xujiahui and Dongjiadu.Footnote ¹¹¹ There, the French church possessed estates and the French naval authorities had planned to construct one road between Xujiahui and the Concession, another between Wusong and Dongjiadu for the transport of troops and supplies, and the French authorities believed that the construction could connect the Concession and shield their troops from the war.Footnote ¹¹²

In January 1861, judging from General Montauban's experience, the French consul Edan proposed a joint action in what would have been a substantial expansion of the foreign military occupation of Shanghai (Figure 3). General Montauban's proposal was to interdict to the Taiping troops an area of the surrounding country comprising circles of 12 to 15 miles’ radius around Shanghai and Wusong. These two places are about 12 miles apart, and the interdicted tract would have been some 30 miles in length by 25 in breadth, including a densely populated British community.

Figure 3.

Map of the defence plan of the British Settlement and the French Concession of Shanghai in 1860–61

Source: This digital map was made on the basis of the original military map at that time. See TNA, MPKK 1/50/7: Shanghai: map of the city and environs, showing the Chinese town and the American, British and French concessions, 1 January 1858–31 December 1862.

In the meantime, Edan admitted to the British authorities that it would not do simply to post threatening notices around this tract, warning off the Taiping troops, but that they must enter into communication with their chiefs.Footnote ¹¹³ However, the British consul, Thomas Taylor Meadows, declined the joint action proposed by General Montauban. He thought that the Taiping troops would come within five miles of the city and the troops would probably not go into the Settlement and the Concession. He thought that the troops would stay alert in convenient areas but would not be hostile to foreigners. General Montauban's measures might put at risk the main interests of Great Britain in China because the British had plenty of convincing proof that the Taiping troops earnestly desired friendly commercial relations with the British side. Therefore such hostilities between the British and the Taiping troops should not harm British interests in the region.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, in fear of social turbulence caused by war, in February Admiral Hope asked Taiping Heavenly King (Taiping tianwang) Hong Xiuquan to interdict to the Taiping troops a piece of the surrounding country comprised within 13 miles radius around Shanghai, whilst the British fleet was passing by Nanjing. Hong Xiuquan agreed to this proposal without hesitation on account of the urgent military situation in the Yangzi River.Footnote ¹¹⁵ Meadows concluded that in the area occupied by the Taiping troops there must be greater demand for the security of people and property than in the area occupied by the Qing Imperial troops.Footnote ¹¹⁶

On 12 January 1862, Walter Henry Medhurst replaced Thomas Taylor Meadows as the most senior British diplomatic officer in Shanghai. Meadows’ successor, who was also initially a Taiping sympathizer, gradually became less troublesome to the activities of western adventurers such as the Ever Victorious Army as the official position of the British government regarding the Taiping regime changed.Footnote ¹¹⁷ Medhurst soon convoked a military meeting at the British consulate with the British and French commanders in order to discuss a warning against the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Admiral Hope proposed a collective response on behalf of the military authorities of the allied forces at Shanghai, warning that any attackers of the city would take all the consequences of their actions. But the French consul Edan noted that this collective response did not mention the defence of Wusong, Dongjiadu and Xujiahui. In other words, French interests were neglected by the British authorities.Footnote ¹¹⁸

Consequently, for the sake of the French authorities, on 13 February 1862, a military meeting proposed by Rear Admiral August Léopold Protet was held at the French consulate, aiming at modifying the defence plan of the allied forces.Footnote ¹¹⁹ At this meeting, the French and British negotiated and signed an agreement as follows:Footnote ¹²⁰

1. 1. The American and English settlements will be guarded by the English force. The French Concession, the city of Shanghai and faubourg of Tuncadou by the French force. Reserving [provided] that the north gate and a portion of the wall adjoining it will also be defended by the English force.

2. 2. The French force is 900 men srong [strong] & which 300 are movable & 100 seamen can be added as reinforcement. The English force is 650 men strong of which 300 are movable & 55 marines and 200 seamen can at moment be supplied from the ‘L'Impérieuse’ which will be reduced to half when she will be relieved by the ‘Pearl’.

3. 3. The signal alarm shall be 2 guns fired at one minutes interval, to be made from the post threatened.

4. 4. Arrangement have been made to preserve the tranquility of the concessions by their respective police and volunteers, and the Taoutae will be reminded that, he will be held responsible for that of the city.

5. 5. The soldiers of the Taoutae being solely for the defence of the town, he shall be requested not to send out any expeditions without giving the notice to the consuls.

6. 6. Woosung commanding the entrance of the river will be defended by the French & English marines, in the first instance, if necessary, such military assistance as circumstances will permit.

The fortifications were built for the protection of the Settlement and the Concession. For the British Settlement, there were three lines of defence. The first was the ‘Muddy Flat’, an adjoining area linking the Chinese City, guarded by British troops; the second was from Shaklee Road (now Fujian Road) to the Suzhou Creek, where the barricades blocked all of the roads from the west, and barriers were erected at the vacant places; the last line was the Barrier Road (now Henan Road), where barricades were placed across the road, and two guard posts blocked two entries to the British settlement, namely Yangjingpang and the Suzhou Creek. The last two lines of defence were manned by the Volunteer Corps of the British Settlement.Footnote ¹²¹

The defence plan of the French Concession was much more complicated than that of the British Settlement. The French authorities imposed a curfew in the Concession; traffic was banned after 9 o'clock in the evening, and all arms were prohibited.Footnote ¹²² But the defence plan of the French Concession included Dongjiadu and Xujiahui, so the defence area was wide. A road 8,000 kilometres long was built between the Concession and Xujiahui, and then a French colonel built another road 3,800 metres long connecting the Concession and Dongjiadu (Figure 4).Footnote ¹²³ Although the attitude of British authorities towards the intervention was not unanimously held, Admiral Hope wished to expel the rebels from the city in co-operation with the Chinese local authorities, and he was much more radical than the British consul Walter Henry Medhurst, who preferred to maintain a neutral stance.Footnote ¹²⁴ Nevertheless, as is apparent from discussion of the defence plan, the intervention of the French authorities was much more active than that of the British. As Teng Ssu-yü pointed out, ‘The main British interest was to improve trading conditions, while France's was the protection of Catholic missionaries who needed to maintain good relations with the Imperial government.’Footnote ¹²⁵ This hypothesis was well proven by the Franco-British disputes regarding the defence plan at Shanghai against the Taiping troops in the years of 1860–62. The defence at Xujiahui and Dongjiadu is the focus of the dispute in the respective defence plans proposed by the British and French authorities.

Figure 4.

Commemorative plaque in the soldiers’ cemetery of Shanghai in memory of the British soldiers who died at Shanghai during the occupation of 1862–63

Source: Virtual Shanghai Project: www.virtualshanghai.net. Image ID: 29634.

The first services of the French municipal council included the police, the construction and maintenance of roads, the installation of street lights and taxation. In the session of 25 June 1862, the French consul Edan was nominated commissary of police by the municipal council.Footnote ¹²⁶ This meant that the French consul at Shanghai directed both the military and civil administration in the Concession, and meanwhile the municipal council became the centre of the Concession.Footnote ¹²⁷ Of 12 municipal councilors, 6 were to be French and 6 foreign. All were to be nominated by election for a period of four years, and any voter above the age of 25 and resident in the Concession could be eligible for election as municipal councillor.Footnote ¹²⁸ Thanks to this regulation, Shanghai was still booming despite the Taiping Rebellion, especially in the French Concession, but the influx of refugees brought about both commercial prosperity and social disturbance.

Shanghai was shaped by the Taiping war at the political level. In order to cope with the turmoil in the years of the Small Swords Society 1853–55, on 9 April 1853 the British and American Volunteer Corps had been established in the British Settlement; and the second crisis of 1860–62 promoted the incorporation of the American Settlement with the British Settlement on 17 October 1863.Footnote ¹²⁹ As a result of the two crises of the Taiping Rebellion (1853–55, 1860–62) there came an influx into the Settlement of Chinese refugees and foreign seamen,Footnote ¹³⁰ so the French authorities had to re-establish the social order in the Concession. On 13 January 1861, the French Volunteer Corps was also established there under the command of Eugène-Napoléon Buissonnet.Footnote ¹³¹ The defence and the social order, as well as the establishment of an independent administrative body, constituted the two cores in the French Concession during the Taiping Rebellion. Discontented with the continual Franco-British disputes over the defence plan, the French consul Edan, on 29 April 1862, finally decided to set up the French municipal council in the Concession.Footnote ¹³²

‘Western’ imperialism has long occupied a central place in explaining the emergence of modern China, both in ‘western’ and Chinese scholarship.Footnote ¹³³ The Chinese treaty ports such as Shanghai have been regarded as the key to modern China because their municipal administrations were demonstrably a response to the western presence.Footnote ¹³⁴ In the case of Shanghai during the Taiping Rebellion, by the time of the turbulence the foreign residents of Shanghai wished to manage and defend their own interests, and they contemplated the creation of a Free City, a practically independent oligarchy responsible only to itself.Footnote ¹³⁵ The Taiping war and the conflict of interests between the empires facilitated the making of modern municipal administration in the French Concession of Shanghai.