Luke Plotica's book is a valuable contribution to the scholarly literature on Michael Oakeshott's political philosophy. Consciously resisting the impulse to “classify” Oakeshott, as many prior commentators have done, the author aims to position him within the mainstream of political thought. In so doing, Plotica engages with Wittgenstein, Foucault, MacIntyre, Shils, Berlin, Arendt, and many others. The book as a whole is inspired by Oakeshott's famous notion of “conversation,” in which diverse voices speak to one another but do not necessarily aim at solving problems once and for all.
Other scholars have placed Oakeshott in conversation with thinkers ranging from Augustine to Hobbes to Hegel. Plotica's book, however, specifically aims at positioning Oakeshott within contemporary political thought. His aim is less to trace commonalities among Oakeshott and other thinkers than to illuminate the ways in which apparently stark differences actually speak to shared concerns. Thus Oakeshott and Foucault, for instance, both see the modern enterprise state as subservient to (and governed by) the concerns of political economy, statistics, and social science. Since most readers of Foucault are not also readers of Oakeshott, and vice versa, this is a fresh approach.
The book's four chapters consider first, the problem of individuality as set against established practices; second, individuality “between” tradition and contingency; third, the modern state; and finally, the place of Oakeshott's work within the discourse of contemporary democratic theory. All is intelligent, well written, and helpful in bringing Oakeshott's work into the world of twenty-first-century political philosophy.
Perhaps most provocative of the themes explored is the author's concern with demonstrating that the oft-assumed “conservatism” of Michael Oakeshott is something that should be questioned. The first two chapters get at this issue in slightly different ways. In chapter 1, Plotica compares Oakeshott to Wittgenstein, noting the similarities between their notions of “practices” (Oakeshott) and “language games” (Wittgenstein). Other commentators have observed these similarities and subsequently concluded that they yield an inherently conservative political outlook. Practices and language games are socially binding constraints on individuality. Therefore, we must act respectfully, not critically.
Plotica, by contrast, sees these constructs as a context in which individuality can more fully express itself. A person can accept rules of conduct and nevertheless challenge or criticize those rules, in just the way that one may accept a legal system and yet challenge a particular law or particular mode of interpreting the law. As Plotica puts it vividly, “In order to question your calculations, I must (for now) accept our practices of mathematics, let them stay put” (34). Thus he concludes that it is too simplistic, and perhaps simply wrong, to extract a conservative political teaching from either of the two thinkers. To do so would be to adopt, in Plotica's words, a “blanket dismissal of criticism as a meaningful activity” and a “blanket affirmation of whatever conventions and practices exist for a given community” (34).
The second chapter takes up similar themes in trying to situate Oakeshott as a thinker who simultaneously values tradition and sees that it is not a straitjacket, preventing individual expression. Although some conservatives in the present day approach tradition as an idol—the thing that will help us to reassemble our scattered, postmodern identities—Oakeshott places high value on both tradition and individual agency, which may at times be critical of tradition.
Though we always act in the context of traditions, what we choose to do with our lives is entirely up to us. Oakeshott's primary focus in On Human Conduct, his most mature statement about practice and individuality, is not on the “collective” character of practices but on individual agency. Or as Plotica puts it, individuality “is a negotiation between tradition and contingency,” where tradition is “a repository of resources to be intelligently used rather than… a collection of scripts or rituals to be followed or reproduced” (41). In fact, Oakeshott reserves his harshest judgments for people whom he deems “anti-individuals,” those who would reject their freedom in favor of unthinking “obedience” or adherence to a collective enterprise.
Plotica is undoubtedly right about Oakeshott's emphasis on individuality and about his resistance to traditionalism. Yet one may wonder whether Oakeshott's work supports quite the emphasis on critical agency that Plotica wants to find in it. He is surely right that Oakeshott does often act as a critic: of Rationalism, of enterprise association, of the workaday mentality of modernity, and many other things. But would Oakeshott really agree with Plotica that “every one of our practices can be subjected to profound criticism” (34) or that “we can use our practices critically, in order to reflect upon and seek to enact alternatives to other of our practices” (35)? This language seems too revolutionary for Oakeshott, who did not think practices could be self-consciously enacted or created, or that most were even in need of “profound criticism.”
Nevertheless, the discussion of criticism in this context points to one of Oakeshott's most difficult and counterintuitive claims. Philosophy, for Oakeshott as for Wittgenstein, is an activity that has nothing to do with practical life; it stands apart and describes the world, but does not pass judgment or try to effect changes. Many readers can go partway down this austere path, agreeing that philosophy is corrupted when placed wholly “in the service” of practical projects. But it does not follow that there is absolutely no linkage between philosophical reflection and human goings-on in the world. As Plotica rightly notes, “the insight philosophy provides changes us.” Though we may not engage in philosophy for the purpose of changing or criticizing the world, we ourselves may be changed or even transformed by it. We may emerge more critical than we were before.
And if Oakeshott is philosophically right about modality (that the world may be approached in terms of the various “modes” of science, history, and poetry, for example), then we may see that criticism is appropriate in certain modes, but not others. This would explain why Oakeshott himself can appear harsh and even polemical in certain reviews and essays, detached and academic in other writings. One hopes that Luke Plotica will take up these questions about Oakeshott, and the character of philosophy in general, in future works.
