This book presents a dense account with voluminous research of how our telephone and Internet phone communications (VoIP) are insecure. It is Landau's argument that both are made insecure by the embedding of surveillance technology (mandated by CALEA) within our communications infrastructure.
CALEA is the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. It was passed in 1994 and mandates that providers of telephone service (including Internet Service Providers who provide VoIP such as Vonage and MagicJack) must configure their systems to provide wiretapping capabilities for law enforcement. It is Landau's contention that these capabilities can be exploited by those outside of law enforcement, which presents a paradox: something that was to provide security is actually making the systems more insecure.
Landau states that the problems begin when the Internet Service Providers of VoIP configure their systems to be compliant with CALEA. This is extremely difficult for them to do, much more so than for landline telephone carriers and even cell phone providers. Many ISP's are small and do not have the resources to configure their systems, so they outsource it to third parties. Because it is so difficult it is not always assured that the configuration is done correctly. This difficulty, taken together with the price ($100,000 in one instance), are some of the reasons why only sixty percent of VoIP providers are CALEA compliant.
As noted above, CALEA was enacted to allow law enforcement the ability to wiretap telephone and VoIP communications. There are two types of information that law enforcement usually requests. Wiretap warrants request the content of the communications and are covered under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Pen registers request the outgoing phone numbers and trap and trace devices request incoming phone numbers (although technology is such that pen registers and trap and trace devices are in many cases a single piece of equipment). Pen registers and trap and trace information, governed by Title 18 of the US Code, Chapter 206, are much easier to obtain by law enforcement, but Landau points out that with VoIP this transactional information includes who is initiating the phone call, the number being dialed, and where the call is taking place and when. This “data enables the mapping of an individual's social network and an organization's chain of command. Following the metadata has become an important investigative tool for law enforcement and national security” (248), and according to Landau, it should have more stringent protections.
Landau acknowledges that wiretapping can lead to information to catch the bad guys but offers many examples where wiretapping by law enforcement was questionable at best, illegal at worst, and the results ineffective at securing convictions. She offers an interesting tidbit about John Yoo, author of the infamous torture memos, who argued for the constitutionality of the Presidential Surveillance Program (warrantless domestic wiretapping). He stated the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the wiretapping as it was performed during a “military operation” (90). Congress eventually approved this program.
As to VoIP, the insecurity of the Internet also contributes to the insecurity of these types of communications. When the Internet was created, security was not the foremost consideration; reliability and transport of messages were what mattered. Therefore, security is added in the form of add-on programs such as encryption. Landau notes that Skype is the only VoIP service that is encrypted end-user to end-user, while other Internet communications are subject to eavesdropping.
Landau documents several other instances of insecurity where hardware was counterfeited (CISCO routers) or corrupted (Seagate hard drives manufactured in China) and hacking performed by insiders of organizations and nation-states. She states, “The Internet has become a major tool for economic espionage … and this form of spying is happening at a time when the Internet is increasingly embedded in the production process” (153). Although the embedded technology for CALEA was not to blame in these examples, it appears to be only a matter of time until hackers take advantage of the embedded technology to exploit information.
Landau concludes by stating that the security of communications is extremely important: “Secure communications is necessary for freedom, security, human dignity, and consent of the governed” (250) and is necessary to “maintain domestic tranquility, and provide for the common defense” (256). In addition, “communication surveillance should not impede the working of the press” (252) for “journalists are society's guardians” (252).
It is Landau's policy recommendation that as embedded technology could stifle innovation, make industrial espionage much easier, and harm national security, all efforts must be made to protect the security and privacy of those communications.
This was an extremely difficult book to review. The sheer breadth and depth of the book (most chapters had 150+ footnotes) required a very dedicated reader to follow all the examples and digressions. It was difficult at times to know if the examples given were of embedded surveillance technology allowing illegal access or were just meant to illustrate the fact that there is unrelated technology to be exploited at a later time. For example, in the final chapters, Landau notes that “genuinely serious threats are, however, intrusions into industrial and military systems. These may leave code embedded for later use, or may exfiltrate data—or both. These national security threats are the backdrop to the issue of whether building surveillance into communication infrastructures is a security benefit” (235). Her point appears to be that these are the greater security threats—so why are the government or law enforcement concerned with wiretapping when these other situations require their time and efforts? Or it could be that these systems must comply with CALEA with embedded surveillance code and I simply missed the point. It is entirely possible.
Although difficult to follow in many places, the book is a welcome addition to the area of surveillance technologies and policy. There are very few book-length works on these topics and however difficult the reading, the book is a must read for those in the field.
The book appears to be intended for an audience on Capitol Hill. In fact, a quote on the back of the book jacket from Suzanne E. Spaulding states that the material in the book is “specific enough to guide policymakers in Congress and the Executive branch—for whom it should be required reading.” The appeals to the Preamble to the Constitution, the Founding Fathers, and economic and national security are tailor made for members of Congress and staffers serving on committees for which the nation's critical infrastructure is the main concern.
