The aim of this article is to explore the current and probable future challenges faced by the Hungarian-speaking religious communities in northern Serbia as they try to navigate two worlds: the past and the present — cultural identification with Hungary on the one hand and with Serbia on the other. The Hungarians living in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina are located in northern Serbia. Hungary ceded this territory to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes with the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 following World War I. The Hungarians living there are in dual minority: they differ both in language and in religious affiliation from the majority Serbian (and by and large Orthodox Christian) population.
The study is divided into two parts. The first one, after identifying the Hungarian-speaking religious communities in question, sets out to explore their current role in the preservation of Hungarian identity and to find out what strategies they have concerning the future. The second part addresses the socio-demographic challenges the Hungarian community faces. The approach is interdisciplinary (including historical and sociological methods and discourse analysis) by necessity and is also concerned with self-identification and the self-representation of churches in public life. The questions guiding the research are: What role do churches and religious communities play in affirming and upholding Hungarian identity and how important is their role in the lives of Vojvodina's Hungarians in general? Is their active participation in the community important at all in the present and for the future? What are the greatest challenges Hungarians and the Hungarian-speaking churches in Vojvodina face today? Is there a middle road in Vojvodina between complete assimilation and hermetic religious-cultural-linguistic isolation? Trying to find answers to these questions as they relate to the longterm preservation of the community and the religious traditions of the Hungarians in Vojvodina is crucial.
Although some literature on religious life in Serbia is available, primarily from a sociological perspective and in the form of socio-political/historical analysis, no systematic study has been conducted on the religious life of the ethnic Hungarians. It is also evident from the available material that local sociologists traditionally prefer quantitative research over qualitative methodologies. Approaching the problematic of religiosity from a quantitative angle means that their studies may provide some very useful information but are usually limited in their ability to answer questions relating to motivation, context, sources of identity, and creation of meaning. Some general studies on values, religious affiliation, religious tolerance, and mixed marriages in Serbia and/or Vojvodina do exist. Among them are Dragomir Pantić's study of religious values in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Pantić Reference Pantić1993); a survey on the percentage of religious wedding ceremonies and the importance people assign them in comparison to civil weddings in Vojvodina (Vuksanović Reference Vuksanović and Tripković2005); a survey of high-school students in seven Serbian towns, asking respondents about their attitudes toward people of religions different from their own (Joksimović and Kuburić Reference Joksimović and Kuburić2004); and a poll conducted in Vojvodina in 2004 regarding religious distancing (Kuburić Reference Kuburić2006). Although none of these studies focus exclusively on the Hungarian population, they do provide some useful information on the social and religious milieu of Vojvodina. Here, as also in other instances, the language barrier presents the most common obstacle to research. As a result, very few scholars have studied specifically the Hungarian minority. The Scientific Association for Hungarology Research in Subotica is the only academic institute in Serbia producing surveys and studies relating primarily to the Hungarian minority. Other approaches in the existing scholarly literature include examining the role of the majority Serbian Orthodox church in political life and society, as well as exploring church-state relations from historical and legal points of view within the larger contexts of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia (see Ramet Reference Ramet1996; Reference Ramet1998; Mojzes Reference Mojzes1992; Reference Mojzes, Witte and Van der Vyver1996; Ilić Reference Ilić2003; Reference Ilić2005). In addition, Miroslav Samardžić provides systematized information and quantitative indicators about educational, media, cultural, and other institutions in his work focusing on the situation of ethnic minorities in Vojvodina, including the Hungarian community (Samardžić Reference Samardžić1999).
The present article depends much on primary sources and on empirical collection of information, while also making use of the available political, economic and social indicators. Some of the content comes from analyzing the media discourse of Hungarian-speaking religious communities in Vojvodina and from a large number of interviews with Hungarian and non-Hungarian religious, political, and civic community leaders. The empirical research was conducted between 2005 and the summer of 2008.Footnote 1
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT
The Hungarian minority forms the second largest ethnic community in the Republic of Serbia but is gradually decreasing in numbers. According to the results from the most recent population census conducted in 2002, 293,000 people claimed a Hungarian ethnic identity (3.9% out of the total population of 7.5 million). At the same time, the number of those who named Hungarian as their mother tongue was somewhat lower: 287,000 (Republički zavod 2003).Footnote 2 Almost all of the Hungarians live in the northern Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, where they make up 14% of the total population of two million, so we can only speak of a local or regional Hungarian identity. Vojvodina is a multiethnic, multilingual, and multiconfessional microcosm — there are more than 20 ethnic groups represented in its territory. On this ethnically and religiously diverse territory live, next to the Serbian majority (51%), Hungarians, Roma, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, Ruthenians, and members of other ethnic groups; Eastern Orthodox Christians, Roman and Greek Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Muslims. In most cases, members of ethnic minorities also belong to a religious minority. Most Hungarians here are Roman Catholic (88%), traditional Protestant (6%), and in much smaller numbers, JewishFootnote 3 or members of Neo-Protestant churches, such as Baptists, Adventists, and Pentecostals.Footnote 4
Sociologically, Serbia in many ways still resembles a post-war society, even though it did not have its share of actual fighting on the ground during the most recent Balkan wars. However, the international embargo, the resulting political and economic isolation, and the ensuing societal crisis coupled with the NATO air strikes in 1999 all contributed to the crumbling of social structures. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia the guiding ideals of Brotherhood and Unity lost all meaning. The combination of all these factors caused long-lasting damage to the collective psyche. In the 1990s, parallel to the increased public presence of national churches, ethnicity emerged as the primary group identity marker (Serb = Orthodox; Croat = Catholic). Since that time, the Serbian Orthodox Church has claimed that an “Orthodox revival” is under way in Serbia. Although there has undoubtedly been some renewed spirituality and a general growth of interest in religion, many scholars agree that in its content this is a revival not of religion as such, but rather of nationalism identified with Orthodoxy (see for example Mavrogordatos Reference Mavrogordatos, Madeley and Enyedi2003, 130).
When speaking about collective Serbian identity, the intertwined nature of ethnic and religious identity must be explained. The Serbian Orthodox Church is a national church, which has played an important role in preserving Serbian language and culture at various times through history, particularly during the centuries of Ottoman Turkish rule. In the 2002 census, 95% of Serbia's citizens reported affiliation with a religious community; 84% of them identified themselves as Orthodox Christians. Even though the Serbian Orthodox Church is not an established church, it has been closely connected to the Serbian state since the early 1990s. Politicians often participate in public religious ceremonies, while church leaders have been regularly making statements on political issues (such as issues concerning Kosovo, the national anthem etc.). In recent years, the successive Serbian governments have taken unequivocal stances in support of the interests of the Serbian Orthodox Church in canonical disputes with other Orthodox churches (e.g., Macedonian and Montenegrin), which has negatively impacted Serbia's foreign relations with those neighboring countries.
Since the 1990s there has also been a strong resistance in public discourse to the “West” (i.e., the USA and Western Europe) and to the values it is perceived to represent. This anti-Western stance, often expressed in the media (and sometimes even in Parliament) by politicians and other leaders in society, attacks both Catholic and Protestant beliefs and values. During the Croatian and Bosnian wars anti-Catholic rhetoric was rampant throughout Serbia. The — at times hysterical — Orthodox paranoia of Roman Catholicism resulted in numerous acts of intolerance against Catholics — both of Croat and Hungarian ethnicity.Footnote 5 Suspicion of representatives of Western Christianity continues: several dozen instances of religious intolerance still occur in Serbia each year, ranging from graffiti on church walls to physical attacks on clergypersons.
Hungarians as an ethnic minority have mirrored many of the societal processes that have taken place within the larger Serbian society since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In response to anti-Western rhetoric, together with mounting political and economic pressures, large numbers of Hungarians have left the country. Many of them had been active members in their parishes; they had practiced their faith even in difficult times. These “valuable” believers (as church leaders would refer to them) who moved abroad left a vacuum in the church. At the same time, many who had not been coming to church embraced their religion but according to religious leaders this meant no qualitative growth — or even quantitative growth, as they took the place of those who had left. Those who have stayed in Serbia now find themselves in a schizophrenic situation: they are identified as “agents” or representatives of the West, the enemy: they adhere to Western versions of Christianity, not to Eastern Orthodoxy; they use the Latin script, not Cyrillic (Ilić and Ilić Reference Ilić, Ilić and Van der Borght2008, 472–473). They are not able and/or willing to fully identify with Serbia but they cannot place their identity exclusively with Hungary, either.
At the same time, partly in response to anti-Western public discourse, many among the Hungarian population also began to identify themselves with the Catholic and Protestant faiths in growing measure. During the 1990s “people joined the traditional religion of their ethnic group, even though they did not become believers by doing so. Politics divided people once again — this time also according to their religious affiliation,” comments Irén Gábrityné Molnár (Reference Gábrityné Molnár, Molnár and Mirnics2000, 162). The sudden explosion of religiosity and its inseparable identification with ethnic identity was counterbalanced by other societal developments; so it has not produced long-lasting qualitative or quantitative growth.
Numerical data suggest that the influence of the religious communities within the Hungarian population in Vojvodina is diminishing; especially in urban settings the social and cultural network they used to provide is visibly decreasing. However, since, particularly in rural settings, they are frequently the only ones with the necessary infrastructure and manpower to maintain community life, they still play a more crucial role in the preservation of the community.
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
The Roman Catholic Church
The percentage of Catholics in the Republic of Serbia is 5.5%; 95% of them live in Vojvodina, where they make up 19% of the population. Between 1991 and 2002, the number of Catholics decreased by 20%. This is partly a result of the emigration of Hungarians and Croats, and partly that of the general population decline. At the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Serbia is the Archbishop of Belgrade, who since 2001 has been the Slovene Msgr. Stanislav Hočevar. There are three territorial bishoprics, of Subotica, Zrenjanin, and Belgrade. The bishops of both the Subotica and the Zrenjanin Bishoprics (János Pénzes and László Német, respectively) are of Hungarian ethnicity. The borders of the Subotica Bishopric roughly correspond to those of Bačka, and the Zrenjanin Bishopric roughly covers Banat. The region of Srem is under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bishopric of Đakovo of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia. The majority of Roman Catholics in Serbia are ethnic Hungarians and in the Subotica and Zrenjanin Bishoprics they form an absolute majority. Although we cannot call the Roman Catholic Church in Serbia a “Hungarian church,” since Hungarians are not the only ones in the church, numerous efforts are directed at preserving the Hungarian linguistic and cultural identity, and many priests speak and celebrate mass in Hungarian, even if it is not their mother tongue.
Serbia is one of the few countries that have not been visited by one or another Pope. Referring to past injustices committed by the Roman Catholic Church on the territory of Yugoslavia, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church has not approved a visit by the Pope to this day, even though such plans were made several times during the reign of John Paul II. As an official announcement of the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church from November 2004 stated, “The relationship of these two Christian churches in our territory is burdened by the legacy of our history” (Kuburović Reference Kuburović2004). As a result of the reservations of the Serbian Orthodox Church no invitation was formally issued for the Pope's visit. This is unquestionably a serious setback to both ecumenical and interethnic relations.
The Reformed Christian Church
The Reformed Christian Church in Serbia (Calvinists; Presbyterians) is active in the territory of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and in Belgrade. The roots of Calvinism in the formerly southern Hungarian territories go back to the mid-16th century.Footnote 6 Although the Counter-Reformation decimated the Reformed churches, the influx of German and Hungarian colonists that began at the end of the 18th century revitalized Protestant life in Vojvodina.
The Reformed Christian Church has about 15,000 members and 17 pastors — of these five are female. Two of the ministers are from Transylvania, one from Hungary, and they do not speak much Serbian. Most congregations are located in villages or in small towns. Only two of them are found in cities: Novi Sad and Belgrade. The largest and most thriving congregations are in those small villages that are ethnically (and therefore also religiously) most homogeneous. The bishop's seat is currently in the village of Feketić (Bácsfeketehegy, Feketics): the bishop is István Csete-Szemesi. District deans are responsible for overseeing the two ecclesiastical entities: Bačka (which has nine congregations and 21 associated ones) and Banat (with four congregations and 13 associated ones). The language of operation is exclusively Hungarian and the church places an emphasis on preserving its Hungarian heritage and traditions. Therefore, the Reformed Christian Church can be called a Hungarian national church.
The Evangelical Christian Church of the Augsburg Confession (Lutherans)
The Evangelical Christian Church of the Augsburg Confession in Serbia — Vojvodina was founded in 2001. It is based in Subotica, comprises two areas (Bačka and Banat) and has a few thousand members. Its largest and most active congregation is in Subotica, which is where Superintendent Árpád Dolinszky is located.Footnote 7 The church operates in Hungarian but on major holidays church services in German are also held in Subotica and Vrbas. Four pastors serve the congregations, one of them is superintendent Dolinszky's wife Márta, and another is his son Gábor. His other son, Árpád leads the radio mission program of the church. The church has ties to both governmental and non-governmental institutions in Hungary, from where they receive some of their funding. This church is not a member of the Lutheran World Federation, the umbrella organization of most Lutheran churches around the world, or of the Conference of European Churches.
Until 1927, the Lutheran Church in Yugoslavia included members of various ethnic backgrounds. That year those of Slovak ethnicity formed their own independent bishopric under the leadership of Adam Vereš. The two largest remaining groups, Germans and Hungarians stayed in one unified church body even though most ethnic Germans left Yugoslavia toward the end of World War II. Rev. Dolinszky considers his denomination to be the legal successor of both the German and Hungarian congregations.
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The Presence of Religion in Public Life
The Autonomous Province of Vojvodina has a Department for Churches and Denominations, which keeps in contact with religious communities. Although its staff attaches importance to ceremonial relations with religious dignitaries, they do not exhibit much knowledge of the actual tenets and communal authority of the churches they represent.Footnote 8 This official contact is therefore formally impressive and jovial but seems to lack content. It focuses primarily on issues of financing and renovation of church buildings.
At the national level, all three churches mentioned above enjoy the position of legally recognized religious communities on the basis of the still controversial Law on Churches and Religious Communities from 2006. Apart from the seven churches and religious communities whose legal standing the law recognizes, it demands that all other religious communities and religious organizations go through a re-registration process at the Ministry for Religious Affairs in order to gain proper legal status.Footnote 9 Religious communities must meet a long list of criteria in order to qualify for registration and those whose application is rejected will be able to legally function only as citizens’ associations, with no privileges that legally registered religious communities enjoy. As of now, only the seven “recognized” churches and religious communities are able to conduct religious instruction in public schools using government funding. Setting up such a hierarchy among religious communities has been seen as discriminatory and in violation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of which Serbia has been a signatory since 2003. Local and international non-governmental organizations (including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), as well as foreign governments protested against the proposed bill, which Serbian President Boris Tadić nonetheless signed into effect on April 27, 2006. Generally speaking, the three churches with majority Hungarian memberships enjoy good standing with the Ministry for Religious Affairs, even though this relationship is largely limited to financing matters (recognized religious communities do receive some limited public funding), religious education in public schools, and ceremonial relations.
The ceremonial presence of the Hungarian-speaking churches is visible in the daily life of Vojvodina. For example, in recent years it has become very popular to commemorate any Hungarian national holiday or cultural event in a religious setting. Such events are readily attended by representatives of the churches. One of the most significant dates is March 15, which marks the 1848 outbreak of the failed Hungarian revolution and civil war against Austrian rule. In recent years, commemorations have routinely involved the participation of clergypersons in public ceremonies, as well as the participation of political and community leaders at religious services held for the occasion. Hungarian cultural gatherings and festivals provide another opportunity for expressing the interconnectedness of the Vojvodinan Hungarian cultural and religious heritage.
As far as the political involvement of the Hungarian churches in Vojvodina is concerned, sociologist and psychologist Sándor Hódi claims that we cannot speak of any: “The Christian political parties have all disappeared — only a few community organizations keep contact with churches.”Footnote 10 On the other hand, religiously inspired foundations have proliferated in recent years and the churches seem to have recognized the importance of raising-up a Hungarian intellectual elite, which is currently almost non-existent. The Circle of Christian Intellectuals is active on the entire territory of Vojvodina and has 49 local groups. It brings mostly Catholics together and since 2004 it has had a youth division. Among its activities are spiritual exercises and academic panel discussions. The Hungarian Protestant Free University began its work in Vojvodina in 2006 and has been cooperating with the Vojvodina Hungarian Cultural Alliance. The Catholic Intellectual Society “Pax Romana” organizes conferences and round table discussions along with spiritual retreats. The Christian Youth of Vojvodina wishes to attract young people through organizing similar events.
Religious Instruction in Public Schools
The aforementioned three religious communities are legally recognized by the government and are among seven that are authorized to conduct religious instruction in public elementary and high schools at the state's expense. Since the introduction of religious instruction in 2001, students must enroll in either religious education classes or education on civic values once a week.Footnote 11 In every interview which I conducted with Hungarian religious leaders and priests/ministers, they explained that, beyond their primary purpose, religious education classes also serve as an opportunity for students to learn Hungarian better and to practice it. Religious education thereby plays a double role: it introduces children to the tenets and traditions of their religion while nurturing their knowledge of their mother tongue.
The Role Religious Communities Play in Preserving Hungarian Identity
A few externalities are apparent at first sight: the Hungarian national flag is almost always present in the worship spaces of the Reformed Christian Church; services at the Reformed churches are always concluded by singing the Hungarian national anthem. According to Sándor Hódi, “in recent decades the cultivation of national identity, the preservation and passing on of cultural traditions and the moral education of children have been the responsibility of the churches. Through this, they have been able to somewhat slow down assimilation, which is now reaching catastrophic proportions.”Footnote 12 Priests, pastors, and laypeople interviewed provide vastly differing assessments: László Fuderer, Catholic priest in the town of Bečej (Óbecse), where Hungarians form almost one-half (46%) of the population, claims that religion and the churches still play a key role: “The Church is the only authority able to hold our nation in Vojvodina together.”Footnote 13 Others, such as József Bogdán, Catholic priest and poet in Novi Kneževac (Törökkanizsa), are concerned that the influence of religion among the Vojvodina Hungarians and the role of local parishes and congregations in their communities are rapidly and irreversibly disappearing.Footnote 14
In discussing ethnic and religious identity, the historical and political positions of churches should be mentioned. As can be quite typical in South Eastern Europe, these churches are trying to hold on firmly to memories from the past. Looking constantly to the mother country (Hungary) for their identity and direction is understandable in their situation. Creating their strategies only on the basis of these two things, however, means a double rejection of Vojvodina and Serbia. The Treaty of Trianon and its tragic consequences provide the most frequent frame of reference from the past. This, coupled with the fact that several congregations (mainly from among, but not restricted to, Reformed Christians) and religious leaders have had contact with revisionist far right Hungarian political movements, has undermined some of their credibility in Serbian society. Unless the churches take on a role in leading a reassessment of history and providing moral responses to past atrocities committed by Hungarians (especially during World War II), their stated purpose of wishing to secure the survival of the Hungarian community in Vojvodina may be called into question. Without having a clear view of their past, the churches will not be able to have a clear view of their future. By turning to themselves and away from Serbian society they may be perceived as advocating an exclusivist identity: a mirror action of the majority, which can breed ethnic and religious intolerance.
Churches on Issues of Public Interest
Much has changed since the time when Josip Broz Tito (1892—1980) was president of Yugoslavia, which can be characterized at best by a reserved relationship toward religion and religious communities. The changes that have taken place since then may seem substantial but they certainly come at a price. Catholic Bishop (now emeritus) of Zrenjanin László Huzsvár lamented the present situation in Vojvodina in 2006 with the following words:
The tide has turned in the last 10–15 years. We have been favored and even pampered by those responsible for organizing Hungarian public life. The bishops and priests of our historical churches regularly receive invitations from our politicians, administrative institutions, cultural associations, school principals etc. Our Hungarian-language media call our pastoral work crucial for preserving our nation. However, they make our Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost impossible and they seize it from us. They invite our children to paint Easter eggs and make papier-mâché bunnies precisely during the time of our Palm Sunday mass; to take part in some concert or sporting event on Easter Sunday; or to a song and dance festival at Pentecost. Should we become the “duped church” in order to satisfy national cultural demands?! At whose expense? (Huzsvár Reference Huzsvár2006).
Illustrating this point is the following case: in April 2006, the Hungarian rock band “Omega” (known for its often sexually-themed performances) was scheduled to hold a big concert in Subotica, on the Saturday before Easter. Churches and several non-governmental organizations protested vehemently against it and asked for a change of date but without success. This was only one example of how, in the name of collective cultural interests, the preferences of churches are regularly ignored. Another case in point is the story of the Hungarian House in Subotica. The building, designed to provide office space to a large number of Hungarian non-governmental organizations in one place, was financed from Hungary and in part by the Hungarian government. The Reformed Christian Church and the Evangelical Christian Church of the Augsburg Confession in Serbia were initially asked to be co-owners and beneficiaries of the building. When the fundraising was completed (and without doubt helped by the patronage of the two churches) they were pressured to hand over ownership to a local Hungarian politician and his associates.
To sum up, the Hungarian churches in Vojvodina still play a considerable role in preserving and nurturing Hungarian identity but their authority, particularly in the cities and towns, is decreasing. Their actual influence in politics and in public life is ambiguous and debatable. Although they are increasingly visible in the public arena, the political leadership often does not listen to them, and sometimes even uses them as instruments for achieving its own purposes. This undoubtedly weakens the churches’ credibility.
THE ROLE OF HUNGARY AND OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The often-changing direction of foreign policy by successive Hungarian governments since 1990 has contributed to creating an identity crisis among the Hungarians of Vojvodina. In the late 1990s, a special identity card was made available to members of the Hungarian diaspora, which entitled them to certain educational, employment, and traveling privileges in the mother country. Although the scope of privileges was later reduced, many Vojvodinan Hungarians took advantage of these benefits.
The “mother country,” Hungary, has been a member of the European Union since May 1, 2004. Six months before joining, Hungary was required to introduce visa requirements for the citizens of all of its non-European Union neighboring countries, including Serbia and Montenegro. Serbian citizens of Hungarian ethnicity were no exception, and this made the already existing differences between Hungarians in Hungary and Hungarians in Vojvodina all the greater. In addition, ethnic Hungarians living in other countries, such as Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have undoubtedly experienced challenges of their own but their living standards are now considerably higher, and as European Union citizens, they can travel and work freely in Europe. Their countries are much more integrated into pan-European and global political and economic structures, while citizens of Serbia still live in relative international isolation and until December 19, 2009 there were few countries to which they could travel without a visa.
Another, perhaps even greater blow to the outlook of Vojvodinan Hungarians came in December 2004, when a proposed referendum in Hungary about giving citizenship to Hungarians living outside Hungary's borders, failed. Hungarian religious leaders in Vojvodina had all been vocal in their support of the proposal. The Reformed Christian Church followed the example of the Hungarian Reformed Church (in Hungary) by unequivocally supporting the initiative. Bishop István Csete-Szemesi and lay president Péter Póth added their signatures to the statement of the General Reformed Synod of the Carpathian Basin, which called “every caring Hungarian to take part in the referendum and to vote with a historic YES” (General Synod 2004).
The issue of the referendum caused all kinds of questions to surface regarding the ambivalent feelings concerning identity that many Vojvodinan Hungarians feel. The discourse was always emotionally charged and very personal in tone. Consider the following statement by Bishop László Huzsvár from November 2004:
We, Hungarian Catholics in Vojvodina are expecting the present from our brothers and sisters in the mother country for the Celebration of Birth with trembling excitement … Will they embrace us after close to eight decades of suffering that our grandfathers, our fathers and we ourselves went through? … Will we feel rejected while we are trying to hold on to our survival with all our strength: will we call ourselves believers in Christ, Hungarians, humans, and brothers to those who question that our mothers taught us to pray in Hungarian while we found ourselves outside of the national border? (Huzsvár Reference Huzsvár2004)
From the outset, the referendum was a sensitive and emotional issue, and one that relates closely to identity. Consequently, many members of the Hungarian community in Vojvodina felt personally rejected by the negative outcome. Churches continued to discuss the issue and look for explanations for many months afterward in a variety of public forums.
The churches in Hungary have been active in trying to help their co-nationals across the borders. These contacts are important psychologically, spiritually, and financially as well. Since there is no higher theological education available in Serbia for either Catholic or (traditional) Protestant clergy, many seminarians complete their studies in Hungary. Numerous congregations in Vojvodina depend on financial support from the Hungarian government and from non-governmental foundations. Consequently, the Hungarian-speaking churches in Vojvodina have benefited in many ways but outside financing has also contributed to encouraging ethnically based exclusivist and isolationist attitudes. The recent closing of a few key public foundations financing Hungarian efforts in Vojvodina also makes the future uncertain.
The ambivalent social and cultural identification is especially observable in the case of the Reformed Church, which supported the failed citizenship referendum. Such a measure would have tied Vojvodinan Hungarians even more to Hungary and would have given them a greater reason for leaving Serbia. Another relevant issue today is the recent creation of one unified Hungarian Reformed Church in the entire Carpathian Basin. This ecclesiastical communion reaches across national boundaries and brings ethnic Hungarians together from all of Hungary's neighboring countries. It came into being on May 22, 2009, when the shared constitution of the newly created church body was signed by members of the general synod in Debrecen, Hungary. While this will undoubtedly provide great moral and spiritual support, it will symbolically move the Reformed Christians in Vojvodina even further away from their cultural environment, therefore deepening their already uncertain identity. Just as the failed referendum proposal brought up hotly debated questions about how one state could conceive to have authority over the citizens of another state, similar concerns can be applied here regarding ecclesiastical law as well.
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES
The most significant demographic challenges threatening the long-term survival of the Hungarian community in Serbia are emigration, assimilation, and population decrease.
Emigration
Already by the end of the 1980s, the number of Hungarians living in Vojvodina was declining at the annual rate of around 1% (Hódi Reference Hódi2001), which was largely due to emigration and internal mobility within Yugoslavia. While during the 1990s, many Hungarian families moved from Banat to Bačka, where employment opportunities were better, emigration has presented the greater problem. In the course of the 1990s, an estimated 35,000 Hungarians emigrated to Hungary (König Reference König2001), which is approximately 10% of the total number of Hungarians that were living in Serbia in 1991.Footnote 15 Others left for Western Europe and North America as part of the “brain drain.” Among the main reasons driving emigration were the wars of the 1990s and the 1999 NATO air strikes, the drastic decline in the standard of living, and the international embargo. The growing percentage of unemployment in Serbia has disproportionately affected the younger generation — between 1998 and 2003 most of those emigrating to Hungary were from the age group between 25 and 34 (Republički zavod za statistiku 2005, 85). This represented an exceptionally high number of well-educated people among those who have left, so the Hungarian community is effectively losing its present and future intellectual elite.
Available statistical data show that the majority of Vojvodina Hungarians studying at universities abroad never return to their homes after completing their studies (Gábrityné Molnár and Mirnics Reference Gábrityné Molnár and Mirnics2005, 7). Many of these young people go to Hungary to attend university. A growing number of families are now sending their children abroad even to high school or to elementary school.
The churches in Vojvodina are losing countless members as a result and through the young people leaving, their future. The percentage of Hungarians is steadily decreasing in many of Vojvodina's towns and villages, so that a growing number of priests and pastors have to serve two or more parishes, as only one congregation most often cannot pay them a full salary. This also puts an added physical and psychological strain on them: they have to travel constantly and have less time for cultivating personal relationships or organizing activities outside the church walls — for example, for young people. Unfortunately, the trend of remaining in the host country after completing studies in higher education includes students of theology as well, and even some ordained clergypersons have opted to move to Hungary from Vojvodina in recent years.
Assimilation
Assimilation in Vojvodina can be primarily observed in ethnically mixed marriages, which were very popular in Yugoslavia, accounting for close to one-third of all marriages in Vojvodina in 1990 (See Mrdjen Reference Mrdjen1996, 104–106).Footnote 16 The ratio of ethnically mixed marriages remains roughly the same in Vojvodina today, with a very high percentage of Hungarian women living in mixed marriages. Children from ethnically mixed marriages were most likely to call themselves Yugoslavs (not identifying with one particular ethnic group) in the 1991 census, while those living in mixed marriages made up the largest percentage (44%) of non-religious persons and atheists.Footnote 17 From among all self-declared Yugoslavs, the ones living in Vojvodina had the largest rate of those not belonging to any religious tradition (49%). Even in the 2002 census, the percentage of those who declared themselves as Yugoslav was more than four times as high in Vojvodina as in the rest of the Republic of Serbia. As can be inferred from the statistical data, distancing from religious tradition, which often led to complete secularization, already appeared in the first generation.
Apart from religious distancing, the loss of one's own language also characterizes mixed marriages, particularly in cases where neither party speaks the mother tongue of the other. In those cases, they typically decide to use the majority language, and teach this to their children. In Hungarian-Serbian marriages, most of the time the majority language prevails, unless the Serbian party has lived in a Hungarian-speaking context and thereby has previous knowledge of the language, in which case they usually use both. The children still might identify themselves as (part) Hungarian and might be members of one of the Hungarian churches but they are often alienated from church life, as they do not speak Hungarian and the churches are mostly unwilling to change the language of liturgy or service. All of this has contributed to the rapid disappearance of multilingualism even from towns and villages where it has been the norm for many generations. Consequently, assimilation takes place on parallel tracks: linguistic and religious, leading to a dual loss of identity.
Among Catholics, ethnically mixed marriages may present a lesser problem because religious identity remains unchanged this way. However, when a Reformed Christian (who is a Hungarian) marries outside their church, it automatically means an ethnically and religiously mixed marriage. The question of where to hold the wedding ceremony gets complicated. Although it may differ from case to case, certain patterns can be observed. László Huzsvár claims that the churches have reservations about working together to keep a record of and counsel those living in religiously mixed marriages. There is an absence of tools and support structures created to help couples in religiously mixed marriages, such as special premarital counseling or ecumenical liturgies for weddings. As a result, the religious scales usually tip in favor of the stronger partner or the dominant religious tradition of their surroundings. For example, when a Hungarian Reformed Christian marries a Serbian Orthodox believer, the couple almost always decides to get married in the Serbian Orthodox Church.
Assimilation, of course, is most visible in the cities, such as Novi Sad or Belgrade, and in those urban areas where Hungarians live only in small numbers. All members belonging to the Reformed Christian congregation in Belgrade live in ethnically (and therefore also religiously) mixed marriages. In the town of Pančevo (Pancsova) near Belgrade, Hungarians make up only four percent of the population. Both the Roman Catholic parish and the Hungarian cultural association have organized Hungarian language classes but they were all promptly canceled for lack of interest. The Catholic parish priest, Mihály Erős, was surprised to find out that it was not only those living in ethnically mixed marriages who showed no interest in enrolling themselves or their children in Hungarian lessons, but also those living in “pure” Hungarian marriages.Footnote 18 This points to the dilemma that many couples living in mixed marriages face: in which language to have their children taught at school. Many Hungarian parents are apprehensive about enrolling their children in Hungarian-taught classes (see Hódi Reference Hódi2001; Gábrityné Molnár and Mirnics 2003). They support their decision to let their children learn in Serbian by saying that they will have smaller chances in the job market later if they study in a minority language. While it is not the scope of the present article to explore these trends in detail, it is important to point out that as a result, many Hungarian children have only poor knowledge of their mother tongue: they may be able to speak it fairly well but not write it, or speak it only poorly. This undoubtedly has an effect on the work of the Hungarian-speaking churches.
Negative Population Growth
The population of Vojvodina is progressively getting older. Already between 1981 and 1991 it was the only federal unit of Yugoslavia that experienced a decrease in its population (Klemenčič and Žagar Reference Klemenčić and Žagar2004, 326).Footnote 19 During 2003, all 45 counties in Vojvodina reported negative population growth. Today the province has one of the oldest populations in all of Europe. In 2002, the average age of ethnic Hungarians was 43.2 years — this made them the ninth oldest group among the 22 ethnic communities listed by the census.
One of the reasons for this is that each year fewer Hungarians get married; they either do not have children at all or they have fewer. Such decisions have critical consequences especially in the small villages, many of which are literally dying out. In some rural communities where the number of potential marriage partners is very limited, many people (especially men) decide not to marry at all when they do not find someone locally. The fact that the number of classes taught in Hungarian has been steadily decreasing at the elementary school level and stagnating in high schools over the last two decades is one of the consequences of these demographic trends (Samardžić Reference Samardžić1999, 156). In Vojlovica (Hertelendyfalva), where 20–30 years ago it was normal to have two or three Hungarian-language classes per year, for the first time there were no new ones in the 2006/2007 school year, due to lack of interest.
Upon examining eight localities where Hungarians make up more than 80% of the populationFootnote 20 one can see that the average age is between 40.0 and 42.2 years. In seven of these towns and villages, the number of preschool-age children is smaller than that of those who are 45–49 years old. While in 1961 the age group between 20 and 34 made up 23% of the ethnic Hungarian population in Serbia, by 2002 their share fell to less than 18%. Some of this results from the already mentioned emigration of young people.
Especially in small communities where there are no strong support networks, people living alone can become psychologically vulnerable and experience difficulties and struggle with loneliness, depression, even thoughts of suicide. From a pastoral point of view, this presents added challenges. These developments can be observed in all three of the major Hungarian-speaking churches in Vojvodina. The difference between the number of baptisms and funerals grows each year.Footnote 21 In some congregations, such as at the Reformed Christian congregation in Novi Itebej (Magyarittabé) there are three times as many funerals as baptisms yearly (Marton Reference Marton2003). The Roman Catholic Church faces the same challenges. According to László Huzsvár,Footnote 22 bishop emeritus of Zrenjanin, judging by the difference between the number of funerals and baptisms, his former diocese loses between 600 and 700 members per year — the equivalent of a village. This also affects the clergy negatively on a psychological level, since most of their working time is spent conducting funerals, while being involved in children's or youth ministry (which is often a source of joy) is minimal.
CONCLUSION
Over the past two decades, the ethnic Hungarian community in Serbia seems to have mirrored many of the processes the majority Serb population has been going through, especially in its relationship to religion and in re-linking ethnic identity and nationalistic emotions with religious identification. Numerical data suggest that the influence of the religious communities within the Hungarian population in Vojvodina is diminishing; especially in urban settings the social and cultural network they used to provide is visibly decreasing. However, since, particularly in rural settings, they are frequently the only ones with the necessary infrastructure and manpower to maintain community life, they still play a more crucial role in the preservation of the community.
Does this mean that the active participation of Hungarian churches in the ethnic Hungarian community is seen as important in the present and for the future? Following the examination of the role of churches and religious communities in affirming and upholding Hungarian identity in Vojvodina, it can be stated that they play an unclear role. As national churches (especially the Reformed Christian Church), they are largely exclusive linguistically and do not accommodate the growing number of non-Hungarian speakers. On the other hand, they are undeniably important upholders of precisely that identity. It is evident that, by and large, they consider the perpetuation and strengthening of the use of the Hungarian language and the sense of a Hungarian identity to be an important aspect of their religious activities. In response to the research question: Is there a middle road in Vojvodina between complete assimilation and hermetic religious-cultural-linguistic isolation?, it can be safely stated that one of the greatest challenges for the future is finding the delicate balance between being inclusive and accommodating on the one hand, and continuing to function as a religious and cultural anchor for the Hungarian (and larger Vojvodina) community on the other.
Among the socio-demographic challenges that Hungarians and the Hungarian-speaking churches in Vojvodina face today is the shifting of population concentrations. Geographically, they are moving increasingly heavily toward urban populations, where the rate of assimilation seems to be the highest and its process the fastest. Regarding age, the Hungarian population in Vojvodina is getting older and the number of children being born is decreasing. Third, emigration (although down from the peak of the 1990s) still presents a steady and considerable loss, especially of young people. How the Hungarian-speaking religious communities in Vojvodina will shift their focus and resources to respond to this changing situation is of crucial importance for the future. In order to be successful in urban contexts, they will have to become more bilingual and expand the boundaries of their membership. Although that represents a shift from their formulated goals and approach, it may be one of the keys to securing their survival.
One of the challenges Hungarian-speaking churches face is to move from living in the past to looking to the future and consequently inspire their members to see their future within Serbia. Playing a role in fostering good ecumenical and interethnic relations can have positive consequences for all of Serbian society. As Roman Catholic Archbishop Stanislav Hočevar maintains, “If Serbia embraced interethnic and interdenominational dialogue, it would be able to gain a clear identity and enrich Europe with its wealth of experience. As a result, the European Union would look forward to Serbia's joining with much greater anticipation and appreciation.”Footnote 23
At the moment, there are two groups of Vojvodinan Hungarians: one sees their future in Hungary or beyond; the other is resigned to remaining in Serbia and it has given up hope for a better future. There are many factors that have contributed to shaping these attitudes: among them are the political, economic, educational, cultural, and religious developments in the country. As Miroslav Samardžić remarks, in the 1990s state centralization efforts pushed ethnic minorities to the political periphery while policies preferential to Serbs caused them to be underrepresented in leadership positions within practically all branches of the public sector in Vojvodina (Samardžić Reference Samardžić1999, 152). In recent years, much of the autonomy of Vojvodina's decision-making capacity and institutional base has been restored or strengthened. At the same time, Serbian governments have also exhibited increasing awareness of minority rights (both ethnic and religious) and a generally growing appreciation of the country's ethnic and religious diversity. In this changing climate, the churches should try to make the best of the situation. Acknowledging the value of the rich religious and cultural heritage they represent, they can greatly contribute to creating a better future for all, regardless of ethnic identity, by recognizing the diversity of the country they are citizens of as a source of strength and by embracing it.
