Chances are that if Russia’s annexation of Crimea or its military intervention in Syria had not attracted your attention, Russia’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election did. For some, these events may indicate that “Russia is back,” but the books by Bettina Renz and Andrei P. Tsygankov emphasize that Russia had not gone anywhere. Rather, these events have roots in the Soviet era and are best understood as outgrowths of Russia’s interactions with its neighbors, the West, and the international community. Both authors survey a range of international developments that, to the casual observer, may have little to do with Russia while making the point that such thinking has, itself, been an influential driver of Russian behavior: the very notion that Western policy makers, especially those in the United States, acted unilaterally to promote their own interests abroad stoked resentment in Russia. More importantly, these feelings of resentment are symptomatic of a fundamentally different vision of the post–Cold War international order, a vision that predates Vladimir Putin’s ascent to Russia’s presidency. According to Renz, Russia’s “history, strongly influenced by geography and geopolitics, has resulted in an understanding that Russia’s destiny is to be a great power,” and “this did not change with the collapse of the Soviet Union” (p. 22). Tsygankov agrees, noting that “Russia’s foreign policy consensus is that the country remains an independent great power with global capabilities and a major voice in international institutions” (p. 52).

In Russia’s Military Revival, Renz highlights the degree to which Western observers have interpreted the resurgence of Russia’s military power—on display in Ukraine and Syria—as a danger not only to its neighbors but also to Europe, the United States, and even international security in general. For Renz, however, such reactions are misplaced, largely because they are grounded in three “misguided assumptions regarding the timing, purpose, and scope of Russia’s military revival” (p. 11). First, Renz argues that Russia’s commitment to military power is inescapably linked to its perception of itself as a great power. As such, the limitations widely associated with Russia’s military in the 1990s, including efforts by Gorbachev and Yeltsin to emphasize diplomacy and cooperation, are historically speaking the exception, rather than the rule. This observation, however, does little to put one’s mind at ease about Russia’s recent military buildup. If anything, it merely justifies NATO expansion, a process that various scholars, like Tsygankov, as well as Renz herself (p. 171), see as having fueled Russian resentment and aggression.

Second, Renz submits that Russia’s military revival is not necessarily linked to an expansionist or aggressive foreign policy. Instead, it should be viewed through the lens of how Russia conceptualizes sovereignty. On this point, Renz contends that Russia adheres to a “‘traditional’ Westphalian reading of sovereignty,” one committed to maintaining a balance of power in Europe and preventing the emergence of a single international hegemon (p. 32). Yet, to the extent that “great power multilateralism”—which effectively permits more powerful states to ignore the concerns of smaller states (p. 42)—also guides Russian foreign policy, then Russia’s military revival certainly seems to be a reasonable cause for alarm for any countries that do not qualify as great powers.

The book’s central contribution, however, revolves around Renz’s third point: that Russia’s military capabilities are still no match for those of the West (p. 11). In fact, the bulk of the work is dedicated to understanding Russia’s military reforms (chapter 2), identifying other “force structures” that comprise Russia’s military establishment and that either go unnoticed or are poorly understood in the West (chapter 3), reviewing post-Soviet Russia’s use of military power as a way to both summarize and assess its capabilities (chapter 4), and reevaluating the concept of “hybrid warfare” (chapter 5). Through the course of these discussions, Renz addresses the degree to which new security threats following the dissolution of the Soviet Union combined with unfavorable domestic circumstances to produce a military that was widely viewed as suffering from degradation and neglect. Yet Renz also emphasizes the extent to which Russia’s elite remained committed to its military, pursuing reforms within the confines of limited resources and investing more heavily as soon as the opportunity arose. At the same time, Renz suggests that Western analysts have vacillated between underestimating and overestimating Russia’s military prowess, believing throughout the 1990s that “the Russian military could never modernize” (p. 161) and then interpreting Russia’s actions in Crimea “as evidence of a new Russian approach to warfare that posed a serious threat to its neighbors and to the West” (p. 175). In other words, Renz provides a more sober assessment of Russia’s military capabilities. In particular, she observes that Russia’s successful use of hybrid warfare in Crimea relied on a host of favorable conditions that would be difficult to replicate elsewhere (pp. 179–80) and that subsequent applications of the concept to Russia’s international activities have stretched it to the point of becoming meaningless (p. 186).

In the conclusion, Renz returns to one of the book’s central themes, that any country’s military power can only be measured in relative terms. Although she seems to take solace in the fact “the Russian military is no competitor to the world’s other great powers, such as the United States and China” (p. 196), this may not be of much comfort to the world’s lesser powers, especially countries where Russia has a vested interest, like those along its borders. Indeed, one potential takeaway from Tsygankov’s Russia and America: The Asymmetric Rivalry is that lesser powers have reason to worry.

In Russia and America, Tsygankov submits that, although the United States still enjoys the upper hand in its rivalry with Russia, the current world order is transitioning to an international system where “the United States will have a diminished role and capacity” (p. 11). Drawing on historical precedents (chapter 2), Tsygankov contends that changes in the world order occur when rising states that are dissatisfied with the current system challenge those responsible for it. Although the United States has dominated the international system since the end of the Cold War, Tsygankov, like Renz, argues that its unilateral actions have increasingly alienated Russia. The list of complaints is long and includes both NATO’s eastern expansion and 1999 airstrikes against Serbia, as well as US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the promotion of democracy within Russia and along its borders, and its 2008 recognition of Kosovo. From Russia’s perspective, the United States has spurned opportunities for establishing a more cooperative and inclusive international system, leaving Russia to seek alternative routes for influence. As Tsygankov points out, these efforts have paid off, with Russia causing splits in European security (chapter 4), reestablishing itself as a major player in the Middle East (chapter 5), and coordinating its actions with China (chapter 6) to balance US hegemony. Just as important, however, is that President Trump has expressed little appetite for taking the steps that would be necessary to preserve US hegemony while possessing a worldview that is more compatible with Russia’s than with that of his predecessors (chapter 3). Throughout the book, then, Tsygankov presents Russia’s international behavior—from its attempts to establish greater influence over former Soviet republics to its strengthening of ties with non-Western states—as responses to US decisions that have ignored Russia’s interests. As a result, the United States must now contend with a rival that is actively committed to challenging its liberal values (chapter 7), its pursuit of nuclear and cyber superiority (chapter 8), and its status as a major player in the global energy market (chapter 9).

For some Western readers, Tsygankov’s presentation of this asymmetric rivalry may prove disorienting. Many US actions that one might assume should be of little concern in Russia or may, themselves, be deemed responses to Russian transgressions are depicted as unsettling when viewed from Moscow. Tsygankov’s goal, however, is to remind his readers that the United States has repeatedly dismissed one of Russia’s principal foreign policy interests, a desire to preserve its position as a great power with a decisive voice in matters related to global security. Renz agrees and, like Tsygankov, believes that any attempt to create a more cooperative relationship between the two countries must address this fundamental Russian desire. However, Renz seems less willing than Tsygankov to justify Russian behavior as reasonable reactions to US hegemony, noting that although the West “bears some responsibility for how subsequent tensions are managed,” it “takes no blame for the Kremlin’s aggressive behaviour or violations of international law” (p. 205).

In the end, neither Renz nor Tsygankov hold out much hope for an improvement in Russian-Western relations. Rather, both worry that increasing tensions may spawn new conflicts, possibly even a global confrontation. As such, understanding Russia’s institutions, interests, and intentions arguably matters more today than at any time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, making both of these works important and timely contributions that should appeal to policy makers and scholars alike.