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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 June 2005
Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System. By J. Mitchell Pickerill. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. 208p. $74.95 cloth, $21.95 paper.
J. Mitchell Pickerill's richly layered book shows the possibilities and limits of “constitutional deliberation” in Congress, defined as “reflection and debate over the scope of federal powers under the Constitution in the context of legislation” (p. 11). Pickerill says that such institutional introspection is rare until Congress is confronted with activist majorities on the Supreme Court, as witnessed in the beginning and end of the twentieth century. But even when using constitutional deliberation to rescue stricken laws and protect future ones, Congress incorporates, rather than “overrides,” the latest judicial doctrine on the proper balance of power between the federal government and the states. He compares the use and specter of judicial review to a presidential veto and concludes that such Congress–Court dynamics show bargaining and compromise. However, interpretive equality is not necessary in this view of a healthy separation-of-powers system.
J. Mitchell Pickerill's richly layered book shows the possibilities and limits of “constitutional deliberation” in Congress, defined as “reflection and debate over the scope of federal powers under the Constitution in the context of legislation” (p. 11). Pickerill says that such institutional introspection is rare until Congress is confronted with activist majorities on the Supreme Court, as witnessed in the beginning and end of the twentieth century. But even when using constitutional deliberation to rescue stricken laws and protect future ones, Congress incorporates, rather than “overrides,” the latest judicial doctrine on the proper balance of power between the federal government and the states. He compares the use and specter of judicial review to a presidential veto and concludes that such Congress–Court dynamics show bargaining and compromise. However, interpretive equality is not necessary in this view of a healthy separation-of-powers system.
Pickerill's premise is that Congress does not have the Supreme Court's institutional perspective and incentive to be deeply interested in constitutional interpretation. HHHe prefers an active judiciary to long stretches of legislative free rein, which one subheading calls “Legislating in the Darkness of Judicial Deference” (p. 98). Even as he uncovers Congress's surprisingly high rate of response to unfavorable Court decisions, Pickerill's case studies and concluding theory of “judicial primacy” place him more toward the scholarly camp of judicial supremacy than coordinate construction. While others have emphasized important moments of constitutional interpretation outside the Court, as well as Congress's mini-rebellions against landmark holdings, including Roe v. Wade and INS v. Chadha, he argues that these exceptions prove the general rule of congressional accommodation.
Pickerill offers two central points on Court–Congress interaction in the twentieth century through a jurisprudential history of the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment, mixed with in-depth case studies highlighting instances of constitutional deliberation, as well as its absence.
First, judicial restraint through the post–New Deal “substantial effects” interstate commerce test removed Congress's incentive to engage in constitutional deliberation, until US v. Lopez in 1995. During this period, only highly charged and innovative uses of federal power, such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prompted visible debates in Congress over Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Pickerill's examination of pre-Lopez legislation in the early 1990s, such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in that case, Violence against Women Act, and the Brady Bill, confirm his theory that Congress did not consider constitutional limits to its powers because it did not perceive any judicial review threat. After Lopez, the Court struck these bills, in whole or part, on Commerce Clause or Tenth Amendment grounds.
Second, when Congress faces a mix of judicial activism and restraint, constitutional deliberation increases as members parse the latest holdings to anticipate and respond to review, as seen during the 1890s–1930s Court and current Rehnquist era. Pickerill's cases include a fascinating account of the Child Labor Act of 1916, in which supporters painstakingly, but ultimately unsuccessfully, tied this expansion of federal power to precedents Champion v. Ames and Hoke v. US. Pickerill observes similar deliberation in post-Lopez Congresses, as members modified the stricken Gun-Free School Zones Act to comply with the holding and invoked the issues surrounding Lopez to shape other policies, including the Hate Crimes Bill. Pickerill argues that these examples of deliberation are neither “deep” nor “independent” because they show deference to the Court's rulings, but “deliberation motivated by the threat of judicial review is better than no deliberation, or deliberation motivated only by public policy or public opinion” (p. 130).
Either way, it is unclear from Pickerill's book whether such moments of constitutional deliberation really protect Congress's policy goals more than simply having at least five justices on the bench who are predisposed to favor federal power. Hammer v. Dagenhart struck down the Child Labor Act despite its author's attention to precedent, and the Civil Rights Act was upheld despite being more controversial. Pickerill's work would be bolder if it analyzed this comparison more deeply to confront the reigning “attitudinal” model of judicial behavior, which would say that Congress could not actually slip one past the justices without predetermined sympathy on the Court. Along these lines, his case studies and larger data set detailing Congress's legislative reaction to unfavorable Court decisions from 1955 to 1997 (see Chapter 2 and Appendix A) can be reexamined to show how the Court responds to what might be called legislative rematches when the Congress modifies a stricken bill by using the majority's holding.
These remaining questions do not detract from Pickerill's overall point about the Court-centered nature of constitutional awareness in Congress, when members care about such issues at all. His concluding chapter highlights dozens of interviews of people close to the legislative process and is a sobering reality check to those who champion Congress's coequal place in constitutional interpretation. The consensus of his respondents was that members “did not believe that the Constitution was an important consideration in Congress when legislation was drafted and considered” and that constituents prefer “common sense” to questions of constitutionality (p. 134).
Pickerill does not tackle the larger ramifications of this so-called political reality, despite its absurdity. Congress's lack of attention to the Constitution can indeed be very harmful to its ability to represent, legislate, and provide oversight. So the reverse of the book's thesis is just as important: What is not on the justices' constitutional radar screen will not be on Congress's either. This fact partially undermines Pickerill's main premise as he makes his argument for judicial primacy. He assumes that Congress is greedy for power and becomes moderated under the Supreme Court's spotlight (pp. 27–28).
But at the same time that Congress pushes for more federal power, it often drastically reduces congressional power, and the justices do not seem to mind. Congress has continually delegated crucial legislative powers from budget making to war to the president, yet on the rare occasion of Court scrutiny, the justices often miss this larger point in favor of formalistic technicalities. So if the Court is ignoring important constitutional questions, or getting the answers wrong, then it is indeed a problem that Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) is one of the few members of Congress fluent in Constitutionese. Even as Pickerill discounts coordinate construction, Constitutional Deliberation in Congress indirectly makes the argument for it to leap from the realm of scholarship into the halls of Congress.