From the beginning, America has been a testing ground for European ideas. For the intellectual historian, this means that the study of the “reception” and “ramifications” of those ideas should become a major concern.Footnote 1 Clearly, ideas do not influence a person or a culture in the straightforward way that one billiard ball strikes another and sets it into motion. Rather ideas exert influence analogously to the complex and often surprising ways that one person influences another. Needless to say, intellectual influence is a tricky thing to work out.Footnote 2 Seen in a wider historical context, the study of the transatlantic movement of ideas makes many of the arguments about American exceptionalism seem beside the point. Most foreign observers emphasize America's exceptional nature, though not necessarily to praise it. Nor are all claims for American exceptionalism from Americans themselves examples of spread-eagled patriotism. Finally, in light of the works under review here, we are reminded that German thought, particularly since 1945 and occasionally before, has shaped American thought as decisively as have British or French intellectual traditions of thinking. Although Allan Bloom overreacted when he warned against the pernicious influence of modern German thought in The Closing of the American Mind (1987), he was right about the fact of its importance. Not only Max Weber and Martin Heidegger, but the Frankfurt school and Hannah Arendt, the literary critics Eric Auerbach and Erich Heller, along with conservative political and social philosophers Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss have played major roles in shaping contemporary American thought.
THE THINGS THEY CARRIED
Two of the most important German influences on American thought since World War I have been sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) and philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Weber and his wife Marianne came to America in late August 1904 to attend a Congress of Arts and Sciences in St. Louis. Then relatively unknown, Weber was part of an all-star team of German social scientists there to discuss the future of the social sciences. Before that, he and his wife Marianne spent time in Chicago after visiting relatives in upstate New York; after St. Louis, Weber travelled to the Indian Territory (Oklahoma), then with his wife back down to New Orleans, up to Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute in Alabama and on to East Tennessee and Piedmont, North Carolina to visit relatives. They capped their visit with time in Washington, Philadelphia, and Cambridge, Massachusetts before leaving New York on 18 November. Along the way, they talked with people of all races, classes and occupations. Besides Max's research interests, Marianne Weber was herself interested in education, the women's movement and settlement house work in cities like Chicago, where she and her husband spent time with Jane Addams.
Scaff contends that the two figures Weber most wanted to meet were W. E. B. Du Bois and William James. However, he was not able to see the former, though they corresponded while Weber was in America; nor is it really clear, though you would not know it from Scaff's account, that Weber actually met James in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Unfortunately, Booker T. Washington was not in Tuskegee when the Webers braved the sweltering Black Belt heat to visit. In all this, Weber avoided the supercilious attitude that most Europeans, including Alexis de Tocqueville, manifest toward American culture, whether popular, high or academic. Weber was himself shaped by Puritan culture in his upbringing. Set against Weber's sympathetic, but penetrating, discussions of American society, Tocqueville's sonorous prose and elegant judgements can seem just a hint glib.
Unlike many foreign visitors to America, Weber did not consign race and ethnicity to the margin of his concerns; in fact, he agreed with Du Bois's prophetic remarks about the centrality of the color line in the twentieth century. Besides time at Tuskegee, the Webers also attended black (and white) church services in the South, in Washington, DC and also in New York. All this testifies to Weber's central concern with “the conditions for the emergence of the modern economy, in part framed comparatively in relation to the world religions” (Scaff, 22). America, Scaff also emphasizes, was not the only thing that interested Weber; the country and its culture stood at the center of his understanding of modern capitalism. So enlivening was Weber's experience in America that, soon after he returned to Germany, he finished what became his great work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905).
Max Weber in America will be invaluable to those interested in how European ideas were inextricably linked to American realities. Scaff knows Weber's work inside out and sympathetically captures the German sociologist's hardworking, questing, and intellectually curious nature. For all of the corrupt aspects of American politics, for instance, Weber thought Germany could learn from the democratic ethos of the United States. The most important single idea Weber came up with about modern America was his contention that America society was neither a romantic community (Gemeinschaft) nor an atomized, modern society (Gesellschaft). Rather, it was organized as a collection of particularistic communities, organizations, institutions, within which the individual forged his identity. Like Tocqueville in the 1830s, Weber underlined the importance of associations in American life. Again, Weber on early twentieth-century America is every bit as interesting as Tocqueville on America in the 1830s.
The last part of Scaff's study is concerned with how Weber's ideas were institutionalized in American academic life, particularly after 1945. First came the establishment of research and teaching networks, mainly at Chicago, Columbia, and the New School for Social Research, with Wisconsin also playing an important role. But although Scaff mentions Weber's influence on sociologists Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset, as well as historians such as Richard Hofstadter and Peter Gay, all of whom were at Columbia, he fails to emphasize the way that, as New York intellectuals, they took Weber's idea into the public sphere of intellectual – as opposed to just academic – debate. Scaff also emphasizes the obvious importance of getting Weber's work translated and published, as well as the way Weber's ideas became part of a theoretical paradigm that focussed on “structure, action and meaning” (Scaff, 248). But not only The Protestant Ethic, the main focus of Scaff's book, was important in Weber's sociology. Weber's idea of charisma, as Josh Derman has emphasized, also had a powerful impact on postwar American social and political thought.Footnote 3 Along with Tocqueville, Weber's influence surpassed that of Marx in Cold War American intellectual and academic life.
Martin Woessner's richly detailed and fast-paced Heidegger in America tells a different kind of story. Because there was no Heidegger visit to America to trace, and he wrote little about America, it is more difficult to take the measure of the German philosopher's impact in the New World. But, as Woessner makes clear, that influence was considerable. The Heidegger case is also problematic because of two other factors. First, his prose was and is notoriously difficult in English as well as German. Second, Heidegger's thought was perforce grounded in the antidemocratic ethos of post-World War I Germany and could never shake the taint of Heidegger's membership, for a short time, in the Nazi Party in 1933. While Weber decisively rejected the scholarly validity of racism in general and anti-Semitism in particular, Heidegger was a self-styled provincial conservative and suspicious of Weimar-style modernity. Nor was he a stranger to a casual anti-Semitism.
All this makes Woessner's task a complex one. In some ways he has solved it admirably by simply focussing on Heidegger's influence on various American thinkers, though he is largely silent on philosopher Stanley Cavell's take-up of the German philosopher. Woessner provides valuable historical background on Heidegger's early influence, even in the late 1920s, on young American philosophers such as Marjorie Grene and Sidney Hook, who attended Heidegger's lecture in Marburg and Freiburg. Perhaps the best parts of Woessner's always interesting book are the intellectual profiles of Heidegger's students who ended up in America. Ironically, many of the young Germans who studied with Heidegger before 1933 were Jewish. This applies to Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, Herbert Marcuse and Hannah Arendt, the subjects of Richard Wolin's Heidegger's Children (2001). But Woessner concentrates on some less well-known but just as interesting former students of Heidegger's who also fled to America. The historian of humanism Paul Oskar Kristeller ended up at Columbia University; Leo Strauss, who attended Heidegger's lectures, taught for many years at Chicago; Gunther Stern (Anders), Arendt's first husband, was perhaps most systematic in his dissection of Heidegger's relationship with National Socialism; while psychoanalyst Hans Loewald also studied with Heidegger and exerted great influence in American psychoanalytic circles after the 1960s.
Woessner rightly underscores the historically crucial role that Protestant theology played in introducing Heidegger into postwar American intellectual life, though not all Christian Heideggerians were Protestants. Still, émigré theologian Paul Tillich was a powerful influence on American religious thought in the postwar years and his theology was decisively shaped by Heidegger. Though Woessner overheats things a bit here, there is a certain truth to his contention: “Only in a religious society could the first translations of Heidegger, the obscure peasant philosopher from the Black Forest (as the myth would have it), only in this context could these translations have sold like hotcakes” (Woessner, 128). One can acknowledge Heidegger's impact by the 1960s, along with other books about the “death of God,” without claiming best-seller status for him. If we want examples of religious books selling like “hotcakes” then the Reverend Norman Vincent Peale's The Power of Positive Thinking and Bishop Fulton Sheen's books really did sell lots of copies in the postwar years.
Although Woessner might have spent more time on the institutionalization of Heidegger's work in America, the profile of Richard Rorty's attempt to meld Heidegger and American pragmatism is a rich and fascinating essay that captures the tone of the American intellectual scene in the 1980s and 1990s. As philosophical persona non grata among anglophone philosophers, Heidegger was most likely to find champions in literature (German, French and English) departments and theology schools. Another of Woessner's best chapters is devoted to the American philosopher J. Glenn Gray, who, with the considerable help of Hannah Arendt, commissioned translations of Heidegger for publishers Harper and Row in the 1960s. In the early 1970s Gray wrote to Arendt that there was a young philosopher named Derrida who deserved attention. At the same time Gray also mentioned attending a conference on Heidegger where Jürgen Habermas, Hubert Dreyfus and Rorty were all in attendance. Clearly Heidegger's influence had survived to see a new generation of American philosophers take his thought seriously.
Woessner clearly knows his way around the cult(ure) of Heidegger in the United States. He is very good on the point that it was not just what Heidegger said but also his style of reading and lecturing that was so important. He also suggests that it was the mediating role of Heidegger's students, as much as it was his texts themselves, that was so critical in perpetuating his influence. Heidegger emphasized a direct textual confrontation with a thinker rather than consulting interpretive work before reading the text itself, a pedagogic and hermeneutic practice identified with figures such as Leo Strauss. Heidegger in America is also a valuable source on Heidegger's impact on architecture (Daniel Libeskind), aesthetics and even film. As it turns out, Terence Malick translated one of Heidegger's shorter works before he turned to filmmaking.Footnote 4 Of Heidegger's influence on environmentalist and ecological thought, however, Woessner says surprisingly little.
One of the puzzling aspects of Heidegger's influence in America is why he has been taken up not by academic nonconformists or southern conservatives, but by Rorty and other liberal figures. The centrality of “rootedness” (Bodenstaendigkeit) in Heidegger's thought seems to have had relatively little influence on American Heideggerians. I would have welcomed more speculation by Woessner on the selective way Heidegger has been embraced – or not – in American universities.
Finally, if Scaff's book is perhaps too narrowly focussed, Woessner probably tries to do too much. I am also not entirely sure that he has worked out his own attitude toward Heidegger's thought. Without some sense of Heidegger's core concerns, Woessner can seem at the mercy of the views of whomever he happens to be discussing, something he comes close to admitting when he writes near the end, “The aim of this book has not been to assess the accuracy of the many interpretations that comprise it, but to explore the conditions that made it possible” (Woessner, 281). In addition, he might have offered a clearer, more systematic sense of the major interpretive issues raised by Heidegger's work. To be sure, Heidegger's “turn” (Kehre) away from the philosophical stance that produced his pro-Nazi rectoral address in 1933 is mentioned, as is his shift from focussing on consciousness (existentialism) to a preoccupation with the question of being (ontology). Because Woessner fails to set this out very explicitly, it is hard to be sure, as we go along, which Heidegger his American interpreters (and opponents) are reacting to.
Still, both Scaff's Max Weber in America and Woessner's Heidegger in America, along with the issue of New German Critique edited by Josh Derman, testify to the rich possibilities of a cross-cultural, transatlantic approach to American intellectual history. It remains to be seen, however, if this interactive focus will ever be reciprocated by intellectual historians in Britain, France and especially Germany or whether the intellectual currents will always be treated as though they flowed in only one direction, from east to west.
