For any researcher, student, or teacher working on democratization in the Maghreb specifically, or on democratization in general, this book is a must. Using Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way's Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Boston: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and the most up-to-date data, the writer has presented an unprecedented piece of work on the complex political situation in the Maghreb and on the often misunderstood relationship between the four countries involved: Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia. More specifically, the book aims to shed light on how the Arab Spring and the post-Arab Spring in these North African countries reflect aspects of their internal sociopolitical intricacies, and seeks to analyze the reasons behind the stability and democratization processes and the choices made by the different regimes and populations.
This book is unique in that it concentrates on one region, the Maghreb, and compares the political and social evolution in its four countries. It is also unique because no other book to date has presented such comprehensive findings on the democratization process in different yet similar countries. Its comparative dimension allows the reader to examine and understand the effects of internal and external forces on the political dynamics of each country. The first major advantage of this approach is that it can be used as a model for other regions. The second advantage is that Levitsky and Way's theory is presented with its range of concepts applied to the Maghreb countries, and the reader is therefore able to appreciate variation in the link between political regime and democratic rule and the important place of competitive authoritarianism in the Maghreb and the domestic developments that have taken place in this region over the past decade.
Levitsky and Way's model aims to explain regime transition, and why some political systems become democratic or semi-democratic, while others remain or become authoritarian or competitive authoritarian.
The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter outlines Levitsky and Way's approach, mainly their competitive authoritarianism, with the focus on three criteria: leverage, linkage, and organizational power. Leverage means the ability of the Western powers and international organizations to coerce countries to democratize, and the ability of these regimes to survive these pressure groups. Crucial to a country's capacity to resist the West is whether it has a great international supporter (a black knight) like Russia or China. Linkage indicates the number of connections between Western states and other international bodies; the nature of these ties is determined by historical, economic, geographic, and cultural factors. For instance, the closer a country is to Europe or the United States, the more ties it has with them. And high linkage fosters democratization. The third criterion, organizational power, focuses on internal factors and refers to the importance of the regime's organizational economic, military and political abilities.
The three notions cover the international and internal factors that may foster or obstruct democratization. The goal of the chapter is to explain why some regimes adopt democracy and the rule of law while others become competitive authoritarian, and others still go back to dictatorship and why the regimes react or behave in these ways. By adopting Levitsky and Way's approach, the book is able to methodically compare and contrast the development of these four political systems and their different experiences since the Arab Spring. The remaining chapters apply this model to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania, respectively.
The book asserts that Morocco's case is different in many ways, especially because it has high connections with the West, and the latter has only low leverage over it. The country also has a large economy and a strong organizational power based on an effective security system. Yet, as in the case of Algeria, Europe and the United States are reluctant to exercise their pressure on the monarch to democratize further for fear of undermining the state's capabilities in the fight against Islamist terrorism, and for fear of weakening the regime.
Hill further argues that, although Europe and the United States had high linkage to, and strong leverage on Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia, it fell mainly because it had an inadequate organizational power characterized by the disconnection between the armed security forces and his “Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique” (RCD) party, and because Europe and the United States were inconsistent or lacked coordination in their leverage and influence on the regime to democratize and open up the country. Mauritania, which has most of its links with Europe, not the United States, has a low organizational power, a less strong economy than its neighbors, and lacks a black knight patron to defend it. Similarly, the Western governments have medium leverage over this country. Further, European countries, namely France and Spain, do not exert pressure on the regime in Mauritania to democratize, also for fear that they will undermine its ability to fight against terrorism and illegal migration.
All in all, this is the first time that Levitsky and Way's model has been applied to the countries of the Maghreb, which has provided significant perspicacity into why each country developed its own trajectory, and had contrasting and different experiences and outcomes of, and attitudes toward, the Arab Spring uprisings. The case studies in this book have revealed important dynamics about the four countries, their histories, shared geography, different ruling parties, their various coercive strategies and military and security capabilities, as well as their different interactions and connections with Western governments.
However, I see two major problems for novices who may read this book. One is that many issues are tackled as if the reader were familiar with how the political system of each country operates. For example, the author discusses regimes in crisis during the Arab Spring without giving a historical background of the socioeconomic and political context of each country, and without providing the root causes for these crises. The second problem is that the book gives the impression that it is more interested in applying Levitsky and Way's model on the four Maghreb countries than in the dynamics of power struggle in the countries themselves. For instance, the author could have mentioned: the failed Arab Maghreb Union as an example of the lack of economic integration; the competition for regional leadership between Morocco and Algeria; and the disparate and often hostile regimes in power in these countries.
To conclude, I would like to say that this book is original and timely. It is truly brilliant in many ways. I think it has almost everything a modern book on democratization in the Middle East and North Africa should have—a reliance on Levitsky and Wayne's model, openness to new approaches of democratization processes, and an understanding of the stumbling blocks facing democracy in North Africa and beyond. It is a sophisticated book that provides an elegant and useful analysis of the situation of democracy in the Maghreb before and after the Arab Spring.
