Liberty, Equality, Fraternity takes the reader carefully and thoughtfully through the traditional social philosophical terrain of the democratic socialist tradition in European social policy. This triad of values, which shaped the design of state welfare provision in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe, by gaining ascendancy over an earlier triad of values, ‘faith, hope and charity’, is in the twenty-first century under threat by yet other triads of values, ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (in Anglo-Saxon countries), and even ‘work, family and country’ (in France at least).

Spicker has systematically dissected the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity (one part and two chapters assigned to each). He has written clearly on the contending constituent concepts embedded in each of these principles, with a degree of even-handedness that is commendable. Under Liberty his concern is with the meaning and merits of positive and negative freedom. He judges positive freedom to be the more important, allowing him to conclude: ‘[Public?] social welfare is necessary to enjoy freedom, and freedom is necessary to enjoy well-being’ (p. 61). Under Equality, his central question is ‘equality of what?’ Persons? Rights? Access to the conditions of civilisation? Welfare? His predisposition is to perceive equality as a principle rather than as an ideal (p. 114), which enables him to conclude: ‘there must be an aspiration for greater equality, through steps [taken by the state presumably?] to remove disadvantage where this is considered illegitimate [by the state presumably?]’. Under Fraternity, he explores the idea that people have responsibility for each other, and he judges that they do, placing a premium on the processes of collective action, cooperation and mutual aid, and on the outcome of social inclusion. This enables him to conclude: ‘A society which is inclusive should be able [using the coercive power of the state, presumably, in the absence of sufficient voluntary initiatives?] progressively to extend its boundaries, developing and strengthening networks of solidarity, building a sense of social responsibility and community, drawing in people who are excluded, and fostering collective action.’ In his concluding section, Spicker usefully identifies three models of radical politics: radical libertarians (liberty first and foremost) (pp. 160−1); radical egalitarians (elimination of disadvantage) (pp. 161−3); and radical collectivism (community, solidarity and mutual aid as ends in themselves) (pp. 163−4). He concludes by making the point that ‘liberty, equality and fraternity are not, of course, the only values which guide social policy, not even the principle aims. . .Conflicts in social policy are usually based not on direct disagreement about specific principles, but between priorities and approaches relating to a range of desired aims’ (p. 166). These aims and priorities are, of course, the outcome of how a society has worked through its values through compromise, which inevitably means drawing upon a range of principles including, ‘faith, hope and charity’; ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’; ‘work, family and country’; and, of course, ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness’.

In Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, there is embedded an implicit ‘model of man’, one that is grounded in the three contentious assumptions. The first is that people deemed, by remote others within collective structures, to be lacking the power (the capacity) to make choice decisions and then be able to act upon them, accept that designation and necessarily want more empowerment (greater capacity) to achieve self-mastery (p. 16), even though the spectre of Maslow's Jonah complex may loom – the fear of success that a person has when he or she fears that the use of his or her talents and creativeness could bring new responsibilities and duties, which could threaten his or her sense of safety, security and belongingness (Maslow [Reference Maslow1962]1968: 59). The second assumption is that the people who are deemed, by remote others within collective structures, to be disadvantaged and socially excluded accept that designation and necessarily want their real or presumed powerlessness, isolation and self-estrangement to be addressed in a way that requires them to engage with paternalistic remote others who have the will or power to intervene in their lives for their own good (p. 36). The third presumption is that people are the product of their social formations, and thus are other-referential, which means they necessarily tolerate collective coercion to engage with previously excluded remote others, and to engage in altruistic cooperation and collective action for the common good as an expression of solidarity (p. 120).

With Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Spicker has eloquently reiterated the moral justification for the presence of the state in the social policy domain. He has reflected on the key values that have justified and moulded the design of the welfare state, and has not found them wanting in any regard. He has reflected on some of the values that are bringing the welfare state to its knees, and has found them wanting in some regard. Not unexpectedly, for Spicker, the collective has ascendancy over the individual, expert opinion has ascendancy over individual choice and public welfare provision has ascendancy over market-based welfare provision.