With the Gulf region dominating news headlines following the continuing conflict in Iraq and the dispute between the United States and Iran over the latter's nuclear program, it is easy to forget that there are still fundamental issues of territorial control that are at the heart of the Gulf security dilemma and remain unresolved. There should be no doubt that the Gulf region remains at the center of contention in international politics, with national states trying to protect their sovereignty, a regional system in flux, and international actors either trying to maintain their own level of control or seeking ways in which to protect what they perceive as their national interests. It is a complicated system, and it is often overlooked that the majority of the nation-states in the Arab Gulf have only had their independence for a very short time, at least in historical terms. As such, matters of sovereignty and protection of territory remain fundamental issues of concern when it comes to establishing regional relations or ensuring a better regional security network. In this context, the relationship between the Arab Gulf states and Iran is of central importance, a fact that is often pushed aside within the realm of international politics and the Gulf's importance in that equation.
One point of contention that has persisted over time is the dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran. The dispute goes back to a period prior to the establishment of the UAE. With the formation of the federation, it became a federal concern rather than one of individual emirates Sharjah and Raʾs al-Khaymah. Up until then, Great Britain had protected the smaller emirates from encroachment by Iran. However, with London's decision to withdraw from the territories “east of Suez” in 1968, Iran's claims over the islands became more pronounced, ultimately leading to the takeover of both Tunbs by the Shah in November 1971 and a dubious memorandum of understanding over Abu Musa at the same time that gave Tehran direct control over additional part of the island. Since that time and from a federal UAE perspective, the three islands have always been considered by the leaders of the UAE as an unequivocal part of their own territory. Naturally, the power holders in Persia and later Iran have taken a different position.
Given the widespread implications that the dispute over the three islands holds for regional stability in general, Thomas Mattair provides a great service with the publication of The Three Occupied UAE Islands: The Tunbs and Abu Musa. The author correctly states at the beginning” that “given the strategic location of these islands, it is essential to have an accurate account of the islands' history and to understand their role in the context of the political and security situation in the Arabian Gulf” (p. 3). In a vast study comprising 440 pages of text and over 100 pages of footnoted material, the author sets out to achieve precisely such an objective by covering the historical background, the legal and strategic perspectives, and the regional repercussions, as well as outlining the concerns of the international community.
At the heart of the island issue is the fact that the Arab Gulf states and Iran do not trust each other. Their relationship remains burdened with different misperceptions. From the Arab side, Iran is seen as intent on solidifying its hegemonic aspirations throughout the region and thus using its possession of the islands to demonstrate Iranian will and power. In that context, what upsets a country like the UAE the most is when Iranian officials refer to the island dispute as a “misunderstanding,” implying that a small state like the UAE simply does not understand the game of power politics.
Mattair methodically lays out the history of the island dispute in great detail, including the different contentions being put forward within that historical context. His extensive use of primary-source material makes a strong case for his argument that “the historical record affirms the rightful title of Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaimah, and now the UAE, to Abu Musa and the Tunbs” (p. 150). Iranian commentators will undoubtedly have a different point of view, but according to this reviewer a similar amount of historical documentation has not been put forward by them. Mattair then proceeds to firm up his argument by discounting Iranian claims from numerous international legal principles, giving the historical narrative even greater clout.
The book is also valuable because it places the island dispute into a contemporary framework. This includes an in-depth look at the regional repercussions of the island question and a lengthy explanation of the policy of the international community. This section underlines succinctly that the policies of external powers like the United States and Great Britain on the islands do not necessarily match their commitment to the stability of the region. For example, their acquiescence to Iran has failed to resolve the issue and in fact hardened Iranian attitudes. The result is an unresolved dispute that could easily serve as a flashpoint in future military confrontations, especially considering that Bush administration warnings to Iran to change its objectionable behavior or face preemptive military action. In a similar vein, as the author points out, “Iran's future use of the islands in action against shipping and the UAE cannot be dismissed” (p. 435).
It should be noted that the book has been published under the sponsorship of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, a government-sponsored think tank located in Abu Dhabi. It comes as no surprise that the book presents a clear case in favor of the assessment that the islands belong to the UAE. This association, however, does not take anything away from the careful work and analysis provided by the author. Overall, the book should be seen as a valuable contribution to an important topic.
