Scholars have done a great deal of work on the impact and importance of reputation in international relations. Most explore how rising and existing great powers seek to enhance their standing in the eyes of competitor or peer states in the international system, which often leads to aggressive and, sometimes, destructive foreign policy decisions. What none have yet explored, though, is how or why a unipolar state, which should care little about what others think of it due to its unchallenged power, can sometimes become consumed by these concerns nonetheless and embark upon similarly aggressive or assertive policies abroad. Tudor Onea’s U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Restraint Versus Assertiveness From George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama takes up this subject and in so doing adds a novel and fascinating dimension to our understanding of prestige in international relations.
Drawing from scholarship on psychology and emotions in international politics, Onea develops a theory of prestige that offers a counter-intuitive explanation for assertiveness by unipolar states. Unipolar powers expect other states to honor or respect them due to their superior material status in the international system. The prestige of the unipole is offended when states do not offer this due respect. These kinds of prestige-based offenses usually take one of two forms: a next-in-line rival threatens the unipole (i.e. positional challenge), or a lower-rank state defies the rules and order established by the unipole (i.e. a symbolic challenge). In either case, the unipole feels offended or humiliated in ways that trigger “the desire for reasserting prestige as well as the thirst for retribution” (p. 21). Under these conditions, the unipole often embarks upon assertive policies abroad.
Onea succinctly demonstrates the power of the argument in post-Cold War United States foreign policy. Covering a wide swath of history, Onea demonstrates how prestige helps explain a switch from restraint to assertiveness in U.S. policy during the middle of the Clinton Administration that has continued to the current day. The humiliation to the United States from Slobodan Milosovic in the Balkans, Mohamed Farah Aideed in Somalia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Osama Bin Laden on 9/11 were all seen by the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations as symbolic challenges to U.S. prestige. The result was a sharp turn away from multilateral restraint toward more unilateral, assertive, and militaristic policies that included, among other things, the bombing of Kosovo, sanctions against and eventual invasion of Iraq, abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and decision not to join the International Criminal Court (ICC). Despite wanting to turn back to a more restrained foreign policy, Onea contends that President Obama has been forced by on-going prestige challenges to continue U.S. assertiveness, most notably with the troop surge in Afghanistan and the 2011 regime change in Libya. Onea’s discussion of each of these cases is interesting and, in most instances, compelling enough to indicate that prestige has indeed played a critical role in explaining post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy.
At the same time, Onea’s analysis also raises important questions that need further study. For starters, it is difficult to determine in several of Onea’s cases if assertiveness is the result of humiliation or, by contrast, an effort to reestablish/protect a reputation for resolve meant to deter strategic challenges abroad. Take the response to 9/11 as one of several possible examples: Onea notes that post-9/11 anger and a desire for retribution played a part in U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But, he also cites comments like this one from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld about reputation: “History teaches that weakness is provocative. Time and again weakness has invited adventures which strength might well have deterred” (p. 130). So, is it a hurt sense of pride related to prestige or a reputation for resolve that explains the policy decision to invade Iraq, especially in 2003? As seen with his discussion of Thomas Schelling’s work on reputation, Onea is aware of the prestige-versus-reputation problem. But, he seems to compound the problem more than help his case here with the claim that operationalizing prestige versus reputation-based concerns is “a frivolous task” (pp. 27–28). In fact, this operationalization is critical to the goal of Onea’s book—i.e. to demonstrate an independent causal role for prestige. If resolve is doing the work, then what role is there for prestige in determining state behavior? Onea wants us to believe that role is substantial, but it is challenging to accept that claim when elites talk mostly of the reputational nature of their more assertive policy steps.
This leads to a second, and related point, about the explanatory reach of prestige. No theory can account for everything, and Onea rightly notes the explanatory limits of prestige at various points. That being said, it seems that Onea tends to overstate the similarities between the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administration foreign policies in ways that raise further questions about the explanatory reach of prestige—at least so far as Onea conceptualizes it. Notably, “assertiveness” across these three administrations appears to be far more distinct than Onea leads us to believe. Relative to Bush, the Clinton and Obama Administrations were (or have been) far more conscribed and limited (for instance, in the use of force), as well as far more multilateral in foreign policy matters generally. Onea seems to recognize this at points, but still insists that assertiveness or primacy was the leitmotif across all three administrations (pp. 8, 128). This point about variation is important. Degrees of assertiveness in U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy is a topic that has been of central concern to international relations scholars for some time now. Staying within Onea’s framework, could these different levels of assertiveness be a function of different levels (or perhaps types) of prestige challenges that the United States faced under these different presidents? Or, maybe, there are other domestic political dynamics beside prestige that factor in here. The sudden end to the Cold War, the trauma of 9/11, and the disillusionment over the Iraq War have generated very different public and national dispositions toward the use of force (especially for more idealistic ends) across the post-Cold War period. Perhaps, this has played a critical role in affecting patterns of assertiveness, by in essence determining what is possible and/or necessary when policy elites face the need to respond to prestige challenges. Overall, this seems to be an important area for further research.
In the end, neither of these questions about reputation or different levels of assertiveness take away from the important contribution of Onea’s book. Good research always sparks new questions. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era falls into this category. It breaks fertile new ground on prestige, further validates scholarship on emotions in international politics, and adds important new insights to our understanding of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy.
