Forster's work in The Time of Freedom is a worthy contribution to scholarship on collective behavior in Latin America. The work appears largely intended to provide a narrative account of peasant organizing in a specific locale; however, the work implicitly incorporates a more comprehensive theory about bottom-up collective action. The account of bottom-up collective action given by the author is really one of contentious politics involving the simultaneous dynamics of four key groups: rural indigenous, rural ladinos, large landowners, and politicians. The movement is contentious for two reasons. First, the social movement arises from a previous period of relative stability, although under a dictatorship, and it incurs a significant change in elite political ideology. Second, the time frame spans about ten years, from the fall of Ubico in 1944 to the fall of Arbenz in 1954. The author leads the reader through the three stages of initial formation, mass action, and demobilization. The author's account of the 1944 Guatemalan Revolution challenges the traditional interpretation of hierarchical initiation. Historical accounts of the 1944 Revolution portray it as urban in its locale and middle-class in its support. Ignoring the rural indigenous and ladinos leaves a chasm in the understanding of contemporary Guatemalan history and politics. This is of particular importance in understanding the movement towards violence that followed from the failure to institutionalize the hard-earned gains of the collective movement.

The area of study is the department of San Marcos in Guatemala, which borders the department of Chiapas, Mexico. In addition, the accounts of ladino banana workers in the area southwest of San Marcos are woven in. The San Marcos area as presented in the 1944–1954 time period is characteristically racially hierarchical. White owners, many of non-Guatemalan descent, control the plantations while ladinos serve as overseers. At the bottom are the indigenous peoples who serve as laborers on the fincas. San Marcos, in terms of agricultural production, is coffee country. Thus, the lives and labor of the indigenous peoples living in this area revolve around coffee production. The landowners' procurement of such things as housing and personal plots is also illustrative of the relationship between worker and owner in the San Marcos area of Guatemala.

The struggle of the banana workers in the Ticquisate area is also an integral part of the collective action that took place between 1944 and 1954. In the 1930s the United Fruit Company (UFC) established banana plantations in the township of Ticquisate. Bananas ranked as the second largest export earner in Guatemala's agro-export economy. The banana workers established a strong, grassroots labor movement that was able to engage in successful mobilization. Over the ten year period, the workers repeatedly struck in request of a living wage. The author presents the ideals of the banana workers' labor movement rather modestly distinguishing it from the rote scholarship on this movement which has traditionally portrayed the labor movement as desirous of revamping the entire agro-export system. This is important because the movement's goal is shown not as the imposition of leftist ideology but instead is shown as the goal of securing welfare and dignity.

The reason underlying the rapid initiation of the collective movement is found to lie in the fifteen years of repression under the Ubico dictatorship in which labor organization was not tolerated. The sudden fall of Ubico in 1944 catalyzed the desires of both rural indigenous and rural ladino workers to acquire their economic rights as quickly as possible. However, the acquisition of economic rights would not have been possible without the aid of an underlying organizational base. Explicating how campesino workers could organize, given their poor material resources, is the primary contribution of this study. The author emphasizes the power of a shared collective consciousness built on the injustices suffered via class and race in general. Problems of class and race are fundamental throughout Latin America, but are said to have been particularly disturbing in Guatemala during the prohibition of organizational outlets under the Ubico regime. However, the author glances over the actual opening factor, which was the 1945 constitution. The new constitution allowed for such rights as the eight-hour workday, seventh day wage, and paid vacations. Without an institutional base, such as a constitution outlining such rights, organization would have been much more difficult.

The contentious politics aspect of this collective movement is best illustrated in the initial reluctance of the Arevalo regime to fully concur with the new rights to labor organization, all the while proclaiming the necessity of such change. The author notes the ideological or spiritual beliefs of Arevalo as his reason for not lending full support to the movement right away. However, the answer may be better sought in noting the bargaining characteristic of contentious politics. The strength of existing socioeconomic relationships in Guatemala at the time may not have permitted rapid political change. Thus, this may account for why the more profound change takes place in 1948 three years after Arevalo became president. The continued growth of the collective movement in line with institutional change over a period of time may have convinced Arevalo of the possibility of actual change. The election of Arbenz in 1950 is strong evidence of the sufficiency of institutional change, hence the continued mobilization of campesinos. However, an important factor, one that is not well illustrated, is the demobilization phase of the collective movement. The factor that contributes to the eventually demobilization of the movement is a mobilization of political reaction on the right, which in the Guatemalan case includes the United States. The expropriation of United Fruit lands began in March 1953 when 209,842 acres of uncultivated land were taken by the government, which offered a compensation of $627,572 in bonds. One month later the US Department of State complained to Arbenz demanding a $15,854,849 compensation for one of the two sized lands. While the Guatemalan government valued $2.99 per acre, the American government valued $75.00 per acre. The Guatemalan government refused to pay that amount and continued with the project expropriating more United Fruit's lands in October 1953 and February 1954 offering the company $500,000 for them. Arbenz attitude began to create diplomatic problems between his country and the United States, which saw his initiatives as too leftwing.

The landowners and the military, with the acquiescence of President Eisenhower, also began to countermobilize. In 1954, Colonel Castillo Armas organized an insurgent army in Nicaragua and returned to Guatemala. Shortly thereafter Arbenz resigned to seek asylum in Mexico. The pertinent point here is the rapid demobilization of the campesino movement in light of the institutional changes gained over the ten years of collective action. This point is important because when explicated it could possibly explain the rise of militant insurgency in Guatemala.

The understanding of peasant mobilization is often difficult to undercover because of the assumptions underlying the necessity of resources. Resources are necessary for mobilization, but they alone are not sufficient. An organizational structure is needed and this organizational structure must come from underlying institutions. The institution in this case is the 1945 constitution, which lays out the economic rights of the workers. The assignment of economic rights to workers provides a foundation from which organizational structure develops. This is recommended reading for those wishing to better understand both contemporary Guatemalan politics and history as well as peasant collective action.