I. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the spread of economic ideas based on a case study of the diffusion of Keynesian economics in two continental European countries: Belgium and Italy. The spread of ideas is often considered as an elusive topic. As remarked by Colander and Coats (Reference Colander and Coats1989, p. 1), “The concepts are vague, the institutions hazy, and the process is messy. Studying the spread of ideas is like studying subatomic particles with half-lives of nanoseconds.” The aim of this case study is to gain deeper insight into the factors determining the dissemination of economic ideas, distinguishing also between the academic world and economic policy-making.
Keynesian economics dominated economic thought and macroeconomic policy-making in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the diffusion of Keynesian economics has been uneven (Coats Reference Coats1996, Hall Reference Hall1989). Belgium and Italy were countries were Keynesian economics gained ground relatively late, not only in comparison with the United Kingdom or the United States, but also compared to continental European countries like the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, or France. This comes clearly to the fore in the Economic Survey of Europe 1949 of the Economic Commission for Europe, which criticized Belgium and Italy, together with Germany, for following deflationary policies (Baffi Reference Baffi and Baffi1985, p. 134). In Germany, contrary to Belgium and Italy, Keynesian economics never gained the same influence as in other countries (Allen Reference Allen and Hall1989). Several factors played a role herein, including Nazism and the massive emigration of (left wing) economists in the 1930s (Hagemann and Krohn Reference Hageman and Krohn1999). So, Belgium and Italy stand out as two countries where Keynesian economics gained influence late, but then remained rather strong. Moreover, both countries were characterized by significant regional imbalances. This contributed to differences of opinion among economists, which affected the spread of Keynesianism. In fact, Keynesian economics was much more popular among economists who wanted to tackle these regional imbalances.
In this study, we do not go into the debate as to how the General Theory was received in Belgium or Italy. We focus on the high days of Keynesian economics, the post-World War II period from 1945 to around 1970. Also, we will not go into the issue of the relation between Keynes and Keynesianism (for a recent overview, see Bateman Reference Bateman, Backhouse and Bateman2006). We take as the main message of Keynesian economics that a market economy is inherently unstable and that the government has a key role in the management of the economy by the use of fiscal and monetary policy. In order to structure the argument, we follow Coddington’s distinction between “hydraulic,” “disequilibrium,” and “fundamentalist” Keynesianism. Coddington (Reference Coddington1976) characterizes the “fundamentalist” Keynesian approach by a rejection of neoclassical microeconomic theory and general equilibrium theory. Mainstream Keynesianism was dominated by the hydraulic and disequilibrium approaches. The “hydraulic” approach centers on the belief that there are stable relations among the various flows in the economy, which provide a basis for active government policy. The “revolutions” in national income accounting and econometrics were also important elements (Patinkin Reference Patinkin1976). The “disequilibrium” approach tries to reconcile Keynesian ideas with general equilibrium theory.Footnote 1
In the first three sections of the paper, the focus is on the similarities between Belgium and Italy: a strong position of (the Austrian variant of) neo-classical economics, slowing the penetration of Keynesian ideas; the breakthrough of “hydraulic” Keynesianism, with special attention to the role of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC); and the rise of Keynesianism in the poorer parts of the two countries, linking government intervention and regional imbalances. In the last section, we discuss the differences in the development of Keynesianism: Belgium was more in the mainstream of Keynesian economics, with disequilibrium economics becoming important in the 1960s, while in Italy, “fundamentalist” Keynesianism was much stronger.
II. THE DOMINANCE OF “LIBERAL” ECONOMICS IN THE EARLY POSTWAR PERIOD
In the 1940s, the mainstream of the Italian economics profession was profoundly steeped in the tradition of neoclassical economics, especially the general equilibrium version of Pareto and his disciples. It was also a school of political economy, strongly in favor of the free market economy, sometimes termed “the Italian liberal tradition” (Porta Reference Porta and Coats2000). In the academic world, professors were mostly over fifty. Keynes’s popularity was restricted mainly to sections of the Italian economic profession he would have been ill at ease with: the corporatistsFootnote 2 and the Catholics (de Cecco Reference de Cecco and Hall1989).
In the area of business cycle theory, the Austrian theory was influential in Italy in the 1930s and 1940s (Barucci Reference Barucci2003). Italian economists worked in the tradition of the overinvestment theory, something which was in strong contrast with Keynes’ oversaving theory. Moreover, Italian economists, like Luigi Einaudi, Costantino Bresciani Turroni, or Giovanni Demaria, criticized Keynesian economics for its use of partial equilibrium analysis (instead of the Austrian general equilibrium approach). They also attacked its excessive aggregation, which did not recognize the microeconomic nature of economic variables.Footnote 3
Following in the footsteps of its founding fathers, the Italian liberal school, together with the Bank of Italy, was closely involved in postwar economic policy-making. A key figure was Luigi Einaudi, who was governor of the Bank of Italy from January 1945 to May 1948. He restored the reputation of the Bank of Italy, which had been tarnished during the fascist regime. Also, Donato Menichella, Einaudi’s successor, was strongly convinced of the need for monetary stability in order to stimulate savings and, in this way, strengthen investment and the productive capacity of the economy.
There was a large consensus among economists that the Italian economy was plagued by severe structural imbalances, especially high unemployment in the Mezzogiorno. So, Italian economists typically argued in favor of increased savings in order to build up the capital stock and combat unemployment. Moreover, they also accepted migration (to the North of Italy, but also to foreign countries like the United States or Argentina) as a way to equilibrate the capital/labor ratio. So, Keynesian ideas of demand management were greeted skeptically by most Italian economists, who were convinced of the structural nature of Italy’s economic problems.
In the years after the World War II, inflation was rampant in Italy, exceeding 100 percent between May 1946 and September 1947. In the summer of 1947, Einaudi became Finance Minister. His key objectives were to smother inflation and to restore balance of payments equilibrium. So, monetary policy was tightened sharply (the Banca d’Italia increased dramatically the monetary reserve ratios and raised the discount rate). Inflation came down quickly.
The Italian liberal school also played a role in the move towards liberalization of exchange controls and trade restrictions in the postwar years. Giovanni Demaria’s 1941 essay on the industrial problem in Italy was highly influential (Porta Reference Porta and Coats2000). It contained a strong condemnation of the fascist regime’s trade policy, which had been based on autarchy since the early 1930s. Both for his academic standing and for the position taken at that stage, Demaria would later chair the works of the Economic Commission for the Assemblea Costituente, which was in charge of drafting a new constitution for the first Italian Republic after the end of the war.
Italy’s economic policies in the early postwar period were often criticized as being too restrictive. For instance, the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva criticized Italy, together with Belgium and Germany, as a country which followed deflationary policies (Baffi Reference Baffi and Baffi1985, p. 134). The U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration often urged the Italian authorities to follow more expansionary policies, especially to combat unemployment. The Italian authorities, however, assigned a priority to the consolidation of monetary stability and the reconstruction of their foreign exchange reserves.Footnote 4
The neo-classical tradition was strong in Belgium in the interwar period, too. But, unlike in Italy, where general equilibrium analysis was dominant, in Belgium, Marshall’s partial- equilibrium approach was also quite influential. Keynes was mainly known by the Belgians as the author of The Economic Consequences of the Peace (Keynes Reference Keynes1919). His ideas on reparations payments were not very popular in Belgium, which had been invaded by Germany and had suffered badly from the war.
In the interwar period, the Institut des sciences économiques at Leuven/Louvain University became the first “modern” research center in economics in the Low Countries (Maes and Buyst Reference Maes and Buyst2005). Léon-H. Dupriez soon came to be the dominant voice in the institute. Inspired by foreign research institutions, such as the Harvard Committee on Economic Research, he invested most of his energy in business cycle analysis. His theoretical framework resembled that of Hayek’s general equilibrium-oriented business cycle theories of the late 1920s (Hayek Reference Hayek1928). Under the leadership of Dupriez, Leuven/Louvain economists gained international status in the 1930s. On several occasions, the Institut des sciences économiques—later called IRES (Institut de recherches économiques et sociales)—obtained grants from the Rockefeller Foundation.
In order to finance its theoretical research, IRES produced business cycle analyses and forecasts, which were sold to private and (semi-) public corporations and institutions (Maes, Buyst, and Bouchet Reference Maes, Buyst, Bouchet and Coats2000). But the influence of IRES on economic policy went far beyond that. Dupriez and several other members of the institute combined their academic careers with an important position at Belgium’s central bank. Moreover, several members, such as Albert-Edouard Janssen and Paul van Zeeland, occupied key positions in different governments.
Immediately after WWII, Dupriez published his magnum opus, Des mouvements économiques généraux (Dupriez Reference Dupriez1947). This book became very influential in France and Belgium, and to a lesser degree in Germany. So, at the French-speaking part of Leuven/Louvain University, business cycle analysis remained a top priority for Dupriez and IRES. Meanwhile, (hydraulic) Keynesianism had conquered mainstream (macro)economics on the international scene. Dupriez always resisted this trend as, in his opinion, the Keynesian approach lacked solid microeconomic foundations. Moreover, he favored a general equilibrium approach, rejecting Keynes’s partial equilibrium method. So he continued to work in the tradition of the Austrian school (Loewenthal and Siaens Reference Löwenthal, Siaens and Dupriez1972). Dupriez’s attitude slowed the penetration of Keynesian ideas in Belgium and particularly at the French-speaking part of Leuven/Louvain University.
Postwar economic policies in Belgium were also very much in line with the classical orthodoxy. At the heart of this policy-making was the so-called “Gutt operation” of September 1944, named after the then Belgian Finance Minister Camille Gutt. The basic problem was the enormous increase in the volume of banknotes in circulation due to the heavy cost of financing the war. Under the Gutt operation, the money supply was cut drastically. Banknotes of 100 francs or more ceased to be legal tender. They had to be deposited, and above a certain minimum these deposits were frozen. With this operation, the monetary overhang in the economy was wiped out.Footnote 5 This also made it possible to abolish price controls and to restore the mechanisms of the free market economy.
Under the governorship of Maurice Frère, from 1944 to 1957 the National Bank of Belgium strongly adhered to orthodox monetary views. They were reflected in Governor’s Frère’s remarks to Finance Minister Janssen: “if you keep a firm hand on the State expenditure tap and I do the same for credit, nothing can go basically wrong” (as quoted in Janssens Reference Jansssens1994, p. 265, our translation). Frère was also strongly in favor of a strong franc and opposed any devaluation of the Belgian franc. Moreover, in 1957 he succeeded in pushing through a law establishing a “metallic” statute for the Belgian currency: the franc was defined as a certain quantity of gold and the gold coverage of the banknotes was re-established.Footnote 6
It is important to remark that, both in Belgium and Italy, the “internationalization” of the economics profession was stimulated by the existence of fellowships. In Italy, there were the Bonaldo Stringher fellowships, awarded by the Banca d’Italia from the 1930s onwards. Initially, the Italian fellows went mainly to Great Britain, especially Cambridge (Sraffa), Oxford, and the LSE. From the 1960s and 1970s onwards, the fellows went increasingly to the United States, especially MIT (Modigliani). So, many of Italy’s most prominent economists, such as Paolo Sylos Labini, Augusto Graziani, Luigi Spaventa, and Luigi Pasinetti, studied abroad with these fellowships. In Belgium, the so-called CRB fellowships made it possible, from the early 1920s onward, for young Belgian economists to study in the United States of America. The Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) was established in 1914 in the United States, in order to save Belgium from starvation during the German occupation. After the war, the remaining funds were used to set up several scientific and educational foundations. One of them was the Belgian American Educational Foundation (BAEF), which awarded the CRB fellowships to promising young Belgians to study at top American universities. Many future economics professors, such as Paul van Zeeland, Gaston Eyskens, Robert Triffin, and Jacques Drèze, went to the U.S. with a CRB fellowship.Footnote 7 It gave economics in Belgium a distinctly American flavor.
III. THE SLOW RISE OF “HYDRAULIC” KEYNESIANISM
By the time World War II ended, Keynes’s analysis had become the “new economics” in the Anglo-American world. A crucial factor was the “digestion” of Keynesian economics, especially the appearance of its neoclassical version, as developed by Hicks and Modigliani. Moreover, the emerging national income accounts fitted in perfectly with the concepts of Keynes’s General Theory (Bateman Reference Bateman, Backhouse and Bateman2006, p. 284). So “hydraulic” Keynesian models made the understanding and acceptance of Keynesian ideas easier. Macroeconomic model-building became the new fashion in economics. It was a crucial element of The Keynesian Revolution (Klein Reference Klein1966).
Keynesian economics was also very influential in the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). European countries thus came into contact with it, as it were, “on the shields” of the victorious Allied armies (de Cecco Reference de Cecco and Hall1989). With the division of the world into two blocs and the start of the Cold War, Keynesian economics became the political economy of those who wanted to contain communism. Moreover, on a more practical level, the OEEC played, together with the United Nations, a crucial role in the development and dissemination of systems of national accounts (Van der Wee and Dancet Reference Van der Wee, Dancet and Van Rompuy1986).Footnote 8 Indeed, the primary task of the OEEC was the distribution of the Marshall Plan funds. This had to be done on the basis of the respective needs of the various countries. So, it was important to measure the “wealth” of the different countries. For this reason, an internationally comparable system of national accounts was indispensable. The OEEC put a lot of effort into this topic and in 1950 published the first international manual for the compilation of national accounts. Furthermore, one should note that Robert Marjolin, “the first French economist who could truly be called Keynesian” (Rosanvallon Reference Rosanvallon and Hall1989, p. 176), became the first secretary-general of the OEEC. In this respect, one can remark that, in France, the relation between the construction of the national accounts and the development of Keynesianism was very strong. Jean Denizet, a leading French Keynesian, went as far as saying, “Keynesianism is national accounting” (Rosanvallon Reference Rosanvallon and Hall1989, p. 185).
However, Keynesian economics had a hard time getting established in Italy (Bini and Magliulo Reference Bini, Magliulo, Pasinetti and Schefold1999). The older generation of Italian economists was solid in its defense of neoclassical economics. But the reconciliation of Keynesian methodology and neoclassical principles worked its magic in Italy, as it had elsewhere. Italian economists grasped the chance of being technically au courant. The first books explaining Keynesian economics in Italian appeared in 1948 and 1949. The authors were Vittorio MarramaFootnote 9 and Ferdinando di Fenizio.Footnote 10 They put the emphasis on the new analytical techniques and methodology of Keynesian economics. Also, with the extension of the intellectual exchanges between Italy and the Anglo-Saxon world, the pull of Keynesian economics on young economists became much greater than before the war (see, for example, Sylos Labini Reference Sylos Labini1949).
Marco Onado, commenting on an earlier draft of this paper, described the situation very aptly:
When I was a student at the Bocconi University in the early ‘60s, the two main courses of Economics were taught by Giovanni Demaria who did not make a reference whatsoever to Keynes. Only in the third year, in the Economic Policy course, thanks to Di Fenizio … and discussing contributions from V. Lutz etc, we discovered that there was a different world out there. No wonder that all the economists of my generation chose Di Fenizio as their teacher. It must be also said that the old generation (perhaps with the notable exception of Demaria) pushed their best students to go abroad, in particular to Cambridge, thanks to the particular position of Piero Sraffa. They did not embrace Keynes’ ideas but accepted that their students did (Mail of September 23, 2007).
So, by the early 1960s, most of the Italian neo-classical economists who were Keynes’s contemporaries were out of the game. Keynesian economics became the new orthodoxy. A new generation of Keynesian-oriented professors came to prominence.
As regards economic policy-making, Keynesian ideas and terminology gained ground more rapidly, largely under the impulse of the OEEC. In Italy, a key role was played by the Interministerial Committee for the Reconstruction (Comitato Interministeriale per la Ricostruzione, CIR),Footnote 11 which coordinated the studies and analyses for the OEEC. As already mentioned, one of the key demands of the OEEC was for a system of national accounts. So, at the end of the 1940s, the Italian authorities produced a first set of national accounts (Rey Reference Rey, Garofolo and Graziani2004, p. 124). Moreover, many negotiations were conducted with the help of input-output tables, based on the industrial survey for 1936–1938 and elaborated at SVIMEZ (the association for the development of industry in the Mezzogiorno, see below). So, with the discussions on the reconstruction, economists and statisticians employed by the government, the Bank of Italy, public and private firms or banks became familiar with national accounting methods. As a result, official documents concerning economics and economic policy began to be drafted in the new terminology and started to use Keynesian concepts.
Keynesian ideas were gaining ground in the postwar period at the Bank of Italy too, even if the liberal free market tradition remained important. New recruits in the Research Department, like Federico CafféFootnote 12 and Salvatore Guidotti,Footnote 13 were more Keynesian oriented. The neo-classical tradition nevertheless retained its importance. A key figure was Paolo Baffi.Footnote 14 Baffi knew Keynesian theories quite well. However, he was skeptical of government intervention in the economy (Gigliobianco Reference Gigliobianco2006, p. 323).
International links, especially with the United States, were important in the breakthrough of “hydraulic Keynesianism” at the Bank of Italy. Keynesian methods of analysis received a boost with the return from the United States of Salvatore Guidotti in 1949. He was the head of the division responsible for production and price analysis in the research department and had been to the Department of Commerce in Washington to study the techniques of the national income accounts.Footnote 15 At the beginning of the 1960s, under the governorship of Guido Carli, the Bank of Italy started with the construction of a macroeconomic model. Guido Rey became responsible for the real side of the model and Antonio Fazio for the monetary part. Rey went for a study visit to the Dutch Central Planning Bureau, where Tinbergen was the director. Fazio went to MIT to study with Franco Modigliani, not only because he was an Italian and a famous monetary economist, but also for his experience with the creation of the FED-MIT model. In the mid-1960s, Modigliani also became a consultant to the Bank of Italy, to advise it on building its econometric model (Modigliani Reference Modigliani1999).Footnote 16 The Banca d’Italia maintained further strong international academic connections because many of the Bank’s economists studied abroad. It is further noteworthy that, in the 1960s and early 1970s, most of the international contacts of the Bank of Italy were with “moderate Keynesians,” like Hicks, Samuelson, Modigliani, Klein, and Tobin (Ciocca Reference Ciocca, Garofolo and Graziani2004, p. 592).
In Belgium, hydraulic Keynesianism broke through at the French-speaking University of Brussels, due to the personality of Etienne Sadi Kirschen. As a Belgian representative at the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Kirschen had become familiar with “hydraulic Keynesianism.” He used this experience and his background as an engineer to start up a quantitative and Keynesian-inspired research program on the Belgian economy.
Kirschen’s research immediately hit a serious problem: a nearly complete lack of reliable Belgian national accounts. This was also a problem for the Belgian government, as the OEEC was asking Belgium for its official national accounts (Van der Wee and Dancet Reference Van der Wee, Dancet and Van Rompuy1986, p. 151). In 1949, a Commission for the National Accounts had been officially established. However, it was not making much progress. Indeed, the Belgian National Institute for Statistics lacked the necessary means, both financially and in terms of personnel. The almost total absence of Keynesian influences in Belgium in the early postwar period, as well as a lack of political will, go a long way towards explaining this situation.
So, Kirschen, who was not a member of the Commission for the National Accounts, assembled his own team to set up a system of national accounts. This also comprised “representatives” of the main Belgian institutions (Ministry of Economy, National Bank of Belgium, etc.). With the help of the OEEC and the Dutch and British statistical offices, Kirschen’s team succeeded in 1953 in providing a full set of Belgian national income estimates (comprising the three approaches: income, production, and expenditure, Kirschen et al. Reference Kirschen1953). After some, often-heated discussion, Kirschen was taken up in the official Commission. However, things advanced only when Gaston Eyskens (an economics professor at the Dutch-speaking part of Leuven/Louvain University and an early, pragmatic Keynesian, see below) became prime minister in 1959. The next year, seven statisticians were recruited. Work on the national accounts was speeded up and the first input-output tables were drawn up.
Meanwhile, Kirschen had also institutionalized his research group with the creation of DULBEA (the Département d’Économie Appliqué de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles) in 1956 and the foundation of a journal, the Cahiers économiques de Bruxelles, in 1958. Typical for Kirschen and DULBEA was the empirical and policy-oriented nature of their research. Kirschen was characterized as “not an economic philosopher; he was really an economic statistician” (Sirjacobs Reference Sirjacobs1997, p. 80, our translation). Kirschen’s applied macroeconomic research brought him into contact with Jan Tinbergen as well. From the late 1950s, Tinbergen was a highly influential person at the University of Brussels.Footnote 17 Kirschen’s research agenda in the 1960s showed a strong Tinbergen-flavor: macroeconomic modeling and the theory of economic policy (Buyst, Maes et al. Reference Buyst, Maes, Pluym and Danneel2005). Researchers at the University of Brussels developed several econometric models, not only of the Belgian economy, but also for Europe and the world economy. One of the highlights of their research was the publication in 1964 of Economic Policy in Our Time (Kirschen et al. Reference Kirschen1964).
Kirschen’s modeling activities brought him into further contact with other European colleagues. It led, in March 1961, to the establishment of the European Scientific Association for Medium and Long Term Forecasting (ASEPELT).Footnote 18 The aim of ASEPELT was to group European researchers active in medium- and long-term forecasting. Kirschen became the first president. In 1969, ASEPELT founded a journal: the European Economic Review. Jean Waelbroeck and Herbert Glejser, both at the ULB, were the first editors.
Keynesian economics gained ground at the French-speaking section of the University of Leuven/Louvain, too, while Dupriez’s influence declined. Michel Woitrin, a student of Dupriez, who had studied in Cambridge (UK) and had worked at the OEEC, played an important role in introducing the new concepts and theories of hydraulic Keynesian economics. In the 1950s and 1960s he taught a very Keynesian course on macroeconomics. Alexandre Lamfalussy, who had gone to Oxford for his dissertation also played a role. Lamfalussy was quite critical of postwar Belgian economic policy. He argued that: “the restrictive economic policy bears some responsibility for the slower pace of development of the Belgian economy” (1961, p. 28). He raised the issue that “internal demand could have been increased through higher Government spending, and a devaluation could have put an end to the competitive disadvantage of Belgian industry” (Lamfalussy Reference Lamfalussy1961, p. 29). In 1966, Albert Kervyn, the first Secretary-General of the Belgian Bureau de Programmation Économique (from 1959 to 1965) and, for thirteen years, the chairman of the Working Party on Medium-term Perspectives of the European Economic Communities, became a professor at the francophone part of Leuven/Louvain University. He was deeply ingrained in the world of macroeconometric modeling and hydraulic Keynesian economics.
Meanwhile, Keynesian economics was also gaining ground at the National Bank of Belgium. New recruits of the Research Department such as Roland BeauvoisFootnote 19 and Godelieve Van PouckeFootnote 20 were much more Keynesian oriented. Their influence would grow, especially after the departure of Governor Frère in 1957.
IV. REGIONAL IMBALANCES AND THE RISE OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS
An important similarity between Belgium and Italy is that Keynesian economics gained ground earlier among economists in the poorer parts of the country. In both countries, the older generation, based in the richer part of the country (like Dupriez in Belgium or Einaudi and Bresciani Turroni in Italy), resisted Keynesian ideas, while a younger generation which wanted to improve the performance of the regions lagging behind (Flanders in Belgium, the Mezzogiorno in Italy) was in favor of more interventionist Keynesian ideas (and, as we have seen, was also very much involved in the elaboration of the national accounts).
In Italy, the breakthrough of Keynesian economics should be understood in conjunction with the unequal development between Southern and Northern Italy and the idea of planning. A key figure here was Pasquale Saraceno (Parisi and Rotondo Reference Parisi, Rotondi, Pasinetti and Schefold1999). He was an expert in banking and business. During the 1930s, he worked in the IRI, Italy’s state holding company.Footnote 21 By the mid-1940s, he was taking part in both the drafting of industry financing plans for the European Recovery Programme and in studies and plans concerning the problem of economic backwardness in Southern Italy. Saraceno was not a theoretical economist. He aimed above all at finding concrete policies to cure the structural diseases of the Italian economy. However, he published articles with a strongly Keynesian framework of analysis (see, for example, Saraceno Reference Saraceno1949).Footnote 22
Pasquale Saraceno was also the first Secretary-General of SVIMEZ (l’Associazione per lo sviluppo dell’industria nel Mezzogiorno, an association to promote the development of industry in Southern Italy, founded in December 1946). Several of its founding fathers (like Menichella, the governor of the Banca d’Italia) had been connected with Italy’s state holding company IRI (SVIMEZ 2006). Saraceno remained the driving force behind it for thirty years. The main objective of SVIMEZ was to study the problems of industrial development in Southern Italy and to draw up concrete programs to strengthen it. More specifically, SVIMEZ wanted to analyze how industrial development might be stimulated, especially by speeding up some branches of industrial production, by mobilizing available local resources and also by providing new capital and technical innovations from outside. Keynesian models were seriously studied and applied at SVIMEZ. Also, Keynesian growth theories, especially those of Harrod and Kaldor, were widely discussed (Magliulo Reference Magliulo and Barucci2003). Furthermore, people working at SVIMEZ drew inspiration from the Anglo-Saxon literature of the 1930s on “depressed” areas. They favored public investment as a means of compensating for the absence of “agglomeration economies” in the Mezzogiorno.Footnote 23 Moreover, they argued that such a program of public investment would generate a continuous stream of demand for industrial products of the North. It was an ingenious way of reconciling the needs of the North with those of the South and this in a Keynesian analytical framework.
Saraceno’s work led to the so-called Vanoni plan or Vanoni-Saraceno plan, which was approved by the government in December 1954.Footnote 24 The main objectives were full employment (and the creation of 4 million jobs), balance of payments equilibrium, and reducing the North-South economic divide. Key elements of the plan were an increase in investment, some sort of economic planning (supported by both public and private investments), as well as strengthening integration between backward non-industrialized regions and the more developed areas.
The Mezzogiorno problem would also determine the Italian position for the Treaty of Rome negotiations. For Italy, it was of crucial importance to reconcile the common market with the Vanoni plan (see, for example, Doc. 65 in Ballini and Varsori Reference Ballini and Varsori2004). So, Italy insisted on “strict parallelism” in the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital. It hoped that, in this way, it would not only have a safety valve for its labor surplus, but also to attract foreign direct investment. In addition, it wanted deliberate government policies to tackle regional imbalances, favoring the establishment of a European Investment Bank (for investment in less-developed regions) and of a European Social Fund (for the redeployment of workers). The launch of the European Economic Community thus became a project in which both the “liberals” and the Keynesian economists in Italy could find common ground, as it involved both the creation of a common market and flanking government policies.
In Belgium, Keynesian economics initially gained ground at the Dutch-speaking (or Flemish) section of the Catholic University of Leuven/Louvain, in contrast to the Francophone one, which was dominated by Dupriez. The basic policy problem for Flemish economists from the late 1940s to the early 1960s was the high unemployment rate in Flanders. In the early 1950s, the male jobless rate stood at ten percent and the female rate was fifteen percent (Abraham Reference Abraham and Dondeyne1972, p. 321). Flanders accounted for seventy percent of total Belgian unemployment but only made up fifty-five percent of the population. Like economists at SVIMEZ, Flemish economists were inspired by American regional economics and American measures to revitalize depressed areas (Neessens Reference Neessens1957). Flemish economists also accepted labor mobility as a way to combat unemployment.Footnote 25 But they argued in particular for a more interventionist regional policy to fight unemployment. Flemish economists were not able to develop these ideas within the framework of IRES, as Dupriez not only rejected Keynesianism, but also strongly disapproved of government intervention in the economy. Linguistic quarrels further poisoned the atmosphere, so that Flemish economists at Leuven/Louvain University decided, in 1955, to set up their own research institute, called the Center for Economic Studies.
So, Keynesian economics became popular among the Flemish economists. In 1952, at the first Post University Lecture Series, Karel Pinxten (together with Gaston Eyskens, the standard bearer of the Flemish economists) gave a lecture on Keynesian economics. He argued that: “The appealing new content of the theory as well as the disrupted economic situation, which still persists, together constitute the two pillars supporting the influence of the Keynesian revolution on economic thought and economic policy” (Pinxten Reference Pinxten1952, p 266, our translation). Together with the spread of Keynesian economics, more and more Flemish—as well as French-speaking—economists became convinced of the merits of (indicative) programming. For instance, it was the main theme of the fifth congress of Flemish economists in 1961, with participants including “foreign,” non-Flemish, economists like Tinbergen and Kirschen.
Gaston Eyskens, the leading economics professor at the Dutch-speaking section of Leuven/Louvain University, also had a strong impact on economic policy-making in Belgium.Footnote 26 He was a prominent member of the Christian Democratic Party and held several ministerial positions. In the periods 1958–1961 and 1968–1972, he was prime minister, and in that capacity he pushed through important economic reforms. During the first of these two periods, he passed a successful Regional Development Act, closely based on the Center for Economic Studies’ policy recommendations. Also, as already mentioned, he significantly reinforced the National Institute of Statistics, in order to construct the national accounts, a crucial element of hydraulic Keynesianism. In addition, he established the Bureau voor Economische Programmatie/Bureau de Programmation Économique (1959). Its main functions were to give the government professional advice in economic policy matters, to improve tools for policy-making and to prepare medium-term economic plans and projections. But as soon as Eyskens left office, interest in the Bureau diminished. When he returned to power, he transformed it into the Planning Bureau (1970). Despite all these efforts, political support for the initiative remained limited (Van Waterschoot Reference Van Waterschoot1975).
The process of European integration, with first the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the European Economic Community in 1958, provided a project in which both liberal and Keynesian economists could find common ground and a common objective (Abraham Reference Abraham and Dondeyne1972). The Treaty of Rome project, with its goals of free movement of goods, services, capital, and people (in which tariffs and quotas would be abolished) had a strong free-market flavor. However, there were also “flanking” policies (agriculture, co-ordination of macro policies). The beginnings of a common market in the 1960s coincided with a period of strong economic growth (both in Belgium and in Italy).Footnote 27 So, free-market economists and Keynesians found one another in a “holy alliance,” around the ideas of economic growth and European integration, leaving opportunities for both free-market solutions and catalyzing government policies.
V. A STRONG “FUNDAMENTALIST” SCHOOL IN ITALY, A STRONG POSITION FOR “DISEQUILIBRIUM” KEYNESIANISM IN BELGIUM
In Italy, the fundamentalist wing of Keynesian economics became quite influential, at least in comparison with most other countries. It fit with the more left-wing leaning of Italian society. Examples are the strong position of the Communist Party (around thirty percent of the Italian vote in the 1950s and 1960s) and strong Marxian influences in the economics profession (Porta Reference Porta and Coats1997). This came clearly to the fore with the “hot autumn of 1969”: the events of May 1968 marked the social and political climate in Italy, and more so than in other countries. The events in Italy were not only more extensive and pervasive (for example, terrorism with the Red Brigades), but also lasted much longer (Allum Reference Allum and McCarthy2000, p. 27).
The Italian Left had sympathy for Keynes, as he showed the inherent weakness of capitalism and the irresistible tendency towards a planned economy. But the Italian communists did not espouse Keynes. They did not feel the need to enrich their cultural endowment of Marxian origin with elements of Keynesianism (Bini and Magliulo Reference Bini, Magliulo, Pasinetti and Schefold1999). In an article published in the journal Critica Economica, Joan Robinson tried to prove that Marx and Keynes are not irreconcilable and that, together, they can strengthen the economic culture of the Left. However, Antonio Pesenti, the leading economist of the Italian Communist Party, disagreed. He replied that there is no possible compromise: Marx intended to overcome capitalism, whereas Keynes wanted to rescue it.
A special place in Italian economics is held by Piero Sraffa. Sraffa was born in 1898 and studied in Turin. He wrote an honors thesis on “Monetary Inflation in Italy During and After the War,” with Luigi Einaudi as supervisor (Newman and Panico Reference Eatwell, Panico, Eatwell, Milgate and Newman1987, p. 445). In 1921–1922, he studied at the London School of Economics, and during that time he became a friend of John Maynard Keynes. He was also a close friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Antonio Gramsci. In 1927, he was offered a lectureship in Cambridge and emigrated to the United Kingdom.Footnote 28 However, he kept good contacts in Italy and was a member of the Academia dei Lincei. Moreover, he was a frequent visitor of the Quirinale when Einaudi was president (Gigliobianco Reference Gigliobianco2006, p. 213). Given the strong position of the Left in Italian society, it is not surprising that Sraffa, especially his Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (1960), had a strong influence back home (see also Bellofiore Reference Bellofiore1986).
“Keynes dopo Sraffa” (Keynes after Sraffa) quickly became a dominant theme in Italian economics. The works of many Italian economists, a prime example being Luigi Pasinetti, can be considered as attempts to reconcile (fundamentalist) Keynesian economics with the work of Sraffa. The key idea was to place the principle of effective demand on a “production scheme,” as elaborated by Sraffa (and earlier by Smith, Ricardo, and the classical economists), while discarding the paradigm of an exchange economy, of which the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model had become the quintessence (Pasinetti Reference Pasinetti, Pasinetti and Schefold1999).
Furthermore, in Italy, issues like growth and income distribution, together with the dual nature of the Italian economy, dominated the scene. So, through the work of Luigi Pasinetti and other economists, the Cambridge equation, and more generally the message of the Cambridge School, came to be very lively and influential in the country. In particular, the link between income distribution and savings, as established by the Cambridge School, came to play a central role in many discussions on economic growth in Italy.
From the early 1960s in Belgium, like in Italy, a new generation of economics professors came to the fore. Most of them had studied in the United States, which gave these young professors an incentive to explore the international academic scene. So, in the course of the 1960s, Dupriez’s influence on the francophone economics department of Leuven/Louvain University declined rapidly, while Keynesianism, in its different varieties, blossomed. Even “fundamentalist Keynesianism,” and other types of left-wing economics, acquired a certain popularity, especially after the events of May 1968.
From the late 1960s to the 1990s, Jacques Drèze was undoubtedly the dominant figure in Belgian economics (Maes and Buyst Reference Maes and Buyst2005). After graduate studies in the U.S., he started teaching at the University of Leuven/Louvain in 1958, but at the same time, he continued lecturing in the U.S. On the theoretical front, his contributions to “disequilibrium Keynesianism” were highly influential in Europe. In 1966, he set up the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, or CORE, together with some Flemish and French-speaking colleagues. The University of Brussels joined the initiative somewhat later.Footnote 29
CORE immediately took an explicit international course. For Drèze CORE was also an opportunity to attract American economists to Leuven. As he had noticed in the early 1960s when he was Ford Foundation Professor at the University of Chicago, many American economists wanted to go to Europe, but there was no research center with the appropriate facilities. Moreover, there was a lack of fellowships. CORE decided then to create two fellowships instead of two posts of assistants, which would be open for anyone in the world. It enabled CORE to welcome economists like Merton Miller, a subsequent Nobel Prize winner, and Jack Hirshleifer as fellows.
In 1968, CORE received a big impetus when Drèze succeeded in obtaining an important grant from the Ford Foundation. Moreover, this grant was matched by the university, which provided CORE with new buildings and six professor positions (three Flemish and three francophone). In subsequent years, CORE became the first economics research institute on the European continent where science was set up as a business enterprise.
CORE developed a broad spectrum of scientific activities, comprising econometrics, operations research, mathematical programming, game theory, and mathematical economics. Researchers at CORE made important contributions in the field of mathematical economics and game theory, especially to the theory of equilibria of a large economy. Arrow and Hahn (Reference Arrow and Hahn1971) refer in this respect to a “Belgian school.” Later, attention shifted to price rigidities, and “the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics” was for some time a big theme (Hildenbrand Reference Hildenbrand, Cornet and Tulkens1989). Applied general equilibrium modeling received a boost by the blending of the University of Brussels’ strength in econometric models with CORE’s expertise in general equilibrium theory.
In Belgium, CORE has been criticized for being too “academic” and “international” and not producing concrete practical studies on Wallonia. However, Drèze also investigated actual economic problems, especially unemployment. He put them in a theoretical framework, very much in line with “disequilibrium Keynesianism,” as comes clearly to the fore in his presidential address to the European Economic Association: “Underemployment Equilibria: From Theory to Econometrics and Policy” (Drèze Reference Drèze1987). As with so many Belgian economists, much of his policy work has to be put in a European context. So Drèze was a member, and later chairman, of the Macroeconomic Policy Group of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).
It is further interesting to note that the basic macroeconomic paradigms with regard to exchange rate policy were rather different in Belgium and Italy (Maes and Quaglia Reference Maes and Quaglia2003). In Belgium in the post-war period, the small open economy framework dominated economic thought and policy-making. There was, both among policy-makers and academics, a broad consensus on a policy of a stable exchange rate.Footnote 30 The exchange rate was furthermore an important element to instill discipline on the economy. In Italy, especially from the end of the 1960s, Anglo-Saxon ideas, which regarded the exchange rate as an instrument of economic adjustment, were running high.Footnote 31 The Banca d’Italia, in its Annual Report presented in May 1969, implicitly criticized the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates by discussing a “crawling peg” system.Footnote 32 So, in Italy economists tended to regard the exchange rate more as an instrument of economic adjustment. This was the case both for neo-Ricardian and neo-Marxian tendencies, influential among academic economists for the “neo-classical” tradition, which was strongest in the North, especially at Bocconi in Milan, and at the Banca d’Italia.
VI. CONCLUSION
Understanding the factors that determine the dissemination of economic ideas, both in the academic world and in policy-making, is an important objective in the study of the history of economic thought. This paper presents a case study of the spread of Keynesian economics in the postwar period, focusing on two continental European countries: Belgium and Italy.
There were very important similarities between the two countries: (1) a strong position of (the Austrian variant of) neoclassical economics, which slowed down the penetration of Keynesian ideas; (2) international organizations, especially the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, played an important role in the breakthrough of “hydraulic” Keynesianism; (3) the rise of Keynesianism, especially among economists who were concerned with the poorer parts of the countries, showed a link between government intervention and a concern for regional imbalances. Moreover, the same people, who were concerned about regional imbalances, were often involved in setting up the national accounts (a key element of hydraulic Keynesianism). The most important difference was that Belgium was largely in the mainstream of Keynesian economics, while in Italy “fundamentalist” Keynesianism was much stronger, especially in the academic community.
Belgium and Italy were two countries where Keynesian economics gained ground only relatively late. The breakthrough came in areas which were more closely related to the policy-making process: correcting regional imbalances, setting up national income accounts, and building macroeconomic models. In both countries, the creation of the European Economic Community provided a common project for free-market economists and Keynesians. It led to a “holy alliance” around the ideas of European integration and economic growth. This was cemented by the strong economic performance of both countries in the 1960s.
The study further shows that there were more similarities between economists who were involved in the policy-making process than between those in the academic world. A reason is probably that economists involved in policy-making were more focused on understanding the “real” world. This fitted in with hydraulic Keynesianism, with its focus on national income accounts and econometric model-building. Moreover, there were quite frequent contacts among economists in the policy-making process, especially through the OEEC. In the academic world the development of Keynesian economics was quite different. While Belgium was mainly in the mainstream of Keynesian economics, in Italy fundamentalist Keynesianism was much more influential. So, the developments in academic economics were more in line with the general orientation of society (more to the left in Italy). The international academic contacts also were quite different: in Belgium they were stronger with the U.S., while in Italy links with Cambridge UK were more influential.
