Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2004
My task is to provide some critical commentary on the preceding essays. My unfortunate conclusion will be that the issues that are their primary focus are more likely to become more ethically intractable over the next several years as medicine progresses. I do not see any easy or obvious way to avoid this conclusion.
My task is to provide some critical commentary on the preceding essays. My unfortunate conclusion will be that the issues that are their primary focus are more likely to become more ethically intractable over the next several years as medicine progresses. I do not see any easy or obvious way to avoid this conclusion.
Let me briefly recapitulate what I see as the core of the ethical problem. First, we have the medical capacity to save the lives of children who, in the relatively recent past, would otherwise have died. The “we” in this case is ethically complex. It includes physicians, society at large, and the parents of these children. Second, to achieve our objective of saving these lives, we need to harvest bone marrow or a kidney (or some other vital material) from another child in the family, which means exposing that child to some level of medical risk for no clear benefit to himself. Third, if that child were a mature adolescent capable of freely consenting to this needed donation, then our ethical problem would dissolve. But the focus of our ethical attention is on cases where the children are either incapable or marginally capable of giving free and informed consent to assume the risks associated with the necessary surgery and the removal of vital material from them. For the sake of concreteness, I will have in mind children ages 10 years and younger.
Fourth, we (social policymakers) usually trust parents to make appropriate decisions regarding the medical care of their children; and we see physicians as a sufficient check on any risk that parents might be motivated to make ethically questionable decisions regarding their children's medical care. This system probably works well enough to protect, for example, terminally ill children from desperate and misguided efforts by parents to enroll their children in clinical trials that promise substantial suffering and only a very remote chance of meaningful life prolongation. Fifth, however, the countervailing ethical considerations and professional safeguards in experimental medicine are not available in the clinical circumstances that constitute our problem. More specifically, the medical interventions themselves (kidney removal and transplant, or bone marrow harvesting) are part of standard medical practice with well-defined and reasonable risk/benefit profiles. In other words, given that a child's life is often at stake, and given that the medical interventions are only minimally risky to the child from whom an organ or bone marrow will be taken, there is enormous ethical and psychological pressure to permit such interventions—for the parents, for physicians, and for society.
But, sixth, we recall that the child who is expected to be the “donor” may not have the capacity to give free and informed consent for what is essentially the sacrifice that is being expected of them. It appears, therefore, that the Kantian principle of Respect for Persons is being violated—that this child is being used as a “mere means” to achieve what would otherwise be the perfectly moral goal of saving the life of another member of the family. Still, there appears to be a strong bias in favor of permitting such “donations.” Finally, this bias appears to be so strong that the primary moral challenge is to construct a moral justification for what many believe intuitively is a morally permissible course of action. What should that moral justification look like?
As most of the preceding articles note, appeal to the best interests of the nonconsenting donor child is morally specious at best. Although the risks associated with these interventions may be no more than minimal to moderate for the donor, the benefits that are supposed to be the substance of the best interests of that donor child appear speculative and contrived for the most part. An appeal to forced altruism is no more promising as a moral justification. If anything, it looks like an oxymoron. What does it mean to be “altruistic” in that morally honorific sense when one is forced to so act by more powerful individuals?
Jansen calls our attention to an intrafamilial principle as a possible source of moral justification for these donations.1
Jansen LA. Child organ donation, family autonomy, and intimate attachments. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2004;13(2):133–42.
Perhaps we are inclined to see parents as having a fiduciary relationship to their children, and parents want to appeal to their conception of their fiduciary duties to justify their approval of bone-marrow or organ donation from one sibling to another. However, that seems obviously to be a nonstarter from a moral point of view because the situation involves an inherent conflict of interest. It is not obvious that the parents can fairly represent and protect the interests of the donor sibling if their strong primary motivation is to do everything possible to save the life of the sibling at risk. Moreover, as Jansen observes, there is always the possibility that parents will disagree as to whether the donation ought to occur. This would represent an important incoherence with respect to the intrafamilial principle. Which parent should be regarded as best appreciating what this overall “family good” value would permit or require with respect to this donation in these particular circumstances? The intrafamilial principle offers no guidance for answering this question.
Jansen offers as a better alternative for addressing these issues an “intimate attachment principle” for determining the ethical permissibility of child organ donation. In brief, this principle requires that there exist an intimate attachment between the child donor and recipient. Jansen sees this principle as being more expansive and more ethically on target than the intrafamilial principle. It is more expansive because it would permit, say, an 8-year-old to donate bone marrow or a kidney to their very best friend, whose life might be at risk due to some medical condition. That person is outside the family, but it seems they are clearly within a circle of moral significance. Further, it seems there is a strong, relevant, and untainted moral motivation for the donation. So, Jansen wants to allow for donation in such a case. However, I see some potential for significant problems with this analysis as well. Consider the following three scenarios.
First, imagine that this 8-year-old very much wants to make the donation because they have this strong bond of attachment to this friend. Would the parents of the child have the moral right to veto this child's effort to donate? The law may be clear on this, but my focus is on this as a moral issue in the context of this intimate attachment principle. Assume, for example, that the parents have no emotional attachments to the parents of the child needing the donation. This is part of the reason for their refusal. Further, they have “concerns” about whether their child ought to be friends with this other child. Perhaps this child belongs to another religious faith, or no religious faith, or seems a little “rough around the edges.” So, this too is part of what motivates their refusal. Should such concerns justifiably “trump” what otherwise are clearly the noble intentions of their 8-year-old child? Perhaps they believe no 8-year-old can form intimate attachments that could possibly carry so much moral weight as to override their parental judgment in this matter. If this argument is made, however, then it risks undercutting the utility of this principle for donations within the family as well. In other words, we are really saying that it is the will of the parents that should really count, morally speaking.
A second scenario would be one in which we have 6- and 8-year-old brothers who have just never been able to get along. They rarely display anything that could be described as care and concern about one another. But the 6-year-old needs a kidney transplant, and his brother is the best match. The 8-year-old sees this as an opportunity to be rid of this pest in his life. There is obviously nothing mature or morally commendable about this motivation. Still, those are the psychological facts. The parents want the donation to occur anyway. They know there is no guarantee that these two brothers will come to love and respect one another. But they are genuinely concerned that the brothers' behavior now reflects youthful immaturity, that this older child might well find 10 years in the future that he had made a horrid and irreversible mistake that could leave him with a painful lifelong psychological scar. Would the intimate attachment principle be sufficient to override this good-faith parental judgment and justifiably veto a parentally required organ donation? If so, is this an outcome that we should judge to be ethically correct in this case? Alternatively, how should the intimate attachment principle be interpreted in a case such as this? That is, should we say that an intimate attachment exists just because the two are brothers, even if, as a practical matter, they have never had brotherly feelings toward one another? If we were to do this, however, would we not have lapsed back into the intrafamilial principle?
Let me add one additional wrinkle to this scenario. The parents are sufficiently realistic to know that physicians would be extremely reluctant to perform this surgery in the face of overt refusal by this child to donate his kidney. So, the parents offer the 8-year-old $10,000 to elicit his consent. This is money he can use for a dream vacation to Disneyland or for an expensive bike or other such desired goods. This does, in fact, elicit assent from him. From the perspective of the intimate attachment principle, nothing changes. This child is no more attached to his brother in any morally meaningful sense now than before taking this offer. So, it would seem that the intimate attachment principle would veto this donation. Is this the morally correct answer in this case? That is, would the parents be open to justified moral criticism for going forward with the donation process using this means in these circumstances?
Here is the third scenario. Though we would ordinarily expect that brothers would be better matches for one another than any outsider, that in fact is not the case here. So, the parents opt to do a sort of trade. They find another couple in the same bind as themselves; they need a well-matched kidney for transplantation. In both families, the brothers are strongly and genuinely attached to one another. But for each family to accomplish its goals, one of the brothers must donate a kidney to the brother in the other family, who is almost a complete stranger. In other words, there are no intimate bonds between the organ donor and the organ recipient. But this is a necessary means to achieving the objective where there are intimate bonds. Does the intimate attachment principle justify this sort of trade? Or would this be an unwarranted distortion of the principle?2
Okie S. Organ exchanges push boundaries: new tactics to attract living donors raise issues of ethics and altruism. Washington Post 2001 Jun 9:A1. I concede that there is nothing intrinsically morally objectionable about these sorts of organ exchanges. But it is close to some moral edge, because many more people will find themselves in the awkward psychological position of being a “compatible donor” for someone in their family with kidney or liver failure. This is because there will be someone “out there” for whom they would be a good match, which will then result in their loved one having rapid access to the next compatible available organ. To illustrate the moral and psychological awkwardness, imagine a family of five siblings. None of them are compatible organ donors for a sibling with failed kidneys or a diseased liver. But they are all “potential donors” for someone on that transplant list. Who should be called on to “freely consent” to be the “actual donor” in such circumstances? Now imagine that these are five children under 10 years of age. Could a parent be morally justified in selecting one of these children to be the actual donor in one of these exchange arrangements when they themselves are just as much a “potential donor” as that child? Is there any moral principle that would justify such an arrangement?
My goal in offering these critical comments is not to conclude that Jansen's intimate attachment principle is ethically inadequate and ought to be rejected. On the contrary, it is to be preferred to the intrafamilial principle for the reasons she gives. However, my larger critical point is that advances in transplant technology are straining all of the ethical resources we would hope to bring to bear to address these issues. To illustrate, my working assumption is that our central question has been whether it is ethically permissible for parents to allow one of their children to be an organ donor or bone marrow donor for another of their children. I take it as an implication of framing the question in this way that, if such choices are ethically permissible (in general), then it would also be ethically permissible for parents to refuse to take advantage of this medical option, even if such refusal resulted in the premature death of one of their children.
I am not at all confident, however, that any of the authors in this issue would embrace such a conclusion. As noted already, there is in fact strong moral and psychological pressure to endorse such donations, so much so that it might not be unfair to say that there is a presumptive duty for parents to permit such donations unless they could offer some compelling moral reason or excuse for not doing so. To be clear, I am not endorsing this point. I offer it only as a phenomenological moral observation. My suspicion is that we have in this context a morally problematic dynamic that is akin to what is occurring more broadly in the field of transplantation as a whole.
I discussed that morally problematic dynamic in earlier work.3
Fleck LM. Multi-organ procurement for transplantation: ethical and religious issues. In: Higgens RSD, Sanchez J, Lorber M, Baldwin J, eds. The Multi-Organ Donor. Oxford: Blackwell; 1997:59–80.
My conclusion in that earlier essay, and here as well, is that none of these proposals for achieving these larger moral goals (more transplantable organs to save more lives, or permitting organ donation between children in a family) are inherently or obviously morally objectionable. But they are morally destabilizing in a morally dangerous sense. Because we have an obviously good moral goal in mind, we are tempted to cut moral corners to achieve that goal—for example, by “adjusting” our definition of brain death or by “adjusting” what should count as free and informed consent for organ donation by children. Such adjusting or reequilibrating of competing moral considerations is a necessary and normal part of social moral change. It needs to be done in a careful and self-critical manner. My comments are intended to suggest that this has not been successfully accomplished in the matter of organ donation among very young children within a family. Until that more critical social conversation has occurred, we ought to be more cautious in permitting at least some types of organ donations that involve children as the donors of those organs.