Thomas Paine has been the subject of growing scholarly and popular interest in recent years. However, much of the scholarship on this Anglo-American thinker has tended to focus on the dramatic (and sometimes bizarre) details of his biography, limiting his unique contributions to the history of political thought to the introduction of a demotic writing style that rendered ideas first formulated by others accessible to the masses. In his outstanding study of Paine's reflections on moral, political, economic, international, and religious matters, Robert Lamb sets out to demonstrate both the continued relevance and the philosophical coherence of this underrated eighteenth-century thinker. Contrary to those who contend that Paine's best-known ideas are largely derivative popularizations of Enlightenment thought, Thomas Paine and the Idea of Human Rights advances a compelling argument that Paine deserves to be recognized for developing an original theory of human rights that has profoundly shaped modern understandings. It is well known that this self-professed citizen of the world addressed many of his most important works to individuals and peoples across national borders, but Lamb makes the case that Paine also spoke across time by tackling problems of enduring moral and political import in innovative ways that still merit our attention.
Simultaneously dispensing with accusations of anachronism that might be hurled by adherents of the Cambridge School approach and disputing attempts by contemporary libertarians to conscript Paine into their battles against big government, Lamb urges readers to see Paine as a radical and visionary thinker who has much to tell us about the scope and content of human rights, the bases of legitimacy in politics, and justice across national boundaries. This is not to say that Lamb ignores the historical or intellectual context of Paine's political theory. He takes great pains to distinguish Paine's thinking on natural rights, political obligation, and other significant political topics from intellectual predecessors and contemporaries such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, Rousseau, and Burke. And in arguing for the relevance of Paine's thought in contemporary debates over women's rights, humanitarian intervention, and other significant issues in domestic and global politics, Lamb deftly engages with a broad array of contemporary scholarship in law, philosophy, and international relations to explain where Paine's contributions fit.
Although the book locates Paine squarely within the liberal political tradition, Lamb demonstrates that he developed a radically egalitarian brand of liberalism grounded in the natural rights of individuals. Central to the argument is a distinction between rights-based and duty-based theories of natural rights. In contrast to Locke's duty-based theory of natural rights (which revolves around what individuals owe to God), Paine's natural rights theory is distinctly rights based (though exactly what this means it not spelled out with the same degree of precision and thoroughness brought to bear on other discussions). Paine's political theory can also be opposed to goal-based theories, which tend to treat rights as “only contingently, and always only instrumentally, important” (29). It is this particular conception of natural rights that undergirds all of Paine's political thought, Lamb contends, from his fervent support for social and economic justice and his equally vehement opposition to hereditary claims to rule, to his full-throated defense of democratic self-government and his support for a national right to self-determination. Extrapolating from Paine's insistence on the priority of the rights of the living over any claims that could be made on behalf of the dead, Lamb suggests that Paine's theory entails the recognition of new rights, including the right of future generations to a clean and sustainable environment.
Despite Lamb's claims about the originality of Paine's political theory, few of the revolutionary's ideas on consent-based systems of representative government seem to break any new ground. However, one important exception to Paine's otherwise standard treatment of representative government is the role he assigns to “publicity” as a condition of legitimacy—and as a justification for more robust expressions of dissent than Kant might have allowed.
Lamb makes his most powerful case for Paine's originality in an excellent discussion of the radical's reflections on economic rights and justice. The chapter on property and welfare offers a balanced and nuanced account of Paine's writings on ownership, economic inequality, and the government's role in rectifying economic wrongs. Focusing primarily on Paine's underappreciated pamphlet Agrarian Justice (unfortunately devoting less attention to the far more extensive treatment of the welfare state in Rights of Man), Lamb demonstrates that Paine's call for “a significant redistribution of resources” (113) actually follows from and is consistent with his justification of an individual right to exclusive ownership of property ultimately derived from the “creative” rather than the “value”-adding quality of labor. The foundational role Paine assigns to rights helps explain his insistence that government-run policies that would provide old-age benefits, aid to the blind and disabled, public housing for the poor, and other forms of public assistance are not instances of charity but are required as a matter of “justice.” According to Lamb, Paine established “a human right to welfare” grounded in a view of the natural rights central to the rest of his political thought. For instance, the direct transfer payments to all adults described in Agrarian Justice would compensate individuals for the loss of their birthright to an equal share of the earth. As Lamb explains, Paine's case for redistribution is not guided by any ideal “pattern” of ownership, but is meant to provide individuals an indemnity for the loss of “the original right to natural [landed] property” resulting from the establishment of private property rights. Going beyond previous accounts of Paine's theory of economic justice, Lamb contends that some features of Paine's welfare state are justified by a third form of property (besides “natural” property in an equal share of the earth's resources and “artificial” property created by one's own labor). There is also a form of “inherited artificial property” that exists only as a result of social development—and generates a “social debt” that individuals owe to society (142). This, contends Lamb, is what justifies certain forms of (progressive) taxation championed by Paine.
Of course, the welfare program that Paine outlines would be administered at the national level by sovereign states. At first glance, any robust defense of the nation-state is hard to square with a commitment to cosmopolitan principles. However, Lamb argues that the natural rights of individuals ground both Paine's commitment to universalistic values and his defense of national sovereignty. The key to reconciling these seemingly incompatible ideals resides in Paine's understanding of consent as the basis for legitimacy. Even if a world state secured the universal and equal rights of individuals, Paine would have rejected it because “a regime of global governance” would deprive individuals of “the right to withdraw consent” (169). It is on the basis of this right to give and withhold consent that Paine's theory supports the “free movement of individuals” across national borders.
The final chapter takes up the subject of religion in Paine's life and thought. Despite the secular orientation of Paine's political thought, Lamb maintains that a religious, particularly Deistic, sensibility informed his thinking across a range of topics, including, most significantly, “his commitment to human equality” (185). But whether Paine actually arrived at his religious ideas by way of his politics or vice versa, there is no question that his egalitarian vision still challenges us to rethink and remake our political systems and policies at both the national and international levels.
