Introduction
The year 2012 was eventful for the Falkland Islands and UK–Argentine relations more generally (see Dodds Reference Dodds2012). In the midst of the 30th anniversary of the South Atlantic conflict, Gavin Short, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) in the Falkland Islands, announced that the Falkland Islands government intended to host a referendum on the political future of the islands. Warming to his theme, and writing in the Guardian newspaper, Short explained the rationale behind the decision to host a referendum:
For Falkland Islanders, this gives the opportunity for our voice to be heard loud and clear in the face of an Argentinian administration that deliberately ignores our existence and our rights. We are holding this referendum not because we have any doubts about who we are and what future we want, but to show the world just how very certain we are about it. . .We hope that this referendum will send a clear signal – not just to Argentina but to other members of the international community – that the attempts by Argentina's president, Cristina Kirchner to bully and harangue these islands are unacceptable in a region that values democracy and human rights. Argentina's efforts to damage our livelihoods through a policy of illegal and counter-productive blockades are unacceptable. Such crass efforts to railroad the Falkland Islanders, and the British government that stands beside us, are doomed to fail (The Guardian (London) 13 June 2012).
The announcement was timed to coincide with a visit by the Foreign Office junior minister, Jeremy Brown, who turned down an invitation to meet with the Argentine foreign minister, Hector Timmerman in Buenos Aires. Earlier in the month, Brown criticised the Argentine President, Cristina Kirchner for her ‘domineering behaviour’ with regard to the Islanders and the machinations of the UN Decolonization Committee (Daily Telegraph London) 7 June 2012).
This note briefly reviews the background to the referendum and considers its organisation and eventual result, which was announced to the world's media on the evening of the 11 March from Stanley's town hall. While the result was not considered surprising, the longer-term significance of the referendum is deserving of some attention and this forms the concluding part of the note itself. We take the view that the referendum is highly significant, less because of the electoral result than because of the manner in which this event will be used in the future to promote and mobilise the ‘wishes’ of the Falkland Islands community to the wider world.
Background to referendum
As Short intimated, worsening UK-Argentine relations profoundly shaped the background to the referendum. The Falkland Islands Government (FIG) believed that Argentina was becoming increasingly hostile and committed to an active policy of not recognising the existence of the Islands’ community in any capacity whatsoever. Such an assessment lay in stark contrast with the late 1990s when two Falkland Islands councillors witnessed the signature of the joint statement of 14 July 1999 between Argentina and the UK. The presidency of Carlos Menem was arguably more co-operative in spirit even if the 1994 constitution committed his administration and others that followed to the ‘recovery’ of the Falkland Islands. Since 2001–2002, however, UK-Argentine relations deteriorated and markedly so following the elections of Nestor Kirchner (2003–2007) and later his wife Cristina Kirchner (2007present). Under the Kirchner administrations, there has been a markedly more assertive approach towards the UK and the Falklands, including intense international lobbying, the deployment of fiery rhetoric and continuing attempts to disrupt the Falklands economy in key sectors such as communications, shipping, tourism, fishing and oil/gas exploration and exploitation.
In 2012, President Kirchner, in the run-up to the 30th anniversary of the conflict, castigated the UK government for ‘militarizing the South Atlantic’ and lobbied the UN more intently in response to news that oil and gas exploration was showing no signs of abating (for a review, Dodds Reference Dodds2012). The UK coalition government, in response, has arguably been the most robust on sovereignty matters since the Thatcher administration (1979–1990). The UK prime minister, David Cameron, accused the Argentine government in January 2012 of ‘colonial’ behaviour and reinforced a commitment to support the ‘wishes’ of the Falklands community. Moreover, the foreign secretary, William Hague, in his Canning House Lecture of 2010 committed the government to enhancing its diplomatic presence in Latin America mindful of the need for the UK to maintain cordial relations with neighbours such as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. One striking element in this enhancement strategy has been the increasingly active promotion of the Falklands community, via both traditional and digital diplomatic means, by the UK's Latin American embassies.
The FIG has also been increasingly active in promoting its own ‘wishes’ and interests to the wider international community. Recent strategies have included the sponsorship of fact-finding visits to the islands by politicians and journalists, and the development of online and paper-based resources explaining the islands’ history and community. The announcement of the referendum in June 2012 was designed to capitalize on interest in the Islands on the 30th anniversary of the 1982 conflict, while, at the same time, being driven by a determination to counter-act Argentina's efforts to frame the dispute as bilateral, involving only the UK and Argentina. Unsurprisingly, Argentina was swift to denounce the announcement of the referendum, and rejected the notion that the ‘implanted population’ of the Falkland Islands were able or entitled to self-determine their future.
In a highly publicised encounter between Cameron and Kirchner during the G20 meeting in Mexico (June 2012), the prime minister refused to accept a package from the president marked ‘UN Malvinas’. Cameron was reported as saying at the time, ‘I am not proposing a full discussion now on the Falklands, but I hope you noted they are holding a referendum and you should respect their views. We believe in self-determination and act as democrats here in the G20’ (The Guardian (London) 20 June 2012). What emerged from this encounter is that the UK was critical of Argentina's reluctance to respect the ‘legitimacy’ of the referendum while Argentina was incensed that the UK were not prepared to discuss ‘sovereignty’ over the Islands. It was later reported that Kirchner refused an invitation from the Falkland Islands government to meet and speak with a delegation of Islanders.
From November 2012 onwards, Argentina elevated its policy of challenging the legitimacy of the Falkland Islands referendum (Mercopress 2012). Argentine diplomats were dispatched around the world in an effort to dissuade other governments, especially in the global south, from officially supporting or acknowledging the referendum process. One area of particular concern to Argentina was the disruption of the FIG's plan for an international team of official referendum observers. A second part of the anti-referendum strategy was to ensure that the Argentine ambassador to the UK, Alicia Castro, highlighted the supposed ‘illegitimacy’ of the referendum at every opportunity. In February 2013, the Argentine foreign minister Hector Timerman on a visit to London refused to meet William Hague in the Foreign Office after being informed that two MLAs (Members of the Falkland Islands Legislative Assembly) would be present. Timerman went on to note that, in his opinion, Falkland Islanders ‘do not exist’, which provoked the UK Foreign Office minister Hugo Swire to tweet a somewhat acerbic corrective in which he pointed out that he had just met three of them.
Ultimately, Argentina's anti-referendum strategy did not disrupt the referendum process and failed to prevent the work of an international observation mission. No other country denounced the referendum bar some words of support for the Argentine position from Bolivia and Venezuela, and there is no evidence that any other country joined Argentina in actively seeking to disrupt or undermine the March 2013 referendum.
The referendum
The decision to hold a referendum was taken by the FIG in June 2012, and there immediately followed a period of public consultation and logistical planning. In October 2012, for example, the FIG issued a public consultation document on the proposed referendum question, which was later agreed to be the following: Do you wish the Falkland Islands to retain their current political status as an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom? The referendum question was formally adopted by the Executive Council of the FIG in November 2012 after around three weeks of consultation and publicity around the islands. The FIG also released a document containing information on ‘electoral registration’, which made clear that eligible voters would be those on the electoral register, and this was followed by an official booklet detailing the rationale, the question, the UK and Argentine positions on the Islands, and what either a YES or a NO vote might mean for the islands (FIG 2012). For example, the booklet explained that a NO vote might entail, ‘. . .further consultation and preparatory work leading to a further referendum on alternative options’. Under the section addressing the YES vote, it was noted that, ‘. . .the Falkland Islands [could] review its status at any time. This could include full independence in the future’. Thus, it was stressed that regardless of the eventual result, the Falkland Islands community was not shutting down its options for the future.
As accredited observers, the authors arrived a few days before the referendum dates of 10 and 11 March, and were immediately introduced to the head of the international observation mission. Funded by the Canadian government via CANADEM (Canada's Civilian Reserve), and staffed by representatives from the Americas and South Pacific, the observation mission was considered critical to the overall legitimacy of the referendum. Led by an American citizen, Brad Smith, the team explained to us their mission and the process by which voting would take place via both mobile and fixed-location polling stations. Polls opened on 10 March, and under the arrangements and rules for the referendum there were four static polling stations (Port Howard Club, Fox Bay School, Goose Green Club and Stanley Town Hall), an aeroplane-based polling station serving the remote island communities of West Falkland, and a series of mobile polling teams, in Land Rovers, operating across the islands of East and West Falkland. The mobile teams were to operate on 10 March and the authors followed Mobile Team 1 which travelled from Stanley to Johnson's Harbour stopping at various road junctions and farms en route. At the end of the day, the authors returned in time to witness a lengthy parade of vehicles carrying islanders travelling through Stanley waving flags and shouting support for the referendum.
Arrangements were put in place to address proxy voting, postal voting and the collection of votes from those residing in the hospital, the Stanley jail, and sheltered accommodation. The arrangements for 11 March were different with much of the observation being concentrated at the static polling stations but members of the international observation team still travelled along the mobile voting routes to ensure that as many people as possible had had an opportunity to vote.
The eventual result of the referendum was announced to a packed audience of local and international media and community members in Stanley Town Hall. The chief returning officer called the result at around 10.30pm local time and confirmed the following: 1518 votes cast (92% voter turnout) with 1513 votes for YES (99.8% of total vote) and 3 votes for NO (0.2%). 1 vote was unaccounted for and 1 vote was considered spoilt. Immediately after the result was confirmed, the head of the international observation mission released a formal statement in English and Spanish. The statement confirmed the following, ‘The referendum was marked by a large turn-out and a technically well executed voting process. The international observation mission's preliminary findings were released after the official announcement of the vote result’. Brad Smith told the audience that, ‘It is our finding that the Falkland Islands referendum process was free and fair, reflecting the democratic will of the voters of the Falkland Islands’ (Referendum International Observation Mission 2013). As accredited observers, we would not dissent from that judgment.
Longer-term significance
Even before the referendum result was announced, international opinion was divided on the likely significance of the process. It is also worth noting that these opinions did not straightforwardly divide along national lines. Seamus Milne writing in the UK's The Guardian newspaper, for example, was caustic on the subject and concluded that, ‘The options for compromise have been canvassed for many years, including joint sovereignty, co-administration and leaseback. A negotiated settlement is in the interests of Britain, Argentina – and the islanders. The sooner time is called on the emperor's new clothes saga of the Falklands, the better for all of us (The Guardian (London) 13 March 2013). In other words, Milne regarded the referendum as a distraction from the real business at hand; the need to confront the sovereignty dispute itself and seek some sort of resolution. This is a view strongly rejected by the current UK government and, of course, the FIG.
The referendum matters for the Falkland Islands community, and provides further evidence that the islanders have distinct ‘wishes’ and that they are able to express, in the words of Brad Smith, their ‘democratic will’. In addition to recent paper-based publications such as ‘Our Islands, Our History’, we have witnessed an upsurge in online activity from within the Falkland Islands (for example https://twitter.com/FalklandsGov) and the Islands’ international disapora (for example https://twitter.com/falkland_utd) representing and detailing the nature of the Falkland's’ community, including its multi-national and multi-ethnic qualities such as Chileans, east Asians and St Helenians.
In the week following the referendum result, Argentina sought to redress the favourable publicity for the islands’ self-determination by making contact with all current UK parliamentarians. The Argentine Embassy sent a cover letter signed by Castro suggesting that, ‘We want to make it clear that we are wholly and unconditionally committed to respecting the identity and way of life of the inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands, as we do with the 250,000 British descendants living in mainland Argentina. . .This referendum in no way changes the essence of the Malvinas Islands Question and its predictable result will not end the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom. . .What we seek is simple: a dialogue between two sovereign states’ (Castro Reference Castro2013). Enclosed with the covering letter was a booklet entitled ‘Malvinas Islands: Argentina, its rights and the need for dialogue’. Right at the end of the document, there is a map outlining the extent of the dispute involving the Falklands, South Georgia and the Antarctic Peninsula region, and alerting the reader to the fact the Falklands are some 8000 miles away from London.
Argentina may have dismissed the ‘legitimacy’ of the referendum but it has nonetheless felt it necessary to actively respond and indeed reject both the process and outcome of the event itself. Some South American commentators, moreover, have actually been rather sympathetic to the Falkland Islands referendum, including members of the international observation mission (Mercopress 2013a, 2013b).
For the UK, the referendum result will add and possibly bolster the determination of the coalition government (and its successors) to maintain both its strategic presence in the region and its political/diplomatic investment in maintaining cordial relations with Latin American neighbours. Cameron seized upon the referendum result in order to reinforce his personal determination to respect the ‘wishes’ of the Falklands community. As he concluded, ‘The Falkland Islanders couldn't have spoken more clearly. They want to remain British and that view should be respected by everybody, including by Argentina” (The Independent (London) 21 March 2013). An unlikely scenario in the case of Argentina, and the remainder of 2013 will be taken up with President Kirchner seeking to secure resolutions and statements condemning the Falkland Islands referendum.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Shackleton Scholarship Fund, Royal Holloway's Research Strategy Fund and the support of the Falkland Islands Government, which granted accredited observer status. We are most grateful to Darren Christie for his guidance while in Stanley.
