Economic crises are commonly viewed as openings for change on a grand scale. This was certainly true of the Great Depression, which ushered Keynesian economics into the mainstream, led to the emergence of the Bretton Woods system, and, specifically in the United States, brought about an extensive renegotiation of the domestic compact and unprecedented regulation of the banking and financial sectors.
This edited volume seeks to measure the corresponding changes that took place in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. As it is now common to refer to the crisis as the most destructive since the Great Depression, one might expect significant policy adjustments to have ensued. Yet the authors arrive at the opposite conclusion; the volume amounts to a description of stasis.
One after another, the contributors to The Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis examine different issue areas and country policies, yet arrive at a similar conclusion. Despite the initial jolt of the crisis, despite early shows of political resolve, authors who expected to see the United States regulate the very financial industry that many fault with causing the crisis find modest changes at most; in Europe, hindered by strong concentrated interests in London, financial regulation has been slower still (p. 85). Rating agencies, which were widely condemned for their overly cozy relations with the industry they were in charge of rating, have encountered only a weak regulatory reaction (p. 153). And while the United States might have expected hard times to lead to an expansion of the welfare state, the public debate since the crisis has been dominated, if anything, by talk of cutting back government programs, such as Medicare, that have long been taken for granted (p. 60). Scandinavian countries, in turn, have not abandoned their solidaristic welfare state policies but have reaffirmed them anew (p. 201). Similar continuity is observed in domestic Britain's policy, and even the push toward regional integration detected in China since the crisis is greatly downplayed in the chapter that examines it.
Why did the crisis not lead to the emergence of political coalitions, either internationally or within affected countries, which stood to gain from an exogenous shock of this scale? The volume's authors fall short of accounting for the surprising degree of stasis, yet this is a task that may require the benefit of greater hindsight. For now, the sheer identification of the puzzling disconnect between reactions to the Great Depression versus the global financial crisis is one worth highlighting.
The volume's analysis is split between an examination of the domestic-level effects of the crisis and its international-level consequences. The latter section appears more problematic for a number of reasons. More than one author expresses an increasingly common opinion found in the public sphere, which is to ascribe the causes of the crisis to the vague labels of neoliberalism and globalization, and thus to find fault with their exemplars: international economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this way, Richard Higgott claims that the WTO, which already faced “serious problems in maintaining its global economic institutional salience” prior to the crisis now saw its legitimacy further imperiled (p. 21). The same is advanced for the IMF, the World Bank, and “globalization” writ large. The broad conclusion drawn in this chapter is that the global financial crisis has “challenged the efficacy and legitimacy of multilateralism” (p. 28). In another, otherwise-highly-compelling chapter on debt-rating agencies, Timothy Sinclair arrives at a similar inference, whereby “it turns out that globalization is something that is unpredictable, that lurches in ways we cannot guess, and that even at the very heart of the global system can imperil great fortunes” (p. 153). Such reification of globalization is not only passé but analytically unhelpful.
More importantly, these are peculiar conclusions to draw from the events of 2008–10. Any crisis of legitimacy in global governance that may exist, which largely rests, as per the authors' claims, on the lack of inclusiveness and representativeness of international organizations, likely has little to do with either the occurrence of the global financial crisis or its immediate consequences. Would a highly representative and participatory set of multilateral economic institutions have prevented or even improved the response to the irrational exuberance that led to the collapse of the real estate market and the financial sector on both sides of the Atlantic?
If anything, the crisis brought back to the fore the very international institutions being critiqued. Far from marking their decline, the crisis has reinforced their function in the global economy. The world's lender of last resort—which had not handed out a loan in years, let alone to a developed country, and had started shedding its own workforce at the eve of the crisis—suddenly took on new meaning in late 2009, as it found itself with a long list of customers. Members agreed to more than double the IMF's resources in response, a fact that receives no attention in the book. This is not to say that the IMF does not continue to face problems of legitimacy; the point is that the crisis has only increased its global reach and its power as an institution.
Moreover, global governance may be said to have withstood its greatest test: A fact largely glossed over in the book is that one of the immediate corollaries of the Great Depression, protectionism on a global scale following the Smoot Hawley tariff, was entirely avoided this time around. Instead, the WTO and the newly formed Group of 20 served as fora in which leaders voiced calls for restraint in responding to domestic demands for protection. And these calls were heeded by member states: Not only was widespread violation of the rules avoided, but countries also exercised restraint in relying on legally allowable trade remedies, such as antidumping and safeguards. More telling still, while the WTO had been unable to pass the Doha Round prior to the crisis, it suddenly attempted to relaunch negotiations in 2009. While the goal was not met, the sheer attempt to do so by invoking the greater-than-ever need for international cooperation is telling. In many instances, multilateral institutions were able to make the case that the global crisis necessitated increased vigilance and monitoring, as well as a greater push for cooperation than had been the case during good times.
Global institutions have actually shown some adaptive flexibility in the face of hard times. One of the only chapters to identify an observable shift in policy, that by Kevin Gallagher, deals with capital controls. In an unusual twist, following on a number of widely circulated studies, the IMF reversed its long-standing position on capital controls, allowing that controls may be justified as part of a country's policy tool kit. And while Gallagher somewhat overstates the role played by the crisis in bringing about this shift of position, since findings about the empirical effects of capital controls had started proliferating prior to the crisis, there is little doubt that its occurrence precipitated the change in the IMF's position on the matter.
Finally, even the case for American market-driven ideology being discredited in the crisis, a premise that permeates much of the volume's contributions, can be quibbled with. When volatility and market uncertainty were at their highest during the crisis, the global flight to safety was toward American treasury bills. Countries continue to treat the American dollar as the world's reserve currency, as witnessed by its relative steadiness in the face of a worldwide crisis of confidence. If the global financial crisis signals the failure of the American economic model, we have yet to see the fallout.
