Haegemans' book deals with the reign of the emperor Maximinus Thrax, from his unexpected usurpation in a.d. 235 to his equally unexpected destruction at the hands of an odd pair of short-lived ‘senatorial’ emperors, Pupienus and Balbinus, in a.d. 238.
H. gives particular attention to the events of a.d. 238, and to how minor local unrest in Africa Proconsularis led to full-scale revolt in Rome and Italy. Because of the scanty and suspect (especially, the Historia Augusta) sources, this requires careful construction of a basic chronology and the resolution of numerous cruces. H. relishes the challenge, introducing new evidence, e.g. on the senatorial vigintivirate that was crucial in continuing rebellion against Maximinus after it had been suppressed in Africa (169), producing a plausible narrative, and, for example, firmly locating the formation of the vigintivirate before the acclamation of Pupienus and Balbinus (164, 171). H. also provides a massive bibliography, a considered ‘Forschungsstand’, and useful appendices on the chronology of a.d. 238 and on the divided loyalties of the provinces in this year. Her work is therefore a welcome revision of Dietz's Senatus contra principem, now thirty years old. With regard to interpretation, H. stresses the importance of patronage in spreading the revolt from Rome to the provinces in a.d. 238 (e.g. 34, 182–5, 191) and how important in Maximinus' fall was the Senate's control of the Italian ports, which hamstrung his access to supplies and his means of influencing the wider empire (e.g. 200, 209, 248–9).
However, H.'s book is not always a comfortable or convincing read. Her English is marred by a succession of irritating slips (e.g. 7: ‘behavings’ for ‘behaviour’; 129: ‘devaluating the denarius’) and the occasional jarring non sequitur (e.g. 197: ‘According to Herodian, Maximinus set out only four days after receiving the news. If this is true he was obviously not in a hurry …’). H. is inconsistent in translating quotations in Greek and Latin, and never translates those from French, German and Italian authors, which will deter monoglot anglophone readers. She provides no key to her bibliographical abbreviations, and no index. H.'s inclination is to attempt to cover all lines of approach and all types of evidence, even if this does not (as at 89–91, on Maximinus' non-military coin-legends) lead very far. She devotes excessive space (e.g. 69–73) to pondering the significance of Maximinus' milestones, the relative frequency of which probably results more from the contemporary ‘epigraphic habit’ than from any discrete historical phenomena. Like many others she cannot resist citing, only then to dismiss as unreliable, the ‘evidence’ of the wretched Historia Augusta (e.g. 88, 230; cf. my remarks in JRS 100 (2010), at 343). And she is historically rather narrow. She offers little consideration of what the preceding and succeeding regimes (of Severus Alexander and Gordian III, respectively) tell us about that of Maximinus. Though she establishes a very strong revisionist case for Maximinus — that he was hardly the monster described by the sources and maintained the fundamental policies and the personnel of the Severan administration — to the end (245, cf. 49) she never entirely rejects the sources' depiction of him as uncouth, and uses this to help explain his fall.
Her overall conclusion is that, though Maximinus Thrax was the first ‘soldier-emperor’, his reign was not the sudden beginning of the end of the High Roman Empire but part of a continuum of socio-economic, political and military change that began in the later second century and was to culminate, after Maximinus' time, in the third-century ‘Crisis’. This is an acceptable generalization, but H. asserts it more than proves it, saying little that is new and, indeed, taking much (see 4–5) from de Blois. Central to any understanding of Maximinus are his Germanic wars. These, H. declares (59), began with campaigns against the Alamanni. However, her treatment of the Alamanni does not take into account the huge amount of research, archaeological and historical, on the early Germani that has taken place over the last half-century. H., rightly, asks (208) whether Maximinus was a good general and, so, an authentic ‘soldier-emperor’. From start to finish, she has no doubt that he was (48–9, 56, 240–1) but, as she realizes, this makes it difficult to explain his defeat at the hands of relative amateurs. This raises the question as to whether Maximinus was really the great warrior that the sources make out, which returns us to the Germani. Some, including me, have recently doubted that these ever posed any great threat to Rome. If not, Maximinus' northern campaigns, which fatally kept him away from Italy, may have been of his own choosing, not the result of strategic necessity, and his Germanic victories easily won. His early army career remains a matter of conjecture and invention (52–6). When he came to power he was in charge of a reserve army, not fighting-troops. Might he, like Timesitheus to come, have been more of an administrator than a soldier, which would explain his failure to cope with a really threatening tactical situation? If so, this would strengthen the notion of continuity, and make the period from the accession of Septimius Severus to the death of Gordian III (a.d. 193–244) a long Severan half-century (cf. my entry in CAH 122 (2005), at 60).
