How will China behave as an Arctic actor in 2050? China has gained prominence as an Arctic actor during the past decades, from its first permanent research representation in Svalbard in 2004 to observer status in 2013 to its self-identification as a “near-Arctic State” in 2018.
Climate change is a key Arctic concern for China: “The natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s climate system and ecological environment” (State Council, 2018). However, China is not an Arctic state. We therefore analyse China’s Arctic future through the lens of China’s future trajectory in international politics. We use scenario analysis to identify these trajectories and analyse what they could mean for China as an Arctic actor. Scenario analysis helps us with “confronting uncertainty and preparing for the unexpected” (Sus & Hadeed, Reference Sus and Hadeed2020: p. 434). It is intended to offer a glimpse into potential future trajectories–and the narratives that can explain the path to those trajectories.
We use three scenarios: “Triumphant China,” entailing global hegemony; “Ascendant China,” entailing status quo maintenance; and “Stagnant China,” entailing stagnation of Chinese economic power and global political influence (Scobell et al., Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020: pp. 103–109).
The article is structured as follows: First, we describe our use of scenario analysis methodology and the scenarios for China that we use in this article. This is followed by an analysis of China’s relations with Russia and the US, which impact China in the Arctic. Then, we briefly outline key aspects of climate change and security in the Arctic. Thereafter, we analyse China’s Arctic White Paper, its climate policy and Arctic interests, and the impacts of climate change on these interests. Finally, we offer some brief concluding remarks.
Scenario analysis
Scenario analyses help account for and reduce uncertainty by considering several possible futures and preparing for the unexpected (Sus & Hadeed, Reference Sus and Hadeed2020, p. 434). This method allows us to assess “the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur” (Junio & Mahnken, Reference Junio and Mahnken2013, pp. 374–375).
A scenario constitutes “a description of a possible future situation, including the path of development leading to that situation” (Kosow & Gaßner, Reference Kosow and Gaßner2008, p. 1). It must satisfy three key conditions. First, it must be plausible, built on logical causal relationships. Second, it must be consistent, meaning scenarios must not be based on mutually exclusive assumptions. Third, it must be relevant and useful (Johansen, Reference Johansen2018, p. 117; van der Heijden, Reference van der Heijden2005, p. 225). Further, it must be comprehensible, traceable, distinct, and transparent (Kosow & Gaßner, Reference Kosow and Gaßner2008).
We rely on Chinese scenarios by Scobell et al., (Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020), labelled “Triumphant China,” “Ascendant China,” “Stagnant China,” and “Imploding China.” They represent Chinese global hegemony, Chinese great power status (status quo), Chinese economic stagnation, and regime instability, respectively. The authors present “a small number of scenarios whose features encompass a wide range of strategic outcomes,” the likelihood of which is assessed as probable, possible, or unlikely (Scobell et al., Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020, pp. 102–103). The scenarios look to 2050, almost 25 years ahead of this article. Approximately 20 years is a common time horizon in scenario analyses (Cordova-Pozo & Rouwette, Reference Cordova-Pozo and Rouwette2023, p. 8), and 2050 is common for climate projections (e.g. IPCC, 2023). 2050 is also near the symbolic date of 1 October 2049, the centenary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Scobell et al., (Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020, pp. 104–109) analyse four elements in their scenarios: overall forecast of China’s development and goal attainment, domestic and foreign conditions required, impact on China’s global influence, and US implications. These scenarios are well-developed and suited for our analysis, as they satisfy the scenario criteria described above. They are plausible, evident in their detailed descriptions of trajectories leading to the forecast outcomes. They are consistent, considering the same four elements throughout the four trajectories. They are relevant because China’s global future is a highly salient topic in discussions on Chinese grand strategy (Foot, Reference Foot and Chivvis2024; Kang, Wong, & Chan, Reference Kang, Wong and Chan2025), the Sino-American rivalry (Bowers & Tunsjø, Reference Bowers and Tunsjø2023; Lind, Reference Lind2024; Winkler, Reference Winkler2023), and China’s Arctic ambitions (e.g. Arons, Reference Arons2025; Kauppila & Kopra, Reference Kauppila and Kopra2022; Kobzeva, Reference Kobzeva2019), to name a few. And they are comprehensible, traceable, and transparent, evident in clearly cited sources. Finally, they are distinct, describing four different outcomes.
We make a minor change in our analysis of the impact of climate change through the lens of the scenarios. In Scobell et al., (Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020), there is a clear focus on US implications, which is appropriate for that report. To make our article more useful in an Arctic context, we instead focus on military implications, an under-studied aspect of China’s interests in the region. This is done in both the analysis of China’s Arctic interests and the analysis of the impact of climate change on those interests.
According to scholars (e.g. Johansen, Reference Johansen2018; van der Heijden, Reference van der Heijden2005), scenario analyses should be limited to 2–3 scenarios to communicate findings more clearly. We therefore focus on the scenarios Triumphant China, Ascendant China, and Stagnant China. We filter out Imploding China because it describes a scenario in which China would largely be unable to pursue Arctic ambitions.
These, then, are our scenarios: Triumphant China, considered by Scobell et al., (Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020) to be unlikely, describes China as the world’s largest economy, an innovation leader, and a global military power. Ascendant China, considered probable, sees many, but not all, of China’s mid-century goals achieved. Stagnant China, considered possible, entails “no clearly discernible economic growth” (Scobell et al., Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020, pp. 103–109).
Triumphant China
Forecast
In this scenario (Scobell et al., Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020, pp. 103–106), China has become the world’s largest economy, the most important innovator, and a capable military power. This follows leadership that has pursued China’s national and international strategies successfully for three decades. The scenario is considered unlikely.
Outcome
China can assert its dominance across most domains of power, except for the military domain, in the Asia-Pacific region and globally.
Domestic conditions
China has built its stability and global influence through a series of successful leadership successions: in 2022–2023, in 2032–2033, and in 2042–2043. As of August 2026, President Xi remains in power, but we do not believe this fundamentally alters the scenario. It is firmly in control of Chinese society, utilising both hard and soft power. Internal social stability has been attained, both amongst the Han Chinese, the frontier regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, and in Hong Kong. Consequently, the “China model” enjoys high regard globally. Through China’s considerable economic, diplomatic, and military power, Taiwan has been absorbed into the political system of the PRC.
Foreign conditions
Beijing has supplanted Washington, D.C., becoming the most important city in the world. Three conditions were required for this to occur. First, tensions on the Korean peninsula were resolved. North Korea agreed to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and two-thirds of its ballistic missiles in return for the complete withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. Second, China showed greater interest in the global commons, contributing to other Asia-Pacific states recognising China as the regional hegemon. Third, China increased its global engagement, working closely with others, including the US, in the United Nations (UN) system.
Implications for the US
China has been unable to surpass the military power of the US but has become the global powerhouse in all other domains of power. There is approximate parity, however, and China has established military bases in countries such as Pakistan, Tanzania, and Cambodia. While China has gained allies, the US has lost some, especially in the Indo–Pacific. However, due to the budgetary pressure and sheer size of the Chinese domestic security apparatus, China has been unable to devote the prerequisite resources to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to surpass the US.
Ascendant China
Forecast
In this scenario (Scobell et al., Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020, pp. 106–108), China has become the world’s largest economy, but it remains behind the US militarily and in terms of science and technology aims. While China is the dominant military force in the Asia-Pacific and the PLA is active outside of China’s borders, parity with the US has not been achieved. This scenario is considered probable.
Outcome
China has become the preeminent power across the Asian continent and a major power in several other regions.
Domestic conditions
China maintains social stability amongst the Han Chinese. Chinese minorities, such as in Xinjiang, are stable except for irregular bouts of regional unrest. Likewise, dissent persists in Hong Kong, and Chinese authorities have announced that the Special Administrative Region status of Hong Kong would be extended for another 50 years after 2047. Nevertheless, widespread protests do not occur.
Foreign conditions
Taiwan remains China’s primary challenge, as the island maintains its independence and diplomatic relations with several states. North Korea has ameliorated its relations with China and agreed to a multi-decadal process of denuclearisation. China has thus been accepted as the primary security guarantor of the Asia-Pacific region by all except India.
Chinese influence is considerable in Africa and the Middle East, but US influence remains dominant in the Western Hemisphere, in which China remains deferential. While China has become the strongest power in Asia, India and Indonesia have also experienced impressive economic growth, meaning China does not totally dominate the continent. China is the dominant military power in the Asia-Pacific region, and the PLA conducts activities outside of China’s immediate neighbourhood, but India and Japan have modernised their own forces, curtailing Chinese dominance.
Implications for the US
While China has become a strong regional and international actor, the US retains alliances with key regional partners like Japan and Australia. However, they remain wary of antagonising China, thus keeping their US alliances “low-key.”
Stagnant China
Forecast
In this scenario (Scobell et al., Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020, pp. 108–109), the Chinese economy stalled between 2030 and 2050, resulting in no discernible economic growth. Claims of economic growth rates of 1–2% from Chinese authorities are dismissed as incredible. Corruption remains rampant, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has retreated to focus on protecting its domestic power at all costs. This scenario is considered possible.
Outcome
China has been forced to shift its focus to the maintenance of its domestic, internal power and seeks accommodations in its own interest on the regional level.
Domestic conditions
The intergenerational leadership transfers that made China so successful in Triumphant China have not occurred, and the country has consequently suffered from elite infighting. Social stability amongst the Han Chinese has been maintained, but protests erupted in several provinces throughout the 2030s and 2040s. Fearing the expiration of Hong Kong’s Special Administrative Region status in 2047, capital began departing en masse in the late 2030s. By 2047, the wealthiest citizens had left, leaving a population blaming the PRC for the economic downturn.
An economically weak China was unable to incorporate Taiwan into the PRC, leaving the island independent. It reoriented its supply chains to other South and Southeastern Asian countries. Further, Taiwan halted potential moves to ameliorate relations with the PRC. With reunification remaining unachieved, the centenary of the establishment of the PRC in 2049 was commemorated with little fanfare.
China experiences economic stagnation in 2030–2050. Protectionist measures and technology export controls implemented by other countries are detrimental to China’s economic development. Export dependency is weaponised against China, and the BRICS states primarily use the organisation to “air grievances,” while members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) trade more with one another than with China. An ageing population imposes further limitations on Chinese economic growth. These factors compel other countries to distrust the CCP’s annual published growth rates as fabricated.
China manages to maintain social stability amongst the Han Chinese majority, but there are several problematic regions. Xinjiang and Hong Kong prove extremely troublesome, especially as global capital departs the latter because of the Chinese crackdown on protests. Domestic issues, such as lacking health services, social security, and retirement schemes, exacerbate social unrest and discontent with the CCP.
Foreign conditions
China’s influence in both the Asia-Pacific and the international stage has waned, particularly as Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations with numerous microstates and its security ties with the US Moreover, North Korea has committed to denuclearisation, has frozen its ballistic arsenal, and has improved relations with both South Korea and the US, all without any meaningful involvement from China.
Sino-Indian relations have deteriorated, and by 2050, India has taken advantage of China’s decline to join and become an important member of ASEAN. Due to its decline, China has been forced to accommodate the interests of both the US and other Asia-Pacific states to retain geopolitical relevance. The PLA maintains growth, but it is slow, and China struggles to maintain parity with other Asian powers.
Implications for the US
Events leading up to 2050 have damaged Sino-American relations. By 2050, it has become necessary for China to attempt to accommodate US interests in a bid to retain what geopolitical relevance is left.
China’s relations with Russia and the US
Today, two bilateral relationships particularly impact China’s future in the Arctic and on the global stage. Sino-Russian relations are particularly important to China’s future in the Arctic, and Sino-US relations are imperative for the latter.
Sino-Russian relations
China and Russia share a revisionist vision for the international order, arguing it favours Western interests (Steinveg & Kossa, Reference Steinveg and Kossa2025). They entered a strategic partnership, but no alliance. After the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Sino-Russian cooperation has expanded. For instance, China imports some 47% of Russian oil exports (Webster, Reference Webster2024). The strengthening partnership is reflected in the Arctic, and China depends on it for several of its Arctic ambitions and activities. Likewise, Russia is dependent on China for oil exports (Katinas, Reference Katinas2025).
However, China does not wish to attach itself too closely to Russia (Saglid & Hsiung, Reference Saglid and Hsiung2025). This is also evident in President Putin’s May 2026 state visit to Beijing, where China did not approve the development of a new gas pipeline (BBC, 2026). Views on multipolarity are another sensitive point. Russia views itself as a pole in a multipolar system, using this as a rhetorical device to obtain prestige. However, China is considered the more realistic possible peer competitor of the US, while Russia does not qualify as a pole at all according to standard measures (Røren, Reference Røren2026, p. 2). This discrepancy risks tainting Sino-Russian relations.
Sino-Russian relations remain heavily skewed in China’s favour, which is likely to remain the case. Therefore, Sino-Russian relations are likely to deteriorate in the long term, even if they may remain stable in the short term (von Essen, Reference von Essen2024, pp. 13–21). Key points of friction include Russian scepticism towards Chinese military presence in the Arctic, China’s argument that the Arctic should be a “global commons,” and negative historical memories (Boulègue, Reference Boulègue2025; Korolev & Portyakov, Reference Korolev and Portyakov2019).
Sino-US relations
Sino-US relations have a significant impact on China’s ambitions in the Arctic. At the structural level, the relationship constitutes a new bipolar power structure, like US-Soviet relations during the Cold War. A new standoff between these two powers now exists, and no third power can challenge this situation (Tunsjø, Reference Tunsjø2018). This situation will have both long-term and short-term consequences in world politics (Cooper, Reference Cooper2026).
For example, the Israeli-US attack on Iran in February 2026 might lead to long-term consequences for US influence in the Middle East and in the Asia-Pacific region. The Trump administration’s lack of strategy has set “America up for failure” (The Economist, 2026). Therefore, in a situation where the US in the years to come fights fires in the Middle East, a consequence may be that China will have its way in East Asia.
The relationship has been described as “conflict-based co-existence” (Tunsjø, Reference Tunsjø2024, pp. 11–12). Cooper (Reference Cooper2026) emphasises that the US faces both divisions at home and distractions abroad, undermining the foundations for American power in Asia. This should be seen in connection with US abandonment of leadership in international politics that started long before President Trump’s presidency (Melby, Reference Melby2017). Nevertheless, the Trump presidencies (2017–2021; 2025–) have further amplified this process, which has manifested scepticism towards climate change and multilateral climate cooperation (Kauppila & Kopra, Reference Kauppila and Kopra2022, p. 151).
These changes have both short-term and long-term consequences. In the short term, trade and tariff uncertainty throughout 2025 have illustrated important changes in Sino-American relations. Sino-American competition has also expanded to technology, with more export controls and investment screening (DNV, 2025). The 2025 US national security strategy points to more international competition and a US transactional approach to international relations. The Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific region are prioritised. The US will recalibrate and balance its economic relations with China, deter conflict over Taiwan, and ensure passage through the South China Sea (The White House, 2025, pp. 19–24). These policies will have long-term consequences for the bilateral relationship with China but also for the US’ status in Asia itself. A protectionist US in combination with the dissolution of development aid has made it a less attractive partner, and China “looks more attractive by comparison” (Cooper, Reference Cooper2026).
The US relationship with Europe also impacts how they view China. Intending to drive a wedge into transatlantic relations, China has “encouraged notions of European strategic autonomy” (Baun & Marek, Reference Baun, Marek, Edmondson and Mentzel2021). However, some analysts warn that this could weaken Europe’s resolve in the face of China and result in increased Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (Mazzocco, Reference Mazzocco2025). Closer Sino-European ties would be incompatible with the US pivot towards China. This could also challenge the transatlantic security community. Ikenberry (Reference Ikenberry, Anderson, Ikenberry and Risse2008, pp. 9–10) emphasises that this community is not only based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but also on a comprehensive “grand bargain” between the allies:
The United States provides its European partners with security protection and access to U.S. markets, technology and supplies within an open economy. In return, these countries agree to be reliable partners that provide diplomatic, economic, and logistical support for the United States as it leads the wider Western postwar order.
The current administration rejects the ideas of a liberal international order, breaking with postwar administrations (Restad, Reference Restad2019), seeking to undermine the institutions, particularly NATO and the European Union (EU), that underpin transatlantic security. These policies will have a direct and lasting impact on the EU’s actorness in all policy areas, particularly security and defence. NATO as an alliance will be the most adversely affected by such a development.
President Trump’s apparent attempt at gaining sovereignty over Greenland in early 2025 is a clear example. Vice President Vance accused Denmark of being a bad ally and a weak sovereign over Greenland, citing alleged Russian and Chinese threats (McCarthy, Reference McCarthy2025). Following the January 2026 arrest of Nicolas Maduro by US forces inside Venezuela, the US renewed their intention to annex Greenland, causing significant concern amongst NATO allies (Gronholt-Pedersen, Reference Gronholt-Pedersen2026). Such fracturing within NATO could enable China to gain a stronger foothold in a more fractured Arctic. Further, a growing Sino-US schism could push China closer to Russia in the Arctic.
Climate change and security in the Arctic
We focus on climate change consequences that are most relevant to defence and security. The Arctic is warming up to four times faster than the average rate of global warming, making it the fastest-warming region in the world (Rantanen et al., Reference Rantanen, Karpechko, Lipponen, Nordling, Hyvärinen, Ruosteenoja and Laaksonen2022). The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program projects an ice-free Arctic in the summer by 2040 (Wang et al., Reference Wang, Smith, Box, Gerland, Isaksen, Meier, Sigmond and Symon2025, p. 46), and the retreating ice eases transport through routes such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and access to resources in the water column and below the seabed. Better access to the NSR is a major Chinese interest in the Arctic.
Furthermore, Arctic waters are warming more than twice as fast as the global average (Shu et al., Reference Shu, Wang, Årthun, Wang, Song, Zhang and Qiao2022), contributing to ocean acidification. Already, boreal fish species migrate northwards from the Barents Sea (Hoel, Reference Hoel2020, p. 2). China has become a world-leading fishery nation (Scholaert, Pradier, & Chahri, Reference Scholaert, Pradier and Chahri2023), and a northwards migration of fish and other marine animals will affect China’s future interests in the region.
Arctic permafrost may be reduced by as much as 50% by 2080 (Overland et al., Reference Overland, Dunlea, Box, Corell, Forsius, Kattsov and Wang2019, pp. 8–9). Permafrost is particularly prevalent in Russia, where thawing is disastrous for infrastructure, ports, and cities. Moreover, permafrost thaw and ice melting contribute to coastal erosion, and along parts of the Laptev Sea, erosion rates have reached as high as 9.5 metres per year (Wang et al., Reference Wang, Smith, Box, Gerland, Isaksen, Meier, Sigmond and Symon2025, pp. 35–37). While Russia acknowledges this threat, analysts assess that their countermeasures are insufficient (Javeline et al., Reference Javeline, Orttung, Robertson, Arnold, Barnes, Henry and Wengle2023). This exacerbates the climate risk faced by littoral installations that are essential to the development of the NSR.
Climate change acts as a threat multiplier in the Arctic, amplifying existing causes of conflict and security challenges (Knutsen & Pedersen, Reference Knutsen and Pedersen2024). Some have presented the Arctic as defined by “Arctic exceptionalism” (Lackenbauer & Dean, Reference Lackenbauer, Dean, Spohr and Hamilton2020, p. 327). Critics argue that the Arctic is globalised and not unique to the extent that its condition is exceptional (Käpylä & Mikkola, Reference Käpylä and Mikkola2015). Climate change exposes the region to security dilemmas by pushing the offence-defence balance away from a clear defensive advantage to an offensive-defensive balance that makes the future less predictable (Knutsen & Pedersen, Reference Knutsen and Pedersen2024; Knutsen & Pettersen, Reference Knutsen and Pettersen2024). Furthermore, climate change will likely weaken Russian Arctic capabilities, entrenching the Russian certainty of NATO hostility as Russia becomes relatively weaker (Pedersen & Knutsen, Reference Pedersen and Knutsen2025; Wilhelmsen & Hjermann, Reference Wilhelmsen and Hjermann2022). The 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has also impacted Arctic security (Heier, Reference Heier2025). Arctic security trends must therefore be correctly attributed. We view climate change as a multiplier, as it indirectly affects known conflict and insecurity drivers.
China’s Arctic strategy
China signed the Svalbard Treaty in 1925 and has participated in Arctic research since 1951. The first Chinese solo expedition launched in 1984 (Liu, Reference Liu2021, p. 3), and the first permanent Chinese research presence on Svalbard, near Ny-Ålesund, opened in 2004. China became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2013, after the Arctic Council changed observer rules in 2011 (Graczyk & Koivurova, Reference Graczyk and Koivurova2014).
China published its Arctic strategy in 2018, wherein two core narratives are presented. The territorial narrative defines China as a “near-Arctic State.” The globalist narrative identifies the Arctic as a globally relevant region: Arctic climate change adversely influences Chinese climatechange. The globalist narrative also argues that:
The Arctic situation now goes beyond its original inter-Arctic States or regional nature, having a vital bearing on the interests of States outside the region and the interests of the international community as a whole, as well as on the survival, the development, and the shared future of mankind. It is an issue with global implications and international impacts (State Council, 2018).
The Arctic strategy is rooted in four core values: cooperation, respect, sustainability, and “win-win,” as well as five aims: (1) Enhance understanding of the Arctic while respecting the sovereignty of Arctic states; (2) Play an active part in protecting the Arctic climate and environment; (3) Exploit resources in accordance with rules and norms; (4) Contribute to Arctic governance on the bilateral, regional, and international levels; and (5) Contribute to a peaceful and stable Arctic region, based on respect for the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (State Council, 2018, pp. 5–10).
Puranen and Kopra (Reference Puranen and Kopra2023, p. 248) consider the strategy a work in development, neither finished nor final. Rather, it is a starting point for future development of China’s Arctic activity. Moe and Stokke (Reference Moe and Stokke2019, p. 27) consider the strategy “thorough and specific,” emphasising the strategy’s four core values and China’s longstanding development of its Arctic presence. Kobzeva (Reference Kobzeva2019, pp. 104–106) considers the strategy a natural continuation of China’s Arctic activity. China needed a centralised document to stake out China’s future in the region. An open declaration of its regional interests without causing alarm was further needed. China also needed a broader framework for its proposal of a Polar Silk Road (PSR).
Thus, the Arctic strategy should be viewed as a foundation on which China can build its ability to be present and operate in the Arctic. As Kopra (Reference Kopra2019, p. 82) wrote, China views its status as a developing country as important to its identity, and while it does not appear to value great power status at present, it expects “greater international respect.” As Lamazhapov (Reference Lamazhapov2025) has shown, China’s Arctic engagement is a part of this status-seeking effort.
China’s climate policy–consequences for the Arctic
During work on the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, China argued that environmental pollution was a consequence of capitalism and that, consequently, communist countries did not suffer from these issues. Further, China argued that environmental protection hinged on development (Kopra, Reference Kopra2019, p. 101). Ahead of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, China had positioned itself as an unofficial leader of the developing world (Ibid., p. 103). In this context, China also argued that developed countries should assume greater responsibility for climate change mitigation while helping developing countries address the consequences of climate change (Kopra, Hurri, Kauppila, Stepien, & Yamineva, Reference Kopra, Hurri, Kauppila, Stepien, Yamineva, Kopra and Koivurova2020, p. 70). When fears that President Trump would withdraw the US from the 2015 Paris Agreement grew, China made it clear it would not reduce its own commitments, emerging as a stronger climate leader (Kopra, Reference Kopra2019, pp. 110–111). In this way, China has leveraged climate policy to advance its interests as an aspiring great power while presenting itself as a developing country.
As Terhalle and Depledge (Reference Terhalle and Depledge2013, p. 574) pointed out, China became the world’s largest aggregate emitter of greenhouse gases already in 2007 and represented 45% of global emissions together with the US in 2011. China remains a significant contributor to global emissions today: in 2024, China was responsible for 25.6% of global carbon dioxide emissions (Climate Change Tracker, 2026).
China acknowledges the huge transformation of the Arctic due to the dramatic effects of climatic changes. This is described in several policy documents and in speeches by central Chinese politicians (see e.g. Fatima, Reference Fatima2025). President Xi Jinping stated to the UN General Assembly in 2020 that China’s ambition is carbon neutrality by 2060 (Y. Wang, Reference Wang2023, p. 9). Some environmental activists described this as “the most important step in tackling the climate crisis since the Paris Climate Agreement” (cited in Y. Wang, Reference Wang2023, p. 9).
China is sometimes considered a potential adversary in the Arctic, especially after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, aiming at “a hybrid warfare campaign that combines overt and covert means to expand influence and reshape Arctic governance” (Rapper, Reference Rapper2025). China’s hybrid tactics have been employed to undermine the Arctic Council’s governance. Furthermore, Irving (Reference Irving2022) writes that “the United States sees China as a potentially destabilizing force, with the economic and military power to try to bend the established order to its liking.” He also warns that China aims to portray itself as a responsible Arctic actor, with the aim of establishing a so-called “silk road on ice,” being an “active participant, builder, and contributor in Arctic affairs,” and an actor that has “spared no efforts to contribute its wisdom to the development of the Arctic region” (Irving, Reference Irving2022).
In an international system characterised by interstate competition, measures taken by one state could be perceived as hostile, resulting in a security dilemma (Jervis, Reference Jervis1978). Thus, climate change can act as a threat multiplier in the Arctic (Knutsen & Pedersen, Reference Knutsen and Pedersen2024). To mitigate this, China now actively tries to fill the void left by a more climate-sceptic US (Fatima, Reference Fatima2025). China further aims to take environmental and climate change challenges and threats seriously through so-called “costly signalling” efforts, through which China demonstrates willingness to adhere to Arctic norms instead of challenging the status quo (Y. Wang, Reference Wang2023, p. 1). Sino-Russian relations are also important. China currently positions itself as a supporter of Russia, which violates international law, “thus impairing the Council’s capacity to pursue justice or coordinated responses to violations” (Rapper, Reference Rapper2025). Although China considers Russia to be a close partner, also in the Arctic, Russia should consider China a challenger more than a partner in the Arctic towards 2050.
China’s Arctic interests
The Chinese Arctic strategy can be viewed, at least in part, as an attempt at further assuaging Western concerns about China’s ambitions in the Arctic (Descamps, Reference Descamps2019, p. 3). Indeed, the strategy continues the previous rhetoric of underlining that the basis of China’s interests and ambitions in the Arctic remains grounded in respect for the rules, norms, and sovereignty of the Arctic states.
There is a clear difference between China’s outward and domestic-facing rhetoric that warrants analysis (Doshi, Dale-Huang, & Zhang, Reference Doshi, Dale-Huang and Zhang2021). A prominent example is the influential Academy of Military Sciences, which addresses the importance of making Chinese military capabilities Arctic-ready. This dimension is entirely absent in the Arctic strategy, which serves to allay the fears of Arctic states (Descamps, Reference Descamps2019). As such, an analysis of China’s rhetoric and actions beyond the Arctic strategy is in order. We prioritise two of the dimensions in the analysis by Scobell et al. (Reference Scobell, Burke, Cooper, Lilly, Ohlandt, Warner and Williams2020): domestic conditions and foreign conditions. Lastly, instead of analysing implications for the US, we analyse military implications.
Domestic conditions
China considers the impact of Arctic climate change on the Chinese climate important (State Council, 2018). The impact of Arctic climate change on global climate change is widely known. For instance, the melting of the Greenland ice sheet could lead to about 7 metres of sea level rise globally, and methane trapped in Arctic permafrost could result in 0.5 ℃ additional global warming by the end of the century (Morlighem et al., Reference Morlighem, Williams, Rignot, An, Arndt, Bamber and Zinglersen2017; Schuur et al., Reference Schuur, Abbott, Commane, Ernakovich, Euskirchen, Hugelius and Turetsky2022).
China is the biggest fishery nation in the world, but has depleted its own fishing stocks while a growing population drives a growing demand for fish (Arons, Reference Arons2025, p. 42). It is responsible for around a third of the global demand for fish, a share that is projected to grow (Urbina, Reference Urbina2020). China possesses the world’s biggest distant-water fishing fleet (DWF), at approximately 17,000 vessels. It is not currently active in the Arctic, and its ownership structure is opaque and diverse (Gutiérrez, Daniels, Jobbins, Almazor, & Montenegro, Reference Gutiérrez, Daniels, Jobbins, Almazor and Montenegro2020, p. 8). Vessels can disable Automatic Identification Systems, despite this being illegal (Scholaert et al., Reference Scholaert, Pradier and Chahri2023). The DWF frequently engages in illegal fishing activities, sometimes shadowed by armed Chinese Coast Guard vessels even in other states’ waters (Environmental Justice Foundation, 2024). As fish species are projected to migrate northwards and Chinese demand for fish grows, it should be expected that Chinese interest in Arctic fishing will grow. This could mean the arrival of the DWF to the Arctic.
The International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOFA) entered into force in 2021 to halt commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. China is a signatory, and the treaty is valid for 16 years, after which it will be renewed for five-year periods unless a party protests (The Arctic Council, 2021).
Further, China views itself as a rightful great power, fuelling Chinese ambitions in all regions of the world, not merely the Arctic (Lind, Reference Lind2024). Indeed, to be a great power, China must have the ability to be present and operate in every region. The military and geopolitical ambitions of China in the Arctic relate to their domestic policies for this reason.
Foreign conditions
We connect economic policies, innovation, geopolitical aims, and military aspirations to foreign conditions.
China pursues a comprehensive strategy to develop its economic potential in the Arctic, focusing particularly on trade routes, fishing, minerals, and natural gas. Chinese companies are encouraged to invest in the region, but Arctic states have been wary of China’s overtures, and Chinese investments remain limited beyond the Russian Arctic (Paul, Reference Paul2025).
Trade routes
China is export-dependent, and its exports are usually transported by sea (Wegge, Reference Wegge2014, p. 86). It is therefore unsurprising that one of China’s primary interests in the Arctic is the development of the NSR. The route cuts transport times between the Asia-Pacific and North Atlantic regions by approximately 40% (Schøyen & Bråthen, Reference Schøyen and Bråthen2011). China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) was the first to mention the Arctic, albeit only with a single sentence (Eiterjord, Reference Eiterjord2023). The Arctic is mentioned in the plan’s section on ocean governance, stating that “We will participate in pragmatic cooperation in the Arctic and build the “Ice Silk Road”’ (State Council, 2021). The number of Chinese passages through the NSR has steadily increased and accounted for some 98% of all international traffic along the NSR in 2024 (Centre for High North Logistics, 2024). Edstrøm, Stensdal and Heggelund (Reference Edstrøm, Stensdal, Heggelund and Østhagen2023, p. 100) warn, however, that project realisation and Arctic shipping remain modest.
The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) was approved in March 2026. It upholds the previous plan’s focus on technological development and self-reliance aims but accounts for growing international tensions that risk disruption of global and domestic supply chains (Green & Parker, Reference Green and Parker2026). This signals a more pessimistic China that views the world as less stable and more uncertain (Marcrum, Reference Marcrum2026, p. 1).
Renewable technology
Another key area of economic ambition for China is in the field of renewables. The Arctic is rich in metals and Rare Earth Minerals (REMs) used in the production of electric vehicles, solar panels, and wind turbines. These include copper, silver, lithium, cobalt, and nickel (Kõrts, Reference Kõrts2023; Nordahl, Harrison, Jarna, & Solli, Reference Nordahl, Harrison, Jarna and Solli2016). The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that renewables’ share of total energy demand will quadruple by 2040, accompanied by an increase of more than 40% for copper, 90% for lithium, and 60–70% for nickel (IEA, 2020). The IEA further estimates that renewable energy capacity will double by 2030. Solar energy will account for almost 80% of this increase, followed by wind (IEA, 2025).
The US, Russia, China, and the EU are all showing interest in Arctic mineral resources, precipitating potential geopolitical tensions. China wishes to develop its control over the supply chains of strategic resources throughout extraction, refining, and export (Raspotnik, Lamazhapov, Stensdal, & Heggelund, Reference Raspotnik, Lamazhapov, Stensdal and Heggelund2025, pp. 733–735). This would also contribute to solidifying Chinese control over key technologies in electric vehicles, solar panels, and wind turbines.
Developing and testing these technologies, particularly green technologies, is another important Chinese activity in the Arctic (Zhang & Yang, Reference Zhang, Yang, Lunde, Yang and Stensdal2016). The Norwegian Intelligence Service has warned that Chinese research activities in the Arctic have clear dual-use potential (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2025). This should be related to the clearly stated Chinese ambition of (1) achieving REM dominance across the entire supply chain, also in the Arctic, and (2) attaining the ability to operate and be present in the Arctic with military capabilities.
Liquefied natural gas
China has invested in various infrastructure development projects in Russia to strengthen the extraction and transport of liquefied natural gas (LNG). For the time being, China receives LNG from only two facilities, Yamal and Sakhalin-2. Only Yamal is in the Arctic, and the Russian Yamal LNG facility is seen as a “flagship of such cooperation” (Humpert, Reference Humpert2025; Zaikov, Spiridonov, & Fadeev, Reference Zaikov, Spiridonov and Fadeev2024).
The Arctic is not as heavily regulated as the Antarctic, making it an attractive region for tests (Paul, Reference Paul2025: p. 2). This enhances China’s well-documented military ambitions in the Arctic. It also supports the assertion that Chinese scientific activity in the Arctic has dual-use implications, for China clearly intends to develop technology that can support potential Arctic operations and intelligence gathering (Pezard, Chindea, Aoki, Lumpkin, & Shokh, Reference Pezard, Chindea, Aoki, Lumpkin and Shokh2025, p. vi). Yue Wang (Reference Wang2023) further points to China’s desire for diverse energy sources, driving China’s interest in developing and testing technology that can withstand Arctic conditions.
Geopolitics
China believes that it is entitled to greater influence in Arctic governance (Holroyd, Reference Holroyd, Coates and Holroyd2020, p. 327), describing itself as an “important stakeholder in Arctic affairs” (State Council, 2018). The Arctic Council plays an important role in this governance. China is an observer, but the Council does not admit new state members. Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the other Arctic states only collaborate with select Russian scientists (Paukkunen & Black, Reference Paukkunen and Black2024). China exploits this fracture to “ entrench itself economically, scientifically, and politically” in an effort to promote alternative governance structures that are more conducive to Chinese interests (Rapper, Reference Rapper2025).
In November 2014, President Xi characterised China as a “Polar great power” for the first time, linking its Arctic (and Antarctic) ambitions to its broader ambition of becoming a maritime great power (Brady, Reference Brady2017, p. 3). The Director of the State Oceanic Administration also stated China’s ambition to transition from a “major polar country” to a “Polar great power” in 2014 (State Oceanic Administration, 2014). Strategy documents do, however, classify the Arctic as a “strategic new frontier,” a term originating from the Chinese military establishment (Andersson, Reference Andersson2021).
China presents its investments and ambitions in the Arctic as a part of its broader efforts towards both domestic and global welfare. However, Chinese officials are clear that China’s Arctic scientific engagement entitles the state to a voice in Arctic affairs. They further wish to leverage this position to entrench China’s identity as an Arctic state and secure access to strategic resources in the region (Doshi et al., Reference Doshi, Dale-Huang and Zhang2021, pp. 1–2). In Chinese economic planning, the Arctic is primarily considered a maritime domain. The above investment ambitions and their aims contribute to lifting the Arctic out of that singular maritime focus, enabling the involvement of Chinese actors outside the maritime sector (Andersson, Reference Andersson2021, p. 22).
The Svalbard archipelago is becoming an object of growing interest. Svalbard is Norwegian sovereign territory under the Svalbard Treaty, but nationals of all signatories enjoy full rights on the archipelago. Norway implemented a Fishery Protection Zone (FPZ) in 1977 for the “conservation of the living resources in the sea and regulation of fishing and catching” (Regulations on fish protection zones near Svalbard, 1977). It has become a controversial topic, also amongst Norwegian allies (Østhagen, Reference Østhagen2018). China, however, has not adopted a formal stance on the Svalbard FPZ. If Chinese vessels arrive in the Arctic, a clarification will become necessary (Lajeunesse & Lackenbauer, Reference Lajeunesse and Lackenbauer2024, p. 77).
Military implications
The Chinese Academy of Military Sciences is influential in the development of Chinese strategic thinking (Fravel, Reference Fravel and McReynolds2016, p. 2). The Arctic is considered an important region for military positioning, whose rules are primarily developed by the West, limiting China’s room for manoeuvre in the region. In the 2020 edition of Science of Strategy, China considers civil-military cooperation the primary tool of Arctic states in securing their military presence in the region. From the Chinese perspective, this has also enabled the Arctic states to support their Arctic interests while avoiding international disputes. Displaying military force in the Arctic is thus considered by China as an important assertion of sovereignty (Academy of Military Sciences, 2020, pp. 105–106). China needs the ability to utilise military force to support polar scientific research, search, and rescue, and in a cautious way. Further, the Academy comments that Arctic states tend to consider the Arctic their ‘backyard,” in which they are wary of extra-regional powers (Ibid., p. 166). The Chinese military establishment also considers the deployment of Chinese nuclear weapons to the Arctic a strong deterrent against Western rivals, such as the US (Holz, Taffer, Miller, & DeThomas, Reference Holz, Taffer, Miller and DeThomas2022, p. i).
The Chinese military presence in the Arctic today is highly limited, but Sino-Russian joint military exercises have become more frequent after 2014 (Fong & Merrow, Reference Fong and Merrow2024). The PLA has participated in joint exercises in the Arctic with Russian forces on several occasions. On 24 July 2024, nuclear-capable Chinese and Russian bombers conducted a joint exercise off the coast of Alaska (Williams, Bingen, & MacKenzie, Reference Williams, Bingen and MacKenzie2024). In September of the same year, the PLA Navy and the Russian Pacific Fleet organised their first joint coast guard patrol (Boulègue, Reference Boulègue2025). Chinese authorities claimed the patrol travelled all the way into the Arctic Ocean, and US Coast Guard vessels spotted the formation inside the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone in the Bering Sea (McCarthy, Reference McCarthy2024). This illustrates the growing Chinese military ambitions for the Arctic. Further, the exercises epitomise the framework for Chinese presence in the Arctic: a partnership with Russia.
The impact of climate change
In this section, we analyse the impact of climate change on the three scenarios introduced earlier, specifically along these dimensions: domestic conditions, foreign conditions, and military implications. Within each of these dimensions, we analyse how the impact of climate change could shape the various scenarios.
China views the Arctic as an important global “strategic height” and a region in which it is important that the PLA can operate. They further view the Arctic as a region in which the PLA may realistically have to operate. As such, developing PLA capabilities for Arctic conditions is important to China. This requires not only knowledge about current Arctic conditions but also knowledge about future Arctic conditions. In this way, climate change exerts a very direct impact on Chinese military ambitions in the Arctic.
Domestic conditions
China states that “the natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s climate system,” making it a key priority to “actively respond to climate change in the Arctic” (State Council, 2018). Arctic climate mitigation is thus important to climate mitigation at home, where more than half of China’s economic output comes from its coastal regions, illustrating the necessity of both adaptation and mitigation in Chinese domestic policy.
As fish stocks migrate northwards, China may be tempted to deploy its DWF there. Climate change could compel China to obstruct the renewal of CAOFA after the first 16-year period comes to an end in 2037. Provided that climate change occurs to such an extent that the Central Arctic Ocean is accessible for sufficiently large fishing vessels, CAOFA would act as an obstacle to China’s growing demand for fish.
Further, the extent of climate change could significantly influence which of the three scenarios in this paper will come to pass. Ascendant China is considered the likeliest scenario, but the effects of climate change could affect China’s economic power to such an extent that Stagnant China becomes the likeliest scenario.
In Triumphant China, China’s superpower status would enable it to directly influence Arctic policymaking. That could entail strengthening Arctic climate policies. An important contemporary challenge in this regard is Russia’s absence. The Russian Arctic coastline comprises 53% of the Arctic coastline, meaning Russia’s absence is detrimental to any attempts at regional climate policies (Lamazhapov & Moe, Reference Lamazhapov and Moe2025). As of early 2026, it also appears that the US will deprioritise Arctic climate policy (Bloom, Reference Bloom2025). Leveraging its global influence would thus be highly beneficial for China in Triumphant China, including from a domestic climate mitigation perspective.
In Triumphant China, China would likely rely on its influence to ensure that it enjoys favourable access to attractive fishing grounds. China would likely obstruct the renewal of CAOFA and adopt a critical stance towards Norway’s FPZ around Svalbard. The FPZ is highly unpopular even amongst Norway’s allies, meaning China could find it a rather easy task to challenge it with considerable backing, in addition to China’s own power. In this way, China could leverage the consequences of climate change to achieve its own ends.
In Ascendant China, China’s current Arctic role would be maintained. China would wield influence as an Arctic Council observer and a global great power. However, the extent to which Chinese domestic policy aims can be translated into Arctic influence would be less than in Triumphant China. Scepticism towards, for instance, Chinese investments amongst the Western Arctic states would likely remain. This scepticism would also limit China’s ability to emerge as a climate leader in the Arctic. China would thus have to work hard to leverage its influence and realise the economic potential of Arctic climate change.
Stagnant China would have different means of achieving its aims. Consequently, its ability to achieve priorities would be low. In the previous two scenarios, China would have some ability to translate domestic policy priorities into Arctic policy, but with its economic power curtailed, this ability would largely be absent. As such, an economically stagnant China would not have the ability to lead broad climate policy coalitions in the Arctic.
The DWF is not exclusively state-owned, which means that an economic weakening of the Chinese state need not weaken the ability of the DWF to operate around the world. An economic weakening of China may even incentivise the deployment of the DWF to the Arctic to meet the growing Chinese demand for fish. A major difference, compared to the previous two scenarios, is that in the Stagnant China scenario, the DWF is likelier to engage in illicit fishing activities to exploit the opportunities presented by climate change.
Foreign conditions
China’s economic power is its foremost tool to exert power across the globe, and climate change will impact this economic might in myriad ways. Russia controls the NSR, and it is highly uncertain how they would respond to international challenges to that authority. The development of the PSR is central to China’s Arctic ambitions, meaning the impact of climate change on Russia’s authority over the NSR may also indirectly impact China’s Arctic ambitions. Ports along the NSR and land-based infrastructure connecting them to the rest of the Russian Arctic will face challenges, especially due to permafrost thaw. Russia acknowledges the threat of permafrost thaw but has been unable to enact policies to address the issue (Devyatkin, Reference Devyatkin, Ferraro and Ambrosetti2022, pp. 86–87; Kluge & Paul, Reference Kluge and Paul2020, pp. 3–4). This poses a direct risk to the viability of China’s Arctic economic ambitions.
China argues it is entitled to a larger say in Arctic governance, citing the region’s global importance and impact on climate change in China. Climate mitigation may act as an entry point for Chinese claims to more influence, behind which large parts of the Global South can rally. Several states of the Global South have echoed China’s arguments, emphasising the region’s impact across the globe (García-Herrero & Xu, Reference García-Herrero and Xu2025; Sharma, Reference Sharma2024). A second entry point pertaining to climate change could be an entrenchment of China’s dominance in the production of renewable energy technology.
China is a party to the Svalbard Treaty but has yet to formally declare a stance on the Norwegian FPZ around the archipelago. While the entire Arctic, including the Central Arctic Ocean, will be interesting from this perspective, climate change is unlikely to render it ice-free year-round. Thus, interest in Svalbard and the Norwegian FPZ is likely to increase as interest in the Arctic increases. As climate change may push fish to migrate northwards and make mineral resources on and below the seabed more accessible, it could precipitate a formal Chinese stance on the FPZ and Norway’s interpretation of the Treaty of Svalbard.
China uses the Arctic to research and test technologies, green and otherwise, with a clear dual-use potential (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2025). This is connected to all their Arctic ambitions. However, challenges present themselves at the intersection of innovation and climate change. First, China develops and tests technologies in traditionally harsh Arctic conditions. Climate change alters the region, making it milder and more prone to extreme weather. The Arctic conditions of 2050 may not be like those under which China is currently developing and testing.
Second, China works to preserve its near monopoly on the refinement and export of REMs. To this end, access to mineral resources in the Arctic is a core Chinese interest in the region. Climate change may somewhat ease access to these resources, particularly through ice melting, but increasingly volatile Arctic weather may nullify this benefit.
In the Triumphant China scenario, climate change may render China more willing to leverage its political and economic influence to shape Arctic governance in general and Russian management of the NSR in particular, in line with Chinese efforts to exploit a fracturing Arctic Council. Chinese firms are encouraged to invest strategically across the globe but have been met with scepticism by Arctic states. A Triumphant China would likely be in a sufficiently strong position to force Arctic states to reconsider. In this way, China could leverage the consequences of climate change to achieve its own ends.
Another important consequence of Triumphant China is that China’s freedom to conduct activity in the Arctic would grow considerably, both in terms of researching and testing technologies and in obtaining beneficial licenses to extract REMs. Climate change could ease access to these minerals. It could, however, complicate research, testing, and extraction through an increase in extreme weather events. A Triumphant China could wield sufficient economic and diplomatic power to promote mitigation efforts, thus aiding both climate policy in the Chinese homeland and its Arctic ambitions.
An Ascendant China would likely seek the same outcome as a Triumphant China but would have more difficulty in achieving it. As we can see today, the much-feared Chinese investments in the Arctic remain limited because Arctic states tend to be sceptical of them. In the Ascendant China scenario, the status quo is mostly preserved, meaning China’s position will remain as today. China will thus have to work hard to leverage its influence and realise the economic potential of Arctic climate change.
In the Ascendant China scenario, China does not achieve global technological dominance, and actors such as the US, the EU, and Japan may be able to form coalitions aimed at limiting Chinese influence. But transatlantic relations are fracturing, and China may be able to leverage the Arctic to strengthen its global position. In this context, climate change plays an important role. The extent of climate change affects the extent to which resources and trade routes become accessible. Thus, the more open the Arctic becomes due to climate change, the more motivated China will be to pursue its interests in the region. Their ability to do so will depend on the extent to which Western Arctic states are fractured or coordinated.
Should China’s economy stagnate, its ability to exploit the resource potential of the Arctic would naturally also weaken. Trade barriers, export controls, and a long-term worsening of Sino-Russian relations would yield a future in which China’s political and economic situation would make exploiting the Arctic more difficult (von Essen, Reference von Essen2024). The impacts of climate change would thus become more dire, as China would lose its ability, primarily through Russia, to develop and test technologies that can function under extreme conditions.
Military implications
In Triumphant China, China should have the ability to operate militarily in the Arctic. Given China’s importance to Russia, it is likely that China will be able to leverage its relationship with Russia or Russia’s dependence on China to attain favourable conditions for conducting exercises in the Arctic. Furthermore, China may be able to open permanent defence installations in the Arctic to develop and test technologies for military use in Arctic conditions. Climate change will continue to alter Arctic conditions, which means that China would have much to gain from being able to scale its Arctic military exercises.
In Ascendant China, the status quo persists, and Russia and China conduct joint exercises near the Arctic Circle. Without a considerable increase in China’s international power, Russia may be emboldened to maintain limits on China’s military activity in the Russian Arctic. This would, in turn, limit China’s ability to develop its Arctic capabilities and conduct larger-scale exercises in the region, despite China remaining one of the global powers in this scenario. With a restrained ability to conduct exercises in the Arctic, China would continue to fall behind as climate change alters Arctic conditions, making climate change a larger military obstacle in Ascendant China.
In Stagnant China, climate change would act as a major obstacle to China’s Arctic military ambitions, together with economic stagnation. Climate change would alter the Arctic faster than China could adapt to it, and their economic stagnation would deprive them of the influence needed to rectify this.
Conclusions
What kind of actor will China be in the Arctic in 2050? This question has preoccupied Arctic policymakers and scholars for almost 20 years, particularly since the release of China’s 2018 Arctic White Paper. During this time, China has balanced advancing its own interests with assuaging Western concerns about Chinese intentions.
We have investigated China’s future as an Arctic actor through the lens of climate change. The future remains uncertain, not least due to climate change. To address this uncertainty, we have conducted a scenario analysis comprising three Chinese futures: strengthening (Triumphant China), status quo (Ascendant China), and weakening (Stagnant China).
Our analysis shows that the scenarios will impact China’s ability to reconcile its Arctic ambitions with climate change in the region. In Triumphant China, China will likely wield the necessary global power to shape climate mitigation in the Arctic, which would aid climate mitigation in China. This would require far more effort in Ascendant China and be difficult in Stagnant China.
Importantly, we also find that climate change itself influences which scenario is more likely. China’s main source of global influence is its economic might. However, China’s economic power base is littoral and exposed to climate change, which exposes China’s economic power base to increased climate risk, making the Stagnant China scenario somewhat more likely. The Arctic is warming fast, and Arctic operating conditions change rapidly. This makes it important for China to adapt military capabilities to operating in the Arctic. The pace of climate change, coupled with limited access to the region, complicates military adaptation, making it less likely that China could achieve regional peer competitor status, particularly with the US. These factors suggest that the Ascendant and Stagnant China scenarios are more likely than Triumphant China.
The likeliest scenario, Ascendant China, is somewhat open-ended. While we can say that China has established itself present in the Arctic, predicting its future engagement is far more challenging. Climate change will cause major changes to the Arctic, and, in a way, the future of China’s Arctic ambitions will depend on its ability to balance mitigation and adaptation. Adaptation to a changing climate is imperative, but without mitigation efforts, even successful adaptation may be insufficient. Both mitigation and adaptation would be achievable in Triumphant China.
The two scenarios that see a change from the status quo, Triumphant China and Stagnant China, are less likely but offer policy-relevant insights across futures that are still possible, despite being less probable. For China’s part, these two scenarios offer more uncertainty. Both mitigation and adaptation would be possible in Ascendant China, although the former would be more challenging. In Stagnant China, adaptation would be difficult, and mitigation all but impossible.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Miika Jarsve Brenna for his valuable input during the proof-reading of the manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors report no conflicts of interest.
Open access
