In this meticulous and thoughtful study, Ross Kennedy probes the deep structure of the domestic political debates about American foreign policy in the years before and during World War I. Kennedy boldly covers ground traversed by many other scholars before him, but he offers a more comprehensive approach by analyzing “the entire national security debate from 1914 to 1920” (xiii). The result is a painstakingly detailed account of the recurrent themes in that debate and the disheartening consequences for the United States both in Woodrow Wilson's time and onward to the present day.
The author structures his account of the national security debates and the quest for international peace by identifying the three primary divisions among American political leaders and intellectuals of the late Progressive Era: pacifists, liberal internationalists, and Atlanticists. These three camps may be understood to array roughly along a liberal to conservative spectrum. Still, the complexities and subtleties of their respective positions, their overlapping worries, and the arguments they advanced, formed a dialogue and debate that, with respect to core normative concerns in particular, was in important ways quite distinct from the early twenty-first century perspective on national security questions. Specifically, Kennedy stresses two deep-seated worries that preoccupied leaders and commentators from all three factions. The first was a concern for the severely distorting effects on American culture and democratic traditions and practices that increasing militarism—land and sea arms build-ups, broad military service, increasingly defensive actions in the nation's dealings with foreign powers—would engender. The second was a nearly universal desire to escape the power politics of the old world approach to international relations. For Kennedy, these common concerns were the prime focal points of the competing strategies for international engagement emanating from the respective blocs. Those focal points structured the paradigm for thinking about the nation's engagement with the world that formed among political leaders at the time, and that remains today.
After introducing and detailing the ideas and positions of the pacifists, liberal internationalists, and Atlanticists in his first chapter, the author initiates a sequence of chapters in which he explores the evolving debate among the three camps on how to develop and preserve American national security, deal with the broadening war in Europe, and secure a new kind of world peace. These chapters advance chronologically and are paired with chapters in which Kennedy pays particular attention to Woodrow Wilson's evolving ideas, arguments, and policy moves with regard to the same broad questions and concerns. This narrative analytical structure is interesting and instructive and effectively places Wilson's thinking and action in the broader context of the debates occurring in American society, debates that both constrained and enabled Wilson's endeavors to realize a new and distinct international order.
Kennedy's identification of the three factions in the national security and foreign policy debates of the era provides very useful guidance for understanding the commonalities and differences among American political leaders, public intellectuals, and the attentive public concerned with the search for how the nation could best cope with the accelerating changes and increasing dangers of the modern world. The true strengths of his analysis, however, lie in his core themes. It may be too strong to call it a revelation, yet the author's illumination and dissection of the deeply ingrained worry over militarism and its potential for severely disfiguring American culture and democratic traditions and practices is superb. Moreover, it raises all sorts of interesting questions about the extent and character of the public articulation of that worry across the full sweep of American political development.
Even more powerful in many respects is Kennedy's discovery of the imperative faced by Wilson, and by extension both his supporters and critics: to end power politics of the old-world type, the United States was forced to practice the self-same power politics. The foundation of this paradox, Kennedy contends, was the ambiguous, incomplete, and logically weak theories of the debating camps for how to end the war in a way that would lay the groundwork for a wholly new regime of collective security. Because he was most responsible for, and most strongly committed to, developing and promoting a new conception of collective security and translating it into foreign policy making and diplomatic practice, Woodrow Wilson bore the brunt of the perils inherent in the paradox. The result was a peace conference whose negotiations and final treaty undermined Wilson's own political fortunes, his nation's (admittedly somewhat conflicting) aspirations, and the hopes of people throughout the world. Kennedy's account of Wilson's futility with respect to the negotiations leading to the Versailles Treaty is perhaps the most engrossing in the book.
More questionable is Kennedy's extension of his analysis across the ensuing decades. He argues all too briefly in the final pages for an interpretation of American foreign policy that has Wilsonian and liberal internationalist arguments shaping the course of American foreign policy through World War II, the Cold War, Vietnam, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of a unipolar international system. Although I find especially thought-provoking the link the author uncovers between Atlanticist thinking and the foreign policy arguments of today's neoconservatives, I have serious doubts that the extension across time of the author's analysis can stand up to significant scrutiny. Kennedy claims at the outset that “notions of American exceptionalism … did not provide the key stimulus” in the progressive drive toward a new world order (xiii). This assertion is not supported in later chapters that reveal how Woodrow Wilson increasingly clung to arguments about American exceptionalism even as the incongruities of his collective security vision became ever more apparent in the cold, hard light of the policy and diplomatic disarray that surfaced at the end of the war.
These are, on the whole, minor doubts about a work of scholarly craftsmanship that I greatly admire. The book enriches considerably understanding of the complexities of the nation's ongoing search for leadership that will provide a secure and peaceful world.
