Robert Gleave has done a great service to the field of Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) by gathering many disparate threads and pulling them into a coherent work devoted to tracing shifts in Muslim scholarly treatment of literal meaning, an idea truly central to Muslim legal hermeneutics. This erudite work will prove very helpful in fleshing out a holistic understanding of the discipline. It consists of an introductory preface and seven chapters. The book is primarily a study of medieval legal hermeneutics, although the final chapter deftly illuminates the role of early discussions of literalism in shaping modern theoretical formulations.
Gleave argues that, for Muslim scholars, the relationship between word and meaning necessarily submitted to differing interpretations of its strength and how and when the relationship could be broken. His charting of this process allows us interesting insights into that space and the ongoing nature of the task. As he notes, pursuit of the literal meaning in the corpus of texts central to Muslim tradition is ongoing. His work charts for us the reasoning behind this impetus as it emerged out of both doctrinal and historical circumstances. Because the literal is an “attempt to control the interpretive process” (p. 46), it must necessarily hold the attention of scholars of exegesis and students of legal theory alike.
This book provides a careful look at the concepts of literal meaning and literalism. The author's overview of modern linguistic philosophy is an extremely useful tool for those considering these terms afresh, although it would have been likewise useful to explore more fully the ideas of an early Arabic literary theorist such as ʿAbd al-Qahir al-Jurjani (d. 1078). His insights into the relationship between lafẓ (words) and maʿnā (meaning) could have provided a solid yet indigenous entryway into the topic, just as more attention to the blurring of boundaries between the literary-critical and the legal-hermeneutical is warranted.
Even so, Gleaves’ reliance on the modern, non-Arab, philosophers is not out of place. In the first chapter, he offers analysis by the likes of Paul Grice and Francois Recanati, then segues almost seamlessly into linking their conceptual frameworks with not only general exegetical discussions of Qurʾanic verses (esp. p. 17) but specific approaches to the ẓāhir (“apparent,” often “literal”) of jurisprudents such as Ibn Hazm (p. 157). Modern linguistic philosophers, Gleaves explains, find that literal meaning is understood to inhere in words based on language rules, while their understanding of literalism is that “statements have meaning distinct from both the intended meaning of the one making the statement, [sic] and the meaning understood by the hearer” (p. 146). The literalism of Muslim scholars was couched thus: literal meaning was closest to God's intent and therefore privileged above all other possible meanings; but at the heart of Gleaves’ work is the idea that such meaning had “pre-eminence” but not “unassailability.” He maintains that literalists and nonliteralists could be found on the same spectrum of rule application, because even literal meaning requires interpretation of some kind. Meanwhile, slightly “less than certain” status was inevitably accorded those interpretations that were more distant from the literal. This trend has not abated: after devoting a chapter to the evolution of the ẓāhiri school, he dexterously links the methodologies of Ibn Hazm (d. 1064) vis-à-vis the ẓāhir with those of premodern and modern Salafi movements which, in their quest for certainty, exploit wider contexts to determine “true” meaning and expand the ḥaqīqa (that Gleaves defines as “literal language use”) category.
Gleave's ease with the relevant sources is evident. The second chapter contains an in-depth discussion of literal meaning in classical Muslim legal theory. Gleaves initially relies upon two primary sources for establishing a framework for discussion of classical uṣūl al-fiqh: Ibn al-Hajib (d. 1249), a Maliki scholar who wrote an abridgement (mukhtasar) of both the Shafiʿi uṣūl scholar al-Amidi, and al-ʿAllama al-Hilli (d. 1325), whose Nihayat al-Wusul is an overview of the major opinions concerning uṣūl al-fiqh. It is telling that Gleaves has chosen to consult both a Sunni and a Shiʿi scholar; it is clear that they are able to differ in doctrine while sharing “assumptions about how language works and how meaning is created” (p. 30). This treatment foreshadows the chapter on Shiʿi conceptions of the literal (Chapter 5), in which early attachment to esoteric, Imam-centered sources of meaning are shown as being eventually subsumed by mainstream uṣūl arguments.
In tracing the evolution of scholarly approaches to the literal, the author delves into early exegesis. He considers interpretations attributed to Zayd ibn ʿAli, Ibn ʿAbbas, Mujahid, Sufyan al-Thawri, i.e., the usual suspects in early tafsīr discussion. In his many informative examples, Gleaves presents the way in which these scholars and many others looked to nonliteral meanings, often “translating” (Andrew Rippin's term) Qurʾanic expressions into the kalām al-ʿarab (words of the Arabs); simultaneously, however, the “words of the Arabs” could be used for the opposite purpose: to define a term (e.g., kaʿba in the tafsīr of Muqatil) (p. 87). A similar disconnect is found in al-Shafiʿi's Risala. Although Gleaves takes issue with Joseph Lowry, claiming for al-Shafiʿi a “reasonably coherent conception” of the ẓāhir as a hermeneutical technique, Gleaves then concedes that al-Shafiʿi flip-flops from asserting that the ẓāhir is necessitated by rules of language to claiming it is “literal meaning discerned through an immediate comprehension . . . distinguished from a grammatically determined meaning” (p. 111). Gleave contends that interpretive expediency of this kind develops further in the work of al-Jassas, al-Baqillani, and Ibn al-Qassar, but fades in the mature discussions of uṣūl that postdate them, “intellectual casualties” of the formalization of the discipline. The mature works to which Gleave refers in this case include that of Ibn al-Hajib (d. 1249) (which is itself a mukhtaṣar of the Ihkam fi usul al-ahkam of the Shafiʿi Sayf al-Din al-Amidi, d. 1233) and that of the Shiʿi ʿAllama al-Hilli (d. 1325).
Such a fine discussion of literal meaning and interpretation in Islamic jurisprudential theory could only have been strengthened by slightly more attention to the likes of al-Jurjani or even the polymath Ibn Qutayba (d. 889)—whose early attention to both the concepts of the “words of the Arabs” and the ḥaqīqa would not have been devoid of meaning for early legal scholars.
The book is essential reading for anyone with a serious interest in Islamic legal theory. For the intrepid graduate student, it should be read sooner rather than later. It is a thoughtful and thought-provoking approach to this undertackled topic.
