Nordic welfare states are known for a unique combination of equity and efficiency and for political institutions that facilitate compromise and consensus between conflicting interests. Kananen analyses the historical and contemporary evolution of welfare states in Denmark, Sweden and Finland during three periods: the developmental period until the end of World War II, the period of the welfare state's days of glory until the 1980s and the period of restructuring subsequent to the 1980s underlining the tension between the emancipatory and constraining elements of societal development.
It is a highly readable book, in particular for readers not that familiar with the Nordic countries, but, as it is about the welfare state, too much emphasis is given to the unfolding of the process towards modernity. Accentuating three emancipatory impulses (the modernisation of agriculture, the universalisation of education and the formation of the modern polity), Kananen argues that constraints associated with the medieval social order were gradually replaced.
It seems odd, however, to let this emancipatory development last until World War II. The more so as Kananen is aware that the post-war welfare state institutions have origins in earlier periods. He thus argues that the Nordic social security systems were established ‘in several waves’ but refers only to two of these: the first wave of welfare state development around the turn of the twentieth century and a second wave subsequent to World War II. It is not explained how the first wave and its further development during the interwar period paved the way for the ‘social security state’ – the predecessor to the welfare state – and how this first wave was connected to previous developments towards modernity and subsequent developments towards the welfare state.
It seems more plausible to work with an alternative periodisation of Nordic welfare state development and reconfiguration. I suggest five distinct phases, with a breaking point at the end of the nineteenth century, a breaking point around World War I, an interwar period, a new breaking point subsequent to World War II and a final one at the early 1980s.
I miss a discussion about the strong disputes on the concept of the welfare state which took place in the 1950s. The chapter on the post-war welfare state and its development into a ‘collectivist social order’ only scratches the surface. Apart from references to Esping-Andersen's Polanyi-inspired idea of de-commodification, there is no endeavour to develop elements of a normative theory of the welfare state as a point of departure for the absolutely most readable part of the book on the renegotiation of the ‘collectivist order’.
Kananen argues that the more individual potentials were liberated and enhanced compared to previous conditions, the more the collectivist characteristic itself turned into a limit to further liberation and enhancement of creative potentials. It is possible, but one could also argue that the renegotiation process has been started by politicians responding to a basic tension built into the welfare state from its early days. The classical Nordic welfare state demands that people are generous, moderate in their demands and willing to supply their labour to ensure the financing of the welfare state in a real sense. This is in contrast to the behavioural patterns of ‘the economic man’ aiming at getting the most for a given effort. As the social security system and the social services were developed and liberalised, an increasing number of the population seems to have behaved as ‘economic men’, implying a strong rise in the number of people dependent on cash benefits and a growing demand for institutional services.
Irrespective of the underlying reasons, it is obvious that the institutions of the public sector, at least from the early 1970s, were criticised for being inefficient and voices arguing against a ‘dependency culture’ were raised.
The implications were a growing acceptance of the ideas of New Public Management, imitating elements of the logic of the market in the public sector. This acceptance went hand in hand with the so-called international competition state paradigm.
The implied renegotiation was started at the initiative of the bourgeois parties, but the social democrats gradually and with much hesitation converted to the same kind of thinking. Modernisation and renewal of the public sector became the new buzz-words. The ideas, however, also touched upon the societal level in a broader sense. Just before the resign of the Danish bourgeois government in 1993 for example, the government declared: ‘Abroad one speaks about “the Scandinavian model”, but this model has to a growing extent demonstrated its weaknesses. If the ideas developed in this statement are implemented one may talk about “the new Danish model” combining security for the individual with the dynamics of the market and free choice of welfare for the single individual.’
The reason why a bourgeois government dared argue in this manner was the publication in 1990 of a report from SAMAK (the cooperative committee of the Nordic social democratic parties and the trade unions). The report might be read as a social democratic endeavour to capture ownership of the instruments that belong otherwise to the arsenal of bourgeois thinking.
Simultaneously the former emphasis given to citizens’ social rights was challenged by new principles of contractualism, quid-pro-quo and the putting of rights and obligations on an equal footing. Again the social democrats were hesitant, but again they gradually converted to what has been called a ‘workfare’ regime governed by incentives and sanctions. The conditionality of welfare benefit receipt was tightened and links were established to programs aiming to ensure the availability of a flexible work force. The idea of collective responsibility was gradually toned down and greater emphasis was attributed to individual responsibility.
Kananen gives a useful overview of the changes implemented in Sweden, Denmark and Finland, but his reflections on the ideological shifts leaves much to be desired.
To the extent that the classical welfare state was a moral project, a basic change has occurred. In the present political rhetoric, ‘the dependents’ have turned from being the objects of pity and compassion into objects of resentment and anger. ‘Dependency has become a scare word referring to something which decent people should be ashamed of.’
It is interesting, therefore, that Kananen ends his book by reflecting on ‘how and whether societal development could be re-reversed so that the constraining development of the third era of the Nordic welfare state could be (re)turned into renewed emancipation’. It seems, however, that ethics – after more than a century in which ethics and rational reason have lived symbiotically side by side – has been left alone. Ethics, therefore, are vulnerable. Thus I am a bit sceptical in endorsing Kananen's hope.
