Did the National Council of Churches [NCC] represent a “Confessing Church” presence in the United States during the Vietnam War? Jill K. Gill's revised University of Pennsylvania dissertation dissects this question through analysis of NCC archival records, interviews with key NCC leaders, and careful reading of contemporary publications. Gill utilizes ecumenism as the interpretive and critical lens for the manner in which NCC leaders approached the war and their programs and actions in response to the war. Gill describes ecumenism as the interplay of “theological discussion, public witness, service actions, and church renewal” (24). In chapters 4–12, Gill traces the intricate history of the NCC's statements and programs relating to Vietnam from 1964 to 1973. In chapters 1–3, Gill provides historical context for these years. The book closes with a lengthy epilogue and appendix that attempts to give an account of what happened to the NCC and ecumenism after the war.
Gill sets the stage with a comparison of NCC action related to civil rights in the United States over against NCC action related to Vietnam. NCC leaders devised and implemented a strategy for educating and mobilizing churches with regard to civil rights. There was congruence and mutual affirmation between the NCC's prophetic stand on civil rights and the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The NCC adopted a similar strategy of education and mobilization with regard to the Vietnam War. NCC leaders came to see the war as a war for Vietnamese self-determination, an anti-colonial war rather than an effort to contain communism. Based on this view, the NCC consistently advocated a negotiated settlement of the conflict.
Through the Johnson and Nixon administrations, U.S. government policy never wavered from the view that the war was centered on containing communism and this was the view held by most people in the United States. NCC leaders were not able to convince government officials, their constituent denominations, and the majority of church lay members otherwise. The NCC lost access to the White House, experienced drastic budget cuts from contributors, and forfeited influence in churches. The self-critical, moral awareness that was so powerfully present in the civil rights movement, a moral awareness eloquently articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr., did not translate to the moral crisis of the Vietnam conflict. An irony of the Vietnam situation was the total lack of race consciousness in the thought of most U.S. citizens. NCC leaders, guided by an ecumenical vision, were open to the witness of non-white, non-Western Christians, especially Christians from Asian countries. Those who followed the NCC and Dr. King in the civil rights movement did not follow them in opposition to the war.
There were additional reasons why the strategy of the civil rights movement was not successful with the Vietnam situation. First, one consequence of the Cold War was that Americans were more inclined to be patriotic than prophetic where communism was involved. In its ecumenical work, the NCC walked a tightrope “between loyalty to American values and commitment to an international, justice-focused, ecumenical worldview” (49). Second, there was little differentiation among the multifaceted groups of the antiwar movement. NCC leaders were viewed as being in league with all manner of radical and extreme groups. The chaos and extremism of the 1969 Detroit General Assembly did nothing to dispel these assumptions. Third, NCC leaders attempted to visit North Vietnam during the war and maintained lines of communication with all parties involved in the conflict, including third-party groups active in South Vietnam. While their motive was a negotiated settlement, NCC leaders were criticized for being sympathetic to the enemy. In fact, Gill says that because of their network of contacts in Vietnam, NCC leaders were aware of the Tet Offensive in advance (204). Finally, of greatest significance is the divide that developed between the leadership of the NCC, the leadership of its constituent denominations, and the laity in mainline Protestant churches. Nearly all coordination and cooperation disintegrated.
Gill makes much of the internal struggles of the NCC. One struggle was between a comprehensive vision (a desire for a truly ecumenical witness) and a narrower scope (a drive to be prophetic on social issues). There were a few leaders at the NCC who understood the difference and advocated the comprehensive vision. The key leader was Robert S. Bilheimer who is the hero of Gill's historical narrative. Another part of this story is the divide between the Church World Service (CWS) and the International Affairs Commission (IAC). Ultimately CWS, the arm of the NCC that provided humanitarian aid, split from the rest of the NCC and maintained good relations with the churches by eschewing any sense of prophetic mission.
Embattled Ecumenism makes a valuable contribution to the scholarship of American religious history in the second half of the twentieth century. One comes away from Gill's work thrilled by the courageous work of NCC leaders yet saddened by the loss of a vital Christian ecumenical witness in the United States. At this point in history, U.S. Protestant Christianity was more informed by national ethos than ecumenical vision. It is also clear how the context of the Vietnam War has shaped the religious landscape that exists today.
