Discussions of immigration policy and border enforcement have become increasingly central to electoral platforms, policymakers, and international negotiations—especially in the European Union and United States. Therefore, Immigration and Discrimination: (Un)Welcoming Others by Sahar Akhtar is a timely and informative read, asking important questions about the origins of immigration policy, the short- and long-term reasons behind such policies, and the ethical implications of both origin and policy. Akhtar asserts that the existing framing of immigration policy—states and their populations can be defined by singular identity characteristics—does not adequately or accurately reflect the reality that both states and migrant populations are complicated (p. 5). Employing both economic and empirical research, Akhtar demonstrates that the concept of wrongful discrimination can be applied internationally to states’ admission decisions.
In chapters 1 and 2, Akhtar lays the groundwork for the rest of the book. She introduces the conventional position that “states have extensive moral rights to make admission decisions as they choose or even to close their border,” what she defines broadly as “states’ choice” (p. 16). Akhtar also makes a critical distinction between what is and is not considered morally acceptable criteria by immigration theorists: states may use security- and safety-oriented reasons as morally acceptable bases for policy, whereas racial and ethnic criteria are illegitimate. Thus, Akhtar argues that immigration and states’ admission decisions should be comprehended in terms of an antidiscrimination framework. That is, by utilizing principles of relational equality—the idea that people “must relate to each other as equals or stand in equal relations” in social, political, and economic life—it is clear that states have a moral duty to avoid contributing to the reduced opportunities of vulnerable groups, as well as to ensure such groups are respected in all areas of society (p. 51).
Akhtar continues throughout the book to develop the idea that while disadvantaged groups are often morally permitted to exclude others based on their identity, a state’s “right to exclude” is ultimately unethical (p. 163). In discussing the differences between states’ choice and right to exclude, she astutely highlights that supporting a state’s right to exclude is to claim that a state has a moral right to commit moral wrongs in the context of its admission decisions. Granting states the right to exclude grants states the right to sole discretion to decide their membership makeup “free from any … interference by outsiders”; in other words, the right to exclude seemingly includes the freedom from interference (p. 166). The problem, as Akhtar identifies, is that states are not unilaterally entitled to make decisions about whom to admit into their borders because states that commit moral wrongs regarding migrants and immigration policy are not legitimate states protected from international interference. Here, she differentiates between claim rights and liberty rights, noting that states cannot claim to have rights to implement immigration decisions that are morally wrong (p. 167). In order to be legitimate, states must include a “global, cooperative migration scheme,” as has been argued by David Owen, and endeavor to protect the basic human rights of both members and nonmembers; otherwise, the state forfeits its right against interference to exclude (pp. 168–69).
Through countless intriguing examples from all over the world (going beyond Western borders), Immigration and Discrimination makes very compelling arguments against many of the conventional immigration theories. It is a valuable read for those seeking a fresh, comprehensive, and nuanced perspective on ethical immigration policy.
—The Editors
