Introduction: The British Connection Revisited
The Charter is a Canadian paradox. Pierre Trudeau believed that a Charter of Human Rights would provide Canadians with a new beginning and strengthen national unity by settling difficult questions about the Canadian identity. “The search for this Canadian identity,” he wrote, “had led me to … the Charter” (Reference Trudeau1993: 323). But Canada's unity and identity remains fragile, contested and elusive. Moreover, those who opposed the entrenchment of rights even believed that Trudeau's proposal represented a defeat for the Canadian identity and a step in the Americanization of Canada. Confederation, they insisted, had “hoped to preserve the British connection” and it was far removed from doctrines of “natural rights” which inspired the American Revolution (Creighton, Reference Creighton1964: 142–43; Lipset, Reference Lipset1990: 1–4). For them, Canada was committed to traditional and conservative British values of the kind incisively described by George Grant in Lament for a Nation (Reference Grant1971) and to British modes of governance built on parliamentary institutions and parliamentary sovereignty as classically portrayed by Walter Bagehot (Reference Bagehot1867) and A.V. Dicey (Reference Dicey1885). A Charter of Human Rights, they insisted, represented a significant shift toward an aggressive and atomistic rights-conscious liberal individualism characteristic of American-style judicial supremacy and institutionalized the kind of government by judiciary that was familiar under American constitutionalism (Cairns, Reference Cairns1988: 230–34; Creighton, Reference Creighton1970: 355–56; Grant, Reference Grant1971: 3–4, 33, 54–57, 68–72). In response, supporters of the Charter insisted that their concern was with human rights and that the Charter finally brought human rights into the Canadian constitution. But even if their reply is accepted, a difficulty remains. Since abstract human rights attach to human beings as such, how could their entrenchment settle questions about the Canadian identity or distinguish Canada from the United States?
To understand the Charter, either as enacted in 1982 or as originally conceived by Trudeau and his critics, it is necessary to begin not with the Americanization thesis or the debate about judicial supremacy, but with “the British connection” and to consider how Confederation and the Charter relate to it. But no topic is more easily misunderstood. Canadians assume that they embraced the British constitution at Confederation, while Americans rejected it. To support this claim it seems only necessary to cite the preamble to the BNA Act, which proclaims (in part) the desire of Canadians to have a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom. No similar desire is expressed in the US constitution. However, these facts tell only part of the story. Canadians emphasized their tie with Great Britain, yet the Confederation Settlement departed in significant ways from English constitutionalism. As for the American Republic, it denounced the tyranny of George III and proclaimed inalienable individual rights in the Declaration of Independence, yet the framers of the US constitution found much to admire in the checks and balances of the eighteenth-century British constitution and emulated it as far as the circumstances of their society permitted. What, then, is the British connection? What are its implications for Canadian and American modes of governance? And what happened to the Canadian identity and Canadian constitutionalism when the Charter of Rights was adopted? Did Canada, as the Americanization thesis asserts, become more like the United States by forgetting its past, embracing an atomistic rights-conscious individualism and substituting judicial supremacy for parliamentary supremacy?
Even to ask these questions requires a reorientation of constitutional theory away from the abstract theorizing about the state of nature characteristic of early modern political theory and sensitivity to issues first raised by Montesquieu, who Judith Shklar and others have called “the father of [modern] constitutions” (Reference Shklar1987: 111). Montesquieu provided the classic eighteenth century account of the British constitution and exercised enormous influence on the framers of the US constitution. He also initiated a revolution in method. Rather than focus on hypothetical models and ideal solutions, Montesquieu was, Isaiah Berlin noted, “most himself, when he tries to convey a culture or an outlook or a system of values different from his own and from that of the majority of his readers” (Berlin, Reference Berlin and Hardy1979: 157). He was not a monist but a pluralist, and he opposed abstract utopian rationalism in politics and constitution-making (Ceaser, Reference Ceaser2011: 31–37). “Many things,” Montesquieu wrote, “govern men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the government, examples of past things, mores, and manners; a general spirit is formed as a result” (1748: 310). Through him, it is possible to probe “the British connection” and to unravel relationships between the British constitution, America's compound republic and the Canadian experiment. In addition, his revolution in method facilitates an understanding of the Charter that connects it to Confederation and distinguishes it from the US Bill of Rights.
A Montesquieuean analysis reveals that Canada did not become more like the United States or less like Great Britain when it adopted the Charter. Rather, Trudeau's initial Charter proposal that combined an abstract theory of inalienable rights and a monistic conception of Canadian citizenship was significantly reshaped by the pluralism of Canada, with the result that the 1982 Charter reflected the mosaic character of Canada itself (Romanow et al., Reference Romanow, Whyte and Lesson1984: 259). By contributing to a distinctive Canadian constitutionalism, however, the Charter neither finally established national unity nor finally defined the Canadian identity. Its inability to achieve all that Pierre Trudeau promised should not be altogether surprising. For the Charter is one part of Canada's pluralistic constitution and not the whole of it.
The Americanization thesis takes too simple a view of the Charter, Canadian constitutionalism and the British connection. It is also relies on a one-sided understanding of American constitutionalism, in which the theory of judicial supremacy postulated in Marbury v. Madison (1803) almost displaces the ideas of the framers about democratic republicanism. In a study of America's Constitutional Soul, Harvey Mansfield emphasizes the enduring significance of the framers’ constitution. The American framers, he argues, viewed themselves as great lawgivers. Their focus was on “we the people” and they knew that the ancient democracies had easily disintegrated. Their achievement was to formalize and reshape popular government through the institutions of constitutional government, including the separation of powers celebrated by Montesquieu, so that America's “we the people” would not easily fall prey to demagogues or political passions but would provide a firm foundation for stable, energetic, and deliberate democratic government (Mansfield, Reference Mansfield1991: ix, 8–17, 216–18). In Charter versus Federalism (Reference Cairns1992), Alan Cairns reflects on Canada's constitutional soul. In Canada, “we the people” is replaced by a fragmented political community. Moreover, Cairns notes that the Charter, the failed Meech Lake Accord, and other initiatives were not just struggles for power between Trudeau, Lévesque, provincial premiers, Aboriginal leaders, and many other political actors. “It was for the possession of our souls,” Cairns writes, “that the contending governments fought” (6).
In his attempt to reshape the soul of Canada, Trudeau encountered Montesquieu's spirit of the laws expressed as Canadian pluralism. If anything, the pluralism of Canada, which left its mark on the institutional structure of Confederation and reshaped Trudeau's Charter, is too pervasive and important to be reduced to “the British connection” and ideas about parliamentary supremacy or “the Americanization thesis” and theories of judicial supremacy.
Rights and the Americanization Thesis
Historically, Canadians have both emphasized the British connection and opposed American republicanism. An often-cited illustration is the contrast between the ideal of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” found in the Declaration of Independence and the commitment to “peace, order and good government” enshrined in Confederation (Grant, Reference Grant1971: 62–65, 71; Lipset, Reference Lipset1990: 93). Not only has this contrast achieved almost mythical status, but it figures prominently in accounts of the Americanization thesis and underpins the belief that the Charter represents a threat to the Canadian identity. In Continental Divide, Lipset insists that “by enacting the Charter, Canada has gone far toward joining the United States culturally” (Reference Lipset1990: 226). He admits that the Charter contains unique provisions and discerns continuing differences between Canada and the United States, yet his emphasis is on the Charter as “the most important step that Canada has taken to Americanize itself” (101–06, 225). Behind Lipset's assessment of the Charter is his reconstruction of the United States and Canada as “two countries [that] came out of the American Revolution.” One, “the country of the revolution,” proclaimed “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”; the other, “the counterrevolutionary nation,” embraced “peace, order, and good government” (1–2). But with the enactment of the Charter of Rights, Lipset goes on to say, a “striking change” occurred and Canada shifted significantly towards the “American model” (3, 101).
The contrast—“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” versus “peace, order and good government” —is important, but it cannot bear the weight Lipset puts on it. Part of the difficulty is that the phrases occur in functionally dissimilar documents: a declaration that dissolves government and a statute that establishes it. Moreover, the Declaration of Independence is not the constitution. One indication of the gulf between them is that the constitution did not initially contain a bill of rights and its principal architect never became fully convinced of the necessity for one. In a letter to Jefferson, Madison wrote, “I have never thought the omission [of a bill of rights] a material defect, nor been anxious to supply it even by subsequent amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others” (Meyers, Reference Meyers1973: 205, emphasis in original). If, as Madison believed, American constitutionalism is not identical either with the Declaration of Independence or the Bill of Rights, then simple statements about the Canadian Charter as an Americanizing instrument are questionable to say the least.
In Madison's formulation, the essence of American constitutionalism is not “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” nor judicially enforced rights against government, but a complex theory of the compound republic (Adair, Reference Adair1998: 144–51, 190–94; Ceaser, Reference Ceaser2011: 120–26). Once Americans severed their tie with Great Britain, the problem became how to construct the American Union, and no simple appeal to inalienable rights or the pursuit of happiness could solve that problem. Moreover, if Lockean ideas inspired the Declaration of Independence, Montesquieu set the stage for the constitution (Diamond, Reference Diamond, Glazer and Kristol1976: 45–55). In the debate over the constitution, Montesquieu was repeatedly cited by Federalists and Anti-Federalists because he had identified the problem that most troubled Americans in 1787. In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu wrote, “It is natural that small states be governed as republics; those of moderate size, as monarchies; and that great empires be dominated by despots” (Richter, Reference Richter1977: 235). Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists believed that Americans formed one people. Both desired a more effectual union. Both abhorred despotism. Where they disagreed was with respect to the innovations proposed by the Federal Convention. The proposed constitution, warned Anti-Federalists in language that echoed Montesquieu, would produce “one consolidated government … [and] an iron handed despotism” (Storing, Reference Storing1985: 210, emphasis in original).
The Federalist, and especially Madison's contribution to it, contains the classic reply to the Anti-Federalist critique. It attempted to demonstrate that the proposed constitution violated none of Montesquieu's principles of freedom. Thus Madison insisted that although the constitution embodied only a partial separation of powers, it took full account of Montesquieu's maxim about it (Ceaser, Reference Ceaser2011: 120–24; Mansfield, Reference Mansfield1991: 115–27). Montesquieu, Madison explained, “did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other” (Hamilton et al., Reference Hamilton, Madison, Jay and Wright1788: 338, emphasis in original). On the contrary, partial agency was necessary to achieve Montesquieu's goal of constitutional liberty. Hamilton also defended the proposed constitution as based on Montesquieu's principles. “The opponents,” Hamilton noted, “cited … Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government.” But, he added, “they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments … expressed in another part of his work.” They had overlooked that “Montesquieu … treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism” (126–27, emphasis in original).
The constitution incorporated many of Montesquieu's insights, but it also went beyond them. When Hamilton insisted that the union must possess authority over citizens, he added a new element to Montesquieu's idea of a confederate republic, one that transformed it from a league of governments to a government of citizens (158–59). It fell to Madison to explain why the transformation did not create a despotic government. In order to do so, Madison went behind Montesquieu's discussion of a confederate republic and criticized the small republic theory which underpinned it. Small republics were praised for their love of liberty and their devotion to self-government. But, said Madison, they provided few securities for freedom, were easily transformed into wretched nurseries of internal warfare and allowed one faction to oppress all the rest. According to Madison, part of the solution to these difficulties was to embrace the idea of an extended republic. By extending the sphere of a republic, parties and interests would be multiplied and a majority of the whole would have less motive to invade the rights of other citizens. For Madison, “this policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defects of better motives” also applied to the separation of powers and to federalism itself (135, 356). In the extent and proper structure of the American union, Madison discovered “a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government,” and a powerful rejoinder to the Anti-Federalist critique (136).
More than anyone else, Madison identified the core premises of the constitution and reconstructed Montesquieu's theory. Political liberty, Montesquieu insisted, exists only under moderate government and only if power is not abused. “To prevent the abuse of power, things must be so ordered that power checks power.” Moreover, “there is no liberty, if the power to judge is not separated from the legislative and executive powers” (Richter, Reference Richter1977: 244, 245). Montesquieu described an intricate separation of powers and a complex system of checks and balances and found both in the English constitution (1748: 156–66). In the compound republic described by Madison, there is no king, or lords, or even commons. But there is a president, a senate, and a house of representatives, which, when combined with a federal system and independent judges, ingeniously institutionalizes in America a version of the model of government that, for Montesquieu, secured liberty in England (Bailyn, Reference Bailyn1967: 296–301).
Although Anti-Federalists were unsuccessful in their opposition to the constitution, they did secure amendments known as the Bill of Rights. But the bill of rights demanded by them restricted only the central government and not the states. Moreover, individual rights against government constituted only one of its motifs and not, in their view, its most important feature. “The genius of the Bill [of Rights],” it has been suggested, “was not to downplay organizational structure but to deploy it, not to impede popular majorities but to empower them” (Amar, Reference Amar1998: xii; Sandel, Reference Sandel1996: 33–9). Trial by jury, which was a key Anti-Federalist demand, appeared in three of the ten amendments. “Trial by jury,” wrote an Anti-Federalist, “is essential in every free country [because] common people should have a part … in the judicial as well as in the legislative department” (Storing, Reference Storing1985: 58). Similarly, the right of assembly and the right to bear arms, protected by the First and Second Amendments, were primarily intended to be rights of self-government rather than as atomistic rights against government. The Bill of Rights, as demanded by the Anti-Federalists and adopted in 1791, “seems largely republican and collective, sounding mainly in … the public liberty of the ancients” (Amar, Reference Amar1998: 133). Its sound was frequently un-Lockean and more than one step removed from the liberty of the moderns.
Despite their disagreements, Federalists and Anti-Federalists shared the same objective: to strengthen the American union without institutionalizing despotism and without disempowering the people. As a Federalist, Madison defended the idea of a compound republic and the checks and balances implicit in it, whereas Anti-Federalists favoured devices that more directly empowered the people. Common ground was provided by Montesquieu. As for a bill of rights, not even Anti-Federalists attached over-riding importance to it (Storing, Reference Storing1981b: 15–23, 64–70). They were far more concerned with protecting local democracy and enhancing representative institutions in the central government. To some Americans, a declaration of rights also seemed an alien idea. After noting that “bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects,” Hamilton even insisted that such devices “have no application to constitutions, professedly founded upon the power of the people” (1788: 534). Although Hamilton's argument did not prevail, it creates additional difficulties for the Americanization thesis. If Americans of the founding generation neither regarded a bill of rights as a uniquely American idea, nor attached priority to it, then no simple appeal to it can show that Canada Americanized itself when it adopted its Charter of Rights.
English Liberty and Canadian Federalism
The Americanization thesis also takes too simple a view of Confederation. In 1867, Canadians rejected American republicanism and expressed their desire to have a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom. But, in rejecting the American model, they did not thereby indicate opposition to freedom or suppose that peace, order and good government was antithetical to the freedom of the individual (Ajzenstat, Reference Ajzenstat2007: 40–66). Moreover, by 1867, Bagehot was challenging Montesquieu's checks and balances theory and, for him, the English constitution rested “on the principle of choosing a single sovereign authority, and making it good” (Bagehot, Reference Bagehot1867: 202). The Fathers of Confederation embraced a Bagehot-like understanding of the English constitution, applied it to Canada as far as their circumstances allowed and regarded their creation as superior to the American model which, in their view, had been a principal cause of the American Civil War.
In the Confederation debates, Macdonald dismissed the American president as “but the successful leader of a party” and “in a great measure a despot” (Parliamentary Debates, 1865: 33). In contrast, Canadians would have a sovereign representative who acts on the advice of ministers responsible to the people through Parliament. “We all feel,” Macdonald emphasized, the advantages of “our connection with England” which secures “constitutional liberty according to the British system” (44). After Confederation, proposals for a bill of rights often met with responses that echoed Macdonald's views. But what had Confederation accomplished and what implications did it have for English liberty and the bill of rights issue?
In Brassard v. Langevin (1877), decided shortly after Confederation, Justice Taschereau provided a partial answer. “We have borrowed from England,” he insisted, “institutions which, as regards civil and religious liberty, leave to Canadians nothing to envy in other countries” (Schmeiser, Reference Schmeiser1964: 1). Still, in times of war or other perceived crises, calls for an entrenched bill of rights were sometimes audible. One such crisis involved the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Duplessis Government. In 1946, with 800 of their members facing trial, the Witnesses distributed an anti-Catholic pamphlet, Quebec's Burning Hate, that led to a charge of seditious libel against Aimé Boucher. Other Witnesses, including Laurier Saumur, were arrested for violating a municipal by-law that forbade the distribution of literature without a license from the chief of police. Finally, Frank Roncarelli's liquor license was cancelled, on Duplessis's order, because he had posted bail for hundreds of his fellow Witnesses (Penton, Reference Penton1976: 182, 202–23). These cases eventually made their way to the Supreme Court. But before they did, W. Glen How's “The Case for a Canadian Bill of Rights” appeared. Himself a Witness, How warned that, since the unwritten British constitution meant “unlimited legislative power” and left “much to be desired as [a] practical safeguard for civil liberties,” Canadians should stop appealing to it (Reference How1948: 763). “In a land such as ours,” he insisted, “peopled by so many different racial and ethnic groups … the rights of the individual citizen must be written in the constitution” (796).
However, the absence of a constitutional bill of rights did not prevent the Supreme Court from ruling in favour of the Witnesses. A divided court acquitted Boucher partly on the ground that seditious libel required an intention to incite violence or resistance, and not just a mere tendency to create discontent (Boucher v. the King, 1951: 265). Saumur v. City of Quebec (1953) was also decided in their favour: four judges ruling that power to restrict fundamental freedoms by regulating city streets was ultra vires a province; two that it was intra vires; another two that control of the streets was a police power of a province; and one that the by-law violated the Freedom of Worship Act (299). In Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959), a majority held that the premier had acted arbitrarily in ordering the revocation of the liquor license, and awarded substantial damages against him (122). All three decisions are Canadian landmarks, and two of them illustrate the value of English constitutionalism. Under it, judges can protect liberty by applying restrictive rules of interpretation to statutes and regulations that impinge upon individual rights (Keir and Lawson, Reference Keir and Lawson1967: 11–14). In Boucher v. the King, such a strategy was used and the appellant went free. An even more fundamental aspect of English liberty is the rule of law: no one is above or outside the law, and officials must act within their lawful authority or face penalties for their failure. Roncarelli v. Duplessis is important precisely because it vindicated the rule of law and affirmed, for Canadians, the enduring value of English liberty.
The rule of law is part of the British connection that Macdonald emphasized. One of the classic discussions of both the rule of law and the British connection is Dicey's Law of the Constitution (1885), published two decades after Confederation. Dicey emphasized the common law origins of the rule of law, and also insisted that the sovereignty of Parliament in no way undermines it. “Two features,” he wrote, “have … since the Norman Conquest characterized the political institutions of England” (183). The first is the omnipotence of the central government, originally expressed as royal supremacy and subsequently as the sovereignty of Parliament. The second is the rule or supremacy of law, which Dicey contrasted with “those declarations or definitions of rights so dear to foreign constitutionalists” (197). Equally important is Dicey's famous account of the conventions of the English constitution and how constitutional conventions secure responsible government (429–31). Dicey's book made explicit much that the Canadian founders took for granted. Where they differed, however, was with respect to the British connection. In fact, Dicey dismissed as a “diplomatic inaccuracy” the assertion, found in the preamble to the BNA Act, that Canada's constitution was similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom (165). The Canadian constitution, Dicey insisted, was in many ways more like that of the United States (166–68).
The important issue raised by Dicey as to the character of the Canadian constitution is not easily resolved. Still, the preamble to the BNA Act is revealing because it acknowledges the desire of the provinces to be “federally united.” The Canadian founders valued the English connection and admired British parliamentary sovereignty. But they also had to take account of the pluralism of Canada which, among other things, necessitated concessions to the federal principle. Schooled in Austinian jurisprudence, Dicey regarded a federal division of powers as incompatible with English-style sovereignty and as indicative of American notions of governance (138–80). The division of powers in the BNA Act also created other complications. Under the British constitution, Parliament has the power to protect, regulate and even abridge basic freedoms. But in Canada, neither level of government was expressly allocated power over basic freedoms by the BNA Act and subsequent judicial decisions compounded the uncertainty. Consequently, the BNA Act and Canadian federalism often appeared to lead to a confusion of powers when it came to many of the freedoms cherished by English constitutionalism. With such a confusion of powers, Frank Scott demurred shortly after Saumur v. City of Quebec, “it is hard to protect [freedom] by law when you do not know whom it belongs to” (Scott, Reference Scott1959a: 50).
The problem identified by Scott also has more general implications for theoretical attempts to reconcile parliamentary sovereignty and Canadian federalism under the BNA Act. One view is that “so long as the term ‘parliamentary supremacy’ [ultimately] referred to the British Parliament, and so long as the Judicial Committee [in London] served as [Canadian federalism's] umpire ab extra, the contradiction between the two principles created no problem” (Verney, Reference Verney1986: 152). But that view is countered by the impact of the Judicial Committee's decisions on the structure of Canadian federalism and the long-standing Canadian debate on the Judicial Committee and its critics. Far from dispelling the problem identified by Scott or reconciling parliamentary sovereignty and federalism, one constitutional scholar noted that “the interpretation of the British North America Act by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is one of the most contentious aspects of the constitutional evolution of Canada” (Cairns, Reference Cairns1971: 301).
A federal division of powers made the Canadian constitution less like that of the United Kingdom. Did it also make Canada more like the United States? “In Canada, as in the United States,” wrote Dicey, “the courts inevitably become the interpreters of the constitution” (1885: 168). For Dicey, it was judicial review that conclusively established the kinship between Canadian and American institutions. Judicial review of the federal division of powers certainly brings Canada closer to the United States, but there are also considerations on the other side. Some of them have to do with the limitations on the scope and functions of judicial review under Confederation. In “Constitutionalism in Canada,” published a decade before the adoption of the Charter, Bora Laskin noted the “major differences between the judicial review obtained under the Canadian constitution and its operation in the United States” (Reference Laskin and Schwartz1970: 173). First, in Canada, unlike the United States, the courts could issue advisory opinions without the need of having a “case or controversy.” Second, in Canada the range of inquiry into constitutional validity was normally limited by the ordinary rules of statutory construction. Third, judicial review in Canada was not directly concerned with preservation of the doctrine of the separation of powers. Fourth, since the Canadian constitution had no bill of rights, Canadian courts did not develop the near-legislative function with respect to rights that American courts had. Laskin's fourth point is sometimes expressed by saying that in Canada before the Charter, Parliament and the provincial legislatures were “sovereign within their spheres” and the crucial question asked by the courts about legislation was, “does it come under federal or provincial jurisdiction?” (Russell, Reference Russell1973: xiv).
What Dicey overlooked was not just important differences with respect to judicial review in Canada and the United States. Even more consequential are the different values that ground the Canadian and American federal experiments. Confederation had military and commercial objectives, as did the American union, and it too envisioned an extensive country. But the Confederation debates contain no discussion of Montesquieu's problem of size and its implications for the problem of despotism. These were American problems. Moreover, if Montesquieu identified the problem that most troubled Americans in 1787, Lord Durham was the crucial figure for Canadians of the founding generation. Durham's name was repeatedly invoked by those who opposed Confederation. To Christopher Dunkin, Confederation even appeared to compound the difficulties identified by Durham as “the war of races” by combining divergent racial and local identities within its framework (Craig, Reference Craig1963: 22–23; Parliamentary Debates, 1865: 509, 514). “Much had been said on the war of races,” retorted Taché, “but that war was extinguished … [when] the British Government granted Canada Responsible Government” (Parliamentary Debates, 1865: 10).
In fact, Confederation went beyond responsible government. It also went beyond the quasi-federal measures that French Canadians had helped to devise to promote their nationality and to radically transform the union of 1841 (Ormsby, Reference Ormsby1969: 122–25). Confederation, unlike the American Union, included constitutional guarantees of minority language and education rights, as well as a federal division of powers that responded to racial, cultural and local identities (Ajzenstat, Reference Ajzenstat2007: 88–91; Scott, Reference Scott1959b: 18–27). “Canadian Confederation,” it has been said, “was a native creation. There was no intention of imitating the United States” (Waite, Reference Waite1962: 115). Canadians did intend to imitate the United Kingdom. But the brand of federalism and the scheme of minority rights that distinguished Canada from the American union also made its constitution unlike that of the United Kingdom.
As a native creation, Confederation conferred on the federal parliament power to enact laws for the “peace, order, and good government” of the new dominion. That phrase is sometimes taken to express a Canadian commitment to a deeply conservative and anti-modern political philosophy or an authoritarian and even Hobbesian conception of political order, which is then contrasted with an open-ended American belief in libertarianism (Grant, Reference Grant1971: 68–71; Lipset, Reference Lipset1990: 44; Vaughan, Reference Vaughan2003: 7–14, 70–73). But Canadians valued their inheritance of liberty in 1867, dreamed of creating a prosperous commercial union, and Macdonald extolled “constitutional liberty according to the British system.” Nor were the American framers so blinded by liberty's bright light that they ignored Madison's “reflection that liberty [is] equally exposed to danger whether the Government [has] too much power or too little power” (Meyers, Reference Meyers1973: 208; Storing, Reference Storing1981b: 71). Where Canadians and Americans differed most was in terms of their respective models of “good government” and the divergent assumptions that underpinned them. In their determination to create “a more perfect union” that avoided tyranny but secured “the blessings of liberty,” Americans eventually settled for a compound republic modeled in many ways on the checks and balances of the eighteenth-century British constitution, and coupled it with a bill of rights that expressed civic republican ideals of governance. Canadians admired constitutional monarchy and parliamentary institutions as they existed under the nineteenth-century British constitution, but modified them to take account of a unique scheme of federalism and minority group rights that implicitly rejected Durham's assimilation proposal, accepted cultural and even “racial” pluralism, and prepared the ground for the bill of rights debate in the next century. In both cases, British institutions had been transplanted and significantly modified by what Montesquieu called the spirit of the laws (1748: 310–33; see also Ceaser, Reference Ceaser2011: 32–34; Durkheim, Reference Durkheim1970: 40–44).
The Fourteenth Amendment, the Charter of Rights and the Spirit of the Laws
Neither the US constitution nor Canadian Confederation remained as the founding generation left them. After the Civil War, Americans adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, a second bill of rights that transformed the first. Sponsors of the amendment were longstanding opponents of slavery. They also regarded federalism with suspicion because of its association with slavery and other violations of rights and conferred power on Congress to enforce the amendment against the states (Curtis, Reference Curtis1986: 27–56). The original Bill of Rights “focused centrally on empowering the people collectively against government agents following their own agenda.” The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, “focused on protecting minorities against even responsive, representative majoritarian government” (Amar, Reference Amar1998: 215). When judicial enforcement is added, the result is the liberal-egalitarian conception of the US Bill of Rights that dominates many contemporary discussions of the Americanization thesis. “Our constitutional system,” writes Ronald Dworkin, “rests on a particular moral theory, namely, that men have moral rights against the state” (Reference Dworkin1977: 147). Dworkin does not confine the liberal-egalitarian conception of a bill of rights to developments in the United States. Instead, he abstracts and universalizes it by insisting that “constitutionalism [is] the theory that the majority must be restrained to protect individual rights” (142).
Implicit in Dworkin's model of constitutionalism is a subtler and more engaging version of the Americanization thesis than the one that regards the Charter as a significant step away from Confederation's “peace, order and good government.” On Dworkin's model, Canada became more like the United States because, by adopting its Charter, it finally recognized human rights, finally conferred power on judges to protect them, and finally limited the unrestricted power of the majority. Like Rawls before him, Dworkin appeals to a Kantian notion of human dignity to ground human rights and thereby wraps his model of constitutionalism in an alluring ethics of humanistic universalism (1977: 198–99). But Dworkin's model is misleading even as an account of American constitutionalism, and becomes more so if applied to Canada and the Charter. Instead of revealing incontestable truths about rights and their protection, Dworkin's model universalizes and distorts the particular. It also obscures important differences between Canada and the United States made visible by the kind of embedded constitutionalism articulated by Montesquieu.
Judged from the perspective of American constitutional history, Dworkin's model not only takes for granted the shift produced by the Fourteenth Amendment, but also distorts the significance of the transformation. In Gitlow v. New York, decided in 1925, the Supreme Court first announced that the free speech and press protections of the First Amendment were among the rights guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth (Curtis, Reference Curtis1986: 197–98). Gradually thereafter, the court expanded the list of guaranteed rights and pitted them against majoritarian democracy at both the local and national level. Then came the Warren court's landmark decisions on desegregation, voting rights and criminal procedure which vindicated for a significant number of Americans the liberal-egalitarian conception of the Bill of Rights. For many of them, Dworkin captured the essence of their political commitment when he defended the judicial activism of the Warren court against Richard Nixon and his supporters. The courts, Dworkin insisted, should devise “principles of legality, equality, and the rest, revise [them] from time to time in the light of … fresh moral insight, and judge the acts of Congress, the states, and the President accordingly” (1977: 137, 149). In Dworkin's hands, the constitution had become the Bill of Rights, the Bill of Rights had become individual rights against the majority and individual rights against the majority had become judicial activism.
Of the Warren court's decisions, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) is not only the most important, but also the one that appears to fit Dworkin's model best and ultimately provides the best test of it. In Brown, the court, relying on the Fourteenth Amendment, reversed the “separate but equal doctrine” and mandated racially integrated schools, despite much opposition to them (483). But when Brown is understood in its context, Dworkin's model encounters considerable difficulties. Historically, Brown was necessary partly because racial segregation had been upheld by the Supreme Court, in 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, an inconvenient fact for Dworkin's theory and related ideas of judges as unflinching guardians of individual and minority rights. Moreover, the court's Brown decision did not implement itself. The impact of Brown was slight until the federal government threatened to withhold funds from segregated schools. Equally significant was the president's decision to dispatch US Army troops to Little Rock, Arkansas to effect the admission of Black students to a local high school. Not even the most activist court in American history acted alone or in the way suggested by Dworkin (Bickel, Reference Bickel1962: 247–72).
The Fourteenth Amendment transformed the Bill of Rights and diminished the power of the states. But the constitutional foundations of the American Republic remained much as before. In the Congressional debate on the Bill of Rights, Madison had argued that, if incorporated into the constitution, its provisions should also extend to the states on the ground that the greatest threat to liberty would come from local majorities (Meyers, Reference Meyers1973: 221–26). Although his argument was rejected in 1791, it eventually prevailed. “Full vindication of the Madisonian vision” came with “the adoption of our Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War” (Amar, Reference Amar1998: 22–23; see also Storing, Reference Storing, Rossum and McDowell1981a: 29–45). In Madison's constitutional vision, courts are not the sole or even the ultimate guardians of individual liberty. Instead, they are part of the institutional arrangement of the compound republic, which itself presupposes the extended republic of America (Agresto, Reference Agresto1984: 96–138; Beard, Reference Beard1962: 55–58). It took Lincoln and the Civil War to end slavery, and the Supreme Court's Brown decision to signal the end of legally sanctioned racial discrimination. But it was Madison who envisioned the institutional arrangements capable of guaranteeing the Brown decision and facilitating the new birth of freedom that Lincoln prayed for in the Gettysburg Address.
Dworkin's model encounters still greater difficulties if the focus is shifted to Canada. With respect to the United States, Dworkin neglects the Madisonian foundations, but his idea of “rights as trumps” does capture dimensions of what atomistic and individualistic America has become (Reference Dworkin1985: 198; Sandel, Reference Sandel1984: 93–95). In Canada, however, “rights as trumps” strikes a more discordant note for reasons unrelated to “peace, order and good government.” There is no incompatibility between rights and good government, in Canada or elsewhere. But there are different conceptions of rights, and the core conception that underpins Confederation and the Charter is not an individualistic or atomistic notion of rights as trumps. “Canada,” as Michael Ignatieff and others have noted, “has become one of the most distinctive rights cultures in the world” (Reference Ignatieff2000: 7; see also Glendon, Reference Glendon1991: 38–39, 164–67). One aspect of its distinctiveness is the recognition accorded to a multiplicity of group rights and group identities by the Canadian Charter. Moreover, the Charter has been described as a “wrenching transformation” not because of individual rights but because “it brings new groups into the Canadian constitutional order and gives them constitutional identities” (Cairns, Reference Cairns1991: 179). Empowered by the Charter, those groups, in turn, have adopted far-reaching litigation strategies in the courts, influence more profoundly the federal and provincial legislative agenda and are active political participants in the process of formal constitutional amendment (Brodie, Reference Brodie2002: xiv-xvii, 123–27; Cairns, Reference Cairns1992: 74–95; Morton and Knopff, Reference Morton and Knopff2000: 149–66). The transformation effected by the Charter is as important as that brought about by the Fourteenth Amendment, but it is a transformation that fits within a different constitutional landscape. It is also a transformation begun in response to a problem that has no parallel in American constitutional experience.
In the years before its adoption, the Charter's most influential advocate was Pierre Trudeau. Initially, he regarded the Charter primarily as an instrument that would empower judges to protect inalienable rights against legislative infringement (Trudeau, Reference Trudeau1968a: 9–12; Trudeau, Reference Trudeau1968b: 53; see also Kelly, Reference Kelly2005: 80–103). Such a conception of the Charter is similar to Dworkin's theory. But Trudeau eventually formulated a second and more complex rationale for the Charter, one that addressed a recurring problem of Canadian federalism. In the Confederation debates, Dunkin predicted the early demise of Canada partly on the ground that it lacked a principle of cohesion. “Have we any class of people,” he asked, “whose feelings are going to be directed to … Ottawa, the centre of the new nationality that is to be created?” (Parliamentary Debates, 1865: 511). In Trudeau's second formulation, like Dunkin's query, the greatest threat to Canadian unity came from the deep diversity of the federation, compounded after 1867 by continuing decentralization to provincial governments and an organized independence movement in Quebec. But if a declaration guaranteeing the inalienable rights of all Canadians were adopted, Trudeau reasoned, the fragmentation of Canada would be halted and its unity established (Cairns, Reference Cairns1991: 43–44; Russell, Reference Russell1983: 31–43).
Trudeau's second rationale for the Charter builds at least partly on a premise that he took from Montesquieu, and expressed as “create counterweights” (Trudeau, Reference Trudeau1968b: xxii-iii). But, where in Montesquieu's account power checked power, Trudeau's counterweight consisted of inalienable human rights. In this regard, and forgetting Montesquieu's discussion of the spirit of the laws, Trudeau also sought to compare the Charter to the 1789 French Declaration and the 1791 American Bill of Rights. Like them, the Charter, he insisted, established the primacy of the individual, constitutionalized inalienable rights, and strengthened the country's unity based on a set of common values (1968b: 53; Reference Trudeau, Axworthy and Trudeau1990: 363). But the struggle for the Charter and the modifications that were made to it before its adoption tell a different story; they also reveal a side of Canadian pluralism that Trudeau underestimated. Aboriginals, women, ethnics, the disadvantaged, among others, did not regard the Enlightenment's individualistic conception of “the inalienable rights of man” as expressive of their identities or concerns (Cairns, Reference Cairns1991: 166–69). For example, section 25 of the Charter states that it shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any Aboriginal treaty or other rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. The Aboriginal peoples of Canada asserted their historic, collective and communitarian rights as founding peoples, and in doing so demonstrated that Trudeau's conception of the Charter was not an adequate representation of their vision of Canada. Nor were provincial and other fears about the Charter's centralizing and atomizing impact any easier to ignore. As a result, more concessions were made to group rights than Trudeau deemed desirable. And a notwithstanding clause that he abhorred was also added (Reference Trudeau, Axworthy and Trudeau1990: 371; see also Manfredi, Reference Manfredi2001: 169–95). The Charter as adopted still expressed aspects of the Canadian identity, but it was an identity with a tilt toward group rights, which in this and in other ways made the Charter unlike the French Declaration or the American Bill of Rights.
The pluralism of Canada not only reshaped Trudeau's Charter proposal, but also turned it into a peculiar counterweight, significantly different from what Trudeau had envisioned. “On the whole, the Charter,” a constitutional scholar has written, “portrays Canadians as a single national community with other than provincial distinctions” (Cairns, Reference Cairns1992: 85). To that extent, the Charter embodies Trudeau's dream of “one Canada” (Johnston, Reference Johnston1990: 8). But Trudeau's dream of Canada was complex and it changed several times over the years. He also envisioned a Canada committed to diversity, celebrated the Canadian mosaic and wanted French and English to co-operate in a form of pluralistic federalism that belonged to tomorrow's world. “Our image,” he wrote more than a decade before the adoption of the Charter, “is of a land of people with many differences … but a single desire to live in harmony” (Reference Trudeau1972: 33; 1968b: 178–79). But with two failed mega constitutional accords and an almost successful sovereignty referendum in Quebec since its adoption, what the Charter has not produced is a more harmonious and more united Canada. Instead, in the struggle against federal fragmentation, the Charter is an enigmatic and unpredictable counterweight (Laforest, Reference Laforest1995: 107–49; Russell, Reference Russell2004: 228–37).
As a constitutional instrument with political purposes, the Charter bears little resemblance to the political purposes of the (1791) US Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. The Charter is also a legal document that judges interpret and their interpretations cast additional doubts on the Americanization thesis. R. v. Keegstra (1990) (hate speech) and R. v. Butler (1992) (sexist pornography) are among the most important Charter decisions, yet neither decision is like anything decided by American judges. The counterpart of Butler is American Booksellers v. Hudnut (1985), a decision defended by Dworkin. “Speech that expresses racial hatred, or a degrading attitude toward women,” writes Dworkin, “has come to seem intolerable” (Reference Dworkin1996: 217). But, like Judge Easterbrook in American Booksellers, Dworkin argues against prohibiting “the speech that we hate” because “freedom of speech, conceived as negative freedom, is the choice modern democracies have made” (221). That is not the choice Canadian democracy has made, either in Parliament or the provincial legislatures or through the Supreme Court. In Keegstra, Chief Justice Dickson insisted that the Charter necessitated a departure from the view—“prevalent in America”—that the suppression of hate propaganda is incompatible with the guarantee of free expression (R. v. Keegstra, 1990: 743). In Butler, Justice Sopinka upheld the suppression of violent and dehumanizing pornography on grounds that American judges have rejected (R. v. Butler, 1992: 509–11). If the Charter has Americanized Canadian law, many Canadian judges do not seem aware of it.
Conclusion: Continuing Canadian Constitutionalism
In Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998), the Supreme Court reflected on the breakup of Canada. The court also analysed the Canadian constitution. It identified four principles traceable to Confederation as forming its “internal architecture,” namely, federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities. So summarized, the court's analysis seems unexceptional. But it acquires considerable significance if the court's full analysis of the Canadian constitution's “internal architecture” is compared to Dicey's sketch of English constitutionalism or Madison's account of American constitutionalism. Not Dicey's sovereignty of parliament with the rule of law nor Madison's checks and balances in an extended republic but the recognition of divergent ways of life and the protection of ethnic, territorial, national, and other minorities under a common constitution are the characteristics that the court most closely identified with Canada. “The significance of the adoption of a federal form of government [in 1867] cannot be exaggerated.” Without it, neither the agreement of Quebec nor the Maritimes “could have been obtained” (Reference re Secession, 1998: 241). As for the Charter, the court regarded its adoption as momentous, and numerous studies—from Manfredi's Judicial Power and the Charter (2001) and Morton and Knopff on The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (2000) to Kelly's Governing with the Charter (2005) and Barker's Not Quite Supreme (2010)—have discussed dimensions of the Charter's importance, especially with respect to (real or apparent) judicial supremacy. But in the Quebec Secession reference, the court emphasized and re-emphasized something else about the Charter, namely, that the protection of minority rights and group rights did not originate with the Charter but was part of a constitutional design begun at Confederation. Even the protection of Aboriginal rights, “so recently and arduously achieved,” was “consistent with this long tradition of respect for minorities, which is at least as old as Canada” (262). Embedded in the Quebec Secession reference is an account of the Canadian constitutional tradition that does not equate it with either English constitutionalism or the American model but regards it as continuous and sui generis with its deepest roots in the pluralism of Canada and will of Canadians to live amicably together under a common constitution, provided their differences are also recognized, respected, and accommodated (Blattberg, Reference Blattberg2003: 7–9, 136–45; Parliamentary Debates, 1865: 59–61).
But the Supreme Court does not always speak in an unambiguous voice. In the Quebec Secession reference the court also remarked that “with the adoption of the Charter, the Canadian system of government was transformed to a significant extent from a system of Parliamentary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy” (258). It is only a short step from this partial slide into constitutional monism to the contemporary complaint, noted by the court itself in Vriend v. Alberta (1998) and other cases, that “hardly a day goes by” without some comment about judicial “usurpation” of the legislative role under the Charter (562–63). The court has rejected the charge of usurpation partly by insisting that the Charter authorizes its judicial interventions and partly by intimating that it engages in a democratic dialogue with the political branches of government (565). The court's idea of Charter dialogue has many supporters; it also has many critics. But even if the court's reply to the critics of the dialogue theory is accepted, it still shifts the focus away from the court's message in the Quebec Succession reference about Canada's many-sided constitutional pluralism which cannot be subsumed under either Dicey's British-style parliamentary supremacy or American-style judicial supremacy and Dworkin's “rights as trumps” theory. Put in another way, is the Canadian constitution from Confederation to the Charter primarily about “the British connection” versus “the Americanization thesis”? Or is it about the complex identity and unity of a pluralistic Canada, in which questions about rights, legislative power and judicial decision-making must be worked out and cannot be simply borrowed? Perhaps the last (but not the final) word belongs to one of the framers of the US constitution. “I hold with Montesquieu,” Alexander Hamilton wrote in a letter to Lafayette, “that a government must be fitted to a nation … and, consequently, that what may be good at Philadelphia may be bad at Paris, and ridiculous at Petersburgh” (Morris, Reference Morris1969 143–44).
