Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy is a major new account of the different paths European states took in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Following in the tradition established by Barrington Moore’s seminal study Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Daniel Ziblatt seeks to explain why some societies like Britain managed to peacefully transition from oligarchic rule to mass democracy, while in other societies, notably Germany, this transition was unsuccessful. Ziblatt claims that the answer to this puzzle can be found in the presence of well-institutionalized conservative parties in some, but not all, European polities. The book substantiates this argument with a combination of rich data from a wide variety of sources, econometric analysis, and detailed historical narratives.
Throughout Ziblatt demonstrates a mastery of several literatures in history and political science. It is all but impossible to summarize the details of the argument in a short review. Each chapter contains a wealth of data and engages deeply with the relevant historical scholarship. The combination of quantitative and historical analysis makes the book a very impressive piece of social science. It will be essential reading for those interested in Britain’s democratic transition and the failure of liberal democracy to take root in other parts of Europe before WWII.
So why did liberal democracy become established in Britain but not in Germany? Ziblatt considers and dismisses several traditional answers to this question. First, he sets aside the claim that England’s eventual transition to liberal democracy was preordained following the Glorious Revolution in 1689. He further argues that even though the early eighteenth century saw the consolidation of a party system and increased political stability, it was by no means inevitable that Britain would become a liberal democracy by the early twentieth century. Ziblatt argues that landed elites in mid-nineteenth century Britain had every reason to feel threatened by the prospects of mass democracy. He presents data from bond markets that suggest that investors were genuinely worried during periods of democratic turbulence in 1832, 1848, and 1867.
What ensured the relatively smooth transition to mass democracy in the late nineteenth century, in Ziblatt’s view, was the re-founding of the Conservative party as a mass democratic party. This ensured that British elites bought into peaceful democratic change. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Conservative party was a strong Parliamentary party, but it was dominated by a small number of landed elites and lacked a presence in local society. After 1874, however, a modern professional party was built. This achievement rested on the establishment of local associations and party agents who played an important role in mobilizing voters. These associations held frequent meetings which served as both social events and opportunities to canvas political support. The Conservative party that emerged was a mass party based on the Anglican Church, hostility to the Irish and non-denominational Protestants and support for the Empire. As it represented an intersection of different interests, it was able to cut across crude class distinctions.
Even so, Ziblatt claims that Britain’s democratization was a narrower-run thing than many have supposed. He argues that the period of Conservative party weakness between 1906 and 1910 was a period when peaceful democratic politics almost broke down, particularly over the issue of Ulster. Hardline extremists such as Willoughby de Broke declared their willingness to use violence in opposition to Irish Home Rule. In the end, Britain was able to advert a democratic disaster in the period between 1906 and 1922, in part, because the Conservative party was able to recover its local support after 1910. This meant that Parliamentary politicians were not beholden to extremists. What was crucial was that the Conservative party, though the natural home of those landowners and old regime elites who had the most to lose from redistribution, high taxes, and mass democracy, remained a moderate party. It could slow developments such as the rise of the welfare state, but not reverse them and continued to operate by the Parliamentary playbook.
The British case-study foregrounds the main components of Ziblatt’s argument. The second half of the book focuses on a case where political developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led not to a stable liberal democracy but the nightmare of totalitarian rule: Germany.
Numerous factors have been cited to explain Germany’s sonderweg or special path. These include the power of the Prussian Junkers, the late unification of the Germany state, German or Prussian culture with its proclivity for militarism and autocracy, and the rise of a coalition between landed elites and the bourgeoisie against the workers. Moreover, given Germany’s remarkably rapid industrialization and economic growth in the late nineteenth century, the durability of German authoritarianism is puzzling.
Ziblatt argues that many elements of Germany’s political development can be better understood once we recognize the relative weakness of landed elites or more precisely, their weak political organization. In contrast, to their British counterparts, German landowners did not develop a well-institutionalized political party during the nineteenth century. They tended to use what power they did have at the local level to repress voter turnout and to oppose movements towards greater democratization through non-democratic means rather than at the ballot box. Contrary to previous scholars who have emphasized the power of Prussia’s old landowning elite, he contends that their lack of organizational capacity meant that they had more to fear from democratization, and hence expended their political capital trying to block all democratic reforms. Suffrage reforms in Prussia repeatedly failed because conservatives were “too weak to acquiesce.”
Moreover, Germany’s failure to fully democratize before WWI was not solely due to agrarian elites. To establish this, Ziblatt looks at Hamburg in 1906. Here, in the absence of a landowning elite, the bourgeois were also unable to sufficiently organize politically. As a result, they lived in fear of the power of organized labor and were willing to accept anyone who could credibly defend their interests from workers and socialists. The central insight Ziblatt emphasizes throughout is game theoretic: the absence of a party to organize around meant that economic elites lacked the ability to strategically defend their interests and hence became willing to ally with any forces that might help them protect their property. While in Britain, the well-institutionalized Parliamentary Conservative party moderated and sidelined the more reactionary and xenophobic elements in British life, the absence of such a strong party meant that in Germany, the right tended towards antisemitism and other forms of extremism.
Defeat in WWI brought about universal suffrage and a liberal democracy supported by the alliance of the Democratic Socialist Party, the Catholic Centre Party, and Liberal parties. Ziblatt disputes the argument that the Weimar Republic was necessarily doomed by its inauspicious birth. It was able to surmount its initial crises, and he contends that in the period between 1924 and 1928 there was a plausible path that the Weimar Republic could have taken towards stable liberal democratic rule.
The Great Depression and the death of Gustav Stresemann in 1929 knocked the Weimar off this course. But an additional problem that Ziblatt diagnoses is that is the conservative nationalist party, the DNVP, was not sufficiently institutionalized or committed to the democratic process to stabilize the Parliamentary system. In part, this reflected the long-standing absence of a moderate right-wing party in Germany. But after 1928 under Alfred Hugenberg, the DNVP radicalized further and withdrew its support from democratic rule. Dominated by army officers, it became a willing ally of the radical enemies of the Republic. Hugenberg’s internal coup within the DNVP thus made the Germany political system susceptible to a move towards authoritarianism even prior to the shock of the Great Depression. The rise of Hitler to power was in many respects a chance event, but the configuration of institutional circumstances that Ziblatt highlights makes the willingness of the conservative right to embrace Hitler in 1932–1933 more explicable.
In the final part of the book, Ziblatt considers three other cases: Sweden, Spain, and France. Sweden and other Scandinavian societies followed the British path. Spain, Portugal, and Italy did not. As in the German case, Ziblatt argues that this was in part due to the weaknesses of their conservative parties.
In summary, Ziblatt certainly offers a powerful and comprehensive account of the divergent political trajectories of Britain and Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There is no doubt that this is an original and impressive contribution to our understanding of the conditions required for robust democratization. I anticipate that it will provoke debate and discussion. Specialists will quibble with elements of the argument, but this reflects the importance of the contribution.
Economists and economic historians have focused increasing attention on the role played by elites in driving economic and political change. The typical story focuses on whether or not elites resist or accommodate democratic pressure (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson Reference Acemoglu and Robinson2005). Accommodation leads to democracy; resistance to autocracy. Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy adds an important new element to this account: political organization matters. Stable and lasting democratization required “buy-in” from old regime elites and this buy-in can only occur if there are institutional mechanisms in place that are capable of assuaging their fears and moderating the influence of extremists. In late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, strong professional conservative parties served this purpose. In the absence of such a party the transition to democracy will likely be temporary and instable.
