Augustine of Hippo’s Confessiones, written between AD 397 and 401, are interpreted as having two meanings: confessio peccati (“admission of guilt”) and confessio fidei (“statement of faith”). Starting a review of this book on economics of barely 100 pages with a reference to Augustine might at first look strange to the eyes of the reader, but closer scrutiny shows that the reference is not too far-fetched. In fact, Robin Hahnel, like many other scholars who were intrigued with Karl Marx’s analysis, had to come to terms with Piero Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (1960). Some Marxists still treat Sraffa’s book as a heretical scripture that ought to be banned. It sent several Marxists, using John Maynard Keynes’s famous words, on a “long struggle of escape from habitual modes of thought and expression.” Such struggles typically and quite naturally involved some confessio peccati, statements about having been wrong, and some confessio fidei, statements confirming the new conviction. When George Bernard Shaw converted from Marxian labor value theory to Jevonian marginal utility theory, essentially the same thing happened. In fact, whenever a scholar sees reason to revise his view on a scientific matter, he or she rightly feels the need to explain why. Robin Hahnel at an early time realized that the labor theory of value was both unnecessary to sustain Marx’s conclusion that workers are exploited, and misleading with regard to price formation and the origins of capitalist crises. His first book (with Michael Albert) was titled Unorthodox Marxism (1978), with the emphasis on “Unorthodox.” When it was written, Ian Steedman’s Marx after Sraffa (1977) was unavailable, but their critique of the labor theory of value had several elements in common with his. At the time he and Albert were arguing that only a very unorthodox reworking of Marxism was helpful regarding both economics and sociology. Marx’s works were considered an important source of inspiration but not a code of law.
As regards the book under review, what may come as a surprise to many readers not familiar with Hahnel’s earlier works is the huge attention devoted to a moral assessment of capitalism. In fact, the longest chapter of the book, chapter 6, elaborates a “Moral Critique of Capitalism” (pp. 78–99). Dyed-in-the-wool historical materialists might dispute that Marx’s analysis of capitalism has anything to do with ethics. While I share Hahnel’s view in this regard, one ought to recall the materialist side of Marx’s argument. Hahnel calls Marx “the greatest critic of capitalism” (p. 1). This may well be true, but Marx was also one of the greatest admirers of capitalism and insisted: “Development of the productive forces of social labour is the historical task and justification of capital. This is just the way in which it unconsciously creates the material requirements of a higher mode of production” (Marx Reference Marx1959, p. 259). Without capitalism, no socialism. But Hahnel is right: thinking about an alternative socio-economic order requires tackling difficult socio-economic, cultural, political, and ethical issues. Unfortunately, Marx’s deliberations on socialism were not elaborate enough to show us the way to a “good society” and the constitution, laws, rules, institutions, and so on that would safeguard it. The experience with state socialism, also known as “really existing socialism,” was sobering and frequently nightmarish. It is regrettable that Marx, apart from incidental observations, did not take up the classical economists’ concern with an empirically grounded anthropology designed to understand man’s light and dark sides and develop thereupon a “science of the legislator,” as Adam Smith had called it. Apparently, Marx was inclined to count upon a big bang that changed things fundamentally and brought about a better society, in which egoism, selfishness, and rapacity, and the exploitation of man by man played no longer a central role and in the medium run no role at all. He could not imagine, it seems, a society jumping out of the frying pan into the fire, but was genuinely confident that the living conditions of men could only improve after the yoke of capitalism had been shaken off. In this perspective, there was hardly any need for a code of conduct for really existing rulers in really existing socialism. He was naively optimistic that eventually all will end well.
In addition to a moral critique of capitalism, the book deals also with the following themes. After a short preface in which Hahnel provides the motives for his enterprise and takes sides on behalf of Sraffa’s analysis, he summarizes, in his Introduction, the argument of the following chapters. In these he points out the flaws in Marx’s labor value-based reasoning and how these flaws affect the rest of Marx’s analysis. Chapter 1 compares the theories of relative prices and distribution of Sraffa and Marx and stresses, in particular, that labor values are unnecessary and misleading with regard to the determination of prices of production. Chapter 2 deals with the origin of profits and the factors affecting the level of the competitive rate of profits. Hahnel confronts Sraffa’s explanation of profits in terms of the surplus product that obtains after all material costs of production (including real wages) have been subtracted from gross output levels with Marx’s explanation in terms of surplus value, and shows that the latter cannot generally be sustained. Chapter 3 turns to the problem of technical change and focuses attention on Marx’s explanation of a falling tendency of the rate of profits. This explanation, Hahnel argues, is logically flawed. Chapter 4 compares Marx’s theories of crises with the theories of several non-orthodox currents in economics, especially Keynesian, Kaleckian, and structuralist. Whether Sraffa would have endorsed any of these is difficult to say, because, apart from a few remarks in his unpublished papers, he did not put down his own point of view in this regard.
Chapter 5 argues that Sraffa’s analysis is better suited to deal with the natural environment than Marx’s and to rigorously measure environmental through-put. In this context it is perhaps useful to draw the attention to the following passage contained in a note dated 25 March 1946 in Sraffa’s papers at Trinity College, Cambridge. Sraffa wrote:
The difference between the “physical real costs” and the Ricardo-Marxian theory of “labour costs” is that the first does, and the latter does not, include in them the natural resources that are used up in the course of production (such as coal, iron, exhaustion of land)—[Air, water, etc. are not used up: as there is an unlimited supply, no subtraction can be made from ∞]. This [is] fundamental because it does away with “human energy” and such metaphysical things. (See Sraffa’s papers catalogued by Jonathan Smith, D3/12/42: 33; emphasis added)Footnote 1
In a brief concluding section (pp. 100–102), Hahnel summarizes his argument. The main reason for Hahnel’s adoption of Sraffa’s theory is that it “is devoid of embarrassing inconsistencies which plague Marxian formal theory which apologists for capitalism exploit” (p. vii). The inconsistencies he illustrates with the help of several small, numerically specified Sraffa-type models. He also deals with attempts to rescue certain Marxian doctrines by redefining them and insists that these cannot be sustained. He concludes his book with the statement:
Radical political economy should honor Great Grandfather Marx for the unpayable debt we owe him. But it is past time we should also take advantage of formal modelling improvements pioneered by Uncle Sraffa—all as we continue to show how Sraffian economics can help us address the two great challenges that face us as the twenty-first century unfolds: Climate change and environmental destruction, and the moral outrage of escalating economic inequality. (p. 102)
Using Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous ladder parable in the Tractatus, we might say that although many of Marx’s propositions turned out to be untenable, they were used like steps on a ladder that led to a higher level of understanding. Once one has reached the higher level, one must throw away the ladder. Advances in the sciences typically follow some such movement and there is no reason why, with regard to Marx, things should be different. To treat his analytical hypotheses and propositions as if they contained only eternal truths, as it has often been done (and still is in some circles), reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of scientific progress and is typically used in political power struggles.
It is to be hoped that many Marxists will scrutinize carefully Hahnel’s arguments. There is no need to agree with him on each and every statement contained in the book; it suffices to share his openness with regard to criticism. He can rightly claim to follow in the footsteps of Karl Marx, who in the preface to volume I of Capital had stated: “Every opinion based on scientific criticism I welcome.” It ought to be added that the second part of the Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe (1976–2012), which contains Marx’s preparatory manuscripts, notes, and jottings for Capital, confirms Marx’s openness in this regard and explains also why he failed to accomplish the task: he was a scrupulous and self-critical scholar, who had to admit that in important respects his work was not yet mature enough and that in some respects he may have been wrong.
