Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnzcf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-12T19:18:05.528Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Digital diasporas' challenge to traditional power: the case of TibetBoard

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2011

JENNIFER M. BRINKERHOFF
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article examines power implications of digital diasporas and the identity negotiation processes they afford. Members of diasporas are potentially socially and psychologically disempowered by two sources: the majority society into which they are dispersed; and the traditional social structures and culture from which they emerged. This potential disempowerment highlights the important role of power in facilitating (or not) migrant integration into new societies, and the integration of values and norms that are increasingly considered universal. The diaspora experience and Internet discussion forums provide enabling normative structures and discourses for individuals to define and pursue their own interests and ideals. Following a review of the literatures on diaspora identity hybridity and power, the case of TibetBoard illustrates how information technology enables diaspora members to explore, negotiate, and validate their self-determined identity and political perspectives, moving beyond passive adoption of traditional perspectives rooted in the Tibetan community of the homeland and in exile.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 38 , Issue 1 , January 2012, pp. 77 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

I. Introduction

Immigration is high on the agendas of most industrialised countries today. Beyond the security concerns regarding terrorism and its potential, increasing immigrant populations are more predictably and commonly posing challenges to their own and others’ quality of life and the social evolution of receiving societies. An important consideration in related debates is the impact on migrants themselves, and beyond the material concerns of housing and employment.Footnote 1 What does immigration mean to participants psychologically? And how do these implications influence our evolving notions of national identity, global citizenship, and a good society? Can we assume that migration is always a disempowering process?

Amitai Etzioni builds on notions of community to outline the contours of the good society. He identifies one of the defining features of community as ‘a measure of commitment to a set of shared values, norms, and meanings, and shared history and identity – in short, to a particular culture’.Footnote 2 Tradition is an obvious source of these values. Etzioni argues that the integration of new values requires what he calls moral dialogue: ‘a process by which people engage in deliberations that involve not merely facts and logic, reasoning, and rational exchanges, but also intensive discussions in which their normative commitments are engaged’.Footnote 3 Additionally, one of the attributes of a good society is ‘one in which strong communal bonds are balanced by powerful protections of self’.Footnote 4 Such a society, he argues, ‘is not simply communal, but also firmly upholds both social ties and autonomy, social order and liberty’.Footnote 5

Migrants confront existing communities and value systems, challenging their own and their new compatriots’ established shared values and norms. Acculturation, or migrant integration into receiving societies, necessitates the integration of new values, but this does not mean that members of these communities entirely abandon those values that build on their own cultural traditions and histories.Footnote 6 Ideally, the diaspora community itself will not interfere with the integration of new values and ideas through imposition of traditional notions of identity. However, some communities choose an exaggerated homeland identity in diaspora.Footnote 7 In considering a ‘good society’ one must look not only within these migrant, or diaspora communities, but also to how these communities and the individuals that comprise them integrate into broader receiving communities, again, ideally without the imposition of values and norms from the receiving societies. In other words, beyond economic challenges, immigrants face the socio-psychological challenges associated with negotiating their way through a new culture and embracing an altered identity, while still maintaining an identity associated with their culture of origin.Footnote 8

For many, integration is a stressful process culturally, socially, and economically.Footnote 9 While bonding social capital can counter the destabilising forces of marginalisation and provide a social safety net for group members,Footnote 10 as Etzioni suggests, it also risks impinging on individual liberty. Members of diasporas are potentially socially and psychologically disempowered by two sources: (1) the majority society into which they have been dispersed and, (2) the traditional social structures and culture from which they have emerged (whether voluntarily or not). This potential disempowerment highlights the importance of the role of power in facilitating (or not) migrant integration into new societies, and the integration of values and norms that are increasingly considered universal. These values and norms are often associated with liberal values of human rights, including basic freedoms of speech, assembly, and self-determination – see, for example, Falk (1981) and Jacobsen and Lawson (1999).Footnote 11 The issue of integrating these values is particularly salient to individuals and communities who migrate from less liberal societies to those that embrace these liberal values.

Barnett and Duvall argue that analysis of power ‘must include a consideration of the normative structure and discourses that generate differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals’.Footnote 12 They build their argument for the need to consider these normative structures and discourses on the examples of post-colonial sovereignty and human rights, which enabled decolonised states and human rights activists, respectively, to voice their interests, represent themselves, and engage in advocacy for their causes. I argue that such enabling normative structures and discourses also include: (1) the diaspora experience, which affords exposure to, experimentation with, and potential adoption of liberal values and, (2) the forums provided by the Internet, which may reinforce these as well as the perception that individuals can voice their own values and perspectives independent from traditional social structures.

In order to cope with their dual minority status – not being ‘of’ either identity source – diaspora members negotiate hybrid identities. In this article I specifically examine the power implications of cyber-communities and the identity negotiation processes they afford. I apply Barnett's and Duvall's typology of power, and, with respect to digital diaspora communities, I address their fundamental power question: ‘in what respects are actors able to determine their own fate, and how is that ability limited or enhanced through social relations with others?’Footnote 13 Following a review of the literatures on diaspora identity hybridity and power, the case of TibetBoard will illustrate how information technology (IT) enables diaspora members to explore, negotiate, and validate their self-determined identity and political perspectives, moving beyond the passive adoption of traditional perspectives and identity rooted in the Tibetan community of the homeland and in exile.

II. Diasporas, hybrid identity, and power

a. Diasporas and hybrid identity

Simply put, ‘Modern diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin – their homelands.’Footnote 14 Among the major components of diaspora, Safran notes ‘the habitual status of a minority in larger societies’.Footnote 15 Chaliand and Rageau add ‘the will to survive as a minority by transmitting a heritage’.Footnote 16

Identity is at the very core of diaspora. Identity ‘transforms [migrants] from the physical reality of dispersal into the psychosocial reality of diaspora’.Footnote 17 The literature on cultural identity in the context of globalisation calls for and confirms cultural hybridisation.Footnote 18 Immigrants neither wholly accept their host country culture, nor do they automatically embrace their traditional ethnic culture to the exclusion of other influences. Shain (1995, 1999) argues that the US’ tolerance for hyphenisation – African-American, Asian-American, and Arab-American – affords diasporas a greater opportunity to pursue their cultural identity, within the context of their American selves.Footnote 19 Diaspora identities are constantly produced and reproduced. They are ‘a negotiated result rather than a reflection of an objective or described reality’.Footnote 20

Diaspora members may come to share civic and other values of the host-country, learned through exposure and/or social pressure, or consciously sought (sometimes through elective migration). To the extent that these values are associated with increasingly accepted and endorsed global norms, diaspora members may be seen to also acculturate as global citizens. US-based diasporas are believed to embrace American values of pluralism, democracy, and human rights. This assumption builds upon the integrationist pluralist model, which ‘emphasizes the protection of cultural practices that are compatible with liberalism’.Footnote 21 Liberalism is both an assumption and a prescription. On the one hand, it assumes that ‘diverse cultures will […] prefer, express, and adhere to the same democratic values when allowed to flourish and attain the best that is in them’.Footnote 22 On the other hand, it expects that citizens ‘will extend to others the same rights they themselves claim’.Footnote 23 Even where traditional cultures are less tolerant, Raz argues they will face pressure within the American multicultural society to conform to more liberalist tendencies.Footnote 24

Identity negotiation in cyberspace may reinforce hybridity.Footnote 25 The very nature of cyber-grassroots organisations (CGOs)Footnote 26 represents liberal values such as democracy and freedom of speech, and in a way that may be alien to previous cultural experiences of many diaspora members. Interactive components of IT are an efficient, easy-access tool for diaspora story telling and sharing, enabling members to make sense of their experiences and feelings in the encounter between cultures and identities, and experimenting with hybridity in a community that can provide validation or correction to ensure continued shared social norms for group solidarity. Information technology provides a dialogical space where tradition and modernity converge to produce new self-understandings.Footnote 27 In such arrangements, participants may focus more on developing new ties, rather than on nourishing or rediscovering old social ties.Footnote 28

Hybridity and ‘new ethnicities’ are more common among youth,Footnote 29 who tend to be more exposed to ‘the cross-currents of differing cultural fields’.Footnote 30 The young are more likely to self-consciously select and assimilate cultural identity artefacts.Footnote 31 Cortini and Associates (2004) found that new media, such as text messaging and Internet discussions, emphasise the development of self-positions among youth.Footnote 32 Research on the cultural production and reproduction of religious belief and practice among South Asian youth, suggests that ‘young people adapt their own interpretations of belief, consciously decide the nature of their religious values, and specify for themselves modes of participation in “religious community” activities’.Footnote 33 As early as 1968, Geertz summarised this change in diaspora consciousness as a shift of the primary religious question from ‘“What shall I believe” to “How shall I believe it”.’Footnote 34

There are limits, then, to the extent to which negotiated identity becomes rooted in accurate descriptions of the ancestral identity, and resulting identities may not always represent liberal values. To illustrate, in his study of the Alevi diaspora,Footnote 35 Sökefeld argues that the websites (or CGOs) he describes at once represent ‘a kind of democratization or empowerment of Alevi self-representation’, and ‘the possibility that elements of Alevism and their meaning may be simplified or even distorted, out of ignorance or even intentionally, to make a case’.Footnote 36 Similarly, Lal describes the historical revisionism present on Hindu diaspora webpages based in North America, where even the Taj Mahal is recast as a Hindu monument.Footnote 37

b. Power

Barnett and Duvall define power as ‘the production in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate’.Footnote 38 Power has implications not only for actors’ actions, but as Barnett and Duvall put it, power's effects include ‘setting the terms of their very self-understandings’.Footnote 39 Their typology defines four types of power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. Compulsory power refers to the most commonly understood exercise of power: direct control over another. This can be seen as roughly corresponding to coercive power, often through the use of physical power resources.Footnote 40

Institutional power is applied less directly. Long-established institutions ‘represent frozen configurations of privilege and bias that can continue to shape the future choices of actors’.Footnote 41 Related analyses necessarily consider decisions not taken, as well as those that are, as institutional arrangements influence agenda-setting processes in ways that may eliminate issues that are points of conflict. An additional influencing factor is material dependence, which can determine the de facto scope of one's choices. Structural power shapes self-understandings and subjective interests through direct relationships. Barnett and Duvall (2005) place Lukes’ (1974) perspective on power in this structural dimension.Footnote 42 Lukes notes that actors may not always be aware of their dominance by power structures as they come to believe that their wants/desires are the same as those promulgated by these structures.

Productive power ‘concerns discourse, the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed’.Footnote 43 It may provide direction to social activity and determine whose knowledge matters. Discourses are power arenas, they argue, because they ‘situate ordinary practices of life and define the social fields of action that are imaginable and possible’.Footnote 44 The bases for productive power are the evolving ‘understandings, meanings, norms, customs, and social identities that make possible, limit, and are drawn upon for action’.Footnote 45

Uphoff outlines six types of power resources: economic, social (social status based on social roles or on complying with socially valued criteria), political (ability to influence the exercise of authority), informational, moral (that is, the perceived legitimacy of decision-makers), and physical (coercion or violence, depending on perceived legitimacy of applied physical force).Footnote 46 As noted above, compulsory power may draw from physical or material (economic) power resources. Institutional power is likely to draw from social, political, and moral resources. Structural power likely combines these with informational power. Productive power may rest primarily on social, informational, and moral resources.

Uphoff stresses the cognitive elements of empowerment. He examines related individual traits and organisational capabilities, including: confidence, the capacity to aspire,Footnote 47 and energy and persistence. Capacity to aspire is defined as ‘the forward-looking capacity of individuals and groups to envision alternatives and to aspire to different and better futures’.Footnote 48 It is a characteristic emerging from collective cultural experience. Capacity to aspire may be determined by institutional power, where ‘Poor and excluded groups are defined by more powerful social groups and held in place by social norms and expectations of behavior, often reified in public debate and even interpretation of scriptures.’Footnote 49

More specifically, a growing body of literature explores the notion of psychological empowerment. Diener and Biswas-Diener provide a particularly helpful overview. Psychological empowerment refers to ‘people's belief that they have the resources, energy, and competence to accomplish important goals’.Footnote 50 It requires objective resources, positive emotions, and feelings of self-efficacy. People are unlikely to pursue their goals without optimistic expectancy that they will achieve them.Footnote 51 Bandura finds that this self-efficacy has a causal effect on future performance independent from performance and external conditions. In other words, action is not necessarily required for empowerment. People's sense of self-efficacy ‘influence[s] the choices they make, their aspirations, level of effort and perseverance, resilience to adversity, and vulnerability to stress and depression’.Footnote 52

Deshmukh-Ranadive provides another way of thinking about power and empowerment.Footnote 53 She emphasises the importance of spaces, including physical, economic, socio-cultural, and political spaces. Spaces, she argues, influence both the capacity to act and the resulting type of behaviour. Empowerment occurs when spaces are expanded due to some change in a person's life, ‘allowing the person the place, freedom, or margin to do what she or he intends to do’.Footnote 54 Deshmukh-Ranadive emphasises mental space as the most important for empowerment. She defines mental space as ‘the feeling of freedom that allows a person to think and act’.Footnote 55 This freedom of thought and action facilitates ‘power within’.Footnote 56

The case of TibetBoard illustrates how the Internet expands this mental space, as well as enabling the development of productive and structural power, as members of the Tibetan diaspora negotiate their hybrid identities, questioning the very essence of what it means to be Tibetan.

III. TibetBoard

a. Tibet and its diaspora

The Tibetan identity in diaspora is largely concerned with policy agendas and strategies to both re-secure the homeland and to sustain a Tibetan cultural and religious identity in continued diaspora. In the 1950s, the People's Republic of China incorporated Tibet into its national territory and began a heavy influence over its politics, culture, and society. The Dalai Lama established a Tibetan Government-in-Exile in Dharamsala, India, with a surrounding exiled community. Shortly after his establishment there, Tibetan refugees began arriving in the tens of thousands each year. Ten thousand Tibetan refugees are believed to be living in the West.Footnote 57

With time in exile, the Dalai Lama's political stance has evolved from one of absolute refusal to concede that Tibet is part of China and that, as peoples, the Chinese and Tibetans have any common bonds, to a less politically-oriented power position and a priority of maintaining cultural and religious power in Tibet.Footnote 58 A Tibetan expert identifies three options for the Government-in-Exile:

1. maintain the status quo by continuing the campaign of enhancing international support; 2. escalate the conflict by encouraging and even organizing violence in Tibet; and 3. compromise by sending Beijing a message that the Dalai Lama is ready to scale down his political demands in order to preserve a more homogeneous Tibetan homeland.Footnote 59

While the options are not mutually exclusive, Baogang and Sautman argue that the Dalai Lama has adopted the third option and has already made significant concessions.Footnote 60 By distancing himself from the perspective of China as the enemy and accommodating a need to negotiate, the Dalai Lama and the Government-in-Exile have come under sharp criticism by Tibetan independence supporters, among others.Footnote 61

b. TibetBoardFootnote 62

Dorjee Nudup was born in Darjeeling, India, after his parents fled Tibet. Nudup and his mother eventually came to the US, and he founded TibetBoard in 2000, just two years after his arrival in New York. He describes it as ‘more of a personal website’, noting the interpersonal interactions and contrasting it with purely information dissemination sites, such as Tibet House, a physical 501(c)3 in New York, whose mission it is to preserve Tibetan culture. TibetBoard is an interactive and comparatively informal destination for those who may want to learn about or negotiate the Tibetan identity in diaspora. Nudup created TibetBoard, in part, to serve instrumental functions:

I based it on my interest and also for people who want to get more information about America, who want to come to America. And also for the main parties, like people in New York City, because we don't have any media which we can use to advertise for a conference or meetings. I advertise for them so people know where we gather and where the festivals are happening.

In addition to posting information and web links for immigration and specifically how to apply for a visa to the US, discussion forums on this topic enable individuals to ask specific questions and provide to each other more personalised advice. The Discussion Forums include topics related to Buddhism, poetry, education, and human rights. The most popular topical area is ‘Politics of the People’. The web site also includes a lively chat room, with as many as 80–90 people chatting at one time.

Beyond the material benefits of providing information, Nudup emphasises the importance of the discussion boards for exploring Tibetan identity in diaspora:

Tibetan people, because of the traditional system, we don't speak openly all the time because of the situation, so that's my purpose. I want people to talk about anything, like politics, without boundary and also have fun.

This free discussion is particularly important to Tibetans, according to Nudup, because:

In our culture, traditional system, our Tibetan government, if we have a different opinion usually they don't – in the mentality – accept that you should, well – whatever the government says then you should do it. Our main conflict is the Dalai Lama. Whatever he says, you have to follow. But people have different opinions […] You can feel whatever you want online. People are afraid to voice their opinions, but you can post without anyone knowing. You can comment on anything.

TibetBoard appears to bring together Tibetans from all over the world. Nudup shared the results of a survey he conducted, confirming membership from Switzerland, India, and Nepal, as well as North America. Participation requires registration, though, as with other sites, one can easily hide one's identity, choosing whichever username one likes. Among the broader number of registrants, Nudup confirmed a smaller, more active core membership. Guests can also post, though they are sometimes prevented from participating in certain discussions, at the discretion of the initiator.

While it is impossible to know the true identity and demographics of participants, many posts allude to study and midterms and some members make their age and identity explicit when it is other than a Tibetan teenager. During the period analysed there was an attempt on the part of one member to learn more about the identity of others. In A Genuine Suggestion, introducing ourselves, WakeUp_Tibet asks members to introduce themselves and initiates by listing his nationality, current location, age range, occupation, and gender. The thread received only 14 responses, and only three were serious responses. These responses, if they are to be believed, indicate that one of the most active members, ChineseGuy is 16–17. Other indicated years or age ranges were: thirties, twenty-six, and twenty.

‘Free Tibet!’ is a frequently quoted call, and some member names reflect a related political agenda, for example, WakeUp_Tibet, tibetanwarrior, and Tibetan Liberation Front. Other usernames reflect alternative political perspectives, such as ChineseGuy. In fact, these are core members – contributing frequently, and their posts reflect the politics implied by their chosen usernames. Other usernames are chosen precisely to be misleading and provocative, such as Dali Llama, who expresses a pro-Chinese perspective and criticises Tibetans for being backwards (for example, FINAL SOLUTION TO THE CHINESE QUESTION!).

Posts indicate that members are self-conscious about diaspora identity issues and explicitly seek to preserve their Tibetan identity by participating in TibetBoard. For example, one member writes:

For me Tibet chat has acted as a platform where i can meet Tibetan people and preserve the Tibetaness in me. I live in white area, my social ciricles have been blonde girls all the time who I get along very well. I am thankful to Tibetchat for making me more Tibetan than I was before (Time to Move on …).

In response to laments about Western influence, a member writes, ‘what i have seen is that we tend to leave our good virtues and pick up the petty characters from the West which are called COOL” (Time to Move on …). Some members encourage others to remain authentic despite these influences:

the Tibet should learn how to be the authentic independent Tibetan without any foreign compulsive influence!! We cannot avoid the foreign influence, but we can think independently and select the best things for us (Should the Tibetan object to the USA?)

In that vein, a member named ‘Preserve the Tibetan Culture’ explains to member ‘Ghetto Child’ what ghetto means and implores Tibetans not to adopt the ghetto culture, even though they think it's cool (Hello Ghetto Child).

The thread, What's there in Future for Tibetans? opens with the observation that ‘Lot of Tibetan teenagers are losing touch with our culture. Parents are working and their sons/daughters don't get the proper guidance that they need and we are all turning into the All American Theory of Consumerism.’ In response, a member questions the relevance of Tibetan culture to the modern world and suggests that at least the language should be kept alive:

One thing you have to forget, the old culture, which is not fit for the modern wolrd then you have to forget, but our tibetan language is not this kind of matter, but on the other side we have to improve it and have to rewrite the grammtic rule, in order to learn it easier way and easier way to speak, then may many teenager tibetan learn the language, eventhough it takes little place for their every day life (What's there in Future for Tibetans?).

Another member suggests that Tibetan teenagers will realise their own identity with age and experience. He writes, ‘In other word, majority of tibetans will develop their own unique character but will not loss their sense that they are a Tibetan (What's there in Future for Tibetans?).

In US Visa, why why, members begin to identify positive attributes of American society. Invoking the famous John F. Kennedy line, a member defends the Dalai Lama and reminds others that most Tibetans in diaspora have probably not contributed much, if anything, to helping their government to re-secure the homeland or at least improve the plight of Tibetans worldwide. She urges others to pursue scholarships in the US and become educated without relying on the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. More explicitly, a member writes: ‘There are good things to learn too in America […] This is surely a land of opportunity, but it doesn't mean you forget your origin, identity and culture’ (US Visa, why why).

Others embrace the diaspora experience even arguing that it may yield positive results for Tibetans and their cause. For example:

going to America or any European countries is a good thing for all of us. … we should think of going to America legally, come on we should atleast trust ourself this much. its is not just about going there, but becoming a better human being and being on a better stand to support our cause. … be a good human being anywhere you go, and be a good tibetan (US Visa, why why).

In a similar vein, another member writes:

Tibetans have to learn to express their individuality. That is the essence of a healthy democratic society and we should not be swayed by all the ‘negative’ influences that come with it. Instead when people are allowed to express themselves this allows for – strangely a better platform for dialogue and understanding. Sadly the Tibetan community has a huge gap within – intellectually. A part remains in the medieval mindset and a part western educated and aware. Then there are the in betweens who are torn between these seemingly opposing groups choosing to take sides when convenient (wasted opportunity, ignorance).

The Dalai Lama as a religious figure is often defended and supported; this can occur at the same time that some members question the effectiveness of the Dalai Lama's non-violent approach and criticise the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. For example, one member takes on the username ‘Dali Llama’ and often argues on behalf of the Chinese. At one point, he defends the Chinese colonisation of Tibet ‘in order to civilize an otherwise backward province’ (FINAL SOLUTION TO THE CHINESE QUESTION!). Another member entreats Dali Llama to change his username:

could u please kindly change the name becouse I do not like someone playing with His Holiness name. I myself respect him so much and he means so much to me (Are Tibetans Terroists?).

Elsewhere, a member asks another, ‘Please do not say anything bad about His Holiness the Dalai Lama. He is the only hope we have. H. H. is not just himself, but he is a symbol of Tibet’ (Ban Chris! Ban all opposition to the HH Dalia Lama). In fact, feelings about the Dalai Lama run high. In the thread What do you think about Dalai Lama?, Let's see how modern your thinkings are, a member initiates a poll with four voting options: ‘1) He is a holy man, the reincarnation of all past Dalai Lamas; 2) He is an ordinary good human; 3) He is a disgraceful beggar; and 4) He is a disgraceful beggar, who shall be reincaranted as a dog.’ Guests were not allowed to vote, and only three votes were cast. It may be telling, though, that one vote was cast for each of the options except that the Dalai Lama is an ordinary man.

The Tibetan diaspora is both a political/territorial diaspora and a religious one. And these identities are not always compatible. For example, one member writes, ‘Getting political independence has nothing to do with Buddha Dharma as long as we interprete it as something carried out by the mind’ (How can we get Freedom, do you have any opinions about Tibet). An unregistered guest initiates another thread with a Buddhist perspective on the Tibetans’ diaspora:

I do not think that it is in our innate nature to be part of a particular region where ones ancestors have inherited. its natural to gradually get assimilated into or with other societies and this simple process has produced all the different people. in buddhism too we are all equal. so why do we, the tibtean have to fight for something that is inevitable? what is the reason for our struggle when every thing is deemed ‘empty’? why??? (why Tibet).

The thread only received three posts – none of which were substantively responsive, and 36 views. In the context of a more popular discussion thread, one member defends Chris, a non-Tibetan pro-Chinese and contentious contributor, arguing that:

My concept is totally different from Chris (I want Chinese out from Tibet and Let Tibetan have their own country. I will even use violence to get my country back in the future) but that doesn't mean I have to avoid him or hate him. Instead I love him so much (Ban Chris! Ban all opposition to the HH Dalia Lama).

Later this member invokes Buddhism and argues that ‘there is no ultimate truth’ (Ban Chris! Ban all opposition to the HH Dalia Lama).

This post inspires an exchange about Tibetan Buddhism, eventually leading to a discussion of how religion is a form of social control. Members note that, even in Tibet, historically it was a political tool. The poster of this historical perspective, tibetanwarrior, goes on to outline the incompatibilities of Tibetan Buddhism and democracy:

anyone who supports violence is looked down upon the rest of the people and the government in exile treats that person with contempt.well if that is not a dictator in action than what.think about it. tibetans need a new political system where monks and lamas are banned then only true democracy and development will be possible (Ban Chris! Ban all opposition to the HH Dalia Lama).

These tensions further underscore the importance of the Dalai Lama, whether as a symbol, a religious leader, or a political leader of the Tibetans in diaspora. As one member puts it bluntly:

We still believe in non-violence because of H. H. Dalai Lama. The fact is I am afraid to tell you that in the future without Dalai Lama, all Tibetan will use violence against China (tibetan violence).

The fact that Tibetan diaspora members use TibetBoard to negotiate their identity, questioning their traditional home culture as they embrace values, experience, and culture from their hostlands, is confirmed succinctly by the contentious non-Tibetan, Chris, in explaining why he chooses to participate in the TibetBoard community:

the reason i am on this board as when i was on the free-tibet boards they say stero typical things about the tibetans, i.e. you were a peacefull nonviolent country, all tibetans worship the dalai lama. they glorify serf/slavery tibet. etc etc i thought they were racist towards you (tibetan violence).

Beyond identity issues, members of TibetBoard more directly dialogue around alternative political agendas. Some make their political agenda very explicit. True to his name, Tibetan Liberation Front writes:

WE must act with resolve and determination! We must put the FINAL SOLUTION to the chinese problem into action! We tibetans are chosen by fate to eridicate Earth of this great evil that is all chinese! Kill them all and let God sort them out! … (FINAL SOLUTION TO THE CHINESE QUESTION!).

This post prompts several of the pro-Chinese members to respond, citing Chinese cultural superiority and possession of nuclear arms. This, in turn, inspires Chinese roaches! to urge others to ‘rise up and exterminate’ these ‘roaches’ (FINAL SOLUTION TO THE CHINESE QUESTION!).

In other instances, members may try to explain their perspective to those who may oppose their position. For example, a Tibetan member explains to ChineseGuy:

not all the tibetans want to kill the chinese … but u don't know the feeling of loosing a country and becoming a refuegee … we have hate because of what ur goverment did to us … dont tell me that if u got beaten up or killed because u believed in a religion that u would turn your back and forgive them … so dont wonder y we have hate because it is pretty obvious … i am not any terrorist … i have no intentions of killing anyone … its just a bunch of talk and nothing more … it is the government not the chinese people that all the tibetans hate … so understand (If I'm Chinese President …).

Some members embrace a Tibetan identity but articulate and try to promote acceptance of the Chinese occupation. In addition to religious arguments, noted above, this acceptance is promoted as a matter of practicality:

There are many reason to hate the Chinese; but, we needed to learn to life with them. The Chinese are not that bad, all they want is for us not to separated, if we just work with them; then they will leave us alone (IMO, It is wrong to hate … Let live in peace).

The member goes on to point out the money and employment the Chinese have brought to Tibet, arguing ‘the Chinese have done more to improve Tibet then the monks for thousand of years’. The post received no replies and only 29 views.

Still others are not certain of the appropriate political agenda and question if violence should be incorporated into the struggle for independence. For example,

what i m starting to realize after watching the news of the world is that whoeva succeeds in creating a headline get noticed by the world and their message reaches out to more people … It sometime sicken the dickens out of me and makes me reconsider the path we tibetans are taking (Nonviolence).. We Tibetans have always stressed about Nonviolence and being compassionate and loving. Is it really possible in this present world where everything is driven by greed and self benefit … The call for independence by suicide bombers seem to gain more attention. We Tibetans had never resort to violence but isn't it high time we should try this path as well … probably Independence isn't simply achieved by nonviolence. Sacrifices might be required (What's there in Future for Tibetans?).

In response, a member returns to the thread's opening question of what would happen in the absence of the Dalai Lama, and writes, ‘The peaceful approach have somewhat subdued the inner rage, and courage that is sometimes vital to our struggle’ (What's there in Future for Tibetans?). In another thread, a member asks, ‘IS TIBETAN INDEPENCE (and self rule) A REALISTIC REALITY OR A HOPELESS FANTASY?’ (INDEPENDENT TIBET: REALITY OR FANTASY!). The member observes that the Chinese had occupied Tibet for 45 years at this point, and ‘there is no sign of them loosing their tight grip over Tibet’. A member responds, ‘In light of the fact that no country has regained its independence WITHOUT some use of force or armed struggle the message is clear-don't give up the fight and keep all options open!’ (INDEPENDENT TIBET: REALITY OR FANTASY!). The original questioner responds, ‘shouldn't use of violence be our last resort?’

Liberal values, such as democracy and human rights, are frequently invoked, in support of the Tibetan cause, against traditional Tibetan identity and/or the political strategy of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and in response to pro-Chinese agendas. For example, recall tibetwarrior's complaint that rejection of those who advocate violence is undemocratic (Ban Chris! Ban all opposition to the HH Dalia Lama). In a Chinese member's efforts at appeasement (Misconception about the Chinese), the member invokes a ‘right’ to defend sovereignty; while in response, a Tibetan member invokes self-determination: ‘Don't you think it makes more sense to have the “Tibetan people” to choose rather than you, a Chinese, decide who they are’ (Misconception about the Chinese). Another member raises the issue of human rights: ‘Tibetans are denied civil political and reproductive rights under communist Chinese occupation’ (INDEPENDENT TIBET: REALITY OR FANTASY!). And even when a desirable political agenda is invoked, if it is not consistent with liberal values, sympathetic members may challenge the writer. For example, when Tibetan Liberation Front, referred to here as TLF, initiates a post called DISSENT AND OPPOSITIONS CAN NOT BE TOLERATED!!!, a member replies: ‘hey … … … are we Tibetans becoming communist..? are we Tibetans under dictatorship of TLF? TLF seems to be like NAZI … …’ Another member similarly accuses TLF of being a fascist.

IV. The power of TibetBoard

TibetBoard does, indeed, demonstrate how the Internet can ‘shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate’.Footnote 63 As illustrated above, TibetBoard affords members opportunities of voice, a sense of being heard, and an ability to influence debate/conversation, most saliently in ‘moral dialogues’, such as those described by Etzioni.Footnote 64 The debates surrounding both ‘Tibetaness’ in diaspora and political agendas vis-à-vis the homeland represent deliberations that are clearly not based only on fact, logic, and reasoning, but also on intense normative commitments. Members are at once deeply committed to maintaining their Tibetanness and to questioning what this means for them in a world without a Tibetan homeland and as they confront new social norms and realities in diaspora. The ensuing debates clearly counter the institutional power of traditional Tibetan culture and authority and illustrate the structural power created through the TibetBoard community.

The very act of negotiating hybrid identities and experimenting with liberal values can be said to counter the institutional power represented by the homeland identity, inclusive of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. Indeed, this appears to be Nudup's stated purpose. TibetBoard members recognise that these institutions ‘represent frozen configurations of privilege and bias’.Footnote 65 They consider Tibet's history and note religion's use as a political tool. Non-Tibetan member, Chris, contrasts TibetBoard with other cyber-communities who idealise Tibetan culture, ‘they glorify serf/slavery tibet’ (tibetan violence). More subtly, members acknowledge the ‘medieval mindset’ that characterises many Tibetans. The institutional power of the Dalai Lama and the TGE have shaped the agenda-setting process so as to remove violence as an option. Tibetan advocates, inclusive of diaspora members themselves, as demonstrated on TibetBoard, question this strategy, sometimes for the first time. Arguably, this institutional power may also be challenged more by those diaspora members who reside outside of Dharamsala, where they are less materially dependent upon the TGE.

Through direct relationships in receiving societies and with diaspora communities, diaspora members’ self-understanding and subjective interests may be shaped. As noted with respect to diasporas more generally, this experience can be a disempowering one on both fronts. Perhaps to counter these influences, members of TibetBoard have cultivated their own structural power within their co-created community. They combat the marginalisation they experience in their host societies, with TibetBoard as a ‘platform where i can meet Tibetan people and preserve the Tibetaness in me’ (Time to Move on..); and they balance their promotion of particular identity constructs and political agendas, with an embrace of liberal values, which may in itself represent transforming self-understandings and subjective interests.

While identity and political agendas are continuously negotiated, no consensus is reached. Individuals have the freedom to hold to their values and beliefs and still participate as members of the TibetBoard community, as evidenced by the range of political views expressed through chosen usernames. Even when calls for expulsion are made, such as TLF's stated intolerance for opposition and his more explicit call to Ban Chris! Ban all Opposition to the HH Dalai Lama, other members defend specified members’ participation, despite political differences. Interestingly, this occurs both based on religious grounds – rooted in the traditional homeland culture, for example, ‘My concept is totally different from Chris … but that doesn't mean I have to avoid him or hate him. Instead I love him so much’ (Ban Chris! Ban all Opposition to the HH Dalai Lama) – and on liberal values, possibly adopted in diaspora, for example, holding TLF and the community in check so as not to become like communists, a dictatorship, or fascists (DISSENT AND OPPOSIONS CAN NOT BE TOLERATED!!!).

In creating and voicing their own structural power, TibetBoard members directly confront the structural power represented by the homeland identity and its created societies in diaspora, questioning and even attacking foundational values, such as non-violence and reverence of the Dalai Lama. They even seek to delegitimise these structures as medieval and oppressive. Several members note the irrelevance of these values and norms to their future and even, ironically, to their commitment to a free homeland. Indeed, one has the impression that members go to extreme efforts to express these challenges, implying a deep angst, which is not only directed at the obvious enemy and wielder of compulsory power (the Chinese), but at themselves. This perhaps reflects the suppression of Tibetans’ inner rage, as one member voices, ‘The peaceful approach have somewhat subdued the inner rage, and courage that is sometimes vital to our struggle’ (What's there in Future for Tibetans?). Lukes’ perspective on the subtleties of structural power does not apply here;Footnote 66 these members believe for themselves that the norms and values promoted by these broader communities are not in their interests.

It is in this sense that TibetBoard also cultivates productive power. Members constitute new relations and a new community in which roles can be defined anew. They borrow and are at once independent from the very sources of their potential disempowerment. Members experiment, specifically, with their political perspectives and rationales. Even when these support non-violence vis-à-vis the Chinese, the underlying reasoning may be religious or more practical in nature (for example, ‘we needed to learn to life with them … if we just work with them; then they will leave us alone’ (IMO, It is wrong to hate … Let live in peace). TibetBoard provides a convenient location and instrument for the discourses that enable members to co-create their community and identities, pushing beyond traditional limits of what is possible or imaginable. These discourses identify the positive and negative attributes of receiving societies; members advise each other on how to navigate these and still remain ‘authentic’. Repeatedly, the value of independent thought and individuality is underscored, for example, ‘Tibetans have to learn to express their individuality. That is the essence of a healthy democratic society and we should not be swayed by all the “negative” influences that come with it’ (wasted opportunity, ignorance). Members are self-conscious about these discourses and the experimentation and expression that occur on TibetBoard. This same member continues: ‘when people are allowed to express themselves this allows for – strangely a better platform for dialogue and understanding’ (wasted opportunity, ignorance).

Despite the imagined violent confrontation and eventual autonomous Tibet, these individuals have no direct political power. In fact, they do not seek to mobilise for political purposes, only to explore and imagine other possibilities, as they freely express themselves. At least one member directly acknowledges this: ‘I have no intentions of killing anyone.. its a bunch of talk and nothing more’ (If I'm Chinese President …). As a CGO comprised largely of teenagers, TibetBoard members also do not likely command economic power resources, though the fact that many of them reside in host countries beyond India and Nepal reduces their economic dependence on the TGE. TibetBoard does provide some informational power resources through Nudup's efforts to facilitate immigration to the US, and other members’ more personalised support in the discussion forums. The power resources that are most salient to TibetBoard are social and moral. TibetBoard members co-create their own social and moral power resources in the context of their community. Both may be conferred by core membership and the content of one's posts. Members check each other, setting limits on the values that are acceptable in this social context. These do not necessarily pertain to calls for violence, which generally seem not be taken too seriously, but more with respect to tolerance and freedom of expression.

Because TibetBoard does not command physical world power resources or seem to take seriously any mobilisation agenda for action in the physical world, its primary implication for power is a psychological one, deeply rooted in psychological empowerment. TibetBoard affords members opportunities to experiment with and develop the capacity to aspire, envisioning alternatives and different and potentially better futures. Much of the discussions also pertain to the expression of sorrow, at the loss of identity and homeland, and angst and anger at how this has come about. Yet, sometimes accompanying these expressions, members express hope for a better future and faith in the sustenance of authentic Tibetan identity. They call each other to ‘be a good human being anywhere you go, and be a good tibetan’ (US Visa, why why).

TibetBoard provides the mental space diaspora members may need to feel free to think and to potentially act. TibetBoard members may actually experience disempowerment from three sources – the two noted above, minority status in the receiving society, and traditional social structures and culture of the homeland identity; and also by virtue of their chronological age. As teenagers, the predominant membership has both the propensity and, given the potential disempowerment sources noted above, a lack of opportunity to self-select identity constructs. Cyberspace affords these individuals the space they may need psychologically to freely express themselves, and to thus develop confidence and a sense of self-efficacy.

V. Implications and Conclusion

CGOs may represent the first time that diaspora members are able to consider aspects of their identity, question traditional interpretations of religion and culture, and choose for themselves what their identity ‘truth’ is. Homeland cultures may have previously been sustained and institutionalised through social or religious hierarchies, for example, which represent, instruct, and promulgate one identity interpretation. By moving beyond these physical communities and structures into cyberspace, diaspora members can more freely propose, debate, and self-correct (whether historically ‘correct’ or not). And in cyberspace, through cyber-communities, these individual processes can be mutually reinforced, with communities forming around similarly selected constructs, without the need for or constraint of more formal or ‘official’ endorsement of traditional identity arbiters.Footnote 67 Thus, cyberspace reinforces the identity dynamics among diaspora youth, where youth are more likely to self-consciously select cultural and religious identity artefacts. As Sökefeld puts it, without cyberspace, these diaspora youth ‘would be consumers of knowledge and representation, not producers and distributors’.Footnote 68

Indeed, in the case of TibetBoard, cyberspace has become a safe haven for the questioning and challenging of the Dalai Lama himself, including calls for rebellion and armed conflict to free Tibet – all of which are considered anathema to the majority of Tibetans. Even if these alternative political perspectives are not manifested beyond expression in the safe space provided in the cyber-community, their expression alone represents psychological empowerment.Footnote 69 Such empowerment may reduce the likelihood that these frustrations be expressed through actions in the physical world. As McCormick hypothesises, ‘if the Internet can provide a canvas upon which nations can paint their social, linguistic, cultural, and political beliefs, then perhaps the physical struggle for safe cultural havens and borders may no longer be as necessary for their preservation or evolution’.Footnote 70

Identity is a fundamental human need. Social and psychological marginalisation and the absence of a collective identity can make individuals vulnerable to recruitment into violent activities.Footnote 71 In this era of globalisation, we can no longer take identity formation for granted. Rather, there are a host of influences, impediments, and temptations at play. A more nuanced understanding of the power inherent in these sheds light on the importance of mental space, discourse, and empowerment. Furthermore, putting these in the context of cyberspace reveals that even seemingly extremist challenges to existing power structures may provide little cause for alarm. Rather, an analysis of the power resources available to these communities, a discourse analysis of their exchanges, and an exploration of their demographics may reveal a psychological power assertion that may be healthy to participating individuals and their ability to successfully integrate new values as they negotiate hybrid identities.

Research supports the importance of community, solidarity, identity support, and self-confidence to psychological well being, even absent a diaspora experience. How much more, then, are these factors essential to those who face the psychological trauma of reconciling two lifestyles, two identities, and potentially involuntarily (that is, as a consequence of forced migration)? Community, with its bonding social capital, solidary benefits, and identity support may be challenging to create for societies that are, by definition, dispersed. Information technology presents a resource of miraculous importance to diaspora communities precisely for its support of these advantages and the opportunities and freedom it provides to negotiate identity.

References

1 See, for example, Nelson-Jones, Richard, ‘Diverse Goals for Multicultural Counselling and Therapy’, Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 15 (2002), pp. 133–143CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Hall, Stuart, ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’, in Rutherford, J. (ed.), Identity: Community, culture, difference (London: Lawrence, 1990), pp. 222–237Google Scholar ; Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M., ‘Diaspora Identity and the Potential for Violence: Toward an Identity-Mobilization Framework’, Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, 8 (2008), pp. 67–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

2 Etzioni, Amitai, The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (New York: Basic Books, 1996), p. 127Google Scholar .

3 Etzioni, Amitai, ‘The Good Society’, Seattle Journal of Social Justice, 1 (2002), pp. 83–96, 89Google Scholar .

4 Etzioni, ‘The Good Society’, p. 84.

5 Ibid.

6 There is a vast and important literature on immigrant integration. It is beyond the scope of this article to review the whole of it. For a broader discussion of how it applies to digital diasporas, see Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M., Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

7 For the case of the Hindu diaspora, see, for example, Lal, Vinay, ‘The Politics of History on the Internet: Cyber-diasporic Hinduism and the North American Hindu diaspora’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 8 (1999), pp. 137–172CrossRefGoogle Scholar . This phenomenon has also been observed among some members of the Egyptian Copt diaspora, see Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M., Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

8 Hermans, Hubert and Kemper, Harry, ‘Moving Cultures: The Perilous Problems of Cultural Dichotomies in a Globalizing Society’, American Psychologist, 53 (1998), pp. 1111–1120CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Lavie, Smadar and Swedenburg, Ted (eds), Displacement, diaspora, and geographies of identity (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996)Google Scholar ; Friedman, Jonathan, Cultural Identity and Global Process (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994)Google Scholar .

9 Nelson-Jones, ‘Diverse Goals for Multicultural Counselling and Therapy’.

10 Gittel, Ross and Vidal, Avis, Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a Development Strategy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998)Google Scholar .

11 Falk, Richard A., Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Homes & Meier Publishers, 1981)Google Scholar ; Jacobsen, Michael and Lawson, Stephanie, ‘Between Globalization and Localization: A Case Study of Human Rights versus State Sovereignty’, Global Governance, 5 (1999), pp. 203–220Google Scholar .

12 Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond, ‘Power in Global Governance’, in Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (eds), Power in Global Governance (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 2005), pp. 1–32, 3Google Scholar

13 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, p. 4.

14 Sheffer, Gabriel, ‘A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics’, in Sheffer, Gabriel (ed.), Modern diasporas in international politics (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 1–15, 3Google Scholar .

15 Safran, William, ‘Comparing Diasporas: A Review Essay’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 8 (1999), pp. 255–291, 280–281CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

16 Chaliand, Gérard and Rageau, Jean-Pierre, The Penguin Atlas of Diasporas (New York: Penguin, 1997), p. xviGoogle Scholar .

17 Butler, Kim D., ‘Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 10 (2001), pp. 189–218, 207CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

18 See Lavie, and Swedenburg, , Displacement, diaspora, and geographies of identityCrossRefGoogle Scholar ; see also, Friedman, , Cultural Identity and Global ProcessGoogle Scholar .

19 Shain, Yossi, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and Their Homelands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)Google Scholar ; Shain, Yossi, ‘Multicultural Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy, 100 (1995), pp. 69–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

20 Friedman, , Cultural Identity and Global Process, p. 71Google Scholar .

21 Spinner, Jeff, The Boundaries of Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994)Google Scholar ; quoted in Shain, , Marketing the American Creed Abroad, p. 26Google Scholar .

22 Shain, , Marketing the American Creed Abroad, p. 26Google Scholar .

23 Ibid.

24 Raz, Joseph, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, Dissent, 41 (1994), pp. 67–79Google Scholar .

25 See Brainard, Lori A. and Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M., ‘Lost in Cyberspace: Shedding Light on the Dark Matter of Grassroots Organizations’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 33 (2004), pp. 32S–53SCrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M., ‘Digital Diasporas and International Development: Afghan-Americans and the Reconstruction of Afghanistan’, Public Administration and Development, 24 (2004), pp. 397–413CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M., ‘Digital Diasporas and Conflict Prevention: The Case of Somalinet.com’, Review of International Studies, 32 (2006), pp. 25–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

26 CGOs are completely virtual organisations, existing only online and co-created by members, Brainard and Brinkerhoff, ‘Lost in Cyberspace’.

27 Bhatia, Sunil and Ram, Anjali, ‘Locating the Dialogical Self in the Age of Transnational Migrations, Border Crossings and Diasporas’, Culture & Psychology, 7 (2001), pp. 297–309CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

28 Tiller, Harry H. and Franz, Tara M., ‘New Ties, Old Ties and Lost Ties: The Use of the Internet in Diaspora’, New Media & Society, 6 (2004), pp. 731–752Google Scholar .

29 Hall, Stuart, ‘Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities’, in King, Anthony D. (ed.), Culture, Globalization and the World-System (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 41–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

30 Vertovec, Stephen, ‘Three Meanings of “Diaspora”, Exemplified among South Asian Religions’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 6 (1997), pp. 277–299, 290CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

31 Vertovec, ‘Three Meanings of “Diaspora”’, p. 290.

32 Cortini, Michela, Mininni, Guiseppe, and Manuti, Amelia, ‘The Diatextual Construction of the Self in Short Message Systems’, Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, 4 (2004), pp. 355–370CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

33 Vertovec, ‘Three Meanings of “Diaspora”’, p. 291; see, for example, Baumann, Martin, ‘Conceptualizing Diaspora: The Preservation of Religious Identity in Foreign Parts, Exemplified by Hindu Communities Outside India’, Temenos, 31 (1995), pp. 19–35Google Scholar ; Vertovec, Stephen and Rogers, A. (eds), Muslim European Youth: Re-producing Religion, Ethnicity, Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998)Google Scholar .

34 Geertz, Clifford, Islam Observed: Religious Developments in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968)Google Scholar ; quoted in Vertovec, ‘Three Meanings of “Diaspora”’, p. 283.

35 The Alevi are a religious subgroup, found primarily in Turkey (with pockets in Albania and Bulgaria). Alevism is related to Shia Islam and also encompasses elements of pre-Islamic religions of Anatolia and ancient Turkic Shamanism.

36 Sökefeld, Martin, ‘Alevism Online: Re-imagining a Community in Virtual Space’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 11 (2002), pp. 85–123, 105CrossRefGoogle Scholar . Emphasis in original.

37 Lal, ‘The Politics of History on the Internet’.

38 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, p. 3.

39 Ibid., p. 10.

40 Uphoff, Norman, ‘Analytical Issues in Measuring Empowerment at the Community and Local Levels’, in Narayan, Deepa (ed.), Measuring Empowerment: Cross-disciplinary Perspectives (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), pp. 219–246Google Scholar .

41 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, p. 16.

42 Barnett, and Duvall, , ‘Power in Global Governance’; Lukes, Steven, Power: A Radical View (London: MacMillan Press, 1974)Google Scholar .

43 MacDonell, Diane, Theories of Discourse: An Introduction (Boston: Blackwell, 1986)Google Scholar ; quoted in Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, p. 20.

44 Foucault, Michel, ‘The Juridical Apparatus’, in Connolly, W. (ed.), Legitimacy and the State (New York: New York University Press, 1984), pp. 201–222Google Scholar ; Foucault, Michel, ‘Afterward: The Subject of Power’, in Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. (eds), Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 202–220Google Scholar ; quoted in Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, p. 21.

45 Hayward, Clarissa Rile, Defacing Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 30CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; quoted in Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, p. 21.

46 Uphoff, Norman, ‘Distinguishing Power, Authority, and Legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at his Word using Resource Exchange Analysis’, Polity, 22 (1989), pp. 295–322CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Uphoff, ‘Analytical Issues in Measuring Empowerment’.

47 Appadurai, Arjun, ‘The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition’, in Vijayendra, Rao and Walton, Michael (eds), Culture and Public Action (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 59–84Google Scholar .

48 Narayan, Deepa, ‘Conceptual Framework and Methodological Challenges’, in Narayan, Deepa (ed.), Measuring Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), pp. 3–38, 21Google Scholar .

49 Narayan, ‘Conceptual Framework and Methodological Challenges’, p. 21.

50 Diener, Ed and Biswas-Diener, Robert, ‘Psychological Empowerment and Subjective Well-Being’, in Narayan, Deepa (ed.), Measuring Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), pp. 125–140, 125Google Scholar .

51 See Bandura, Albert, Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (New York: Freeman, 1997)Google Scholar .

52 Bandura, Albert, ‘Personal and Collective Efficacy in Human Adaptation and Change’, in Adair, J. G., Belanger, D., and Dion, K. L. (eds), Advances in Psychological Science: Social, Personal, and Cultural Aspects, 1 (Hove: Psychology Press, 1998), pp. 51–71, 51Google Scholar ; quoted in Diener and Biswas-Diener, ‘Psychological Empowerment and Subjective Well-Being’, p. 138.

53 Deshmukh-Ranadive, Joy, ‘Gender, Power, and Empowerment: An Analysis of Household and Family Dynamics’, in Narayan, Deepa (ed.), Measuring Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), pp. 103–121Google Scholar .

54 Deshmukh-Ranadive, ‘Gender, Power, and Empowerment’, p. 109.

55 Ibid., p. 113.

56 Ibid.

57 Central Tibetan Administration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama; quoted in International Campaign for Tibet, ‘US proposes new Tibetan refugee admissions program’ (7 September 2005), {http://www.savetibet.org/news/newsitem.php?id=808} accessed 28 July 2006.

58 Baogang, He and Sautman, Barry, ‘The Politics of the Dalai Lama's New Initiative for Autonomy’, Pacific Affairs, 78 (2005/2006), pp. 601–629CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

59 Goldstein, Melvyn, Tibet, China, and the US: Reflections on the Tibet Question (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the US, 1995)Google Scholar ; quoted in Baogang and Sautman, ‘The Politics of the Dalai Lama's New Initiative for Autonomy’, p. 608.

60 Baogang and Sautman, ‘The Politics of the Dalai Lama's New Initiative for Autonomy’.

61 See Zupp, Adrian, ‘Why won't the Dalai Lama pick a fight?’, The Humanist, 64 (2004), p. 5Google Scholar .

62 Unless otherwise specified, information on TibetBoard derives from my personal interview with the founder, Dorjee Nudup, 12 October 2003. Discussion threads were observed and analysed from May–July, 2003. Two hundred and forty-one threads were selected, with an average of approximately seven replies. I selected discussion threads based on the topic's relevance to the research questions, and randomly selected additional threads in order to partially counter bias selection and to sample the general climate of the digital diaspora. I analysed webpages and their interactive components along two dimensions: the nature of the benefit gained from the member's participation (purposive, material, solidary, and cultural identity) and the type of communication involved (conventional, interpersonal, communal, and announcements). These categories are not mutually exclusive. Quotes from the discussion forums and web pages include the original stylised language, as well as errors in punctuation and spelling.

63 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, p. 3.

64 Etzioni, The New Golden Rule.

65 Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, p. 16.

66 Lukes, Power.

67 These benefits are increasingly recognised resulting in intentional efforts to produce CGOs for these purposes. See Srinivasan, Ramesh and Shilton, Katie, ‘The South Asian Web: An Emerging Community Information System in the South Asian Diaspora’, Proceedings of the Ninth Conference on Participatory Design: Expanding boundaries in design, Vol. 1 (Trento, Italy: Association for Computing Machinery, 2006), pp. 125–133CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

68 Sökefeld, ‘Alevism Online’, p. 109.

69 It should be noted that diaspora CGOs are also created for explicit political mobilisation purposes, see Kanak, Kilic, ‘Ethnic Media and Politics: The Case of the Use of the Internet by Uyghur Diaspora’, First Monday, 10 (2005)Google Scholar , available at: {http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_7/kanat/index.html}.

70 McCormick, Glenn M., ‘Stateless Nations: ‘I pledge Allegiance to… ?’, in Mazarr, Michael J. (ed.), Information Technology and World Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), pp. 11–23, 12CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

71 Brinkerhoff, ‘Diaspora Identity and the Potential for Violence’.