Discounting the Future analyzes the invention, use, and limitations of one of the most widely implemented and important economic techniques in the economist’s tool box: time discounting.
While it is undoubtedly an economic technique, time discounting has applications in a wide variety of fields, from the optimal use of natural resources to the calculation of profits from an investment, from research and development in a pharmaceutical company to models describing climate change.
There are many uses and many disciplines, and therefore many historical and sociological contexts, that Liliana Doganova addresses, from forestry in nineteenth-century Germany to Chile under the Pinochet dictatorship, passing through the managerial and accounting practices of the modern pharmaceutical industry. Of course, it is not only the subjects dealt with that vary but also the methodology of investigation: Doganova’s book tackles the history of ideas, epistemology, ethics, and the sociology of science.
At the center of this impressive conceptual and methodological maelstrom, Doganova places the practice of discounting the future, transforming it into a monetary value that can be linked to the present or to different futures (to different scenarios, to multiple temporalities), a tool for decision-making, stating how to use ecological and economical resources rationally and efficiently.
Due to the variety of the case studies, the book sometimes abruptly shifts between different time periods and very diverse contexts. And yet, the central idea—studying how the future is valued and depreciated—provides a strong overall coherence to the work. The book’s thesis is clear and repeated many, perhaps too many, times: depreciating the future is not just an economic technique, it is not a trivial accounting calculation, and neither is it the consequence of logical and factual analysis. It is a political technology, as the title clearly states. It serves to think about the future, to make it comparable to the present, but above all it serves to plan and justify public policies and private investments choices, and it serves to create a common ground for agreement on how it is reasonable to treat the future. Not “reasonable” in the sense of innate rationality, of a correctly performed calculation, but reasonable in the sense of a shared rationality, of a calculation on which it is possible to agree. One of Doganova’s criticisms in this regard is that the “accounting” approach leads to a devaluation of the future and makes political action in areas such as climate change slow and difficult, precisely because of the inability to give a distant future the weight it deserves.
DECONSTRUCT, SITUATE, CONTEXTUALIZE
The book presents a clear, strong, and well-defined thesis, supported by rich historical material. Stylistically, it is sometimes a little cumbersome and could have been more concise and less repetitive, but it certainly provides enough material to merit careful reading. In conclusion, the author claims that “this book has probed the existence of a ‘homo prospectus’ … projecting and evaluating [how] future possibilities drive thought and action,” a process that Doganova labels “contingent and contested” (p. 258).
Indeed, if this is the case, the book fully succeeds in its intent. At the end of the book, I am fully convinced that the process by which we depreciate the future, deciding at what speed it loses value, is not a factor mysteriously embodied in the human mind but is the result of a mixture between the need to prefer today to tomorrow, for fairly obvious reasons, and the need to define how long it is worth waiting before consuming, a question that is intimately social, and political in every sense of the word. Therefore, yes, the depreciation of the future is a political technology, no question about it.
The problem is that this is hardly an original or surprising conclusion. The two most important precursors of time-discounting techniques, Harold Hotelling and Frank Ramsey, clearly understood this almost a century ago. Ramsey famously criticized the practice of discounting as ethically unjustifiable (Ramsey Reference Ramsey1928; Gaspard and Missemer Reference Gaspard and Missemer2019). Hotelling, for his part, noted that the simple fact of depreciating at the interest rate makes interest rate policies directly responsible for the rate of resource exploitation, thus transforming monetary policy issues into an ethical and moral problem (Franco, Gaspard, and Mueller Reference Franco, Gaspard and Mueller2019). In short, nothing new under the sun.
I do not mean to suggest that Doganova’s book says nothing new: on the contrary, it suggests a great deal, but in a sense, it throws stones and hides its hand. It certainly shows convincingly that depreciating the future is a socially and historically situated and constructed choice, much as gender, capitalism, and religion are situated and constructed.
The point is that Doganova wants to do more than this: she also wants to suggest that—given that there is nothing natural or obvious about discounting the future—it is possible to make politically different and wiser choices. To do this, however, it is not enough to deconstruct and historicize: it is also necessary to show to what extent the choices that have been made historically and socially are suboptimal and therefore deserve to be rethought. In short, if we want to change the way we deal with issues of religion, gender, or economics, it is not enough to say that they have a history; we must also show what, in that history, could have been done differently, could have been thought and conceptualized otherwise, could, in short, have been better.
CONTENT IS THE NEW CONTEXT
If a well-contextualized intellectual history, a fine array of sociological tools, and some of the best methods typical of science studies are the most appropriate means of deconstructing and historicizing, in order to suggest what could have been done better, one should delve deeper into the content, the mathematics and the logic of scientific invention. If we want to criticize, say, a discount rate at a certain percentage, we need to analyze how that value was defined, what assumptions were made, what calculations were used, and what estimates were given. The content, far from being a set of disembodied techniques and Platonic mathematics, is political: if we want to talk about politics, at a given moment we have to contextually tackle some content.
This dialogue between context and content, where content is politicized and studied in order to show its political significance, has prominent exponents and achieves excellent results (Chang Reference Chang2004, Reference Chang2008; Alexander Reference Alexander2014). On this front, however, Doganova proves elusive, shy. The content that corroborates and enriches the context is sparse and superficial. There is little insight into how time-discounting tools were developed, beyond a few very simple formulas. Compared to the rich historical and sociological context, the content appears bland and tiny. It almost seems as if Doganova considers technique and calculation, i.e., the content itself, to be free from any political attribute, focusing only on the context, on how the tools are narrated and described by those who justify and present them in retrospect, rather than on how they were discovered and invented. There is almost nothing about the logic of scientific discovery that led to the creation of, for example, time-discounting instruments.
This is a pity, given that the technical and epistemological debate on how much to depreciate the future has been just as rich as the historical and sociological debate on the same issue (for instance, on discounting and conservation, see Hays Reference Hays1999; Smith Reference Smith1982).
This is certainly not meant to be a criticism of the work of historicization and contextualization, which is indeed a very valuable contribution, but rather a suggestion that without its content counterpart, it is a bit like a runner with only one leg. No matter how muscular that leg may be, it will be difficult for the runner to go far. The impression is that Doganova is a little reverential of mathematics and science. Unfortunately, it is precisely this fear that prevents the discussion from taking off: without context, the content is a tedious technical exercise, but without content, the context fails to hit the mark. This is the major limitation of Doganova’s book, in its refusal to delve into the intricacies of technology and scientific ideas.
Otherwise, it is an enjoyable read. The sources are rich, the historical work is accurate, and I would add that the edition is well-edited and elegant. It is a good book on a subject that has been little studied and opens innovative perspectives for reflection on an issue that will be fundamental in the years to come. Definitely worth reading.
