The partisan representation of the interests and aims of particular clients sometimes requires lawyers to act in ways that would be morally questionable if carried out in the course of ordinary living. The armory of the effective lawyer includes tactics and strategies such as filing strategically motivated claims; manipulating law and facts to suit their clients' purposes; undermining what they themselves consider to be truthful testimony; exploiting technical issues to thwart the law's substantive purpose; and so on. The nature of the ethical burden imposed on lawyers by aggressive partisanship is the most difficult general question for contemporary professional legal ethics. The question is central to professional legal ethics courses worldwide, including the ‘Professional Responsibility’ courses that law schools in the United States were mandated by the American Bar Association (ABA) to offer in the wake of the Watergate scandal.
The modern orthodoxy is that the principles of lawyer loyalty, client control and adversary assertiveness are expressed in contemporary codes of professional legal ethics to facilitate a form of professional detachment that produces, on balance, a system that best serves the overall administration of justice. Lawyers can state claims and forge compromises for clients who would otherwise be inarticulate, and they do so in contexts of significant procedural and other entitlements. In an eponymous Reference Luban and Luban1983 essay, David Luban coined the expression the ‘adversary system excuse’ to describe this justification for otherwise dubious professional legal behaviour. In addition to excusing aggressive partisanship in professional terms, it also allows a professional legal life to be integrated into a life well lived.
In this new book, Daniel Markovits of Yale Law School observes that ‘professional duties to lie and to cheat’ (p. 26) exist not only under the positive law found, for example, in the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct but also ‘under any alternative regime of professional regulation that remains consistent with adversary adjudication's basic commitment to a structural separation between advocate and tribunal’ (p. 4). Markovits thus claims a universal applicability for his analysis: in inquisitorial processes of dispute resolution the legal and factual record in a dispute is developed primarily by the tribunal or court, but inquisitorial legal advocacy – suggesting lines of factual inquiry, supplementing judicial examination of witnesses, urging inferences from fact, and so on – is, in the same way as in adversarial systems, structurally separate from the tribunal or court. Most practising lawyers in both systems do therefore act as adversary advocates at least some of the time.
Markovits rejects the ‘third-personal approach to impartiality’ (p. 108, emphasis in original) at the heart of the adversary system excuse. According to this approach, ‘equal concern and respect requires counting all persons’ interests equally as contributions to an aggregate or collective interest and then acting maximally to promote the collective interest' (p. 109); for Markovits, this approach in legal ethics ‘deprives lawyers of an ethically significant sense of authorship and undermines their integrity’ (p. 111). In many jurisdictions, critics of aggressive partisanship have brought about some changes in the positive law that governs lawyers – in the interest, for example, of harm that might be caused to third parties – but the terms of debate remain fixed by impartial reasoning about the appropriate professional limits to lawyerly lying and cheating. For Markovits, neither the defenders nor the critics of aggressively partisan lawyering can satisfy lawyers, ‘who naturally resist’ the charges of lying and cheating and who ‘wish not just to excuse the lawyerly vices but rather to deny that they display them at all’ (p. 155).
The inner, ethical lives of lawyers are the central concern of this book, but its premise that lawyers are generally dissatisfied with their ethical burdens and with the discourse of applied legal ethics is unsubstantiated and indeed sometimes lends an air of unreality to proceedings. Are adversary advocates really so preoccupied, in the way Markovits portrays, with how to preserve their ‘integrity’ in their everyday legal practice? Are they constantly bedevilled by anxiety about what others consider – incorrectly from lawyers' point of view – their professional ‘lying’ and ‘cheating’? There appears to be some confusion here between the notoriously rather low public opinion of the legal profession on the one hand, and the undocumented, and presumably hugely differentiated, ethical self-image of lawyers. The moral domain is the domain of deliberation and choice; the moral question asks what in given circumstances is to be done. That question underlies every lawyer's practice in all its detail and constantly changing circumstances. Markovits's approach suggests instead that the preservation of integrity is the fundamental moral issue for lawyers, and this not-so-subtle displacement has the effect of orienting his ethical analysis away from the more fundamental existentialism at the heart of ethics. The preservation of integrity is indeed a fundamental problem, but it is not one that is settled separately from the daily cut and thrust of adversarial representation and argument.
Whether or not A Modern Legal Ethics addresses questions that are directly pressing for practising lawyers, it certainly provides food for thought for those reflective lawyers who are seriously interested in debates about the ethics of their profession. The author proposes an ambitious reconstruction of professional legal ethics in which ethical justification should be sought not only impartially but also from the agent's – that is, the lawyer's – point of view. It is surprising, in a work as philosophically sophisticated and rigorous as this book otherwise is, that Markovits's avowal of a ‘more intimate approach’ to ethics (p. 109) is framed with such a cursory reference to Aristotelian virtue ethics, and with a sideswipe at early Christian thought that is, by his own admission, ‘not necessary’ (p. 109). Although he overstates the case that ethical duties in the modern world tend to be measured, almost exclusively, ‘in the impartial currency of self-sacrifice’ (p. 109), he is nonetheless ultimately convincing in arguing that impartial reasoning must be complemented by first-person concerns in the field of professional legal ethics.
Marvovits invokes a particular, lawyerly brand of ‘fidelity’ as the organising ideal for his reconstruction of legal ethics. Lawyerly fidelity ‘is a complex virtue – quite different from loyalty simpliciter and its cognates and much more difficult to achieve’ (p. 90). It is founded on professional detachment recast analytically in light of Keats's ‘negative capability’: the lawyer may express a version of this poetic sensibility and employ ‘a distinctive subtlety of mind and an unusual practical imagination’ (p. 94) to allow an ‘integrity-preserving role-based redescription’ of legal practice (p. 164). The concept of role-differentiated morality is the subject of intense debate within normative legal ethics: Markovits argues strongly that roles are necessary in order to mediate between the particular and the universal in our lives and to sustain an ‘integrated practical personality’ (p. 163). Just as the prizefighter ‘boxes’ rather than ‘assaults’ his opponent, Markovits argues that the lawyer's role must be understood as including ‘idiosyncratically lawyerly first-personal ambitions’ which recast the professional conduct ordinary people consider lying and cheating as virtuous ‘self-effacement’ about claims and causes (p. 93). Such a role is ‘not a veiled invitation to completely unconstrained adversary zeal’ (p. 95) but legal role-occupants can address and satisfy the demands of impartial morality while also preserving, from their perspective, their integrity: to their clients they can be, at least potentially, a ‘mouthpiece’ instead of a liar and a ‘champion’ instead of a cheater (p. 165).
The issue then becomes, as Markovits puts it, how ‘to elaborate in detail an account of lawyerly fidelity that establishes fidelity as an essential political virtue’ (p. 170). In the United States, Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith (Reference Freedman and Smith2004) have advanced a traditionalist, client-centred view of the lawyer's adversarial role by arguing that legal ethics are rooted in the Bill of Rights and in the autonomy and dignity of the individual. Markovits addresses the relationship between legal ethics and political ideas in a very different way. In elaborating his ideal of fidelity – that is, in setting out his redescription of the lawyer's role – he argues that lawyers are ‘guardians of our political culture’ who ‘administer the processes that legitimate (at least provisionally) resolutions of otherwise intractable conflicts’ (p. 166). He draws on writers such as Karl Llewellyn and, particularly, Talcott Parsons, to support his view that ‘what democracy is to political legitimacy at wholesale, adjudication is to political legitimacy at retail’ (p. 185). Lawyerly fidelity is a high calling, he argues, both in its intrinsic merit and in its role in sustaining social life more broadly: the substantive role of cultivating and exercising lawyerly fidelity in the context of dispute resolution processes is what in principle renders the lawyer's professional life worthy of commitment.
Markovits notes, however, that ‘fidelity’ also requires certain forms of practical cultural and institutional support: professional legal education and practice are processes of ‘role-education’ (p. 169) and, for a lawyer to live with integrity, the role must be ‘authoritatively insular’ (p. 225). In Markovits's view, the history of the American legal profession since the Civil War has seen lawyering become ‘increasingly incapable of sustaining any distinctive forms of moral life and increasingly deferential to outside judgments’ (p. 12). There has been excessive external regulation of an increasingly heterogeneous and specialist bar, and these conditions lead Markovits to the conclusion that fidelity is not available to lawyers in the United States in practice. Lawyers are ‘tragic villians’ (p. 243) because although it is ‘conceptually possible’ (p. 213) for them to live with integrity, the lack of a proper context for what would otherwise be a valid role-ethic renders Markovits's vindication of legal practice ‘only bittersweet, at least when assessed from lawyers’ own points of view' (p. 2).
There is a strange air of nostalgia about Markovits's account of the traditional bar, and this lends irony to the manner in which he downplays the distinctive ethic of the legal profession that comes from its ‘living law’. The idea of a living law of society as a whole and of professional groups or ‘human associations’ within society has been current since Ehrlich's seminal work, Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts (Reference Ehrlich1913/2002), and its usefulness in understanding forms of non-state law remains strong (see, for example, Hertogh, Reference Hertogh2009; Barden and Murphy, Reference Barden and Murphy2010). The living law of any community constitutes the commonly accepted moral rules of the community, some of which, but rarely if ever all of which, may be written down or even clearly formulated in speech. The living law is a moral tradition: it is the set of those ways of acting that, in a particular community, are admired and thought appropriate to common types of situations. While Markovits refers to informal sources such as legal memoirs to support his argument for ‘role-redescription’, these sources also provide direct insights into the moral tradition of the profession and how that tradition interprets and mediates the demands of aggressive partisanship. It seems that such a tradition could play a significant role – to use the term differently from the way it is commonly used in normative legal ethics – in explaining why lawyers are in practice not preoccupied with ‘integrity-preservation’ and not overly anxious about their professional behaviour.
In this complex and thought-provoking work, Markovits makes an original and substantial contribution to the field of professional legal ethics. He resists any casuistic application of general ethical principles to particular cases in favour of an interpretive method; he employs this method in his positive theorising and holds fast to his – as the present reviewer thinks, correct and enlightening – view that the task of philosophical ethics is ‘primarily to elaborate what is rather than to command what should be’ (p. 19). His association of lawyerly fidelity with political legitimacy is particularly compelling in that it emphasises the necessity of partisanship for forms of authoritative adjudication. Markovits does not ask if the conditions he describes as impeding lawyerly fidelity are unique to the United States: instead he provocatively, and too briefly, broadens the scope of his argument to compare the dilemmas in legal ethics that he identifies to ‘the broader predicament of modernity’ (p. 249). This book should not be judged in the light of the author's peripheral discussion of that issue but rather in the light of its scholarly and challenging presentation of an alternative professional legal ethic.
